



UNCHARTED

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Introduction

This report presents the research carried out in the frame of the UNCHARTED project fourth work package, “Analyzing political intervention and impact”. The research objective is “to provide a comprehensive analytical view of the cultural policy coherence in relation with the promotion of the values of culture both in an internal inter-territorial perspective and with respect to value configurations in society”. Thus, it aims to assess cultural policy coherence of cultural administrations, contrasting their policy goals in relation with their policy configurations (their related structure of policy programs and budgetary allocations) in different European countries and at different territorial levels.


1. A multi-level, international, inter-institutional and internal comparison

Our analysis has been made through comparative research, including 13 case studies of cultural policies carried out by public administrations at different levels (European, National, Regional, Local), selected, according to a matrix of comparative variables (in terms of budgets, levels of public action, types of values promoted...). The cases selected do not (and could not) constitute a representative sample of cultural models in Europe but ensure diversity and complementarity of values and models.

For each of these cases, a common methodology has been developed, focusing on the internal and external coherence of the values; the coherence of the implementation of cultural policies with regard to the values; and finally, the democratic governance of the values and their social accuracy. The overall analysis of cultural policy has been complemented by a detailed analysis of the music sector, and its sub-policies and programs.

The coherence of public action programs has been assessed from an internal point of view - specific to each administration (by comparing different levels of decision, and differences between the global cultural policy discourse, the music sector policy and its sub-programs) ; from an inter-institutional point of view - by comparing national and local administrations within the same country; and from an international point of view - by comparing the models identified in each country - and at each level.

Figure 1. Summary of the methodological approach



Source: Own elaboration

Research questions and evaluation criteria

The “coherence” of cultural policies has been explored through four main types of evaluation criteria: internal coherence, inter-institutional coherence, social accuracy, and governance.

- **Internal coherence:** Are the programs marked by internal contradictions regarding promoted values? Are policy programs, budgetary allocations, actions and means coherent with the defined objectives and values ? What degree of coherence exists between the different levels of decision-making, and between the music sector and the overall cultural policy? Are there internal contradictions in the policies for the music sector?
- **Inter-institutional coherence:** Are the values promoted by different institutions at different levels of public action consistent? Is the coherence between values and action programmes and budgets similar in each institution, or do they reveal different types of gaps?
- **Governance/adaptability:** How values promoted in public action programs are defined? Who are the actors involved in this process? Are there tensions between these actors, particularly concerning the values they promote? Are the values in conflict or transformed during the implementation processes? To what extent can institutions appropriate new values and set up instruments of public action in these directions? What are the characteristics of these coping skills? What are the causes of these differences in the direction and intensity of change? Do the existing parameters of public cultural action allow or block the effective promotion of the societal value of culture in its complete plurality?
- **Social accuracy/relevance:** To what extent do cultural policies and programs meet the “value configurations in society”?

Focus on the music sector

In each case, an overall analysis has been conducted at the level of general cultural policy objectives, but with a specific focus on the music sector. Indeed, the music sector is present in all the selected cases; it includes a vast diversity of practices and actors (in terms of listening, spectatorship, cultural education, cultural industries, amateur practice...); and values linked to music have been previously analyzed in other WP2 and WP3¹. Moreover, it is a sector showing a wide diversity of values (democracy / democratization; economy; well being; aesthetics / excellence; social values...), and can reveal contradictions between values and shifts in terms of coherence. The music sector allows us, on the one hand, to analyze the "value gap" in the concrete implementation of a cultural policy (how the major objectives take shape and are transformed in a "concrete" policy, in terms of budgets, actors, programmes, etc.); and on the other hand, to analyze contradictions and tensions of values that could exist within the same policy.

2. Case selection and comparative variables

Thirteen cases have been investigated:

¹ Previous work in UNCHARTED regarding the music sector includes: Jazz ao Centro Clube (WP3) ; informal music listening (WP3). London Choirs (WP2), online concerts in Norway (WP2), online music education in Norwegian culture schools (WP2), online music distribution in the Norwegian Cultural Rucksack programme (WP2), Rave parties and DJ parties (WP2), Clandestine concerts during the COVID-19 (WP2),

- Ministry of Culture, Spain
- Galicia Cultural Policy (Spain)
- City of Barcelona Cultural Policy (Spain)
- Ministry of Culture, France
- Occitanie Cultural Policy (France)
- Montpellier Metropolis Cultural Policy (France)
- Ministry of Culture, Norway
- Vestland County Cultural Policy (Norway)
- City of Bergen Cultural Policy (Norway)
- Ministry of Culture, Hungary
- Ministry of Culture, Portugal
- English Art's Council, UK
- Creative Europe's Culture Sub-Program, EU

The selection of the cases had several objectives. First, it met the need to rely on a set of data already available and collected in the framework of WP2 and WP3; namely, 10 out of 13 cases had already been studied (from a different perspective) in WPs 2 and 3. Secondly, the selected cases reflected the specificities regarding the institutional architecture as well as the specific values displayed in the cultural programs of the six investigated countries (France, Hungary, Norway, Portugal, and Spain). Being attentive that cases from different countries were comparable, the sample aimed to provide a good overview of European cultural policy models (Chartrand & McCaughey, 1989). Therefore, from a qualitative perspective, our approach relied on the complementarity of the selected cases rather than representativity.

Several variables were used to ensure the diversity and complementarity of the sample, as shown in the table 1 below.

3. Data collection

Our approach is resolutely qualitative. First, the analysis focuses on the general objectives of the cultural policy defined by the administrations studied and the specific objectives and programmes linked to the music sector. In several case studies, we could rely on the materials collected in WP2 (analysis of grey literature, budgets, documents defining public action programmes, and semi-structured interviews with key actors in their implementation). Similar data was collected on administrations that have not yet been subject to empirical analysis.

In addition to the existing material, for each administration, three decision levels were analysed: the political level (elected representatives), the level of senior officials, and the level of implementation (street-level bureaucrats and experts).

In concrete terms, the data collection was divided as follows:

- Policy level: global and sectoral analysis (grey literature + interviews)
- Executive bureaucrats: global and sectoral analysis (grey literature + interviews)
- Street-level public servants: sectoral analysis (grey literature + interviews)
- External experts/observers: global and sectoral analysis (interviews)

We have constructed a standard interview grid according to the previously mentioned analysis criteria (coherence, accuracy, governance), allowing for collecting comparable data, using a common set of questions each partner has adjusted and completed in the field.

Empirical materials and data collected are described in the Appendix section.

Table 1. Description of selected cases

Case / Administration	Partner in charge	Public action level	Country	Cultural Budget	% Cultural budget	Evolution of cultural budget over 10 years (%)	Demography (last census)	Cultural EUR. Per capita	Regional Authority Index	Cultural policy model	Degree of marketisation of the Cultural Policy Regime	WP2 main tensions	WP2 Data	WP3 Data	WP4 Data collection
1. Creative Europe	CNRS	European	EU	2.44 billion EUR.	1.43%	66%	447.7 million	5.45 EUR.	NA	≈ PATRON	NA	NA	NA	NA	Grey litt. + interviews
2. Ministry of Culture, Spain	UB	National	Spain	1.8 billion EUR.	0.9%	39% <	47.4 million	38 EUR.	35.6	ARCHITECT Decentralized (quasi federal)	Established	NA	NA	NA	Grey litt. + interviews
3. Ministry of Culture, France	CNRS	National	France	4.2 billion EUR.	0.91%	68%	67.7 million	62 EUR.	21.85	ARCHITECT Centralized + Decentralized	Emergent	Intrinsic cultural value vs Economic performance	Grey litt.	Indirect : informal dancing and music listening	Grey litt. + interviews
4. Ministry of Culture, Norway	TRI	National	Norway	2.2 billion EUR.	0.88%	125%	5.5 million	400 EUR.	12.11	ARCHITECT / PATRON Centralized + Decentralized.	Resistant	Social vs. economic value	Grey litt. + interviews	NA	Grey litt. + interviews
5. Ministry of Culture, Hungary	UB	National	Hungary	1.8 billion EUR.	6.4%	90% <	9.7 million	185 EUR.	8.13	ARCHITECT/ ENGINEER Centralized	Resistant	National identity vs Diversity	Grey litt, scientific literature and 1 interview with experts.	NA	Grey litt.
6. Ministry of Culture, Portugal	UB	National	Portugal	619.4 million EUR.	0.6%	4.9% <	10.3 million	61 EUR.	9.51	ARCHITECT Centralized	Established	Traditional definition of cultural consumption vs valuation of an enlarged catalogue of cultural experiences	Grey litt., literature+ interviews	Indirect: Jazz ao Centro Clube + Loulé Criativo	Grey litt.
7. Arts Council England	TRI	National	UK	920 million GBP	0.14%	11.5%	56 million	16 GBP	9.59	PATRON	Dominant	Economic vs. social values	Grey litt.	NA	Grey litt.

Table 1. Description of selected cases (continued)

Case / Administration	Partner in charge	Public action level	Country	Cultural Budget	% Cultural budget	Evolution of cultural budget over 10 years (%)	Demography (last census)	Cultural EUR. Per capita	Regional Authority Index	Cultural policy model	Degree of marketisation of the Cultural Policy Regime	WP2 main tensions	WP2 Data	WP3 Data	WP4 Data collection
8. Galicia Cultural Policy	UB	Regional	Spain	139 million EUR.	0.87%	35% <	2.7 million	51 EUR.	[Spain] 35.6	[Spain] ARCHITECT Decentralized (quasi federal)	[Spain] Established	Partisan/corporatist power vs Social value, Public support to tourism-oriented culture vs Poor valuation of sectoral	Grey litt., literature + interviews	Indirect: Matadoiro case	Grey litt. + interviews
9. Occitanie Cultural Policy	CNRS	Regional	France	137 million EUR.	3.77%	71%	5.8 million	23.6 EUR.	[France] 21.85	[France] ARCHITECT Centralized + Decentralized	[France] Emergent	NA	NA	Indirect: informal dancing and music listening	Grey litt. + interviews
10. Vestland county Cultural Policy	TRI	Regional	Norway	32 million EUR.	3.67%	42%	0.63 million	50.2 EUR.	[Norway] 12.11	[Norway] ARCHITECT / PATRON Centralized + Decentralized.	[Norway] Resistant	NA	NA	NA	Grey litt. + interviews
11. City of Barcelona Cultural Policy	UB	City	Spain	167 million EUR.	6.6%	34% <	1.6 million	104 EUR.	[Spain] 35.6	[Spain] ARCHITECT/PATRON, Decentralized.	[Spain] Established	Aesthetic excellence vs Social performance Administrative change vs Changes focusing on social and sectoral actors	Grey litt., literature + interviews	Indirect: Fàbriques, and Architecture cases	Grey litt. + interviews
12. Montpellier Metropolis Cultural Policy	CNRS	Metropolitan	France	83 million EUR.	6.19%	61%	0.5 million	166 EUR.	[France] 21.85	[France] ARCHITECT Centralized + Decentralized	[France] Emergent	Creative vs Cultural focused orientations of cultural democracy	Grey litt.	Indirect : informal dancing and music listening	Grey litt. + interviews
13. City of Bergen Cultural Policy	TRI	City	Norway	45 million EUR.	2.5%	29%	0.3 million	150 EUR.	[Norway] 12.11	[Norway] ARCHITECT / PATRON Centralized + Decentralized.	[Norway] Resistant	Local development vs. internationalization	Grey litt. + interviews	NA	Grey litt. + interviews

PART 1. CASE STUDIES

1. Introduction to the Spanish cases

Amidst the democratic transition in Spain in 1977, establishing the Spanish Ministry of Culture mirrored the French cultural policies model. The 1978 Constitution delineated a quasi-federal system, allocating responsibilities whereby the Ministry regulated cultural industries and supported national heritage and institutions while Autonomous Communities wielded substantial competencies in the cultural domain (Rius-Ulledemolins & Zamorano, 2015). In this framework, local governments increasingly assumed vital roles, overseeing aspects such as local libraries and civic centers. Throughout the 1980s, there was a proliferation of public cultural action and investment facilitated by the transfer of legal powers and resources to regional governments. This process contributed to the development of the national system, concurrently bridging the gap between cultural policies inherited from the Franco era and those resembling those of central European countries (Rubio Aróstegui & Rubio Arostegui, 2008).

Moreover, the cultural policies implemented by the Ministry of Education and Culture exhibit a continuity with the nation's monarchical heritage. These policies have taken on a centralist nature with limited efficacy concerning system coordination, as noted by Bouzada (2007). Notably, it wasn't until specific periods, particularly under the last socialist administrations (2004-2011), that cultural policy initiatives were introduced at the federal level. During this time, various coordinating bodies, such as the Sectoral Culture Conference and other intergovernmental technical entities, were activated to foster coordination, as highlighted by Rubio Arostegui (2008). This approach stands in contradiction to the evident trend of decentralization and resource allocation to regional and municipal authorities, resulting in a multilevel governance structure marked by conflicting powers and a conspicuous absence of cooperation, as discussed by Rius-Ulledemolins and Martínez Illa (2016). As we will address in the three-level case analysis below, substate actors have gained a central role in fostering cultural production, exchange and participation as part of this quasi-federal system.

1.1 Ministry of Culture, Spain

Introduction

The current Ministry of Culture and Sports, created in 1977 as the "Ministry of Culture and Welfare," is the central unit of the Spanish cultural administration. After assembling several cultural and artistic organizations from Franco's regime, the Ministry underwent a process of democratization and decentralization, becoming part of a complex, quasi-federal cultural policy system (Rubio Aróstegui, 2008; Rius & Zamorano, 2015). The literature highlights the initial influence of cultural democratization in the process of cultural institutionalization in Spain, inspired by the French case (Rubio Aróstegui, 2008; Quaggio, 2011). However, for Rubio Aróstegui (2008), since the 1980s, this paradigm has coexisted in the background with a growing interest in a cultural development model that privileges the economic value of culture.

An essential process in configuring the Ministry's strategic framework involved transferring some responsibilities and broad competencies in cultural matters to the Autonomous Communities (Bouzada, 2007, p. 23). The Spanish Constitution (SC) distinguishes between exclusive, shared, and concurrent powers at each level of government (Articles 148 and 149). While matters such as international relations, protection of intellectual property, freedom of expression, and media

regulation are exclusive to the state level, other policy domains such as cultural promotion are shared by the state level the Autonomous Communities (regions) (Article 149.1). The SC entrusts non-exclusive cultural powers to the central government in preserving and defending cultural heritage and managing museums, libraries, and state archives (Article 149.1.28).

In this constitutional framework, the Ministry has had a narrow role in orienting cultural policy since it has been mainly focused on supporting major institutions, specific heritage, and the promotion/regulation of cultural industry. Moreover, the cultural policy system turned into a multilevel system, which has its centre in the Autonomous Communities and municipalities (Rodríguez Morató, 2012), thus limiting the incidence of the Ministry of Culture. Along these lines, the Ministry is the actor with less public expenditure regarding the level of government. For example, in 2020, the central-federal level represented 0.21% of the general public budget. Instead, the regional level invested 0.55 of the overall budget the same year and municipalities 4.15 (MCD, 2022). This process has not historically been free of conflicts of the centre-periphery type – i.e. Madrid and the other regions- which ultimately concern the legitimacy of the Ministry and its effectiveness (Bonet & Négrier, 2010; Rubio Aróstegui, 2008).

Among the Ministry's three Directions, the "Direction of Cultural Industries, Intellectual Property, and Cooperation", together with the National Institute of Performing Arts and Music (INAEM), lead cultural policies for the music sector within the current centre-left administration (2018-). While the Direction focuses on industrial promotion and internationalization, the INAEM works on production and implements actions to dynamize the live scene (dance, theatre, music). The Direction also addresses regulatory aspects concerning national and transnational commercial exchanges. As part of its promotion policies, it finances key cultural institutions dedicated to high culture in Madrid and the entire country, often in partnership with Autonomous Communities and local governments. Moreover, the Ministry has a diverse nationwide policy supporting musical production belonging to several aesthetic repertoires.

Objectives and values

Our analysis, although focused on the current situation, covers the last decade, when the main historical parties from the center-left (PSOE) and center-right (PP) governed the country in the context of Mariano Rajoy (2011-2018) and Pedro Sánchez (2018-today) terms in office. Following a historical trend in national cultural policies, the Prime Minister, Mariano Rajoy, merged the culture area within the Ministry of Education, with the Secretary of State for Culture being responsible for its powers until 2018. This year, with the new coalition government led by the socialist Pedro Sánchez, the Ministry recovered its autonomy, and it was reorganized under the current "Ministry of Culture and Sports".

The PP cultural policy between 2011 and 2015, with Ministry José Ignacio Wert in charge, was characterized by implementing austerity policies, which justified public investment and infrastructure reductions under a value framing of modernization, entrepreneurialism and resilience building² (Zamorano & Bonet, 2022). One of the core goals during the period was reforming the funding scheme for the arts by fostering a Patronage Law. After this period, with the Ministry Íñigo Méndez de Vigo (2015-2018), plans prioritised culture's economic and aesthetic/artistic quality values, which were associated with participation, legal reform, commercial promotion and internationalization of the Spanish brand.

² Its 2011 electoral program already assumed this perspective and had a Patronage Law proposal. See at: <https://www.pp.es/sites/default/files/documentos/5751-20111101123811.pdf>

Cultural policy goals in official plans and programs

In 2017, the PP's second Secretary of Culture launched the national plan "Culture Plan 2020", where cultural policy's main goals and strategies for achieving them in the following three years are depicted. This document sets five main objectives. Firstly, Promote a quality cultural offer, understood as policies aimed at creating conditions for "excellence" to flourish while ensuring "universal access to culture" (MECD, 2017: 9). This was expected to be achieved through policies such as the "reform of the National Institute of Performing Arts and Music (INAEM)" (MECD, 2017: 19). Secondly, Update the legal framework for the projection of culture, primarily associated with the need to improve the application of legal criteria to remunerate copyright. Thirdly, Promote a social alliance for culture, seeking cultural cooperation between the Ministry and the civil society organizations but also with other public administrations (including Autonomous Communities). Fourthly, Extend Spanish culture beyond our borders, where cultural diplomacy is connected to touristic strategies, research on cultural heritage, the promotion of Spanish arts abroad or the National Library Hispanist literature. Finally, Promote creative activity, focusing on "creative agents", where different grants and funds are strategically placed.

Later, the value hierarchy embedded into PSOE plans was conditioned by the context given by the COVID-19 pandemic. Values such as care of working conditions, economic development, resilience through culture, and digitalization gradually acquired centrality in policy programs. The "Recovery, transformation and resilience plan" launched in 2021 reflects the administration's strategic goals in the cultural domain. It was aimed at setting an overall investment and recovery strategy for the country using EU Next Generation financing instruments. Culture is one of the 10 "Lever policies and components" (Gobierno de España, 2021: 7) titled "Revaluation of the cultural industry". With an investment of 325 million euros, it sought to strengthen "the value chain of the Spanish cultural industries by reinforcing their capacities and resilience, promoting three strategic axes: competitiveness, revitalization and cohesion of the territory, and digitization and sustainability of large cultural services" (Gobierno de España, 2021: 167). In this framework, different reforms are proposed. Firstly, the development of the Statute of the Artist and Promotion of investment, cultural patronage and participation (Gobierno de España, 2021: 167), which project entailed unemployment benefits. This reform aimed to modify cultural labour's legal and taxation conditions, foster private investment in the cultural sector and improve the situation of workers. Secondly, the "Reinforcement of copyright and related rights" comprises a set of new laws. These reforms are translated into actions such as scholarship programs for artists or cultural management training, internationalization to reinforce the "competitiveness of cultural industries" (Gobierno de España, 2021: 167), tools for the "dynamization of culture throughout the territory" with a focus on non-urban areas and the "digitization and promotion of large cultural services" such as the Museo Nacional del Prado or the National Library.

However, from the perspective of executive officials in the Ministry, the overall primary goal of the Ministry in the last government has been to "fix culture as a State policy" and give more autonomy to the Ministry in order to foster values such as equality and access to culture (Executive Bureaucrat, interview, 07-2023). In this view, beyond situational pandemic measures, the valorization of cultural policies has been reflected in the cultural budget growth and increases (see next section) in the number of civil servants in the Ministry and all dependent agencies and through its central policies. Accordingly, the principal lines of action and their expected impacts are the above-mentioned Artists Statue, being developed as part of inter-ministry work, a Young Cultural Bonus with 400 euros for young people above 18 years old -to acquire and enjoy products and activities (Cebrián, 2022)- and the so-called Cinema Senior (Cine Senior) to foster access from the elderly to the audiovisual art. Overall, it is about policies that are expected to impact production and access, boosting the cultural sector as follows: "What is being touched are a series of keys to activate different sections and segments of the population, professionals, young and old, which in the end results in the fabric of the

cultural sector itself." (Executive Bureaucrat, interview, 07-2023). Along these lines, under the dominant values of democratization and equality, gender justice is also introduced as a transversal value for cultural policies.

Cultural policies' ground values and value frames

As we can see above, even though the cultural policies of PP and PSOE had been historically distanced in their core narrative, examined governments reflect similarities in their primary goals. However, they rank a limited set of underlined values differently. The PP focuses on artistic excellence, support for production through private investment and taxation reforms, digitalization, participation and internationalization. The PSOE follows a similar approach by promoting access and artistic production, digitalization of culture and support of cultural industry, although under the discourse of competitiveness and resilience. Both policies also coincide in several lines of action, such as the Artists Statue, copyright legal reform, digitalization projects and reforms of crucial institutions such as Reina Sofia or Tabacalera. Still, the PSOE framing must be understood under the justification required to integrate cultural policies into the overall discourse of the EU behind the Next-Generation Funds. Notably, the value of excellence is not a priority for the PSOE period.

In this regard, there seem to be value tensions between two different programmatic approaches. On the one hand, an approach towards promoting culture's economic value focused on the culture industry's international competitiveness (related to innovation, copyright, private investment, digitalization, etc.). On the other hand, voiced ways of approaching social actors (mainly through stressed inclusion policies and using participation, secondarily). Still, both PP and PSOE cultural policy values can be inscribed within the country's traditional model of cultural policies, where the Ministry's role in cultural services ultimately entails different interpretations of the welfare state. Change factors seem to be mainly associated with the hierarchy given to the private market in the cultural sector and the need to respond to economic and pandemic crises with more or less state intervention. However, some interviewees see the democratization approach as partially abandoned by the Ministry already in the 90s while underlining certain disvalues in its policies, such as national identity, accountability, technical expertise and efficiency (Interview with Expert, 07-2023).

Implementation coherence

General implementation, strategies and resources

Cultural policy implementation during the PP government (2011-2018)

The above-described PP 2011-2018 cultural policy programs were partially implemented. This policy was marked by the suppression of the Ministry and its demotion to a Secretary of State. Under this new institutional scheme and in the context of the effects of the 2008 financial crisis, the Government carried out structural reforms (cuts in public spending, number of civil servants, salaries, etc.), in many cases rejected by cultural bodies' civil servants (La Información, 2013; Rius-Ulldemolins & i Illa, 2016). The administration also achieved a limited number of new lines of cultural action. In the legal domain, Mariano Rajoy's Government protected Toreo (bullfighting) through a specific Law (Law 18/2013, of November 12; Law 10/2015, of May 26). The norm was dedicated to the Intangible Cultural Heritage and sought to disguise the bullfighting festival under a general category. Although it incorporated minimum reforms, a new Cinema Law (2015) was also approved. In terms of the above goals associated with the dynamization of territorial governance and relationships with Autonomous Communities, differently than other PP governments in the past, the administrations held the

“Sectorial Conferences of Culture”³ ten times between 2012 and 2018⁴.

Furthermore, the Government failed to fulfill the entire list of legal reforms included in its 2020 program, such as the mentioned Patronage law. A tax reform “replaced” it at the end of 2014, in which deductions were made on donations made to non-profit activities. Moreover, the Artist statute was not approved either. Along the same lines, its Law of intellectual property, rejected by all opposition parties, integrated partial modifications to the previous text only (2014-2015)⁵. The cultural industry was particularly affected by austerity policies and the increase in VAT from 19 to 21% on all cultural products and services –except books, newspapers and magazines in physical format – (Marc, 2017; Corredor & Bustamante, 2019). Deep cuts in subsidies and production aid accompanied this process (Bustamante, 2016).

Accordingly, in terms of public investment in culture, the PP started its first term in office with deep cuts in public cultural spending. The central Government's budget was reduced from 1.051 million euros in 2011 to 957 in 2012 (MCD, 2013:42), reaching 630 in 2013 (MCD, 2015: 45), the lowest budget in its decade. When the PP left the Government in 2018, the item culture only represented 0.2% of the general state budget (Ministerio de Hacienda y Función Pública, 2017: 69).

Cultural policy implementation since 2018

Upon entering the new government in June 2018, the new center-left coalition led by the PSOE restored the Ministry of Culture (and Sports). His three Ministers (José Guirao, José Rodríguez Uribes and Miquel Iceta) promoted the Statute of the Artist, advances in the management of intellectual property rights and a new draft Law on Cinema, with a particular focus on independent production, namely small companies carrying out audiovisual projects. However, the Statute of the Artist is still under negotiation, with several non-agreed components (primarily fiscal) by the Artist Statute subcommittee⁶ and the Cinema law⁷ debate was stopped by the early call for early general elections in May 2023. Both norms were, therefore, not concreted, although they have been discussed at the Parliament.

Instead, besides shock measures during COVID-19, initiatives were taken to recover state powers in matters of Historical Heritage by applying jurisdiction over plundering. Actions included a lease contract for the Collection of Carmen Thyssen-Bornemisza. Also, a more active management of the INAEM (Interview, Elected Officials, 08-2023), together with advances in the reform (a goal of the PP period), which the workers' representatives agreed⁸. In terms of territorial governance, it should be noted that the so-called "Sectorial conferences" between the Ministry and the Autonomous Communities to coordinate quasi-federal action were annually celebrated.

Moreover, some of the above-cited core lines of action were concreted. The Youth Bonus was initiated

³ Plenary session of the Sectoral Conference group representatives of the General Administration of the State, the Autonomous Communities and the Cities of Ceuta and Melilla.

⁴ All sessions held can be found at:

<https://www.culturaydeporte.gob.es/cultura/areas/cooperacion/mc/conferencia-sectorial/calendario.html>

⁵ See law at https://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-2014-11404 More information at: <https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/consejodeministros/paginas/enlaces/140214enlaceleypropiedadintelectual.aspx/>

⁶ See full list at:

<https://www.culturaydeporte.gob.es/dam/jcr:20db197e-47af-4a8c-8e3c-4ae4a813b75f/seguimiento-medidas-30-03-2023-pdf.pdf>

⁷ See press release of its approval by the Ministries' Council:

<https://www.culturaydeporte.gob.es/actualidad/2022/12/221227-cmin-ley-cine.html>

⁸ See press release at: <https://www.culturaydeporte.gob.es/cultura/artesescenicas/contenedora-noticias-prensa/a2018/diciembre/reforma-unanimidad.html>

in 2022 with three main goals: “to provide an economic boost to discover culture; generate consumption habits of cultural products among youth, and revitalize the cultural sector in Spain, severely affected during the pandemic” (La Moncloa, 2023). In 2022, a total of 272.962 bonus requests were granted, entailing 55.84% of all possible beneficiaries, with high levels of participation in regions such as Andalucía and Basque Country (MCD 2023). Numbers are increasing in 2023, with 377,539 operations carried out in the first three months, representing a total investment of 15,057,498 euros in the cultural sector⁹. In July 2023, the Cine Senior program began, allowing people over 65 to go to the movies for 2 euros, one day a week, in any of the 420 exhibition spaces. Together, there are more than 3,000 projection screens distributed throughout the territory.


Budget structure and resources in the last period

Coherently with the above programs and claims, since 2018, the general cultural budget gradually increased. The central government raised from 696 million euros in 2018 to 735 in 2020, which later incorporated COVID-19 aid associated with the Recovery Mechanism and Resilience. Moreover, in 2021, culture had an overall budget allocation of 1,148 million euros, increasing by 25.6 % compared to the previous year (SEPG, 2021), namely from 0.05% of the GDP in 2020 to 0.08% the next year. Most of the provisions are managed in the organizations dependent on the Ministry of Culture and Sports, whose budget in this policy amounts to 758 million euros, representing 66.0% of the total (SEPG, 2021). In 2022, excluding Recovery funds, the overall cultural budget increased another 30.2% from the previous year (SEPG, 2022). In this regard, it should be noted that an incoherence with the above-stated achievements concerns the lack of civil servants and temporal staff for using all available EU funds in policy making at the INAEM (Interview, Elected Official-music, 08-2023). Lastly, the last General State Budget project (2023), including a new raise in the culture budget, elevates the time from 0.2% of the general budget in 2018 to 0.4% (SEPG, 2023).

When analyzing the structure of cultural spending as a percentage of the total cultural budget of the central administration in 2020, the distribution shows four main groups. Most of the budget (44%) is targeted at “Cultural goods and services”, which include Historical and artistic heritage, Historical monuments, Museums, Historical and Artistic Heritage and Libraries (MCD, 2021). Secondly, “Visual and performing arts” (Exhibitions, Performing and musical arts, Music and dance and Performing and musical arts) and “Interdisciplinary” (Promotion, dissemination and cultural cooperation, Cultural diffusion abroad, Administration and general services and Interdisciplinary) entailed about 20%. Finally, “Book and audiovisual” with 11%. This confirms the concentration of the central state budget on historical heritage and large cultural institutions.

⁹ Data available at: <https://bonoculturajoven.gob.es/>

Figure 1. Sectoral distribution of the central administration cultural budget



Source: SEPG, 2023.

Coherence of implementation with regard to main values

The above measures taken by the PP government follow explicit claims on the need to reduce public intervention and direct spending in cultural policy as part of austerity policies framed under the prism of responsibility and modernization. In this regard, the initial reduction in cultural resources and infrastructure can be understood as aligned with values regarding the economic instrumentalization of culture and the arts. Nevertheless, policies associated with externalities expected from such processes, such as promoting entrepreneurialism through tax scheme modifications or patronage policies, were not reflected in implementation. For instance, an evident lack of coherence with the ideological grounds of the PP is found in tax increases for the cultural industry, which are expected to impact adversely on consumption.

Moreover, overall, during the cycle 2015-2018, the government did not implement core policies embedded in goals and value hierarchies reflected in its 2017 program. For instance, no relevant policies in the domain of cultural engagement and participation are identified. Instead, open opposition to cultural industry unions and cultural organizations was expressed concerning legal reforms and budgetary cuts (Rius Ulldemolins and Zamorano, 2015). Limitations in finding pertinent policies to increase the quality of artistic production, as reflected in government plans, are also detected. For instance, the planned reform of the INAEM was not achieved during the period (Interview, Elected Official, 08-2023). Moreover, laws on patronage and art labour were not approved.

Instead, with the active support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Marca España project-associated institutions, the Secretary of Culture was very active in implementing goals concerning promoting Spanish culture abroad (Rius Ulldemolins & Zamorano, 2015). This cultural diplomacy action embedded concrete values grounding an entrepreneurial approach to cultural policies since it was seen as part of an instrumental strategy to achieve external investment in a period of financial crisis. Moreover, coherence can be found regarding the value of branding and traditionalism concerning promoting immaterial heritage linked to bullfighting practices.

Value coherence for the period 2013-2018 can be seen as:

Table 1. Coherence of Spanish Ministry cultural policy values 2013-2018

Main values by prioritization	Coherence analysis
Modernization /competitiveness	Under the interpretation of modernization associated with state reform and reduction, supporting the enlargement of private market, such value is partially reflected in policy action (for instance, no Patronage Law was approved)
Economic	The economic value is expressed in an instrumental perspective of cultural policy. For instance, by focusing on the international projection of culture and attraction of investment.
Artistic excellence	No specific support facilitating artistic excellence is observed, for instance, grant-making targeted at artistic sectors is reduced.
Access	Access policies were not expanded beyond the promotion of heritage spaces and national museums.
Internationalization	Specific lines of action, such as artistic promotion associated with the Marca España project, were opened and fostered in association with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Source: Own elaboration

The PSOE administration manifested a slightly more coherent integration of core values in cultural policy implementation, which should be addressed according to the COVID-19 and post-pandemic periods. The actual increase in public spending on culture, which concerns both the overall budget and additional aid associated with COVID-19 recovery plans (allowing to boost cultural grants), allowed further support for cultural production. According to an Executive Officer (Interview, Executive Bureaucrat, 07-2023), all budget lines were increased except for the potential and significant boost associated with the non-approved Artist Statute.

Moreover, policies encouraging access to culture, including the Youth Bonus and the Cinema Senior, express a specific understanding of social participation. In the government's view, this approach is linked to the values of equity and equality, also facilitating market and production development. Furthermore, specific initiatives and projects, such as creating the National Centre of Photography, follow the above redistributive and decentralization principles by being placed in Soria province¹⁰. In terms of protected groups targeted policies, gender coherence can be found in the work done in terms of policy evaluation, the use of the Gender Observatory feedback or the integration of gender variables to grant provision to the music sector by the INAEM (Interview, Elected Official-music, 08-2023).

Still, divergences between programmatic and implementation value configurations must be underlined. Different aspects of the Artist Statute and the new Cinema law, embedding values such as care, have been part of a political dispute mostly outside but also within the governing coalition (Interview, Executive Bureaucrat, 07-2023). Moreover, diverging approaches exist to value justification and interpretation to justify coherence gaps. While resilience and competitiveness have often been seen as crucial regarding cultural programs, placing a focus on the productive capacity of the cultural industries system, public officials manifest broader value principles concerning democracy, equity and equality. Additionally, even though cultural policy has been importantly repositioned in

¹⁰ Details at <https://futurocentronacionaldefotografia.es/>

terms of budget and scope of lines of action, its role as state policy is still in discussion.

Value coherence for the period 2018-2023 can be seen as:

Table 2. Coherence of Spanish Ministry cultural policy values 2018-2023

Main values by prioritization	Coherence analysis
Economic development/ /competitiveness	This value, expressed in programmatic lines, was promoted through specific lines of action supported by Next Generation funds (i.e. digitization projects, support to the independent audiovisual sector, dynamization of consumption)
Equality	The created bonuses and other policies, for instance, concerning the expansion of the grant system, are aligned with this value. Still, this value is less manifested in studied policies due to the lack of policies linked to socio-demographic variables such as income or residence and limited instruments of direct participation in policymaking.
Access to culture	As mentioned above, critical new policies are associated with boosting universal access to culture, which may involve a narrow understanding of equality.
Artistic work conditions	This value is only partially reflected in policymaking due to the protracted inter-ministerial and Parliamentary negotiations, which also integrated social organizations and unions, not translated into legal reform.
Resilience	This value is partially reflected in specific policies, such as actions concerning digitization of cultural heritage and digital and production integration projects aimed at urban territories.

Source: Own elaboration

Governance, adaptability and social accuracy

Cultural policies governance model

The evolution of the Secretary of Culture and the Ministry of Culture and Sports administration in the studied period shows two conceptions of the institution's role in the cultural domain. Generally, while the PP focuses on changing regulatory schemes promoting privacy action in the cultural field, the PSOE implemented policies giving the State a more expansive and central role in cultural policy and social change overall.

Still, as we saw above, culture is one General Secretary with limited capacity to drive cultural policy in the context of the Spanish multilevel system. Its current legal design¹¹ and limited investment drives its government scheme and capacities into three main domains organized by order of importance. Firstly, in the cultural industries sector, from a regulatory approach. This is achieved through its Agencies on Scenic Arts and Music (INAEM), Cinematography and Audiovisual Arts (ICAA), and three Directorates, one of Book, Comic and Reading and the other of Cultural industries, Intellectual

¹¹ See at <https://www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-2020-4860>

property and cooperation. Secondly, the General Directorate of Cultural Heritage and Fine Arts, together with the management of the Museo Nacional del Prado, Museo Nacional Reina Sofia and the National Library, play a pivotal role in heritage policies, mainly concerning Madrid. Lastly, the General Subdirectorate of Relations International and Union European is in charge of cultural diplomacy.

Policies aimed at fostering social accuracy

While both governments manifested the importance of reorienting the Ministry design to a more bottom-up approach, the PSOE administration has attempted to go beyond the traditional actions conducted by these departments to achieve more transversal policies. Therefore, such policies aimed to produce and circulate the arts in the whole State territory, including labour issues or even some aspects concerning the participatory design of policies. Access to diverse cultural expression and artistic practices through the Youth Bonus or the Cinema Senior is aligned with this open approach. Along these lines, the Ministry officers emphasize that the cultural bonus has shown a great diversity in terms of age and socioeconomic diversity of users, but also aesthetically since at the head and in second place of "what young people spend on the voucher are books and movies" (Interview, Executive Bureaucrat, 07-2023).

Moreover, the Ministry officers present the protocols around legal reform processes, such as public audiences, public debate and amendments to legal texts suggested by unions, associations and cultural organizations as a core form of participation behind its policies. Along these lines, it should be noted that meetings with the audiovisual sector exhibitors, distributors and platforms were held to discuss the legal design (Interview, Executive Bureaucrat, 07-2023). "The policy we have right now in the Ministry is: request that arrives, request that is attended to. In other words, meetings, information. So, in the end, I think that welcoming everyone and giving everyone a voice is a good way to map and see how the environment is." In terms of territorial governance, besides the Sectorial Conferences mentioned above, public officers mention the relevance of provincial Government delegations¹² to communicate and collect feedback on the Ministry measures. Another way of aligning cultural policy with society's interests, demands and needs is by using data collected by the Gender Observatory at the central level.

However, it should be noted that, in the context of the Spanish system of cultural policies and its powers' distribution scheme by levels of government, the Ministry has less incidence than regional and local policies in participatory developments and direct policies. This is clear, for instance, in the case of the INAEM's main strategic tools, which are marked by using several grant lines to support specific musical projects based on the institution's design. Therefore, officers have the last say concerning which field "falls outside" their scope of action (Interview, Elected Official, 08-2023). In this regard, the parallel use of "nominative grants" in the state budget, which is regularly targeted to prominent institutions such as the Liceu Theater or the Teatro Real (or supporting historical heritage) and the focus of this institution in Madrid, follows the same top-down approach which is often limited to high culture. Along these lines, one of the interviews pointed out that one of the INAEM's main goals is to "see within the music sector where we have to incise and that is constantly changing" the decisions are based on an internal need assessment: "is backed because we see that are fields where or there is support, or that is going to disappear" (Interview, Elected Bureaucrat, 08-2023). Accordingly, for the interviewed Expert (07-2023), the Ministry has quit its democratization and equity value principles from the initial period (80,90s) and only has a few actions in this regard. In this perspective,

¹² The Government delegations in the Public Administration of Spain are bodies organically dependent on the President of the Government and functionally on the Ministry of Territorial Policy aimed at representing the Government in the corresponding autonomous community or city. In this framework, this body coordinates the collaboration between the State Administration in the autonomous territory and the administration of the autonomy in question.

the cultural Bonus is interpreted as an instrumentalization aimed at communication rather than a strategic approach to his policy domain.

Conclusion

The above examination of the Spanish Ministry of Culture in the last decade provides several elements concerning coherence and incoherence between cultural policy goals and values and their concrete manifestation in policy action. This can be divided into two periods marked by the 2008 financial crisis first and by the COVID-19 pandemic second, which importantly defined cultural management plans.

Both value frameworks and goals reveal a top-down perspective towards cultural production and consumption aligned with the type of administrative instruments used by the Ministry, such as grants, subsidies, legal texts and taxation. Still, both administrations generally reflected their ideological and dominant cultural policy models in the ways of confronting such crises and strategically managing post-crisis-derived cultural policy orientation. Ground interpretations and contradictions between value justification and policy implementation are also characteristic of such orientations in the last decades.

For the period 2011-2018, dominant incoherences concern the lack of concrete policies enabling the promotion of artistic excellence in a context of economic crisis combined with a reduction of direct support for artists and arts institutions. Moreover, and along the same lines, the values of access and participation, manifested in policy plans, were not reflected in emerging mechanisms to dynamize actors' engagement in the cultural field or facilitate citizens' consumption of culture.

For 2018-2023, the value of equality can be seen as partially covered by policy programs. While cultural budget increases and new lines of action cover two critical groups for dynamizing citizens' access to cultural institutions of goods, young people and the elderly, other groups and intersectional policies are only partially covered. Moreover, the cultural budget is still far from the 1% recommended by UNESCO. In this context, the most crucial gap in terms of coherence with democratization goals in the period concerns the lack of a perspective of support for cultural production and creators beyond indirect assistance through the dynamization of consumption. In this regard, although ambitious for the Spanish context, the Artist Statute legal project did not complete its parliamentary process.

1.2. Galicia Cultural Policy

Introduction

Galicia is considered one of the three historical “nationalities”(Art 2 and 3 SC) with its own co-official language in Spain and the Spanish Constitution (SC) grants it broad powers and control over both administrative and normative dimensions of cultural policies. As a result of a profound decentralization process, the leading actor in this area is the Galician government of the Xunta de Galicia through the Regional Ministry of Culture, Education and University. Other entities, such as the Agency for Cultural Industries (AGADIC) and the City of Culture Foundation, are also attached to this Department. Additionally, the Galician Cultural Council (CCG) depends on the regional Parliament. Regarding this specific linguistic promotion sub policy the Law of Linguistic Normalisation (1983) establishes Galician as one of the region's co-official languages and makes the autonomous government responsible for its protection and promotion (Volkova, 2018).

The Galician cultural policy model that emerged after the Spanish cultural decentralization and democratization process is characterized by a conservative vision of culture. It is also distinguished by an intervention approach that includes limited planning and highly hierarchical cultural activities with low density and diversification. Moreover, the literature has characterized it as a social intervention of a reactive nature, shallow and with an instrumentalizing bias (Lage et al., 2012). In this framework, the Xunta cultural policies have been described as a discretionary and contradictory governance model.

In this policy framework, for instance, sectoral policies oriented to music have a particular orientation, with programs regarding production, distribution and audiences¹³. Galicia stands in a peripheral position on music production in a centripetal mainstream system based on Madrid and Barcelona regions with powerful traditional CCI's at the Spanish level (Cifuentes, 2013). Bigger cities with larger populations and more potential consumers count on a battery of emergent musicians linked to genres such as electronic and indie music.

Music could function, in its double artistic and cultural character, as a viable engine of Galician identity creation, in contrast with other arts with less public reach. Tanxugueiras¹⁴ phenomenon shows the relevance (.....) Sadly, the Xunta lacks any political interest in engaging in the promotion of Galician music in any of its styles.” (...) Another side of Galician music is the very specific phenomenon of rural orchestras. They are not only a symbol of the value that a social community gives to their mainstream and classical music heritage, with many city bands and music schools spread throughout the country, but they are also a very valued political asset, with many civic entities and associations related to the music in the hands of centre and right parties. Galician folk music, related with the so-called “Celtic nations” of the European Atlantic shore, is linked at the same time to the rural right and nationalist left parties spread all over the Galician geography. (Interviewed 01, 2023).

Added to this endogenous music, the phenomenon of the itinerant local Latin music orchestras is remarkable, with a hegemonic role in the rural areas fairs and “verbenas”. This phenomenon results from the return of the Galician migration to Latin America in the XIX and XX centuries and the close relationship between both sides of the Atlantic kept during all that time, which has been handed over in legacy to the younger generations. Galician cultural policies have endorsed national expressions, for instance, through regional public TV (Castelló Cogollos, 2004), while poorly supporting the cited

¹³ However, the emergence or nomination of audiences has been progressive in the last years since all reports show successive a loss of cultural audiences like readers, cinema, and scenic attendees traditionally low in the region.

¹⁴ Tanxugueiras is a group of Spanish pandeiriteiras originally from Galicia formed by Aida Tarrío and the twin sisters Olaia and Sabela Maneiro.

local and amateur music circuit.

Objectives and values

Our analysis, although focused on the current scenario, covers the last decade, when the right (PP) led the Autonomous Community in the context of President Alberto Núñez Feijóo's (2009-2022) governments. Following a historical trend in regional cultural policies, in 2009, the new Xunta's President merged the area of Culture within the "Regional Ministry of Culture, Education and Universities". It should be noted that there were two periods when the area of Tourism (first as administration and then as agency) was integrated into this Ministry to be disaggregated from it later.

This Ministry is responsible for promoting and disseminating culture, protecting and promoting Galicia's cultural heritage (including managing the UNESCO Santiago's Camino agency), and fostering and protecting the Galician language, especially in and through education. This creates a particular articulation of cultural and touristic strategies:

The conception of regional cultural policies is centred on the idea of culture subordinated to tourism and at the service of socio-economic development" (Politician 1, May 2021). In this context, for instance, the "scarce promotion of music detected in our country has as its main function to give meaning to an infrastructure of dubious utility, such as the City of Culture, or to promote a tourist resource, the Santiago's Ways. It is done, moreover, by means of large concerts with foreign stars with the main objective of achieving high numbers of spectators.. (Politician 3, June 2023).

Galician Cultural policies are, therefore, characterised by promoting the Santiago's Ways and the Xacobeo Holy Year's cycle every seven years as a typical Galician event. It is also linked to large cultural infrastructures such as the City of Culture and the international visibility of Galicia (Linheira et al., 2018). Primary values of Galician cultural policies are condensed in these policies, with an instrumental orientation of culture. Culture is conceived as a symbolic resource to create a tourism brand, thus becoming another economic factor, another asset in the tourism marketing strategy.

Cultural policy goals in regional plans and documents

Several recent documents reflected the Regional Ministry's strategic goals within the studied period. In 2017, the PP's Regional Ministry of Culture launched the regional plan "Cultural Strategy of Galicia (ECG21)"¹⁵, where cultural policy's main goals and actions for achieving them in the following three years are depicted. This document sets 6 strategic lines divided into 34 objectives. Such a structure was designed after a participative process with CCS around these goals, revealing their backing values. The plan proposes:

- 1) The "Pact" is understood as the democratic value of participation but from the point of view of two sides negotiating. This is the cultural administration versus CCS, which were very opposed during Núñez Feijóo's terms in office.
- 2) The CCS cross-sector objective is to support production, distribution, and audiences.
- 3) To add social values to cultural administrations and entities. Following the North European trends, the report calls for outlining the social outcomes of cultural policies.
- 4) To foster the cultural administrations and entities: libraries, archives, museums and foundations.
- 5) To highlight the endogenous value of different cultural heritage. Since the 1993 Declaration

¹⁵ More information at: <https://www.cultura.gal/es/nova/29115/la-xunta-impulsara-la-cultura-gallega-a-traves-de-una-estrategia-integral-con-horizonte-en-2021>

of UNESCO World Heritage of French Santiago's Way, this goal has been particularly translated into policies for fostering religious architecture.

To spread Galician culture internationally. European and international branding has been, since 1986, for a region with a minority language. It has been particularly used to legitimise the Ministry's top-down cultural policies and lack of endogenous participative processes¹⁶.

The COVID-19 socio-sanitary crisis had clear implications for the cultural and tourism sector. Moreover, since cultural policies are generally intricate to tourist objectives, the government set up the “Regional Recovery Plan for the Tourist and Cultural sector”. The plan counted on 26.8 million euros and several measures, most with a cultural-touristic perspective. The document states that “culture recovery is a shared challenge that Galicia will rise to”, as “culture defines our identity [...] it is an inexhaustible source of pride and safeguard of our people’s tradition, talent and creativity, but also a relevant economic activity contributing to employment, wealth, well-being and progress.” (Xunta de Galicia, 2020: 12). The Plan 22 measures and 49 actions aimed at assisting the cultural sector through the transition to the “New Normal”. Most of the cross-sectoral measures were focused on and ended up in the Xacobeo programme of 2022.

Another relevant transformation in the last period was the activation of the Galician Cultural Council, the regional advisor entity for culture. The organisation launched more than 102 reports between 2020 and 2022¹⁷. They identify “a highly vulnerable productive structure (especially performing arts), a contraction in cultural consumption, and concerns about the future of cultural workers”¹⁸. Among the challenges Galicia should face shortly, the reports mention “the need to adapt existing digital tools to the new context to facilitate cultural production; to foster a more competitive Galician economy as a way to internationalisation and able to support cultural agents’ enterprises, and to design long-term cultural policies to protect and retain its own cultural capital”¹⁹²⁰. Moreover, the Galicia regional government was a pioneer at the State-level in developing a Youth regional Cultural voucher (“Bono Cultura”, initiated in 2021 for two years) with 400 euros for young people above 18 years old (2 M Euros on 20k vouchers) being benchmarked at the State level²¹. Overall, these policies were expected to impact both production and access, boosting the cultural sector.

Official policy goals under the overall strategic philosophy

The Galician PP discourse behind the above planning has focused chiefly on artistic excellence, support for production through freelance and SME investment and digitalization. This model follows the traditional regional cultural policies orientation, where cultural services are understood as auxiliary

¹⁶ Decentralised two agencies (Xacobeo for Unesco WH Santiago’s Way and Tourism Galician Tourism Agency) were also united. In 2021, the Tourism area returned to the Vice Presidency. In 2020, Nuñez Feijoo’s third government united again into one single ministry —alleging austerity and efficiency in public spending— the areas of Education, Culture and Sports, which two different offices previously managed.

¹⁷ See at: <http://consellodacultura.gal/libros-tipo.php?tipo=Documento%20de%20Traballo>

¹⁸ See at: gcediario.com/cultura/357515-un-tercio-de-las-empresas-culturales-creen-que-la-principal-debilidad-del-sector-es-el-escaso-apoyo-institucional/

¹⁹ Available at: galiciapress.es/articulo/cultura/2023-04-20/4260392-tercio-empresas-culturales-creen-principal-debilidad-sector-escaso-apoyo-institucional

²⁰ Available at: <https://www.farodevigo.es/sociedad/2023/04/21/sector-cultural-gallego-suspende-administraciones-86288257.html>

²¹ More information at: <https://www.xunta.gal/notas-de-prensa/-/nova/76078/bono-cultura-xunta-genera-ingresos-por-valor-1-6-los-establecimientos-gallegos>
https://www.abc.es/espana/galicia/abci-xunta-presenta-bono-cultural-y-carga-contra-gobierno-202110111945_noticia.html?ref=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F

means to the tourism infrastructure sector. Secondly, policies are oriented to classical welfare state policies regarding cultural-educative resources such as libraries, productions to scholar audiences or live concerts in summer for tourists, returned migrants during holidays and local/regional population. Moreover, such value framing seems not to be part of public and sectoral debates. As one local responsible said, "I cannot identify what these strategic objectives of the regional government's cultural action might be and, in fact, I am not aware that they are set out in any kind of publicly available document. It is clear that the programming of the City of Culture and everything related to the Camino are the main axes of public investment." (Interviewed 4, 2023). Continuity and change factors are mainly associated with the hierarchy given to the cultural sector and the need to respond to the pandemic crises with more regional intervention.

Implementation coherence

General implementation, strategies and resources

From the above, it is possible to identify five main goals for Galician cultural policies in the last decade: tourism promotion, cultural branding, fostering regional cultural heritage, promoting CCS from an economic standpoint and social/linguistic cohesion.

However, regarding cultural policy orientation, most agents undermark the discretionality of cultural policies and their relative "absence". Overall, they point out the lack of data analysis, planning, performance, evaluation, new data and analysis for replanning within Galician cultural policies. The main focuses are audiovisual productions, festivals and promotion of religious heritage, following global trends of massive media and consumption: digital platforms, mainstream music festivals and cultural tourism.

The above structural lack of strategy, diagnoses, planning and evaluation of Galician cultural policies is mirrored in budget design. For instance, the report "Public Investments on Culture"²² (2014) stressed the difficulties of knowing the distribution of budget executions precisely because of the different morphologies of cultural administration (including the regional ministry, agencies such as AGADIC, public companies such as Xacobeo, foundations as City of Culture...). In this regard, in 2019, a BNG²³ deputy underlined on the Parliament Committee about the Galician Cultural Strategy: "without concrete actions, schedule and budget, this cultural strategy is fumed" (Olalla Rodil, BNG deputy, 2019). This aligns with other claims regarding lack of systematic strategy or planning: "I remark the achievement of artistic production grants battery but the lack of support to scenic arts too, dance especially. The publishing sector does not have a mid-term strategy linked to digital shifting, translation or internationalisation too" (Politician 01/2023).

While cultural tourism and branding aims seem to be broadly addressed in policy making, other goals related to the productive fabric seem to historically be less developed. Two of the reiterative demands from cultural sector companies and professional associations, regional advisory Council for Culture, the Galician Cultural Council (CCG)²⁴, and the political parties in the opposition (BNG, PSOE, now SUMAR space), are to mirror the cultural budget to regional 2% of PIB and reach a 3% of employment in the sector (AGPXC et al. 2020-2022). According to the AGPXC, the basic concept will be that if your sector's public funding is less than these ratios, the government would be considered extractive to the

²² Available at: http://consellodacultura.gal/mediateca/extras/CCG_2014_Gasto-publico-en-cultura.pdf

²³ More information at: <https://www.bng.gal/articulo/novas/olalla-rodil-anxo-lorenzo-accions-calendario-orzamento-estratexia-da-cultura-fume/20190620160859025062.html>


²⁴ "Diagnose da cultura galega. Datos para unha estratexia cultural no século XXI." (Galician cultural diagnosis: Data for one cultural strategy of XXI century"), 2018. See: <https://www.cultura.gal/es/diagnose-cultura-galega-datos-para-estratexia-cultural-seculo-xxi>

territory. Only by equalising the sector budget and GDP would a government be neutral versus the sector. In this regard, the document underlines the weak points of cultural budget cutlets from the beginning of the 2012-2022 period (58,40% since 2008).

The structure of regional cultural budgets

The CCG reports reveal that cultural budgets focus on cultural heritage and artistic production²⁵. From the previous context, starting from the 2008 crisis to 2014, there were 12% budget cuts²⁶. Only in 2011, at the pick of the austerity process, there was a cultural budget cut of 94,24M euros, including 22,56M corresponding to cultural services and goods, 300k to music, scenic and visual arts, 5,52M to audiovisual and publishing, and other 65,85M to multidisciplinary activities (namely advertising and Galician language policies). After following the austerity process strictly, the Galician cultural budget represented 0.65% of the total regional budget (2018). However, the regional budget for culture started to recover in recent years, reaching 96 million euros in 2021 just after the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2022 the cultural budget was 100 million euros. In terms of sectoral distribution, this can be illustrated as follows:

Figure 1. Distribution of Galicia cultural expenditures



Source: Own elaboration

Finally, the cultural budget for 2023 has climbed to 104,46M (+8.51% from 2022). This represents a significant expansion which is irregularly distributed. The leading causes of this increase are more than 10 million euros assigned by the Next Generation European funds, additional investment in staff costs and resources associated with other chapters such as museums, libraries and archives. In the budget structure, while resources for the Agency of Cultural Industries (AGADIC) and linguistic policies are reduced, those for cultural heritage promotion and cultural tourism growth.

The above represents an emphasis on cultural tourism and the heritage associated with it, as well as cultural industries. It also reveals less importance given to language promotion, which is also identified in a broad understanding of linguistic policies. While there is limited debate and strategic thinking

²⁵Available at:

<http://consellodacultura.gal/libros-arquivo-tipo.php?arq=5&tipo=Documento%20de%20Trabalho>

²⁶More information at:

<http://consellodacultura.gal/libros-arquivo-tipo.php?arq=5&tipo=Documento%20de%20Trabalho>

concerning language education and promotion through the cultural offer, it is often instrumentalized politically: "the Galician media don't show it as a cohesion factor if not as a political weapon and cleavage irresponsibly" (Interview, 2021 May). Along these lines, policy implementation in the last decade has not been translated into systematic tools for promoting the expansion of Galician speakers (Interview, 2021 April)²⁷.

Coherence of implementation with regard to main values

Overall, Galician cultural policy implementation can be seen as aligned with its primary goals, including cultural tourism and branding, nation identity building and promotion of mainstream cultural production. The above hegemonic conception of values in cultural policies dominated by economic instrumentalization is often opposed to more contextual and social-centred perspectives, which are not entirely reflected in policymaking. In this regard, political actors within opposition forces to the current government outline cultural policies stressing some specific deficits in terms of capturing contextual demands. For instance, it is said that: "in an eminently rural society, cultural policies designed for the rural be implemented" (Politician 6, April 2021).

Policy implementation and the literature reveal a trend towards simply understanding culture as another productive sector with limited capacity to integrate participation and creativity promotion. The government, mixing regionalism and entrepreneurship, exploits Galicia's large-scale cultural facilities as pathways for economic growth and place branding (Rius-Ulldemolins et al., 2016; Rius-Ulldemolins, 2005) at the expense of cultural democratization and grassroots activities (Linheira et al., 2018). The above lack of planning, mixed with "event-ism", seems to lessen coherence with secondary explicit goals of cultural policies, including social cohesion. Accordingly, one indicator of this lack of citizens-focused policies is the demand: cultural consumption in Galicia is under the Spanish rate (in 2014, 201.9 €/year in the former, 260.1 €/year in the latter) (Lorenzo, 2019). This suggests "the need for a better articulation between cultural and educational policies in order to achieve these objectives, and to take on citizen participation beyond the audience model; introducing participative mechanism, community actions and policies co-design" (Interview, 2021 April).

Incoherences in cultural policy goals' implementation

An element representing a certain incoherence in Galician policies relates to its constitutive role is the protection and promotion of the Galician language. This is the unique official minority language that is losing speakers in Spain, as underlined by the Galician Royal Academy to European institutions (UE, European Card of Minority and Regional Languages, Monitoring Committee, 2021). However, such a mandate is not properly handled when the Popular Party rules on regional government (Miguélez-Carballeira 2013). Upon a scenario of linguistic minoritization, two visions concerning the national culture and the Galician country are identified: one prioritising the value of linguistic promotion and the other giving an instrumental character to this value. In this regard, there seems to be a lack of alignment between identity protection claims and the instrumental use of language aimed at political gains. For some actors, this involves an intentional strategy from the government for reducing the Galician language in the public sphere.

In Galicia, there is an ongoing national conflict that is also cultural. The promotion of Galician culture and music could be an enormous resource in the necessary process of re-galeguisation of our country, which, as the data on the evolution of speakers show, has been losing the battle for its cultural survival at an accelerated rate in recent years. (Interview 01, 2023 round)

²⁷Available at: <https://rm.coe.int/16806d81a4>

However, there is an attempt to capture implicit anthropological values, for example, in constructing a Galician identity-nation. In this regard, the above incoherence corresponds to a particular perspective in fostering Galician identity from the left parties and actors, where communitarian and social inclusion aspects, together with a less “liberal” approach to national construction, are supported. From this perspective, the PP policy actions in the linguistic and national spheres of cultural policies are seen as focused on economic profitability, touristic promotion and repercussion, especially Xacobeo Year and Ciudad de la Cultura complex infrastructure (Interview, 2021 May). Therefore, nationalism can mostly be linked to branding, “white elephant”, and speculative urban policies (Linheira et al., 2018). In this dialectic, this second approach can not satisfy explicit goals in terms of linguistic and rural cultural protection.

Furthermore, another incoherence in Galician cultural policies is associated with a tension between the formal, economic and institutional structuring of cultural policies and its lack of presence in many domains of the cultural field. Even though cultural planning exists, different agents underline the lack of mandatory criteria for designing a long-term action based on data, diagnosis, planning and cross-evaluation. Moreover, in turn, greater multilevel (local/provincial/regional) cooperation based on “proximity cultural funds” concern 85% of the cultural region added to municipalities’ budget. Planning efforts are only focused on the Camino de Santiago and the Xacobeo, which has been associated with “self-promotion, institutional propaganda, spectacularization, major events, etc.” (Politician 3, April 2021). In brief, insufficient budgets, dense bureaucracy, hidden interests, and direct dependence on political representatives and terms are some of the consequences of this approach pointed out by cultural organizations and producers.

Another identified incoherence concerns cultural policies’ capacity to efficiently promote the Cultural and Creative Sectors. The above corporatist and instrumental approach to cultural policies (combining direct intervention seeking political and clientele instrumentalization) may lead to weak public services aimed at democratising creation and consumption. It has been suggested that the various deficits of coordination, cooperation and consensus coupled with the political competition between the different Galician political parties may have resulted in a considerable waste of economic effort and human resources, which has worn down the cultural system (Lage *et al.* 2012). In general, this diagnosis of PP fragmentary cultural policies and contradictory value discourses can be opposed to the program recently articulated by the Consello da Cultura Galega and the parliamentary opposition and, as well, to the delineated in the ephemeral left and nationalist government.

Governance, adaptability and social accuracy

In the above context of discretionary management of cultural policies, top-down governance has dominated the institutional dynamics in the region. Reactions and demands from cultural organizations and actors from different sectors and subsectors reveal an active confrontation regarding the above-detailed cultural policy orientation, its main goals and its value prioritization. Along these lines, it has been underlined that interinstitutional cooperation is usually limited to distributing funding. Thus, stakeholders’ participation in policy design and implementation is limited and non-horizontal, according to interviewees.

Two examples of governance re-alignment and relative adaptability

Regarding democratic openness and dialogue with stakeholders, two subsector developments allow us to illustrate the above. In 2022, some organized actors came into conflict with the regional government in the fields of Dance and Literary publishing. Along these lines, an interviewee stresses:

In the cultural sector, the format of a large festival linked to the promotion of the Camino is, once again, the protagonist of the Xunta's promotional events. In terms of administrative procedure, the direct awarding method does not seem, moreover, to be the most open and transparent. The promotion of local artists at the level of production and distribution is directly non-existent." (Interviewed 01, 2023) or "....macro festivals format that are promoted by regional government shows the priority of quantitative performance results and institutional publicity should not be objectives of the public government of cultural administrations and policies" and "I am very convinced that our scenario is contradictory, without mentioning names nor festivals labels. It exists only here that public regional funding supports macro festivals without any Galician character, Galician Language, nor Galician Music. I think that in other countries it will not be possible. (Interviewed 02, 2023 round)

The process of participative design of the "Integral Plan for Dance"²⁸ was launched in 2022, developing working tables and online proposals for a year after being the second subsector on cutlets during the period observed, after linguistic policies. After the announcement by the regional government, the more significant theatre and Dance companies Association, Escena Galega and the smaller one, Galician Dance Professionals Association PAM (Plataforma Artes do Movemento), with individual suggestions, were admitted. PAM that brings together 35 professionals and 26 Galician Dance companies and projects) declared its disassociation from the PID Galician Dance Plan published on March 2023 by AGADIC, considering that it does not meet the minimum conditions for the real support and promotion of dance in Galicia, and asked the administration to take accurate and effective measures²⁹. The construction process of the PID started in 2020 with the announcement by AGADIC of the start of a 'participation' process to:

respond to the needs of this sector in Galicia. Throughout three years of work, minimum demands remain unmet: the PID document was published, in addition to a long delay (3 years from the beginning of the process), without a budgetary framework, allocation of specific resources, or commitments on deadlines for implementation of the measures provided therein. These concerns were expressed to AGADIC (and other members of the PID process) on successive occasions and prior to the publication of the document, requesting its inclusion. However, the administration decided to go ahead with the announcement of the PID and formed a committee to monitor the Plan in which the PAM was left out. (JVL, Interview, 2023)

I remark as an achievement the system of grants to artistic production and as a weak point the lack of support to scenic arts, dance especially. The publishing sector does not have a strategy on digital shifting, translation and internationalisation in the long term. (Round 3, Politician 1)

Later, in 2023, all the Book sector with AGE (Literary Publishers Association), AELG (writer professional one), FLG (bookshop owners one) and AGPTI (translator one) denounced that the regional government had presented another annual plan for the publishing sector without agreement with the Book subsector, traditionally strong. The sector is unified under this umbrella association after the regional government (with another political colour) developed in 2006 a Regional Law about Books that considers the agreement year by year mandatory³⁰. This lack of agreement was manifested last year with episodes of dissociation between publishing houses and institutional different representations on international book fairs and critics to the design of funding calls for publishing and translating.

²⁸ More information at:

https://industriasculturais.xunta.gal/sites/default/files/2023-06/plan_integral_danza_galicia.pdf

²⁹ More information at:

https://www.pamgaliza.org/files/ugd/20c8d9_0588c2f7830e4bc5ac02c33ec4863770.pdf

³⁰ More information at:

<https://www.nosdiario.gal/articulo/cultura/xunta-anuncia-plan-impulso-ao-libro-galego-consultar-co-sector/20230420185329166860.html>

Bottom up intervention as an instrumentalization dynamic

Another incomplete participative forum process on the design of the cultural policies at the regional level was the informal participative design between 2021 and 2022 of a "Catalogue of tractor projects to Next Generation Funds". This is an open addition to semi-open (by CCS subsectors worktables) proposals reception with 3 stages or phases of working but without any kind of public result verified along the development of bilateral agreements or open calls out of this forum. The evolution of values in relation to social developments, the introduction of criteria of environmental sustainability on all funding open calls originated on next-generation funds decentralised at the regional level (Territorio Cultura, etc.) was part of top-down of European administrative rules to this funding, added to gender equality and rural-targeted programs. "European level is a little heterotopia. European projects have accelerated many initiatives, but they still need a big effort" (Interviewed 02, 2023 round). According to interviewees, the above corporatist and non-participatory approach has specific effects on cultural democratisation, access equity and capacity to articulate cultural policies with other relevant areas such as education.

Conclusion

It is possible to identify two main incoherences in Galician cultural policies. On the one hand, a core of instrumental values is observed in practice (economic value, touristic image) and in discourses (artistic excellence, identity and inclusion). These incoherences are often seen as emerging from the need to respond to corporate commitments and propagandist use of cultural assessments by the governing party. These values compete with others, focusing on regional development, participation, and equality.

On the other hand, a second tension is identified concerning values and valuation processes regarding the Galician language issue, a key factor framing national identity. Opposed conceptions of this value include a view centred on its social and identitarian nature and another dismissing such character. Regarding this, the Galician language has been (and still is) a vital discussion topic and an element for political confrontation.

Beyond the above incoherence, a fundamental problem is the absence of cultural policy "in the sense of the Galician history of non-cultural policies" (Interview, 2021 April). The unique policy line of activity with a bit of strategic planning is the cultural-touristic Santiago's Way and Xacobeo's years (every seven years).

1.3. City of Barcelona Cultural Policy

Introduction

Since the reestablishment of local democracy in 1979, cultural policy in the city³¹ of Barcelona has been framed within a predominantly social-democratic political agenda for which the cultural program became a key part of the democratic refoundation, in a double constitutive and redistributive orientation (Rodríguez Morató, 2012). Constitutive because the left-wing parties that formed the coalition that won the government after those first elections incorporated cultural policy as a space for the recuperation of the civic and political life proscribed during Franquism's dictatorship, and redistributive because cultural action appeared strongly tied to social rights. In this context, cultural policy was conceived in alignment with the values and objectives of cultural democracy (Zimmer & Toepler 1996), in which the participation of civil society organizations was viewed as a structuring element of the social-democratic cultural project and also as an actor for the deployment of the local welfare system. Even though these traits are remarkable in this stage of cultural policy, the policy framework at central and regional level, the relevant role that the private sector has historically played in the city's cultural action, as well as the impulse since the mid 80's of the local decentralization process endow the Barcelona cultural policy with characteristics belonging to the typologies of the architect model and the patron model as defined by McCaughey and Chartrand (1989).

Although this report is focused on the present of cultural policy, the analysis covers the last decade, a timeframe that allows us to consider significant changes that have impacted on local cultural policy. We take as a starting point the year 2011 when, for the first time, a nationalist and neoconservative coalition wins the city council, after 32 years of social-democracy. The four years (2011-2015) of government of that coalition, which is in charge of implementing austerity policies at the local level, enhances the economic value of culture, something that is manifested in local cultural programs and institutions, as well as in strategic alliances between culture and actors in the economic and financial global sector (Sánchez Belando, 2021). Within this last decade, we also witnessed a new substantive change: the arrival of the left-wing coalition Barcelona en Comú (BeC) to the City Council (2015-2023) which seeks to enhance an institutional discourse and practice the social value of culture over the economic one.

Music interventions The Barcelona City Council's management of the music sector at the local level are the result of the cooperation between different policy areas, government levels (central and regional) and non-state actors in which local cultural administration has a limited role. Main efforts have been devoted to support Music and performing art Festivals (Cebrian, 2021) and High Culture Institutions, such as the Consortium l'Auditori and the Symphony Orchestra, the Consortium and Foundation Gran Teatre del Liceu Music education and the Foundation Palau de la Música. Concerning musical training, creation and consumption policies the Cultural and Educational Areas administrate the Conservatory of Music and the Municipal Schools of Music.

The elaboration of this report is based on the analysis of documentary sources from local cultural administration and semi-structured interviews with experts, politicians and technicians that are anonymized and coded³².

³¹Regulated in the Law 7/1985 (of April 2, 1985, Regulating the Bases of the Local Regime. Published in the Official State Gazette No. 80 of April 3, 1985) which defines that heritage protection, cultural promotion and the provision of cultural facilities and services correspond to the local governments.

³² The interviews are coded and correspond to the following groups and profiles (a) cultural policy field: B1 executive bureaucrat, B2 expert, B5 elected official; (b) music sector: B3 elected official, B4 executive bureaucrat, B6 expert and B7 street level bureaucrat.

Objectives and values

Main objectives, values and their evolutions

Since early '80 cultural policy has been becoming more comprehensive, and at the same time more sectorial specialized. A mix of objectives aimed at improving social and cultural infrastructures in a redistributive and community participatory approach alongside supporting the cultural sector and boosting the city through culture from a competitiveness view has led to tensions between social, aesthetic and economic values (Rius and Sánchez Belando, 2015).

Barcelona's cultural policies were reshaped during the Olympic Games (1986-1992) urban renewal project that was a key action for the Barcelona Model of local development fostered by the socialist Mayor Pasqual Maragall (1982-1997). In line with an ongoing entrepreneurial shift of local governance (Balibrea, 2001; Degen & García, 2012; Marshall, 2000) the City Council promoted a sectorial-industrial approach on cultural production, created a public agency for coordinating the sector (The Institute of Culture of Barcelona-ICUB in 1996), fostered public-private governance and strategic management (Rodríguez Morató 2008; Barbieri et al. 2012). From the mid-1990s and throughout the 2000s cultural policy objectives were focused on structuring the cultural sector (Institut de Cultura de Barcelona, 1999, 2006; B1; B2; B3; B5) and increasingly aligned with a market-oriented creative city approach (Sánchez Belando and Zarlenga, 2022). Between 2011 and 2015, fueled by the austerity policies and the victory of a nationalist and right-wing coalition in local government this trend was intensified, giving rise to an instrumental link between culture and global leadership objectives of the city in the tourism, technological and financial sector (Asociación Plan Estratégico Metropolitano de Barcelona, 2010) that relegated policies promoting participation and cultural decentralization (Sánchez Belando, 2015).

In the field of music, the objectives and values were aimed at professionalization, internationalization and artistic excellence. This is concretized by giving support to large institutions and major events in the sector and live music venues, centralized in the city center (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2015). At the same time the access to music education is restrictive for low and lower middle-income families. On the one hand, because of the lack of public music education institutions³³ and on the other, because of the economic cost, which even in the public circuit is high for these income profiles.

Since 2015, with the victory of BeC, governing in coalition with the socialist party (PSC), the question of cultural rights has become central in the discourse of the new elected officials in charge of cultural policy. Following the electoral program proposal, the new government fostered actions aimed at resume more inclusive and community-based cultural policies under a commoning approach on knowledge and culture (Bcn en comú, 2015). The cultural rights approach can be understood as a reaction to the deepening of the economist's viewpoint of cultural policies together with the identity-based turn that some actions took between 2011-2014, focusing on heritage and traditional culture. In contrast, the objectives proposed from 2015 onwards are based on democratic (participation, rights, diversity) and egalitarian values (inclusion, access to culture, gender), social values (social and territorial cohesion) and economic and environmental sustainability. Local strategic planning axes for the period 2016-2019³⁴ (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2016) as well as main goals of the Barcelona

³³ Between 1993 and 2016, five municipal music schools were created and the Barcelona Conservatory of Music became a municipal institution in 1994. In addition to the limited number of public vacancies, in the public circuit, the cost of tuition ([between 900 and 1250 euros per year](#)), the price of instruments and the disposal of other resources, as well as the lack of public support operate as factors of exclusion for families with low and low middle incomes.

³⁴ This Strategic Plan refers to the Barcelona of "good living" (*Buen vivir*), a concept coming from the indigenous movements and later globally spread by the Zapatista movement and Latin American political leaders, such as Evo Morales (Bolivia, 2006-2019) or Rafael Correa (Ecuador 2007-2017).

Cultural Plan 2016 (Comissió de Drets Socials, 2016) were addressed to cultural proximity, cooperativism and ecological transition, community culture and historical memory, territorial budget distribution, and the strengthening of coordination between cultural and educational policies, within a horizon of values of equality and social justice.

The Municipal Action Plan 2020-2023 (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2020) introduced objectives for tackling the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on art, education and sociability spaces, such as encouraging artistic and creative practices in schools and in informal education. In relation to artistic excellence and aesthetic values, the objectives mobilized in the field of music are the artistic promotion of contemporary music and opera, as well as support for cultural venues in order to reactivate live music. (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2023: 33-39). The creation of the Program “Barcelona Creació Sonora”³⁵ is another outcome of the extraordinary COVID-19 funding for culture. Beside this, the promotion of public-community cooperation in cultural creativity and managing cultural programs and facilities appears as a manifestation of democratic values, sustainability and social link.

The Cultural Rights Plan 2021 develops nine axes around two dimensions of cultural participation: the right to access to culture (as an expression of democratization) and the right to contribute to the cultural life of the city (as an expression of creativity and democracy) (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2021: 19). This involves the articulation of various objectives in relation to community action, decentralization and neighborhood identity. In this “grassroots culture” approach, the defense of the labor rights of creators and the socially transformative role of creation are integrated both in the Municipal Action Plan 2020-2023 and in the Cultural Rights Plan of 2021. Support to creators is aimed at cultural projects embedded in the social reality of each neighborhood that are capable of fostering social and democratic values. Another set of objectives is oriented to popular and traditional culture or life-long education, understood as spaces for social cohesion and participation. Gender and ethnicity culture are also objectives that shapes cultural policies linked to the values of equality and diversity³⁶, which since 2019 has been proposed as an influential element in cultural practices and consumption, as well as in the criteria for evaluating support for creators³⁷.

Culture in the public space and community culture in high cultural institutions takes on special relevance. The “Street Music Project” (2004)³⁸ that seeks decentralizing music performance in the city, the innovative policy of the Auditorium of Barcelona and the Museum of Music which is mobilized by objectives of inclusion, equality and diversity in programming and representing music manifestations, or the experience of community opera co-production of the Gran Teatre del Liceu, are examples in this direction.

Hierarchies and tensions between values / internal coherence

In relation to value hierarchies and tensions between values, the findings of work package 2 (D2.7) offer us a first point of support to identify a particular configuration of values in cultural administration that is now useful to move forward in the analysis of the internal coherence of cultural policies in the

³⁵ <https://www.barcelona.cat/barcelonacultura/es/suportcultura/barcelona-creacion-sonora>

³⁶ The Cultural Rights Plan includes specific actions for recognizing the diversity of cultural backgrounds and historical rights of the Romany community (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2021:30)

³⁷ Since 2019, the Culture and Gender working group has operated within the framework of the Program “Cultura Viva” which is responsible for expanding the indicators of cultural uses and public management with a gender perspective. The implementation of this perspective involves, for example, the segregation of data by sex in all centers under the responsibility of the City Council and the evaluation of fellowships and grants under this approach.

³⁸ It is a mechanism for accreditation and creation of broadcasting points for street music. <https://www.barcelona.cat/culturaviva/es/proyecto/musica-al-carrer>

city of Barcelona in the last decade.

A deep-rooted tension in cultural policy is that which confronts the aesthetic, social, equality and economic value of culture. These are tensions that have historically structured the cultural arena and that we find, in different hierarchical relationships in the case of Barcelona, depending on the orientation of local policy in the context of a set of political, social and economic factors of larger scale and temporal scope.

As we have seen, the relevant role that culture takes in the economic impulse and internationalization of Barcelona as a global city since the 1990s, together with the process of gerencialist restructuring of the local administration, gives rise to a hierarchy of values that places economic value and excellence on a higher priority than the social and democratic value of culture, even within the framework of a local social-democratic political agenda. This value configuration is not isolated from the neoliberal turn of public and cultural policies at the international level (Gattinger & Saint-Pierre, 2010; Zimmer & Toepler, 1996). In this policy milieu values such as sustainability, participation, and those urban heritage manifestations that were not of help in promoting the post-industrial and global Barcelona are on the back of the agenda. This implies a disarticulation and defunding of cultural decentralization and proximity policies in favor of promoting large events and emblematic and aesthetically iconic institutions that encourages a competitive valuation of innovation and creativity. (Sánchez Belando, 2015).

While this trend had been being contested by part of the creative workers, as well as social and cultural activism it was not until the social outbreak of 2011 that there was a reconfiguration of cultural values aimed at influencing local institutions. The cultural manifesto of the “Indignados Movement” in Barcelona (Sub-Comissió de Cultura 15M, 2011) suggested a hierarchization of values that challenged the political party in power at the time. The reconfiguration of values that emerged in 2015 also recreates and updates some of the principles of the cultural policies of the early years of the democratic City Council, for example, in terms of citizen participation in cultural policy making, as a way of going beyond the participatory model limited to the cultural sector promoted since the creation of the Barcelona Institute of Culture. Thus, the values that BeC emphasizes are those of welfare, democracy and community participation, equality and the socially transformative value of art and culture, as well as the value of sustainability and labor and social rights in creative work. The new government refounds the discourse and designs the actions of cultural policy on this configuration of values, establishing a confrontation with the economicist articulation of culture and the exclusionary effects of this dynamic in relation to participation in urban cultural life and urban space, given the role of culture in the elitization of some areas of the city.

However, this change faces limits that are the manifestation of tensions between the economic, social, equality and aesthetic value of culture. We find an example of the tension between economic value and the value of equality in the social access to internationally renowned heritage sites. The Picasso Museum in Barcelona, which can be considered extreme in this sense, is inaccessible to the local population due to tourist massification. Despite attempts (by politicians and directors) to mitigate this dynamic of exclusion, the forces of the tourism market remain a constraint on the exercise of a cultural right in such cases (B2, B5). Promoting decentralization also reveal tensions between the social, democratic and aesthetic value in the case of community facilities such as civic centers: fostering of artistic-cultural productions under quality standards in these facilities mitigates the participation of grassroots organizations that remain conditioned to reduced budgets and the management resources of each civic center (B7). Another challenge in this sense for public and private actors involved in culture and the music sector is to shift the bases of legitimization of cultural policy from the economic to the social as well as the predominant aesthetic orientation. This is a tension that is evident in the disputes over cultural discourse between Catalan Socialist Party politicians and municipal technicians who follow the inertia of economic justifications of culture (B5; B3; B6). A concrete limit to the incorporation of new values and a source of conflict between these is often the very dynamics of

management and the daily practices of the actors in the local bureaucratic system (B5; B4).

Implementation coherence

Implementation, strategies and resources

The interventions that have taken place in the last decade can be grouped into those aligned with the economy of culture and knowledge and those proposed along the lines of the educational city.

With respect to the first group, we highlight the support to the creative industries (video games, publishing and animation, audiovisual³⁹), which is expressed in the creation of specific Departments in the Institute of Culture: “Promotion of the Cultural Sectors” and “Creativity and Innovation”. In terms of the internationalization of the city, the cultural administration promoted Barcelona's cultural capital status and created the “Barcelona Capital”⁴⁰ Direction which includes music and the management of international relations. Cultural Policy in coordination with creative economy fostered the Barcelona Science Program and the “Cultural Ring” for creative excellence⁴¹, inaugurated the Museum of World Cultures (2012) and the Design Museum (2013) and supported Big Music Festivals, such as Sònar and Primavera Sound.

In connection with the lines of the educational city the BeC government include different actions in the two Cultural Plan⁴² developed since 2016. Main actions were vertebrated around decentralization, social economy and common culture (concerning creation and management), as well as socioeconomic inequalities, gender and ethnicity perspectives as cross-cutting elements. The creation of the Program “Cultura Viva” aimed at co-designing and co-producing with local actors’ involvement public policies fostering cultural rights, participation and community strengthening in the city, is the main example in this direction.

The Plan of 2016 “Towards a change of model: Cultures of Barcelona” (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2016) promotes the decentralization of music and performing arts major events to the neighborhoods, as in the case of the “Festa Major de la Ciutat” (La Mercé); or to other cities, as in the case of the Primavera Sound Music Festival. At the same time, neighborhood cultural activities are intensified, as well as support for cooperation between community facilities and high culture institutions.

As part of the heritage and memory policies, the Memory and History Plan is designed to stimulate the right of citizens to build an image of the past. This Plan, which is linked to democratic values and local identity, promotes a set of programs involving schools and the creation of a network of memory organizations. Another action within this framework is to include in the heritage catalog the local retail network, urban complexes or degraded infrastructures for community use. The creation of the Housing Museum (2023) and the Citizen Heritage Program (2017)⁴³, are examples of this orientation.

This shift towards community cultural action has had a certain impact on musical institutions of high

³⁹ An example is the promotion of the “Bcn Film Comission” <https://www.bcncatfilmcommission.com/es> a Municipal outsourced service to support audiovisual production.

⁴⁰ [Organizational Chart of the Institute of Culture of Barcelona](#), published on September 19, 2011.

⁴¹ a public-private action that involves theaters, libraries, museums, civic centers, arts factories, industries, companies and universities.

⁴² Both are in connection with the Municipal Action Programs (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2016, 2020) to which we also refer in this report.

⁴³ A catalog of disused urban infrastructures that could be rehabilitated for social and cultural uses. (Sánchez Belando & Pradel i Miquel, 2021).

culture. An example is the program "Opera Prima" (2018)⁴⁴ of the Gran Teatre del Liceu that led to the realization in 2022 of "La Gata Perduda" (The lost Cat) the first community opera co-produced with the neighbors of one of the neighborhoods with the lowest income in the city, the Raval. Despite criticism of this intervention for its cosmetic and exceptional character (B4) by an institution representing the cultural, political and economic elite of the city, this community opera has also been interpreted as a means of aligning the Gran Teatre del Liceu with the cultural rights approach promoted by the City Council (B1; B3; B5).

The Cultural Plan "Fem Cultura. Barcelona Cultural Rights Plan" (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2021) makes progress on some actions that are worth highlighting.

Interventions on cultural community action take place in articulation with programs aimed at territorial equality, such as the "Neighborhood Plan"⁴⁵ that expands its artistic-cultural dimension for valorizing daily life and collective memory of neighborhoods historically stigmatized or excluded in the narrative about global Barcelona (B5). It is interesting to note that these actions are deployed from a perspective that opposes a localist and romanticized narrative of the neighborhood reality, but is proposed as an exercise of collective critical thinking that seeks explanations of this reality by placing it in the context of macro social and macro historical factors⁴⁶.

The development of the grants program for creation and innovation in cultural practices, the new Artistic Residencies Plan (aimed at expanding this service from 5 to 20 residencies for creators), as well as the opening of the Barcelona House of Music (2022) are oriented to support artistic creation in a way that combines values of excellence, equality, social link and economy. In coordination with these actions and values, the Training Plan for cultural professionals managed by the employment area and the social economy area aims to offer training in management, business models, entrepreneurship and innovation. The creation of the program of subsidized prices for the affordable rental of spaces for cultural creation and dissemination is another complementary intervention in the area of promoting the right to creation and the social rights of cultural workers.

Another group of interventions shows the strengthening of the relationship between culture and education. Among these, we can highlight the expansion of municipal programs to promote artistic creation within educational centers in the area of music ("En Residència"), dance ("Tot Dansa") and theatre, "Escena Pilot")⁴⁷ and the promotion of the program "Companionships and Links" in the high schools of performing arts and visual arts of the city or the expansion of the number of municipal schools of music and arts.

In the field of dissemination of creation, science and knowledge the Biennial of European art Manifesta planned for 2024 and the Biennial of Thought (created in 2018) constitute two major events with a global dimension that aim to work critically on the relationships between culture, city and citizenship within a framework of democratic, social, aesthetic, innovation, welfare, sustainability and equality values. Both actions reflect the transversal vision of art and education, science and innovation, territory and memory promoted by the cultural administration since 2016 (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2021; B5).

⁴⁴ Funded by the Project TRACTION Opera Co-creation for a social transformation. <https://www.traction-project.eu/>

⁴⁵ <https://www.pladebarris.barcelona/>

⁴⁶ The participatory activities of the [Housing Museum](#) and the [photographic reports](#) on the city's working-class neighborhoods illustrate this perspective.

⁴⁷ <https://www.enresidencia.org/es>
<https://ajuntament.barcelona.cat/educacio/es/tot-dansa>
<https://ajuntament.barcelona.cat/educacio/es/escena-pilot>

Resources

Over the last decade the budget⁴⁸ has tended to grow regularly, except for the years in which the global crisis of 2008 impacted more strongly on Southern European economies, weakening local welfare systems (Andreotti *et al.*, 2012). In the case of Barcelona, cuts in the cultural budget can be mainly observed between 2011-2013 while there is a growing tendency to link culture with a strategy of economic growth of the city focused on a greater promotion of mass tourism, real estate, the new information technologies industry and finance, as sectors of the knowledge based-economy (Ramon and Rodríguez, 2014). Under this approach, and during the most acute years of the crisis, the local government and the cultural administration prioritized the promotion of creativity, innovation and knowledge as part of economic reactivation and job creation. The local strategic planning in 2012 highlights as a core goal "to make Barcelona the city of culture, knowledge, innovation, creativity and science in order to generate a favorable environment for attracting and retaining talent" (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2015: 53).

Since 2012 to 2023 public expenditure on culture has increased from 4,5% to 6,6% in the global municipal budget, reaching the highest percentage of the last decade and representing one of the highest in the Spanish state for local administration (UNCHARTED Deliverable 4.1; B3; B5). Reactions to the COVID-19 pandemic had an impact in the cultural budget that increased from 4.5% to 6.6% between 2020 and 2021 in order to specially support live entertainment, such as music⁴⁹. Among the main actions, we highlight the extraordinary budget allocation to the sector (10 million euros) in 2020 to fund cultural facilities and a cultural voucher to promote consumption (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2020: 39).

Table 1. Cultural budget evolution (millions of euros)

	Cultural	Municipal	% Cultural
2011	117,32	2.517,44	4,7
2012	114,87	2.579,64	4,5
2013	104,93	2.298,90	4,6
2014	132,87	2.574,00	5,2
2015	136,67	2.550,57	5,4
2016	134,10	2.455,93	5,5
2017	147,88	2.736,18	5,4
2018	146,47	2.739,96	5,4
2019	149,99	2.902,26	5,2
2020	150,72	3.352,16	4,5
2021	160,20	3.253,30	6,6
2022	167,20	3.406,20	6,6
2023	180,20	3.500,90	6,6

Source: Own elaboration based on the Municipal consolidated budget⁵⁰.

The periodized analysis of the cultural budget allows us to see changes in the distribution of resources by programs. Some of the most significant are the increase in the item for Museums, Libraries,

⁴⁸ Budget data refer to 2011/2012 - 2022/2023. In relation to the periods of government, considering that legislatures do not begin and end with the calendar year, we take the first and the last year of legislature with executed annual budgets.

⁴⁹ https://ajuntament.barcelona.cat/turisme/ca/noticia/ajuts-perque-hi-hagi-concerts-a-lestiu_1061327

⁵⁰ <https://ajuntament.barcelona.cat/estadistica/castella/Anuaris/>

performing arts and music, and cultural identity (see graphic 1). It should be noted that starting in 2013 the cultural administration item began to be distributed in the other ones. That explains the contrast between 2012 and 2022 in that case. In addition, this leads to an increase in the budget of the other programs.


Table 2. Budget by cultural program and period of government (millions of euros)

	2012-2015		2016-2019		2020-2022	
Program	2012	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Cultural Administration	94,37	10,77	21,80	16,50	10,60	32,10
Libraries	0,10	12,33	14,80	13,90	16,80	16,30
Museums and Visual Arts	0,37	46,42	51,50	48,40	65,40	61,70
Performance Arts and music	0,00	17,29	17,80	18,60	22,30	18,20
Cultural Identity Promotion	4,25	15,36	16,40	22,20	22,80	21,40
Historical and Artistic Heritage	0,00	0,21	0,20	0,20	0,20	0,20
Community Centers	10,92	11,91	14,60	17,40	19,40	20,30
Popular and Folk Events	2,37	7,02	7,30	8,90	6,80	9,50
Total	112,37	121,30	144,30	146,20	164,30	179,70

Source: Own elaboration based on the Municipal executed budget⁵¹.

The contrast between the first (2012) and the last year (2022) of the budget period analyzed shows, in general, more relevant increases if we compare absolute numbers. However, the comparison in relation to the global culture budget allows a more nuanced view in the case of community centers, for example, and a more contrasted view in the case of museums.

Graphic 1. Budget distribution by Program (Percentage)



Source: Own elaboration based on the Municipal executed budget.

The municipal resources distributed among the Consortiums and Foundations, are also a way of assessing the coordination between public and private actors within music sector. Public

⁵¹ <https://ajuntament.barcelona.cat/estrategiaifinances/es/pol%C3%ADtica-de-gasto-de-cultura>

administration support to these entities have increased from 42,60 million euros in 2012 to 129,45 in 2020. Nevertheless, the percentage of municipal contribution to Major Music Institutions has decreased from 42,5% in 2012 to 9,9% in 2020. It must be considered the incorporation of alternative funding sources, such as european funding (in the case of Gran Teatre del Liceu) and extraordinary funding COVID-19 (in the case of the Program Barcelona Creació Sonora managed by this Entities).

Table 3: Municipal funding to Consortiums and Foundations

Public funded Consortiums and Foundations (millions euros)	2012		2014		2016		2018		2020	
	Euros	%	Euros	%	Euros	%	Euros	%	Euros	%
Cons. de l'Auditori i l'Orquestra	7,70	18,1	6,72	22,4	9,56	17,6	8,80	16,1	10,33	8,0
Cons. del Gran Teatre del Liceu	5,03	11,8	0,89	2,9	0,10	0,2	0,11	0,2	0,10	0,1
Found. del Gran Teatre del Liceu	4,86	11,4	2,57	8,6	2,77	5,1	2,35	4,3	2,37	1,8
Found. Orfeo Català - Palau de la Música	0,54	1,3	0,46	1,5	0,64	1,2	0,46	0,8	0,00	0,0
TOTAL	42,60	42,6	30,05	35,4	54,22	24,1	54,80	21,4	129,45	9,9

Source: Own elaboration based on the Municipal Statistical Annual 2012-2020⁵².

The municipal contribution to cultural subsidies is a data of interest in an administrative configuration in which the participation of non-state actors is relevant. The data show a general increase in subsidy items between 2012 - 2022 (see Table 3). However, if we look at the data of the Area of Culture and the Institute of Culture, we find divergent movements. In the first case the percentage in relation with the total budget almost triples, growing from 12.7% in 2012 to 29.8% in 2022. In the case of ICUB, however, we see that the percentage of funding for subsidies within the global budget for cultural subsidies decreases from 87.42% in 2012 to 70.21% in 2022. In comparison with other areas of the local administration, ICUB and the area of culture are, respectively, the managing body and the area with the largest budget for subsidies (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2022: 53).

Table 4. Cultural subsidies evolution (millions of euros)

	2012-2015		2016-2019		2020-2022	
	2012	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Area of Culture, Education, Science and Community	0,54	0,43	1,15	2,56	1,09	2,07
Institute of Culture - ICUB	3,70	3,99	4,02	5,12	4,87	4,88
Total	4,23	4,42	5,16	7,69	5,96	6,95

Source: Own elaboration based on the Report 2022 of the Municipal Central Office of Subsidies.

Coherence of implementation with regard to main values

The period starting in 2011, characterized by the effect of austerity policies and the neoconservative turn in local government, allows us to observe a certain correspondence between the values prevailing in those years (economy, innovation, competitiveness, aesthetic excellence,) and the main actions included in the strategic planning and local cultural administration. City Council reinforces its role as "facilitator" in local policies and the programs developed are guided by objectives of economic rationalization and aimed at cultural entrepreneurship.

An example of this consonance is the creation of the Departments "Promotion of the Cultural Sectors",

⁵²<https://ajuntament.barcelona.cat/estadistica/angles/Anuaris/Anuaris/anuari19/cap06/index.htm>

"Creativity and Innovation" and "Barcelona Capital" (see page 6 of this report) in the Institute of Culture, the support to cultural and creative industries (audiovisual, for example) or the policies of cultural city branding. Some examples in this regard are the promotion of the Barcelona Science Program and the Cultural Ring Program, the creation of the Museum of World Cultures (2012) and the Museum of Design (2013). Nevertheless, of this set of actions, the ones that particularly stand out are those linked to the tourism industry and internationalization. The cultural budget cuts, the centrality of enterprises sponsorship (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2012; 2013) and the promotion of Major events such as the Primavera Sound⁵³ and Sònar Festival, or the creation of museums linked to tourist circuits, show a consonance between actions and the economic, competitiveness and efficiency values in management and creation attributed to culture in those years (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2012, 2013; B5). These actions contrast with the innovative and knowledge dimensions of the creative city narrative that the local government emphasizes in the Barcelona Brand campaign "Barcelona Inspires"⁵⁴ which is protagonized by celebrities such as Ferrán Adrià or Messi.

With the arrival of Barcelona en comú (BeC) in 2015, we observe in a general way a wider correspondence between values, actions, budget allocation and the profile of the politicians in charge of the cultural administration. The evolution of this alignment is affected in 2016 because of the government agreement between BeC and the Socialist Party (PSC) that assumes the government of the cultural administration. The new head of cultural policy seeks to restore the economic value of culture as an element of international competitiveness and economic growth of the city. He also deactivates the development of the collective agreement that the workers of the sector and the cultural policy leader were promoting⁵⁵. This is a moment of tension between values (democratic and social versus economic and aesthetic) and inconsistency between actions and social and sectorial demands. The most radical projects of democratic deepening from culture (such as the community management of a large cultural facility, the Arnau Theater) are paralyzed, generating dissonances and resignations (effective and rhetorical) in relation to citizen participation in the cultural field and with the political project of BeC for the cultural sector.

With the rupture of the BeC and PSC government pact at the end of 2017 and after a period of crisis of leadership of the cultural administration, the responsibility for cultural policy is once again in charge of a BeC politician who reinforces the social and community value of culture, cultural democracy and the importance of the articulation between social, educational and cultural policies to promote equal access and the exercise of cultural rights. Based on this impulse, measures included in the Cultural Rights Plan (2021) called "Fem Cultura" ("We make culture", in an evocation of citizen participation in the design of cultural policy) are proposed. In 2021, the new head of the administration promotes a line of continuity with this project, reinforcing the educational city approach and promoting actions that show a challenging articulation of the local and global dimensions as well as the social and aesthetic values of culture (see table 4).

Regarding the materiality of the actions, the data support the argument of coherence between values, actions and resources which is given by a generalized and significant increase in the cultural budget in relation to the overall municipal budget from 2015 (see table 1, 2 and graph 1) and the increase in the budget of central programs in the two culture plans for the period 2015-2023 such as Libraries, performing arts and music, and cultural Identity that includes interventions oriented to collective memory, diversity and equality in relation to gender, ethnicity and the social and cultural representation of the local territory. As we have seen the budget increase to community centers in absolute terms almost doubles from the period 2012-2015 to 2016-2022. The nuance that we have

⁵³ <https://ajuntament.barcelona.cat/premsa/2014/05/23/jaume-ciurana-participa-en-la-presentacio-de-la-14a-edicio-del-festival-primavera-sound/>

⁵⁴ <https://www.barcelona.cat/bcnmetropolis/2007-2017/en/dossier/barcelona-inspira/>

⁵⁵ <https://www.ugt.cat/sindicats-empreses-i-administracio-acorden-crear-una-taula-de-treball-per-a-la-redaccio-dun-conveni-regulador-del-sector-de-la-cultura/>

commented in the previous section in relation to the percentage that this increase represents must be contextualized in the increase of the overall municipal budget since 2016. The change in the dynamics of the budget for subventions shown by the decrease in ICUB's budget compared to the increase in funds for the Area of Culture is in line with the actions aimed at grassroots culture, decentralization and community culture, which are more often carried out through this administration and not through the Institute of Culture. The decrease in support for ICUB can be associated with the argument, expressed in the interviews, that the cultural sector is already sufficiently consolidated and now is the time to promote the exercise of cultural rights (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2021, B1; B3; B5). In general terms, the analysis of the budget can guide us in the coherence between values and actions, however it must be taken into account that the budget items are limited to observe the coherence between values and actions that are explained by the cooperation and cross-fertilization between programs and policies (cultural, educational, social, urban planning and community action, etc) promoted by BeC (Ajuntament de Barcelona- Sisena Tinència d'Alcaldia Àrea de Cultura, Educació, Ciència i Comunitat, 2021; B5).

Table 5. Intervention fields and values per periods of government

	Main interventions	Main values
2012 -2015	Cultural and creative Industries (e. creation of specific areas, Major events and Music Festivals, Program Cultural Ring) Cultural and creative City Branding (e. creation of specific area, Museums, Branding Campaigns) Promotion of Public-Enterprise cooperation (e. fostering enterprises involvement in managing and supporting programs and institutions)	Market-centered economy Competitiveness and efficiency Aesthetic as artistic excellence Well-being as hedonism and entertainment
2016-2019	Community participation mechanisms (e. "Cultura Viva") Cultural decentralization and access (e. La Mercè at the neighborhoods) Commoning culture and Public-Community cooperation (e. Citizen Heritage Program) Promotion of Social Economy in the cultural services and production (e. social value criteria to assess projects and stakeholders in the local cultural system) Gender equity and cultural diversity (new approach on grants evaluation) Major events and Programs globally connected and aimed at local needs (e. Plan for the Promotion of Reading and Books; Biennial of Thought. Memory Policies (e. Memory and History Plan, Housing Museum)	Democracy as cultural and civic participation Equality as social class and gender inclusiveness in cultural life (practice/consumption) Social-centered economy Aesthetic as social creativity and excellence Social Link as community and territorial cohesion Identity as collective memory and diversity-equity in community and territorial representation Sustainability Well-being as sensitivity
2020-2022	Cultural decentralization and access (e. new cultural actions in the Neighborhood Planning; supporting community centers; Master Plan Libraries 2030; Street Music Project; cultural voucher) Community participation mechanisms (e. Participatory process to develop the Barcelona Cultural Rights Plan 2021) Promotion of Social Economy in the cultural services and production (e. social value criteria to assess projects and stakeholders in the local cultural system) Commoning culture and Public-Community cooperation (e. Citizen Heritage Program; expansion of community management in cultural facilities; Program "Opera Prima") Enhancing the interplay Education-Culture (e. Educational city; cultural voucher, "En Residència", "Tot Dansa") Promotion of socially embedded creativity and innovation (e. Artistic Residencies Plan; Barcelona House of Music; Biennial of Thought) Gender and ethnicity equity (e. new approach on grants evaluation, coordination with ethnic communities) Promotion of Major events and Programs globally connected and aimed at local needs (e. Biennial of Thought; Manifesta 2024) Promotion of Memory Policies (e. Memory and History Plan, Housing Museum)	Equality as social class, gender and ethnicity inclusiveness in cultural life (practice/consumption) Democracy as cultural and civic participation Social-centered economy Aesthetic as excellence and social creativity Social Link as community and territorial cohesion Identity as collective memory and diversity-equity in community and territorial representation Sustainability Well-being as sensitivity

Source: Own elaboration based on documentary analysis and interviews

Finally, coherence can also be measured by the interventions that are rejected. This is the case of BeC's policy of not supporting the creation of new facilities that can become "White Elephants", refusing Museum franchises and decreasing support and decentralizing major international events. Under this perspective, the creation of the Museum of Architecture in 2016 was not approved, nor was the installation of the Hermitage Museum in 2021 in the city's port accepted (B3; B5). In this sense, BeC's cultural policy has maintained coherence with the values of sustainability and participation that it defends by seeking a more efficient use of existing facilities, as well as the adaptation of disused infrastructures (Comissió de Drets Socials, 2016; Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2020, 2021).

Governance, adaptability and social accuracy

Democratic openness, dialogue with stakeholders and power relations

The nationalist and neoconservative party in local power between 2011-2015 promotes a policy of attracting market actors in local and cultural governance. As we have seen, a policy of participation of large international companies (such as Samsung and Vueling) is deployed through sponsorship (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2012, 2013), a closer relationship between culture and tourism is favored (supporting major events and deregulating the use of public space in historic neighborhoods and areas of concentration of historical and artistic heritage value, such as the axis formed by the "Sagrada Família" and one of the treasures of modernist architecture, the Sant Pau Hospital. As a result, these changes give more power in governance relations to private for-profit actors. The track data of the subsidy budget shows that the 2012-2014 period is the one with the lowest economic endowment of the decade. If we consider that cultural associations are the main grant claimants (79%) (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2022: 22, 43, 45) we see an impoverished third cultural sector with little power to act in cultural governance in relation to local institutions. Despite these constraints, the third cultural sector is a relevant actor in cultural governance, in particular in the case of music education, a practice still distinctive (B4; B5; B6) and restricted to low and lower middle-income families⁵⁶. An example is the VOZES project which, inspired by the Venezuelan Youth Symphony Orchestra model, constitutes a network of choirs and orchestras active in vulnerable neighborhoods of the city that pursue values of equality, inclusion and well-being through the practice of music.

In the context of austerity policies, paradoxically, the local government promotes citizens involvement in managing proximity culture through informal and unfunded agreements that make the sociocultural sphere precarious and instrumentalize citizen participation as a low-cost resource for the implementation of programs and policies (Sánchez Belando, 2015; B1; B2; B3; B5).

Governance, adaptability and social accuracy

The change of political color in the local government with the arrival of BeC favored the institutionalization of some of the aspirations that social movements and cultural workers had been pursuing for the last decades. The main demands were focused on the democratization and decommodification of cultural governance relations. This took the form of demands for more citizen participation in cultural consumption, practices and decisions, improved labor conditions for cultural work and a greater share of power for social and solidarity economy actors (cooperatives, associations) in cultural governance. The demands made by the social movements that had brought BeC to local government called for the strengthening of redistributive policies in favor of equality and recognition policies in favor of diversity, both based on a wider opening of local institutions to the citizenry. In this line, participatory mechanisms that go beyond the cultural sector have been developed⁵⁷ to involve citizens in decision-making (participatory processes, thematic forums, commissions), in implementation (instruments to regulate civic and public-community management of cultural spaces, permits for the opening and management of live music venues promoted by companies and social organizations) and in the evaluation of cultural policy (introduction of indicators and evaluation criteria to favor gender equality and cultural diversity, social value and equal access).

⁵⁶ Between 1993 and 2016, five municipal music schools were created and the Barcelona Conservatory of Music became a municipal institution in 1994. In addition to the limited number of public vacancies, in the public circuit, the cost of tuition ([between 900 and 1250 euros per year](#)), the price of instruments and the disposal of other resources, as well as the lack of public support operate as factors of exclusion for families with low and low middle incomes.

⁵⁷ A concern that had been growing in this regard was the limitations of the Cultural Council of the ICUB, which only allowed the participation of the cultural sector under unequal conditions and in a non-binding form.

We can observe that, although partially and with limits, the main claims raised have been addressed. The leadership crisis and the conflict of cultural values between the model of cultural policies developed by the PSC versus the one promoted by BeC during the first legislature (2015-2019) imposed concrete limitations that deactivated initiatives of participatory governance in high culture facilities and frustrated the implementation of a specific collective bargaining agreement for cultural workers.

Conclusion

The case of Barcelona reveals the values, objectives and actions that characterize two contrasting periods of cultural policy (2011-2015 and 2015-2019) and informs us about the consonances and dissonances of cultural policy in each of them. One issue to be stressed is that both periods are affected by great crises: that of 2008 and that of COVID-19. This exceptionality makes the divergence of values in each period more visible.

The predominant cultural policy objectives and music sector ones between 2011-2015 were oriented to a market-centered economy and based in competitiveness, efficiency and aesthetic excellence as main values. Nevertheless, this period could be understood as an acceleration of a neoliberal trend of culture policy that had been in progress since the mid-1990s. In 2011 the government in power benefits forms of intervention and alliances oriented towards a "facilitator" state at the local level and prioritizes objectives of economic re-nationalization and entrepreneurship in cultural administration. In this context we can observe a lack of coherence between the values that operate at the discursive level and the actions in some of the dimensions of the policies oriented to the cultural-cognitive economy. In this sense, what we identify is a rhetoric that values cultural and scientific innovation oriented to local development, while executing cultural interventions in favour of the tourism industry, attracting investors and elite workers.

Moreover, during this period we observe an ambiguous position in relation to citizen participation in local cultural policy. While on the one hand the local government is in favour of cultural decentralization and community management of culture, on the other hand, budgets for local cultural programs and facilities are cut, as well as subsidies to the third cultural sector. Looking at these dynamics in detail, what is observed is not so much an incoherence, but a correspondence between the neoconservative perspective of the local government on the role of the state and an instrumental vision of citizen participation in the deployment of cultural policies.

The cultural policies promoted by the BeC since 2015 are structured as a response to the trend of a market-centered cultural policy, predominant in the previous period and to the claims of social movements and cultural workers in relation to the expansion of rights in the cultural sphere. As we have seen throughout the analysis, the cultural administration in this period attempts to promote participation in three senses: as consumption, as practice and as the capacity to influence policy making. The Culture Plans (2016 and 2021) are the result of a participatory process with the citizenry and not exclusively with professionals and cultural corporations. We have also observed that the promotion of public-community cooperation in the design and management of cultural programs and spaces corresponds to predominant and transversal values such as equality in its different dimensions, democracy and social values. As a whole, this favours a change in the hierarchies of value and in the dynamics of local cultural governance, which becomes more permeable to actors of the social economy and cultural associations. The balance between social, democratic and aesthetic values (as shown by the inconsistencies between the promotion of participation and cultural decentralization and artistic excellence in the neighborhoods) remains a challenge throughout this period. However, the closer articulation between the Institute of Culture and the Program "Neighborhood Plan", the emerging openness of the institutions of high culture in the field of music to the local community and local artists, as well as the increased interaction between the cultural and educational administrations

have addressed these pitfalls in an innovative way, with results that can be assessed in the mid and long-term. Finally, we have also noted that some of the contradictions and limits in this period are related to market dynamics (articulation between culture, tourist industry and territorial management) and administrative and legal dynamics (collective agreements and labor rights for cultural work, access to artistic training, models of governance of cultural institutions) whose transformation is conditioned by factors and actors operating on a regional, national and global scale.

2. Introduction to the French cases

In terms of its cultural policies, France corresponds to what McCaughey and Chartrand (1989) have described as the "architect" model, which frames the conditions under which public cultural services are defined and implemented. This model is characterized, on the one hand, by the presence of a Ministry of Culture, and, on the other, by a logic of direct intervention in the culture field, in contrast to the Anglo-Saxon tradition of "at arms' length" action, based on the role of Arts and Culture Councils. These two elements are typical not only of France, but also of many other southern European countries, such as Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece (Négrier, 2007). But they do not reflect the aims of these policies, the framework of their governance or the values on which they are based.

From the point of view of goals, we can consider that over the history of a ministry dating back to 1959, five major paradigms have successively appeared on the government agenda. Prior to the creation of the Ministry, the objective of cultural policy was essentially defined around artistic excellence. With the creation of the Ministry, and its own need for legitimization, the notion of cultural democratization became the watchword for public action, although it was not always publicly expressed in this way. In addition to simple artistic excellence, it became imperative to ensure that as many people as possible had access to public cultural offerings, whether heritage or creative. From the 1970s to the 2000s, this principle was discussed in three directions, each with a new purpose. Democratization, seen as excessively top-down and elitist, was succeeded by a more horizontal vision, based on the notions of cultural development and cultural democracy, and since the beginning of the 21st century, cultural rights. The forces driving this discussion are essentially territorial actors (associations, local authorities, cultural actors involved in territorial rather than sectoral dynamics) and representatives of genres or aesthetics dominated within the classical framework: popular music, street art, new urban aesthetics (graffiti, hip-hop, etc.). On the other hand, and also for legitimization purposes, the creative economy paradigm has been used to provide further justification for government action on culture. Finally, in recent years, the theme of ecological transition has come to challenge the overly "self-centered" nature of cultural policy goals, proposing that they be reinserted into the more global framework of contemporary societal issues (Négrier, 2023).

There are two major characteristics of this cultural policy system. The first is that, unlike many other fields of action (agricultural policy, foreign policy, economic policy, etc.), there is no real paradigm shift in cultural policy. The old paradigms (excellence, democratization) continue to be politically effective, even when a new goal emerges. This new goal always claims to replace the others, but in reality it simply adds to them. If there is no paradigm shift, it's because the actors and interests that objectively support each of them remain present and powerful in the system. The paradigm shift is therefore not one of substitution, but of accumulation and bargaining. This leads to two constraints. Firstly, cultural policy is always an unstable compromise between these goals. Secondly, cultural policies multiply their claims in terms of objectives, while resources remain relatively stable. This scissor effect has an impact on relations between levels of government.

The second characteristic of the French cultural policy system is its cooperative nature. It was born of the need for the initial ministry to find political and financial support for its own actions. It took on a new dimension with the political decentralization of the 1980s, when the powers of local and regional authorities were strengthened. It then developed around the practice of cultural development agreements, joint participation (State, Region, Département, Communes) in the funding of artistic and heritage institutions, and even cultural events.

Table 1. Evolution of cultural public funding in France (2014-2020 ; Millions €)

	2014	2019	2020
État : ministry of Culture	3400	3620	3658
Regions	773	760	802
Départements	1355	1044	1047
EPCI**	1460*	1976	1728
Communes	4721	5540	5120

* Data 2015; ** Établissements Publics de Coopération Intercommunales (intermunicipal cooperation bodies)

Source: Own elaboration

Here's a table reporting the breakdown of public funding for culture between the State and local authorities since 2015. It clearly shows that the various actors involved in cultural policies are in a rather slow evolution of their cultural budgets, but also that the State, through the Ministry of Culture and its other components (other ministries, fiscal support instruments⁵⁸), must largely take into account the role of local and regional authorities. Chartrand and McCaughey's Architect is no longer the only master on board; he has become a cooperator.

But this cultural cooperation is also unstable, as the table does not show (Teillet, 2022). This instability refers in particular to the values on which these policies are based, as they evolve. For each of the levels of action we are now going to study (National, Regional, Urban-Metropolitan), we will show how useful it is to look at cultural policy values. After identifying them, we'll examine their coherence, mode of governance and consistency.

2.1. Ministry of Culture, France

Objectives and values

At a first, very general level, the values basing the French Cultural Policy are known and consensual. They can be deduced from the republican triptych: Liberty, Equality, Fraternity. The value of "freedom" consists in the idea that artistic creation is free, which refers to the responsibility of the public authorities to limit as far as possible any control over creation, but also to implement the means necessary for artistic creation and its public audience. Freedom" therefore refers to two values, aesthetic and economic, which underpin the organisation of the Ministry into thematic sectors. The value of "equality" emphasises the public authorities' responsibility to ensure that as many people as possible have access to cultural practices. The value of access, often linked to an objective of democratisation, is coupled with a value in terms of sovereignty, whereby culture not only makes society within its territory, but also manifests itself as such in an international influence. The value of "fraternity" concerns both universalism and diversity: universalism refers to the idea that culture is a

⁵⁸ The cultural expenditure of other ministries is very diverse. In the case of the Ministry of Education, this includes the remuneration of teachers in arts subjects, delegates for cultural action within the administration of the Ministry of Education, and the funding of cultural projects within schools. For the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this includes funding for foreign cultural policy (French Cultural Institutes and Centres, cultural staff in embassies, export support, etc.). For the other ministries, this mainly involves the management of museums (e.g. Musée de la Marine, for the Ministry of Defence), funding for the creation of libraries and joint cultural initiatives between the Ministry of Culture and other ministries. In 2020, this amount is estimated at €4.4 billion, to which must be added €1.5 billion in tax expenditure in favour of culture, resulting from tax breaks granted to the cultural sector (e.g. reduced VAT on books).

foundation of a national community without discrimination linked to the geographical, social or cultural origins of populations; diversity refers to the possibility offered to everyone to develop their cultural capacities, to place them in a framework of exchange and cooperation, and to be encouraged by public action to do so.

More generally still, the value of a cultural policy is based on the belief that access to culture is a major lever for citizenship in a democratic society.

In France, instability is not linked to the existence of values specific to one level that are opposed to those of another. Everyone shares these values and beliefs, albeit at a high level of generality. Rather, it is linked to two phenomena. Firstly, each level hierarchises these values differently. For example, as we shall see, the Ministry undoubtedly places more emphasis than others on the notion of 'freedom', in that it relates directly to its responsibility for supporting professional artists and cultural facilities. Territorial authorities (regions, départements, communes) place greater emphasis on the notions of access and diversity. The major difference between ministerial policy and that of local authorities is that culture is the sole object of specialisation for the former, while for the latter it competes with other principles and values, such as economic development, political legitimacy, social cohesion, etc.

On the other hand, the instability surrounding values is the result of an ongoing controversy over the meaning to be given to these values and their articulation, in a context of cooperative government. It is the operational and political meaning given to these values that is the subject of tension between these levels. For example: what respective importance should be given to artistic production (closer to the notion of "freedom") and to dissemination (closer to the notion of access)? What is the legitimate relationship between universalism and diversity when it comes to choosing the management of an arts institution? Should creative freedom be defended in and of itself, or should it be defended in conjunction/negotiation with the values of access and diversity? On all these questions, there is a plurality of positions which explains the structural instability in the promotion of cultural policies.

Implementation coherence

General implementation presentation

The Ministry's embodiment of these values is formally faithful to the architect's model. It is divided into three thematic directorates: General Directorate for Heritage and Architecture (DGPA); General Directorate for Creation (DGCA); General Directorate for Medias et and Cultural Industries (DG-MIC); plus two more transversal delegations: General Delegation for Transmission, Territories and Cultural Democracy (DG2TDC); General Delegation for French Language and Languages of France (DG2LF). 79 public establishments are attached to the Ministry, including the national centers dedicated to the various sectors; as well as 20 services with national competence, such as the national museums or the National Archives. A General Inspectorate, a Department of Studies and Forecasting, and several support functions are attached to a General Secretariat, which also acts as a link with the Ministry's regional administration. In each region, the Ministry has a Regional Cultural Affairs Office (Regional Direction for Cultural Affairs - DRAC), whose staff report not only to their regional superiors, but also to the above-mentioned national directorates. The last decade has seen a twofold territorial evolution. On the one hand, regional departments have been given an increasing number of responsibilities (so called "deconcentration") vis-à-vis general management. On the other hand, the regional directorates have developed a network of agents at departmental level, the "conseillers à l'action culturelle" (special advisors for cultural action). They embody a desire for cultural action that is more sensitive to the diversity of intra-regional territories, where they interact with local authorities, prefects representing the State, and of course cultural actors.

Tableau 1. Evolution of the ministry of Culture budget (2017-2022) by main programs

	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Culture	2849	2913	2949	3163	3201	3461
- Heritage	878	898	949	1109	1012	1023
- Creation	784	796	779	900	861	915
- Transmission/Democratization	490	510	514	505	577	748
- Staff Costs	697	709	707	650	665	683
Higher Education & Research	113	111	109	108*		
Cultural Industries	549	547	577	1146	604	675
Total	3511	3571	3635	4418	3805	4136

* Then (2021 and after) integrated into "Transmission/Democratization"

Source: Own elaboration

The budgetary balance of power between these different thematic departments is changing slowly. Heritage accounts for the largest share (1.02 billion euros in 2022), ahead of Creation (915 million euros), the transversal program linked to the new delegation, DG2TDC (748 million), and Cultural Industries (324 million excluding press and media; 675 including them). This presentation does not allow us to identify a hierarchy of values based on the budget. Even if most of the organization (excluding DG2TDC) is based on sectors (and therefore prioritizes sectoral identity in aesthetic and economic terms), each integrates sub-objectives that refer here to equality of access, there to cultural diversity of forms and audiences. In this respect, the recent creation of the DG2TDC does not give it a monopoly on these latter values. On the contrary, it introduces competition between departments to maintain a plurality of values pursued within the heritage, creation and industry departments.

Coherence of implementation

The first observation to be made is that the use of values to explain cultural policy is often implicit. More often than not, our interlocutors, whether at the top of the Ministry's hierarchy, in its national agencies or territorial divisions, or whether they are institutional interlocutors, are very circumspect when it comes to using the notion of value to justify French cultural policy. They prefer to talk about objectives and instruments. But "values" are an unstated concept that the interview process enabled us, more often than not, to clarify, making the interviews fascinating for the interviewees themselves.

At a first level of response, the coherence between values and programs is strong, since each of the Ministry's programs can ultimately be related to the three key values of its action: freedom (aesthetic, economic); equality (access, sovereignty); fraternity (diversity, cooperation).

In connection with freedom - and its declension into creative freedom, favoring an aesthetic understanding - we find the organization by major themes (heritage, creation, cultural industries), each defending a sector, its professionals, and its aesthetic and cultural objectives. Within each sector, we find public establishments financed by the Ministry (e.g. the Bibliothèque Nationale de France), national centers (for film, books, music, etc.) and labels (Centre Dramatique National, Centre Chorégraphique National, Scène Nationale, Musée de France, etc.). These sectoral policies form the basis for a vast policy of contractualization and co-financing with local authorities.

In terms of equality and democratic access, the development of ministerial organization across the country is a formal response, combined with the ability to negotiate with local authorities.

In connection with fraternity, coherence is theoretically ensured by adapting funding to new sources

of creation and practice (micro-folies⁵⁹, urban arts, festivals) and developing new schemes (the culture pass). This is where cultural democratization and democracy come into play. It is also, in a perspective of global representation of interests, promoted by the dialogue of policy makers with representatives of the sector, via numerous national councils that bring together the State, territorial authorities and cultural actors. (but the internal fragmentation of these interests is very different from other sectors with more representative bodies).

In the republican ideal, these values are not hierarchical. They are in constant interaction, one being the condition and limit of the other two. In reality, things are different.

Incoherence through non-fulfilment

In the concrete implementation of cultural policies, coherence is much weaker. For example, access (as a value) is only enjoyed by a tiny minority of the population. This fact is underlined by fifty years of research into French cultural practices (Wolff & Lombardo, 2020). This structural incoherence can be explained by several factors. The first - and most general - is due to the contradiction between the modest means (0.8% of the State budget devoted to culture) and the extreme pretension of the ends: to give the greatest number of people access to the major works of humanity, and to the cultural practices of their choice. From the point of view of these values, cultural policy is structurally deceptive. This incoherence can also be explained by the negative balance of power between the Ministry of Culture and other ministries, particularly the Ministry of Finance, which determines the growth of its resources. This factor of incoherence is all the more important given that, as we pointed out above, the paradigms underlying the Ministry's action (excellence, democratization, democracy, creative economy, territorial and cultural diversity) tend to accumulate over time. The result is a growing contradiction between slowly evolving resources and an increasingly open spectrum of legitimate public action.

The third factor in this structural incoherence is linked to the divide between the aesthetic and economic logic of the offer, on the one hand, and the sociology of the populations for whom it is intended, on the other. If the value of freedom, and its aesthetic and economic corollaries, only makes sense in terms of its correspondence to the other two values (equality: access and sovereignty; fraternity: diversity and cooperation), then its practical application is discriminatory, and constantly stirs up criticism of inequalities and the domination of one aesthetic and social model over others, within French society.

Incoherence through competition between values

The values of the triptych, which are in principle non-hierarchical and complementary, are implemented according to implicit or explicit power relationships. We can't list them all here. But an example of each will help us to understand their logic.

Between Liberty and Equality, we observe that the economic and aesthetic logic of supporting artists, professional teams and outreach institutions leads to a considerable imbalance in the distribution of resources (funding, labels, institutional establishments) to the benefit of the city of Paris and its region. This imbalance interacts with the location of recognized artists, who themselves are overwhelmingly based in the French capital.

Discourse on unequal freedom goes beyond this geographic dimension, to also concern the share, deemed excessive, of resources granted to major art institutions and labels, compared to emerging projects linked to minority cultures. In this case, it's the value of freedom that takes precedence over

⁵⁹ Local Cultural Platform welcoming remote access to digital cultural goods, cultural practices and events.

that of equality, but also fraternity, in the sense of an adverse trend towards cultural diversity, and not just territorial diversity.

As for equality in relation to fraternity, the same logic of confrontation exists, if we consider this time the over-representation of classical and heritage cultures over emerging cultures and those linked to the cultural diversity of the population, including their own vision of what makes heritage; or the over-representation of men over women at the head of cultural institutions and in artistic programming. It's easy to talk about an implicit hierarchy, even if the cultural projects now supported by the Ministry give their place to a plurality of cultures and plea for a gender balance in artistic support. The same observation can be made of the artistic outreach policies that involve the Ministries of Culture and Foreign Affairs. After years of promoting a French culture with a very classical content, foreign cultural action is now taking greater account of contemporary cultural and artistic diversity, as well as cooperation with foreign territories (Bonet, Zamorano & Négrier, 2019).

When all is said and done, the balance of power between values almost always shows the value of Liberty dominating over the other two.

Incoherence due to divergence in the meaning of values

To these first two major factors of incoherence (non-fulfilment and competition) we can add a third. This is linked to uncertainty about the content of the values at stake. Here again, a large number of developments could be proposed. We'll concentrate on one case per major value.

In the field of freedom, the most obvious case concerns music policy. This policy has long been implemented within a ministerial framework, with an essential role given to the DGCA, and its Direction for Music. Since 2020, a Centre National de la Musique (CNM, National Center for Music) has been created, by merging a series of organizations involved in the music industry. Funded by a tax on ticket sales and State support, notably during the COVID period, the CNM has become one of the instruments of musical policy, without the Ministry disappearing from the public landscape. This raises the question of values for two entities which, each in their own way, implement French music policy. And, as with the creation of any new organization, the perimeters, as well as the values defended, are in question. Here, we can say that two approaches - opposing and complementary - are being implemented in terms of funding for musical actors (ensembles, establishments, artists, etc.). On the one hand, the Ministry (DGCA) focuses primarily on an aesthetic and cultural approach to project evaluation. The general philosophy of support is not to consider the commercial market as a sufficiently legitimate space, from a cultural point of view, to guide public decisions. On the other hand, when examining projects, the CNM proscribes any aesthetic assessment, concentrating instead on the economic viability of the projects and their relevance within the music industry. Naturally, the division of responsibilities between the two bodies is far from fixed. On the contrary, during the implementation of a new plan in favor of festivals, a real battle took place to determine whether the CNM or the Ministry would dispose of this fund (30 millions euros) and proceed with its distribution. Given the differences in valuation between the two, this battle resembled a conflict of valuations. In the end, it was the Ministry and its regional departments that prevailed.

Such valuation disputes are legion, even within the Ministry. How does freedom play out in entertainment policy? By favoring support for creation? This is the tendency of part of the Ministry, often pejoratively referred to as the "artists' ministry"; on the contrary, by putting maximum effort into supporting distribution? This is the preference of another part of the Ministry, more sensitive to the issues of cultural democratization than artistic production.

How are equality and sovereignty embodied in heritage policies? By enhancing the legacy of a monumental past, through national classifications and inventories? Or, on the contrary, by pluralizing the notion of heritage (to open it up to the diversity of objects and forms of what constitutes heritage

for different territories and social groups, regardless of their monumental quality? Since the 1980s, the Ministry has certainly recognized the legitimacy of an ethnological approach to heritage, going beyond monumental traditions. This has enlarged the already vast field of intangible cultures, local traditions and vernacular heritages. But here too, the opposition between two visions (and two possible uses) of the notion of heritage continues to punctuate the construction of the Ministry's heritage policies, to the advantage of the former in terms of recognition, financial commitment and mobilization of human resources.

Governance, adaptability and social accuracy

As we have seen, the cultural sphere is less about paradigm shifts than about adding a new paradigm to those previously recognized in public action. It is in this context that we need to understand the question of adapting cultural policies to the changes in values taking place within societies. It is also - let's start with this point - the key to understanding the complexity of the democratic openness of these policies, their logic of concertation with the organized interests of the cultural milieu.

Dialogue

The Ministry's openness to social interests involves two main types of consultation. The first concerns institutionalized dialogue with representatives of the various sectors: the heritage, performing arts, music and cultural industries professions each have representative organizations that regularly exchange views with the Ministry in the context of public policy development. In this context, it is not so much the values of cultural policy that are at stake - it has been said that they are most often implicit and little discussed - as the objectives and interests that meet. This dialogue does not lead to a model of co-production of public decision-making, for two reasons. The first is that, unlike other sectors of public action, the cultural milieu is represented by a myriad of unions, national associations and professional groups, all competing (and cooperating) to assert the legitimacy of their interests. This fragmentation of interests explains the weakness of these organizations' collective influence in dialogue. It also explains the use of other means to assert these interests, such as public voicing and lobbying. On the other hand, interest representatives are both members of collectives and individual recipients of support for their projects, in a context where relations with decision-makers are highly individualized. This representative dilemma (representing a collective/negotiating one's project) has a negative impact on the ability to influence concertation. The consequence of this weakness (at both national and regional levels) is that dialogue does little to promote a truly collective vision of the cultural milieu, and tends to preserve the position of the most powerful actors (collective and, above all, individual). Yet the latter are most often those whose values are closest to a classic model of cultural policy. There is thus a correspondence between the fragmentation of interests and the hierarchization of fairly classic dominant values. As a result, forms of innovation require mechanisms other than those of organized openness to social interests. Here, the role of public or private experts, consultancies and "organic intellectuals" is ultimately more important in deciding on a new direction, or even new values to defend. Here too, political parties are extremely weak when it comes to setting the agenda for new values or new cultural policy objectives. Experiences, at local level, of breakaway programs put forward by the Greens, radical left-wing parties and even the extreme right all show a considerable gap between an initial desire to change the model, and the reality of much more limited, incremental changes.

Cooperation

The second form of concertation involves cooperation between the Ministry and local authorities. It is much more integrated in terms of decision-making, which does not protect it from tendencies, some structural and others emerging, towards controversy. As we said in our introduction to the French case, cultural policy is the fruit of the combined investment of the State and local authorities (regions, departments, communes). Apart from establishments fully financed by the Ministry, this policy determines a large part of the public domain of culture. In 2020, the Ministry's budget stood at 4.4 billion euros, while the sum of territorial funding represented over 7 billion, much of which was spent on projects combining ministerial and local funding. Until the 1980s, apart from a few rare exceptions, the State enjoyed a relative monopoly on legitimate expertise. The local authorities, through their subsidies, followed the State's lead. This logic of integrated and relatively consensual cooperation continued until the 2000s, with increasing support from the State and the mobilization of local authorities. The value of culture, as we have defined it around the initial triptych, was debated only in terms of modalities, not in terms of objectives or values. Gradually, however, the rise in power of territorial authorities, and the professionalization of their cultural services, led to tensions over this model of cooperation. On the one hand, territorial authorities felt they had the legitimacy to identify and recognize cultural projects of their own choosing. Initially, this tension was limited to a strategic discussion - the competition between projects defended by the Ministry and those supported by local authorities - without any fundamental divergence on values. Professionals still shared most of the values that underpinned - even implicitly - their cultural policies. In recent years, new attempts to distinguish between the two have emerged. These are no longer simply based on tactical disagreements, but on fundamental differences. In the field of performing arts, for example, the Ministry's preference for supporting the creation of new works, rather than local cultural dissemination, is the subject of fundamental debate. The local authorities are no longer inclined to follow the ministerial model on this point, asserting preferences that depart from the consensual model of the past. However, these differences remain limited to the operational framework of project negotiations. However, a new discourse is emerging among certain elected representatives - such as the President of the Auvergne Rhône-Alpes Region - who are rejecting the cooperation model in order to promote a different approach to cultural funding, more oriented towards rural areas, for example, and to free themselves from co-financing large institutions (opera houses, orchestras, cultural cooperation establishments). Whereas the pursuit of labels (*scènes nationales*, *centers chorégraphiques nationaux*, etc.) used to represent a major recognition for the policies of territorial authorities, they are now sometimes seen as instruments of constraint opposing their freedom of choice.

So, while the cooperative approach to governing culture ensured that public authorities were aligned around the same values, new divergences are emerging as to the practical meaning to be given to these values, and the objectives that correspond to them. This is a major challenge for contemporary cultural policies, and for their adaptation to social change.

Adaptation to social change

This adaptation of policies to social change does not only involve public cooperation. As we have said, the Ministry is committed to a logic of open recognition which, even if it takes place at the margins of its policies, enables it to promote new paradigms. The case of music is exemplary. With the emergence, since the end of the 20th century, of contemporary music (rock, pop, punk, hip-hop, rap, etc.), the Ministry has had to revise music policies that were essentially based on two aesthetic and political paths to recognition: time and reason. Legitimate musical creation was that which was part of the long term and contributed to extending the field of reason and knowledge. This scholarly and patrimonial vision exploded in the face of the emergence of musical genres based on the ephemeral, on

presentism rather than duration and patrimonialization, and which challenged good taste and the scholarly approach to music. At the same time, in terms of value, recognition could no longer operate on traditional bases, but the Ministry could not remain deaf and blind to these new forms of musical creation. The way through which the State brought these new musical registers within the perimeter of legitimate cultures differs fundamentally from the usual modes, by emphasizing the social groups that identified with them: young people, the populations of working-class neighborhoods. But this emphasis on social groups (as opposed to traditional aesthetic judgment) has not led to a level of recognition equivalent to that enjoyed by classical registers (Teillet, 2021).

More recently, this "social" valuation has taken on a new meaning, with the introduction of the culture pass, partly imitated from the Italian Bonus Cultura experiment. Endowed with 200 million euros, this policy entrusts all young people with a budget that they can use freely to acquire cultural goods or finance a cultural outing or visit (concert, festival, cinema, exhibition, etc.). In a field dominated by a logic of supply, this represents a considerable breakthrough. The Ministry expects it to be better adapted to young people's cultural tastes, and to be a more effective way of stimulating young people's cultural practices than supply-side policies, and beyond that, to trigger sustainable practices beyond the age (18) during which these practices are subsidized by the pass. Implicit in the objectives of this demand-side policy is the idea that this instrument could be also more effective in stimulating cultural diversity, since it is based on the decisions of young citizens themselves. It's too early to assess the performance of this new tool. The most we can say is that its implementation is not without paradoxes. In terms of diversity of practices, for example, we note a massive reliance on purchases of the most standardized products and outings (major festivals, commercial headliners, bookstore purchases of manga), the opposite of the classic intentions of a cultural policy. It remains unclear to what extent this tool concerns all young people equally, whatever their geographical or social background. But in its own way, it is an attempt to adapt cultural policies to social change, and to reduce the inequalities that the sociology of cultural practices has long demonstrated.

Conclusion

National cultural policies are changing as new paradigms emerge in response to new values emerging in society. However, if these new values are transformed into public policy objectives, they do not replace the old ones. The coexistence of several paradigms expresses the permanence, at a very general level, of three major political values that recall the republican triptych: liberty, equality, fraternity. But this consensus is only valid at a very general level. That's why the values underpinning cultural policies are hardly ever publicly expressed, let alone the subject of controversy. More often than not, they remain implicit. But the republican triptych postulates that the three values reinforce and complement each other, with no hierarchy of one over the others. In practice, however, these values are indeed hierarchical, in favor of freedom and its aesthetic and economic corollaries. But there is no consensus on this hierarchy.

In practical terms, the inconsistencies between values are threefold. Firstly, their non-fulfilment is structural. Secondly, the hierarchy between them is unstable and contested. Finally, each value is subject to different interpretations and appropriations in the implementation of policies, depending on the actors and cultural spaces involved.

As for the adaptation of policy values to social change, this is the result of three processes of unequal scope. On the one hand, it occurs through dialogue between the Ministry and organized interests in the sector. The influence of this dialogue remains moderate, due to the fragmentation of these interests, which weakens the neo-corporatist power of concertation. Secondly, it is the result of cooperation between the State and local authorities. Long marked by an overall consensus on values, but with tensions over methods and instruments (notably financial), this cooperation is seeing the development of new forms of fundamental dissensus, not only on methods, but also on the substance

of public policy objectives, and ultimately on values and, more precisely, on the value per se of culture as a legitimate object of public action. Finally, the Ministry's integration of new aesthetics has not been without its tensions with the traditional methods of valuing art, which emphasized its long-term nature and scholarly contribution to the Enlightenment. The valuation of aesthetics claiming the event against duration and provocation against "good taste" is done in the name of other values: youth, or singular social groups, reputed to practice or appreciate them.

What status should be given to these factors of incoherence?

On the one hand, they could be seen as frontal criticism of the content of cultural policies, guilty of constantly betraying the spirit they claim to embody. This negative view would be akin to a cynical view of public policy as a "school of disappointment" (according to Kenneth Boulding, 1989): that linked to a structural gap between global goals and limited, debatable capacity to achieve them. But another way of looking at the same reality is to assume a certain level of incoherence as a positive indicator in a democratic regime (Jobert, Gazier & Dente, 1995). Not only is this assertion correct with regard to the general link between public policy and democracy, it is particularly so in the field of cultural policy, due to three factors. The first is that public resources are structurally limited in relation to expectations of support. The second is the vagueness of the criteria for judging legitimate culture (Dubois, 1998). The third is the growth and diversification of the number of agents claiming, from their own mental and territorial space, the right to politicize culture. That's what scholars define as an overcrowded policy making (Richardson & Jordan, 1983). Under these conditions, it is coherence (between values, objectives and instruments) that would be democratically suspect.

2.2. Occitanie Cultural Policy

Objectives and values

Main values and their evolutions

The merger of two distinct cultural policy models

In 2015, the territorial reform made the merger of a majority of the former 22 French regions. Before the merger, the two former entities that now make up the Occitanie region were characterized by clearly differentiated public cultural action models. The former Languedoc-Roussillon region made a substantial financial effort in the area of culture as a result of its decision to take on the direct management of major facilities such as the Centre régional d'art contemporain (CRAC) in Sète and the Musée régional d'art contemporain in Sérignan, and its central position in several museum projects - in Rivesaltes on the memory of the camps, in Narbonne on Romanesque art - as well as in the management of major festivals and the Montpellier opera orchestra. As a result, the average per capita budget devoted to culture in Languedoc-Roussillon was double the same budget in Midi-Pyrénées (Négrier and Simoulin, 2018). Differences between the two former regions were also noticeable in terms of priorities - heritage for Midi-Pyrénées, performing arts for Languedoc-Roussillon - action logics - territorialized action and contracting with sub-regional communities in the west, action by sector in the east - or the role accorded to agencies - important in Languedoc-Roussillon, whereas the Midi-Pyrénées region favored direct administration of culture.

The merger of the two regions in 2015 resulted in an initial period of managing the new balances, marked by power struggles between sometimes opposing visions of cultural policy, a necessary relearning of the administrative machinery by the cultural sector, and a slow and perilous process of harmonizing management methods for cultural action. The widespread re-election of Carole Delga as President of the Occitanie region in June 2021 - her list won over 57% of the vote in the second round of the election, albeit against a backdrop of massive abstention (over 62% of registered voters) - has enabled the regional executive, past this initial adaptation phase, to develop a genuine regional strategy for culture.

Territorial equality as a distinctive value?

In the field of culture, the regions have sometimes been described as the elder daughters of the State, applying its major action programs and management principles at the local level thanks to centralized administration and close collaboration with deconcentrated services, in this case, the regional directorates of cultural affairs (Bodiguel, 2000; Négrier and Teillet, 2014). Analysis of the Occitanie region's cultural program suggests an attempt to emancipate itself from the values espoused by the State, but above all, in the hierarchization of these same values. Why this change? First and foremost, it is the result of ongoing cultural decentralization. Several recent laws, in particular the NOTRe Act of August 7, 2015, recognize culture as a competence shared between the State and local authorities, with the regions inheriting, regarding their specific competence over high schools and vocational training, the organization of preparatory teaching for entry to higher arts education establishments and the ability to participate in its funding. In addition, they are responsible for inventorying artistic heritage and teaching, supporting creative work, and promoting cultural diversity and regional languages.

This can also be seen as a direct effect of the merger: now made up of 13 départements and almost 6 million inhabitants, the Occitanie region extends over a vast and heterogeneous territory, requiring the development of a specific cultural policy, all the more necessary as the two former regions, as we have seen, were based on sometimes opposing principles of action. From this point of view, the

change can be explained by the fact that more and more regional elected representatives have taken on board the merger and are less assertive today as defenders of the former regional identities.

Nevertheless, the adoption of a new cultural policy can also be understood from a strategic point of view in a context where, faced with a fragmented left wing that is questioning the right alliance strategy to adopt, the President of the Region is displaying national ambitions that are likely to be carried by a very vast territory. Finally, the COVID-19 pandemic also accelerated the Region's distancing from the State. At a time when the latter was committing substantial expenditure to support the cultural sector, it was becoming complicated for the Region to keep up with this budgetary effort. The health crisis prompted the Region to reflect on how to distinguish itself from the State in terms of cultural policy by renewing its objectives and professional targets.

What are the values underpinning this new project? The first value is that of emancipation through exposure to a diversity of artistic content. A direct parallel can be drawn here with the values of liberty and fraternity central to the State's policy. Behind emancipation lie the values of well-being and republican identity. Continuity with the State's cultural policy is evident in the pursuit of a policy of large-scale facilities under direct management, such as the renovation of the Musée de la Préhistoire in Tautavel or the Cérès Franco Art Center in Montolieu.

Not surprisingly, the value of equality is also one of the key principles of regional cultural policy. The aim is to give every inhabitant access to culture. While this is, in part, a social conception of equality, the originality of the Region program consists in adding a territorial conception to it. In such a vast and diversified territory, equality must be seen in terms of mobility and the territorial coverage of cultural offerings. While certain social groups, particularly young people, remain prime targets regarding competencies at the regional level, the idea is to move away from a cultural policy based on access to works of art and major facilities and implement a territorialized policy based on practices.

The economy is the third value of Occitanie's cultural policy. This value overlaps with territorial equality insofar as the stated objective is to promote the attractiveness of territories through culture. The other objective attached to this economic value is professionalizing the cultural sector. While this objective is more generally linked to the Region's responsibility for vocational training for job seekers, it is also more specifically applied to contemporary music and the cultural and creative industries. In both areas, the goal of professionalization is expressed through a strategy of structuring the sector, symbolized for contemporary music, by the implementation in 2018 of a State-CNM-Region sector contract. The development of the cultural and creative industries sector, which took place at the end of the first mandate, is also part of a strategy to raise the profile of the Region's cultural strategy.

Finally, the fourth value is innovation. Here, support for artistic creation and dissemination does not involve the pursuit of artistic excellence as a primary value but rather integrating the values of diversity, equality, and inclusion within cultural policy. Among these values, particular emphasis is placed on promoting gender equality and ecological transition.

Hierarchies and tensions between values

Innovation and territorial equality

Two lines of tension emerge from the program. The first pits innovation against territorial equality. This raises the question of adopting new values as a constraint imposed on cultural actors, particularly in merged regions with heterogeneous territories. In rural areas, to what extent do the injunctions to integrate the values of equality and ecology into teams, programming, and distribution methods not hinder the development of a fragile cultural offering? In urban areas, to what extent is this possible in a context where the offer is structured by major facilities and well-established institutions with strong

legitimacy - illustrated by the possession of state labels - likely to resist change without the Region being able to impose economic constraints on them?

Economy and territorial equality

The second line of tension is that between economic value and territorial equality. Here, we see the classic opposition between industry logic and territorial logic. This tension is more explicitly expressed in contemporary music than in cultural and creative industries, where the industry logic is a regional choice. In the field of contemporary music, the industry policy is today perceived as a constraint imposed by the State and cultural decentralization: the presence of major label - or agreement-labeled facilities in the Region, as well as numerous professional networks, obliges the Region to make high levels of financial commitment. In this way, the emphasis on territorial logic is as much about asserting the Region's specificity to the State as it is about regaining budgetary and political leeway: the redeployment of resources devoted to the sector towards support for less visible and more modest projects, with a less long-term commitment, would enable not only a better distribution of aid across the Region but also a greater renewal of the cultural offering. However, this territorial approach also has its limits in that it runs the risk of not sufficiently encouraging the cultural sector to consolidate and structure itself, thereby slowing down cultural initiatives and the realization of the objectives and values of cultural policy.

Implementation coherence

General implementation

Adopting a new cultural action program requires revising pre-existing management methods. Today, this revision is one of the Region's objectives. The Region has several tools to implement its cultural policy successfully. The first is the direct management of facilities in cooperation with other local authorities, the State – notably through the "contrats de filière" – and the départements, intercommunalités and communes. In contemporary music, the Region relies on an industry contract signed in 2018 and renewed in 2022 with the State and the Centre National de la Musique. This industry contract is based on two calls for projects, one concerning support for programming and new forms of dissemination of contemporary music in rural and urban areas, the other aiding the structuring and adaptation of production companies.

Support for artistic creation

The Region's cultural policy is based on three main pillars. The first is support for artistic creation, which aims to enable works to be developed under professional conditions. Until 2022, this creative support scheme was based on multi-year agreements. The discontinuation of this type of agreement in 2023 is due to budgetary reasons, which we will discuss later, but it also reflects the Region's desire to refocus on support for more emerging actors. Multi-year agreements were primarily aimed at supporting emblematic artistic teams corresponding to a criterion of influence and economic development. The creation aid scheme adopted today merges these former agreements with annual creation aid, which means that longer creation durations will be considered. The Region is now requesting that applications be considered over at least two years to encourage the development of reliable, sustainable, and coherent programming.

Creation grants are awarded by committees of professionals specialized in different artistic fields. The

opinions issued by these expert committees are advisory but play a decisive role in the final decision. To give their opinions, the committees rely on the knowledge of each member in his or her field of expertise and criteria defined in advance. These criteria relate to the visibility and credibility of the artistic team, the originality of the project, the ability of the team to present the project, and the project's financial plan. Concerning this last criterion, the main indicator is the presence of a financial partnership since the Region cannot be the sole funder of the project. It should also be noted that, since 2023, parity among artistic directors and eco-responsibility have been included in the evaluation criteria.

The members of the expert committees - each committee has around ten members - are chosen by co-optation on the proposal of the Region to respect a territorial balance between the two former regions. Several aspects of the evaluation are the subject of sustained discussion within the committees. The first concerns the appropriateness of supporting the most emerging teams or, conversely, the teams that have received the most support in the past. The second point of debate concerns the artistic interest of the projects evaluated. The third point of discussion concerns the teams' target audiences and territories. Of the three points addressed, the last is undoubtedly the least salient, as the support system here essentially responds to a logic of structuring the offer rather than a logic of impact on audiences.

Support for artistic diffusion

The second scheme is the "diffusion" scheme, which concerns venues with regular artistic programming activities. This scheme is divided into two parts. The first is support for structuring venues, i.e., those with a label or an agreement. The second is season support. The specifications or criteria for structuring operators will be more demanding and selective than those devoted to season support. The criteria for structured venues are more directly related to territorial impact and audience appeal issues, including eco-responsibility.

Distribution assistance also includes support for festivals, managed by a technician in charge of all festivals in all disciplines. Finally, distribution support also includes a component for occasional distribution, known here as local distribution. Here, regional aid is granted based on a subsidy corresponding to a percentage of the artistic cost - 50% until 2022, now 40% - and concerns programming structures located in municipalities with fewer than 15,000 inhabitants. The interest of this last component is twofold. On the one hand, it helps finance programming in areas without venues capable of providing regular year-round programming; on the other, it enables teams from across the vast Region to go where they would not necessarily be paid. Artistic criteria are stringent here, with the main requirement being the professionalism of the artistic team.

With the notable exception of festivals, distribution support is not based on the advice of advisory committees. Final budgetary decisions are made by elected representatives based on applications submitted by venues, first to the Culture Committee and then to the Standing Committee. If a new venue applies for support as a structuring venue or as part of its season, the proposal will be submitted to the elected representatives, and a technician will prepare a summary. The Culture Commission comprises elected representatives who are often also members of other sectoral commissions and represent the currents that make up the regional assembly. The commission does not vote but issues favorable or unfavorable opinions, which it then submits to the standing committee.

The third mechanism is artistic education, provided for in the various decentralization laws. Since the LCAP law of July 7, 2016, the regions have had the option of participating in the funding of artistic teaching. However, most regions prefer not to participate in this funding for budgetary reasons and for fear of encroaching on the competencies of other local authorities. This is currently the case for the Occitanie region, although discussions regularly take place intending to exercise this competence.

To carry out its cultural policy, the Occitanie region relies on three agencies in performing arts - Occitanie en scène - books - Occitanie livre et lecture - and cultural and creative industries - Occitanie film. These agencies pursue several objectives through support, assessment, and consulting activities, notably structuring actors within the various artistic fields, coordinating professional networks, and supporting the distribution and mobility of artists.

Coherence of implementation

Budgetary inconsistency

The first identifiable inconsistency in implementing the Region's cultural policy is budgetary. As Table 1 shows, the evolution of the Occitanie Region's budget since 2016 has followed two main phases. The first corresponds more or less to the first mandate following the merger when cultural budgets increased slightly from 3% to around 4% of the total budget. As we said, this phase corresponds to managing the restructuring linked to the merger and the concern to maintain the Region's commitments to the East and West. The second phase corresponds to the health crisis linked to the COVID-19 pandemic. The crisis led to a significant drop in the budget allocated to culture. Table 1 shows, however, that this drop is not specific: the share of the cultural budget remains stable at 4% of the total budget, which shows that it is the overall budget that the crisis has impacted. In 2021 and 2022, the budget dedicated to culture will increase without reaching pre-crisis levels while maintaining its relative share of the total budget. Between 2021 and 2023, however, there is a downward trend in this relative share. In light of the testimonies gathered during our interviews, we can analyze this trend as the Region's desire to join in the financial effort encouraged by the State no longer systematically. One of the solutions found by the Region in this respect is to guarantee its support while obtaining state labels without making this support conditional on a future financial commitment.

It is essential to remember that the Region's jurisdiction over culture is not compulsory. The Occitanie region will, therefore, not be looking for ways to commit its budgets over the long term. All the more so since, as Table 1 shows, the regional budget for culture is primarily impacted by operating expenses that correspond in part to obligations linked to partnership agreements or accredited organizations - "compulsory levies," as some of our interviews pointed out. As a result, the decline in the cultural budget since 2020 has been at the expense of capital expenditure. This State of affairs leads to inertia, which limits the funding of actors outside the institutional sphere and hampers the achievement of the objective of territorial equality.

Inconsistency in the territorial approach

The choice to develop a strategy focused on territories may seem incoherent in such a vast region in the context of budgetary constraints and restructuring due to the merger. For example, the Region has decided to reorganize our technical services so that each agent is responsible for all the Region's departments. This reorganization raises the question of the possibility of maintaining a constant, personalized link between technicians and cultural actors. The territorial strategy could also weaken certain key actors in the link between the regional institution and cultural actors. For example, the role of the agencies has evolved between the last two mandates. While Occitanie Film is no longer intended to play a networking role for the cultural and creative industries but to become the driving force behind the Region's development policy for the sector, Occitanie en scène and Occitanie livre et lecture are in such difficulty due to budget cuts that plans for at least a partial merger have been mooted.

Last, integrating equal opportunity and eco-conditionality criteria into support schemes for the

cultural sector is not without contradictions, particularly for those actors or sectors most likely to promote the territories and cultural diversity. Similarly, to what extent can the Region impose its conditions on those actors best endowed with financial and symbolic resources? The stated objective of definitively integrating these criteria by the end of the current mandate thus appears unrealistic and risks leading to a distortion between rhetoric and the concrete implementation of values.

Table 1. Occitanie cultural budget and its evolution since 2016

Year	Total cultural budget (in M€)	Operating (in M€)	Investment (in M€)	Share in Total budget (in %)
2016	69,3	/	/	3,1
2017	69,7	/	/	3
2018	84,4	/	/	3,7
2019	81,7	41,3	40,4	3,8
2020	66,9	42	24,9	4
2021	73,15	41,69	31, 69	4
2022	72,2	40,6	31,67	4,2
2023	69,1	40,3	28,8	3,8

Source: Own elaboration.

Governance, adaptability and social accuracy

Democratic openness

Internal governance

Implementing the Occitanie region's cultural policy is governed by a complex system that operates on several levels. Firstly, at an internal level, governance consists of ongoing negotiations between the President and his cabinet, the Vice-President for Culture, members of the Culture Commission, technical departments, and other regional elected representatives.

After the merger, the regional President's office assumed fundamental importance in implementing cultural policy. Today, this influence is being challenged in at least two respects. On the one hand, the role of the President herself is much more assertive, particularly in two main areas: the management of major facilities, as with the Tautavel museum renovation project, and the structuring of the cultural and creative industries sector. On the other hand, the leadership exercised by the cabinet is essentially collective, and it plays a more assertive role in transmitting the requests from elected representatives. The vice-presidency in charge of culture also provides impetus, particularly in asserting the territorial dimension of cultural action. The vice-presidency is now entitled "Culture for all, heritage and regional languages" to affirm this role.

The role of elected representatives, particularly on the Culture Committee, may seem a logical consequence of transitioning to a management style more in tune with local issues. In practice, the

role of elected representatives is sometimes a response to the need to support the cultural scene in a region that is sometimes poorly endowed with facilities. However, there is sometimes a risk that elected representatives will support or oppose a given project for purely instrumental and political reasons. The involvement of elected representatives is mainly focused on the facilities themselves or on certain aspects that are more open to discussion. This is particularly true of festivals, which are highly territorialized and change over time. Given the highly dynamic nature of festival creation in a given region - but also, as a result, its instability - the need for political support is much greater for festivals than for other venues.

Opposition to the Region's cultural policy from elected representatives mainly concerns financial or administrative aspects and little ideological ones. The absence of ideological criticism is surprising in a region where the far-right Rassemblement National party is the second best-represented political force after the left-wing majority. This is understandable, given that the Rassemblement National also holds political positions at the helm of major regional cities, such as Perpignan and Béziers. In Perpignan, the city is in charge of the Archipel, a theater awarded the "scène nationale" label. It is as if managing major cultural facilities imposes a particular caution on the Rassemblement National regarding cultural discourse. Ideological opposition, particularly to the promotion of diversity and gender equality, resurfaces in the political arena, in committees, when voting on projects or events that they do not manage.

External governance

Externally, the Region's modes of governance enable it to articulate its relationships with other local authorities and cultural actors. Relations with the French State are still marked by partnership agreements concerning label-approved facilities and industry contracts. The Region's stated desire to focus its cultural action on the Region is sometimes criticized by State officials. The first criticism insinuates that by favoring diversity and territories over artistic excellence, the Region is acting to the detriment of its goal of emancipation. The second criticism denounces the political logic behind territorialization.

The relationship between the Region and other local authorities is reflected in the management of facilities, where the Region generally has minimal room for maneuver since it only plays a minor role in financing them. Most of the time, the Region has to contend with the distrust of other local authorities on the part of town councils, which remain the main financiers of the facilities. Here again, conflicts rarely concern the values of cultural projects but rather technical or financial aspects or the direction a facility should take, such as extension or renovation.

Relations with actors in the cultural sector involve three main vectors. The first is that of technicians, who act as the interface between cultural professionals, elected representatives, and funding schemes. On this last point, the role of technicians is to guide and advise professionals, encouraging them to choose the most appropriate scheme or, if necessary, to reconsider the appropriateness of their application. The second vector is that of the agencies. Finally, the third vector is networks and professional associations. Here, the Region faces several actors with limited negotiating power and legitimacy. This fragmentation makes negotiations difficult, and the Region's representatives sometimes feel they have to deal with actors close to its reform projects. In the case of the performing arts, these negotiations occur within the Comité régional des professions du spectacle (COREPS). Here, the Region will co-opt certain partners onto the COREPS, at the suggestion of the technical departments, in order to organize working and discussion groups on the most sensitive subjects. Within COREPS, we find the tensions inherent in the music sector between artistic and economic value. Music actors, particularly those involved in contemporary music, regularly express their desire to be recognized as actors in the economic sector in their own right and, therefore, to benefit from support

for both the performing arts and the economic sector. To date, this desire has been unsuccessful and a source of tension with institutional actors on the one hand and other performing arts sectors on the other. The impact of discussions within bodies such as COREPS is, therefore, very limited, and negotiations with actors in the cultural sector carry little weight in the governance of regional cultural policy.

Social accuracy

Criticism toward budget imbalance

The criticisms voiced by actors in the cultural sector have less to do with the budget mentioned above cuts than with the lack of overall coherence in the Region's cultural policy. These criticisms focus essentially on two aspects. The first is the discrepancy between the stated objectives and the resources deployed to achieve them. A recurrent criticism in the cultural world, the questioning of the budget breakdown focuses on the imbalance in favor of the "big" institutions and networks, on the excessive importance of communication expenditure, and on the lack of support for local initiatives in rural areas, accentuated by the weakness of the territorial network capable of responding to requests from actors.

The second axis is specific to the performing arts and points to the lack of clarity in regional policy in this area. While the objectives in the heritage and cultural and creative industries sectors are clearly stated, the performing arts sector is still perceived as a dependent and critical sector, a social and political problem whose resolution is uncertain. Should it be the subject of a specific policy or integrated into other areas of public action? What is to be made of the tensions between aesthetic, territorial, social, and economic criteria that can be applied to it through support schemes for creation and distribution? These questions are constantly being debated within the Region and its representative bodies, but so far, no clear-cut solution has been found. At present, the Occitanie region has chosen to pursue a policy for the performing arts that is integrated with other cultural fields and to proceed with incremental changes in evaluation criteria, which limits its ability to initiate significant change in terms of value.

Lack of concertation

Two other factors further limit these capacities. The first is the absence of any accurate means of assessing the impact of cultural policy. The Region's new measures include a requirement for activity reports, carbon footprints, and so on. Each department has its tools for questioning the balance between men and women, the balance between creative fields, or the works distributed and their distribution across the Region, based on data concerning projects supported by the Region. The objectives set out in the current music sector contract are also measured using an evaluation grid. There are, therefore, several ways of measuring the direct effects of cultural policy, but the objectives set are never evaluated explicitly in terms of impact. In addition, the Region lacks reliable data on cultural audiences and the economic impact of cultural policy. On the latter point, the Occitanie en scène agency had set up an observation system during the COVID-19 crisis, but this never materialized in the creation of a permanent observatory. This absence is detrimental to the visibility and legitimacy of the reforms carried out and also testifies to a certain lack of prioritization between the Region's stated cultural objectives.

Last but not least, audiences are rarely involved in these modes of governance. The Region's action in this area remains highly conventional and is carried out indirectly through the actions of the venues

and actors it helps to finance. The Region sometimes organizes consultations on its cultural initiatives, as it did for the renovation of the Tautavel Museum. However, here it comes up against a classic pitfall of citizen consultations, which mobilize the majority of the involved minority of a territory's inhabitants. Here, too, public action in the field of culture is confronted with a demand that, unlike other fields of action, very rarely expresses its expectations.

Conclusion

The Occitanie region has embarked on a turning point in its cultural policy. The choice of a territory-based approach is intended to distinguish it from the strategy pursued by the State, but it comes up against a number of constraints. The main one is the budgetary and administrative resources allocated to cultural policy in one of France's largest, most diverse and most populous regions. Another limitation lies in the attempt to reconcile this strategy of territorial equality with the emergence of values that sometimes contradict this objective. The persistence of vertical approaches to governance and the absence of any real space for consultation add to this gap between the values expressed in the rhetoric and programmes and their practical implementation.

2.3. Montpellier Méditerranée Métropole Cultural Policy

Objectives and values

Main values and their evolutions

The cultural policy as a mean of attractivity

In the 1980s, Montpellier was one of the first French cities to focus on cultural policy as a factor for growth and influence. In a medium-sized city that had been undergoing demographic expansion since the 1960s as a result of the arrival of people from the former French Algeria, the establishment of major service-sector companies such as IBM, and the development of its universities, cultural policy was conceived by the then Socialist mayor, Georges Frêche, as a means of attracting and retaining a population of executives looking for leisure activities and cultural outings.

Against this backdrop, the primary objective of Montpellier's cultural policy was essentially to promote the city's territorial influence, an objective that encompasses a coherent set of values. The first of these is identity, which relates to the construction of the identity of an emerging city: the cultural heritage and offerings of Montpellier, "the gifted one," are promoted through nationwide advertising campaigns in order to build an image of a dynamic city, in perpetual but reasoned growth (Nay, 1994). The second value related to this objective is economic. The aim here is not so much to enhance the city's economic development through culture as to use culture as an instrument of soft power in a context where local political power, symbolized and held by Georges Frêche, is seeking to assert itself within the city, on its territory, but also beyond, within a region where it has opponents on the right as well as in its camp. Montpellier is asserting its status as a metropolis in a geographical area that is not only local but also national and even Mediterranean, and it is doing so through culture.

This affirmation was achieved through a policy of major cultural facilities: the Centre chorégraphique national, the Opéra Orchestre national, which has two major venues with the Opéra Comédie and the Corum, inaugurated in 1989, the conservatoire, classified as a national regional conservatoire in 1987, the Zénith sud (1986), to which we can add the Musée Fabre, labelled "musée de France" in 2002 et renewed en 2003, as well as major festivals such as the Festival international de Montpellier-Danse, the Festival international du Cinéma méditerranéen and the Festival international de Radio-France et de l'orchestre philharmonique de Montpellier. Beyond the values of identity and economy, this policy of major facilities – reflected in a "race" to obtain significant state labels - also conveys an aesthetic value linked to the pursuit of artistic excellence. This value is embodied in the choice of renowned figures in their field to head up these facilities.

In this context, politicians do not intervene directly in artistic choices. The definition of artistic excellence as a value of cultural action is a matter of choosing and validating the management and their projects. The demands made by politicians, through the agreements on objectives and resources signed with major facilities, are more concerned with audiences and access to culture. The rhetoric used here is the classic of cultural democratization, i.e., access to artistic excellence for as many people as possible. This value of equality, which is grafted on the population's well-being, is highly consistent in promoting the city's attractiveness through culture. Rather than quantifying this objective economically, Montpellier's political authorities have qualified it in terms of democratic access and well-being.

Alongside this network of top-class facilities, the city's demographic expansion has been accompanied by the development of smaller private structures, particularly in the field of contemporary music, including venues such as Victoire 2 - created in 1987 in Saint-Jean-de-Védas, on the Montpellier's

southern outskirts - and festivals such as Jazz Action Musique (JAM).

The creation of the Communauté d'Agglomération in 2001, then the Métropole in 2015, in place of the District, reinforces this cultural project. The administrative territory of the intercommunality has grown from 15 to 31 communes, encouraging the maintenance of this strategy of attractiveness and influence through culture. Intercommunal cultural policy is based on a logic of centrality, which can be described as Jacobin, where the central city crushes the periphery by concentrating facilities and, therefore, budgets.

The outreach strategy has thus been pursued through the strategy of major facilities – the creation of the Museum of Contemporary Art (MO.CO) in 2017, relocation of the conservatory, renamed the "Cité des Arts" in 2021 – but also through the announcement on March 31, 2022, of Montpellier-Sète's bid for the title of European Capital of Culture 2028. Alongside this outreach strategy is the value of equality, supported by the idea of democratizing access to culture. One of the main thrusts of the Metropole's culture and heritage strategy, which also features in the European Capital of Culture application, is entitled "building the audiences of tomorrow."

A turn in Montpellier's cultural policy? The 2028 European capital of culture and the emergence of new values

However, an analysis of successive strategic documents reveals several striking changes in the values espoused by the Montpellier metropolis in recent years. The first of these concerns the evolution of the objective of outreach. The economic value represented by the use of cultural policy as an instrument of soft power, deployed on a metropolitan scale in a top-down, Jacobin logic, is now accompanied by greater attention to the issue of territorial equality. This attention, which has intensified since the creation of the Metropolis, is symbolized by the deployment of resources no longer concentrated in the central city but in an ever-increasing number of communes on the outskirts of Montpellier. These include the inauguration of the Arena Sud de France, a venue capable of hosting sporting and cultural events, in Pérols – a city from the southeastern suburb - in 2010, and the Agora and Kiasma concert halls - located respectively in Le Crès and Castelnau-le-Lez, in the northern suburbs - in 2017, the renovation of the Lattes archaeological museum - in the south - or the increase in funding for the Atelline, a venue dedicated to the performing arts in public spaces located in Juvignac – in the south-west - which was recently awarded the label of « scène conventionnée d'intérêt national ». While the resources remain the same - large-scale facilities and state-approved labels - they are redeployed to ensure equal access based on territorial rather than purely social criteria. Demographic changes in a constantly expanding city, where the upper classes are increasingly moving to the outskirts, explain much of this evolution.

At the same time, culture is now being mobilized as a vector for urban renewal through the exhibition of works of art in public spaces, but also as a means of questioning relationships with the territory, whether through the promotion of soft mobility or, more broadly, ecological values, or through the implementation of trans-territorial cooperation, a project driven primarily by the Montpellier-Sète 2028 bid.

These developments also question the value of artistic excellence in favor of innovation. Still highlighted in the 2015 activity report, artistic excellence is only mentioned in the 2023 strategic program under the heading of excellence in audiovisual production. The program now speaks of "exigence" and links this term to that of "innovation." This change can be explained first and foremost by audiences, particularly the younger generations, turning away from cultural venues, a trend accentuated by the health crisis linked to the COVID-19 pandemic. Cultural innovation is promoted primarily by highlighting events or venues encouraging audience participation, including the Zone Artistique Temporaire (created in 2011) and Les Halles Tropismes (2019).

Two other new values emerge from the Metropole's recent cultural action programs. The first is hospitality, highlighted in the bid to become the European Capital of Culture. Hospitality is used here in a dual sense, referring first and foremost to consideration of the multicultural nature of the metropolitan area, encouraging the expression of a diversity of artistic forms, as well as transnational cooperation. Hospitality is also used as a broader term, referring to support for creation and for an artistic sector undermined by the economic and health crisis, but also - particularly in the case of the network of private venues used to present contemporary music - to a sometimes dilapidated building and administrative restrictions relating to neighborhood disturbances.

Last but not least, the economy as a value in its own right has appeared in programs and discourse. The question of the economic impact of Montpellier's cultural sector, particularly in terms of employment, began to be raised in the early 2010s with the blossoming of the cultural and creative industries, driven in particular by a regional dynamic. Since then, this dynamic has taken on new importance in the metropolitan area, with the opening of specialized training courses such as the Cours Florent, the expansion of Ubisoft studios specializing in video game creation but also in film and television post-production, and the arrival of France Télévisions studios. During our interviews, the presence in the Montpellier Métropole area of 9 winners of the call for projects launched by the French Ministry of Culture around the theme of "La grande fabrique de l'image" was highlighted.

Hierarchies and tensions between values

Equality versus centralisation

The internal coherence of Montpellier's cultural policy can be assessed today by analyzing this fragile balance between, on the one hand, the values carried by the legacy of an era marked by the effects of cultural decentralization and, on the other, the emerging values characteristic of an area undergoing profound change. The balance in question here stems from the perceived and, at times, asserted need to dust off a Friesian cultural heritage that is impossible to abandon for structural reasons we will discuss later. This choice of syncretism, or instead of incremental change, reveals at least three lines of tension in terms of values.

The first stems from the desire to implement territorial equality regarding cultural access in a context where cultural facilities remain highly concentrated in the central city. Despite the rhetoric and efforts to achieve a more egalitarian distribution of cultural projects across the region, the actors interviewed emphasized the persistent centralization of Montpellier's cultural policy. The Radio France festival is cited here as an example: the refocusing of events on the Metropolis for the 2023 edition - until now, the festival programmed concerts and events throughout the Occitanie region - has led to a withdrawal to Montpellier's major symbolic venues.

Excellence versus innovation

The second line of tension is between the value of artistic excellence hitherto espoused by major institutions and the value of innovation and openness to cultural diversity. This is partly due to the inertia induced by the policy of large-scale facilities, which consists in delegating programming choices to personalities with strong legitimacy in the artistic field.

Finally, the third line of tension, linked to the previous two, opposes democratization to participation. There are two opposing logics, which can also be found at state or regional level: should we promote access to culture through a top-down or vertical approach, in which the offer is defined upstream, either at political level or at the level of cultural professionals, or through a more horizontal approach,

banking on the diversity of cultural content that embraces the diversity of expectations and tastes expressed by audiences, as well as on their participation in defining the offer? In other words, should we focus on the democratization of a legitimate offer or the recognition of cultural rights?

Implementation coherence

General implementation

The analysis of the implementation of Montpellier's cultural policy consists of assessing the public authorities' ability to resolve the tensions we have identified in the analysis of public action programs. Today, the cultural strategies of Montpellier and the Metropolis are shared. While there is a division of legal and financial powers in managing cultural facilities and budgets, there is unity in policy and values between the two entities. The city relies on three elected representatives - for culture, heritage, and cultural and artistic education - while the Metropolis relies on a vice-president for culture.

Implementing cultural policy requires several action levers, depending on the actors involved. The distinction between actions taken by major institutions and private-sector actors is again apparent. The main lever for action is the management of the city's cultural facilities, principally the network of media libraries, as well as the major institutions within which it participates on the boards of directors.

Subsidized private actors are subject to monitoring committees and, where applicable, multi-year agreements on objectives. The city and Metropolis also have a "creation and creative and cultural industries" department comprising sector-specific project managers in contact with the associative sector. The Metropole is interested in integrating new music sector contracts to support its network of private venues.

Several significant features characterize this system of cultural policy management. Firstly, it is a system in which the dependence of cultural actors on public funding is extreme. Secondly, it is top-down and individualized, leaving little room for co-construction and collective dynamics as public actors discuss and negotiate with actors individually, whether within boards of directors, monitoring committees, or through project managers. This difficulty is compounded by the lack of structure in the cultural sector at the local level. Unlike the state or regional level, Montpellier's cultural context is not structured by professional networks.

Thirdly, this is a form of public action in which the question of values is rarely discussed for at least two reasons. The first is that the definition of artistic values is traditionally settled when the person appointed to head the facility is chosen. After this stage, the Metropole has little say in programming issues, either in artistic terms or in terms of values outside culture. Unlike other French metropolises, Montpellier has not included eco-conditionality or ega-conditionality in its agreements on objectives. The match between the values espoused in the discourse of public action and the projects implemented by cultural institutions is, therefore, less a matter of financial constraint than of informal incentives. The second reason for the disappearance of values from public cultural action is the high degree of interdependence between cultural and political actors, which limits debate or critical opposition specifically on values.

Coherence of implementation

Budget analysis

To what extent does this model for implementing public action favor pursuing Montpellier's cultural policy's traditional and emerging objectives? From this point of view, the analysis reveals two main forms of inconsistency. The first concerns the financial resources allocated to cultural policy. An analysis of Montpellier's cultural budget reveals significant imbalances between the major institutions and other actors in the cultural sector and between the central city and the rest of the Metropolis. This can be observed in the repartition of cultural expenses by sector between 2014 and 2018 (Table 1): the repartition displays a large imbalance favoring performing arts.

Table 1. Repartition of cultural expenses by sector between 2014 and 2018

	Expenses (M€)
Performing arts	109,58
Museums	55,75
Heritage	10,64
Literature	31,33
Arts education	9,67
Cinema, media	8,67
Pluridisciplinary	6,09
Scientific culture	0,37

Source: Négrier & Teillet, 2019

Table 2. Montpellier Méditerranée Métropole cultural budget and its evolutions since 2015

	Operating (M€)	Investment (M€)
2015	54,7	8,5
2016	53,4	14,1
2017	52,3	16
2018	34,3	22
2019	35,5	23,2
2020	36,7	33,9
2021	38,9	18,7
2022	39,4	16,6
2023	39	16

Source: Montpellier Méditerranée Métropole original budgets

This analysis shows that, in reality, there are powerful constraints on the renewal of the dominant envelopes, reflecting the fairly strong domination of the historical value block to the detriment of implementing projects focused on emerging values. These constraints are partly linked to the system

of governance in place: it is now difficult to question the budget lines and projects supported by the major institutions that now account for the vast majority of the city's cultural policy.

From this point of view, budget constraints appear to be an obstacle to pursuing both traditional and emerging objectives. Regarding traditional objectives, the question of maintaining the resources allocated to major facilities arises, given the public's disaffection with the cultural offer, a disaffection accentuated by the health and economic crisis linked to the COVID-19 pandemic (Table 2). The interviews we conducted revealed the emergence among public decision-makers of the idea that the presence in the Montpellier area of large structures with substantial financial resources no longer corresponds to the reality of the economic and cultural context. The public authorities' response to this first problem has taken the form of budget cuts or restructuring. However, these measures have been a source of opposition and conflict. The first example is that of Rodrigo Garcia, appointed to head the Théâtre des Treize Vents, Centre dramatique national, in 2014 and resigning four years later at the end of his first term, citing successive budget cuts, the theater's peripheral location and the sharing of sets with the Opéra national as the reasons for his departure. The second example is the planned merger between the Domaine d'Ô, which includes an amphitheater and two theaters, and the Printemps des Comédiens festival, which has been held at the Domaine since 1987, to create a European Theatre City. The merger aims to create an establishment with greater resources and optimize institutions' resources by pooling them to better meet the new objectives of metropolitan cultural policy.

This incoherence regarding resources also hinders the pursuit of emerging objectives, even more so insofar as it deprives other actors in the cultural sector of the support they need to develop. The main criticism of the Montpellier model, voiced mainly by "small" cultural actors, often from the associative world, points to the budgetary imbalances in favor of the large institutions, described as "dinosaurs" by the other actors.

Analysis of policy instruments

The second inconsistency relates to the instruments used to implement cultural policy. The first weakness of this horizontal, individualized policy is that it introduces a logic of cultural action management by sector or major aesthetic field, which does not necessarily correspond to the reality experienced by actors in the cultural sector, particularly from the associative world, who operate according to a more cross-functional, multi-disciplinary logic. These actors are often faced with specialized interlocutors with little connection between them. Cross-functional initiatives exist, but they remain dependent on individual, spontaneous initiatives rather than on a political impetus clearly integrated into management methods. This is the case, for example, of the partnership between the Opéra and the Arabesque festival, which focuses on the arts of the Arab world and is the result of a spontaneous agreement between the two departments. This informal cooperation mode certainly has advantages in giving the actors great organizational flexibility. However, on the other hand, it makes the collaborations more fragile because they are linked to the personalities behind them, sometimes leaving the most fragile actors uncertain.

The lack of discussion of values beyond general policy speeches and the selection of managers for major facilities also leads to inconsistency in implementing cultural action. It contributes to reinforcing the inertia of the value system attached to the policy of large-scale facilities. Interviews with the directors of these institutions confirm that their appointment is not necessarily accompanied by a mission statement detailing the expectations of the political authorities in terms of programming; sometimes, the cultural project supported by the candidate plays a negligible role in his or her appointment. Once again, changes in the strategic choices adopted by major facilities depend essentially on the individual initiatives of their managers. For example, the management team of a

theatre located in a working-class district has implemented shared creations without this being the result of a political initiative.

The Montpellier-Sète 2028 bid can be seen as a tool designed to shake up the inertia of the Montpellier system. The bid is an opportunity for the Metropole to assert the importance of emerging values. The Metropole's latest strategy document on cultural policy takes up the bid's program almost verbatim. Strictly speaking, the bid was not a time for the emergence of new values but rather an accelerating factor in the concrete adoption of these values in public action programs and cultural action management methods. One of the main changes introduced by the bid in this area concerns the provision of new funding and the significant introduction of calls for projects as the preferred method of financing. The provision of new funding could resolve the budget imbalance in favor of major facilities and the central city, just as operation by calls could introduce emerging values more explicitly into the specifications imposed on cultural institutions. At the same time, however, the system of calls presents a number of risks, the first of which is favoring institutions with procedural competence, i.e., those in charge of large-scale facilities. Furthermore, as the analysis of the Creative Europe case shows, the system of calls for projects runs the risk of introducing an instrumental vision of culture in the service of a set of measurable economic or social values to the detriment of cultural innovation. In other words, it is not sure that the changes initiated through the European Capital of Culture candidacy will break the inertia inherent in Montpellier's cultural milieu.

The bid does, however, introduce other tools capable of bringing about a significant change in how cultural action is managed. Among these, it proposes to change modes of governance by facilitating cooperation between cultural actors and other sectors, encouraging the restructuring of major facilities mentioned above, and better structuring the private sector.

Governance, adaptability and social accuracy

Cultural values hardly putted into question

The new values of Montpellier's cultural policy are rarely called into question. The latest cultural strategy was adopted unanimously by the metropolitan council. Admittedly, the budget allocated to culture is sometimes criticized by political opponents as being too large in a context of crisis, to the detriment of other public action sectors deemed to have higher priority, such as employment, housing, or social action. However, no party is now hostile to cultural action or the values it embodies. This consensus can be explained in several ways. In France, few political parties fundamentally question the aesthetic, social, or environmental values attached to cultural action. These actors - including the Rassemblement National and a fringe of the right-wing Les Républicains party - are absent from Montpellier's decision-making bodies. It is also likely that, in this specific local context, political actors have little interest in questioning a field of action that has, as we have seen, contributed to the city's influence.

Questioning is also rare among representatives of major facilities, who benefit from a mode of appointment and the inertia of modes of governance. Conflicts between these actors and politicians are rare. We could cite the case of Rodrigo Garcia, already mentioned, as an example of open conflict between a Montpellier venue and the Metropole over programming choices and aesthetic values - the author had thus decided to rename the Théâtre des Treize Vents "HtH" for "Humain trop Humain" to signify his desire to break with the previous management.

Meanwhile, Private-sector actors are critical of the distribution of the budget allocated to culture and the implementation of cultural policy. As far as values are concerned, it comes as no great surprise to find that the comments made by our interviewees were well received. However, the lack of discussion on values and the inconsistency between these values and the policy implementation make the

cultural program promoted by the Metropole challenging to understand in the eyes of peripheral actors. The appearance of emerging values in discourse, without any perceptible change in the instruments used to implement cultural policy, contributes to cultural actors viewing these discourses with suspicion as a communication exercise ill-suited to the realities on the ground. This also leads to the development of critical discourse on the lack of substance in the discourses put forward by those responsible for implementing the policy. In an almost contradictory manner, this lack of substance is contrasted with the rhetoric of the Friesian era - which was based on the values of excellence and democratization - when programs were consistent with the way they were implemented:

I am dealing with managers or people who manage their careers or political positions and with whom I no longer have substantive discussions. Not as much as with the generation before [...] I am dealing with people who are in the execution of the next mandate, in a personal position, in tricks, and with a level of artistic requirement that scares me. However, when you see the state of the SMAC here and the festival at the Peyrou [a famous place in Montpellier]... I do not have any substantive discussions about projects or aesthetics. (Excerpt from an interview with an associative cultural actor)

Audiences, meanwhile, are characterized by their silence. In 2015, Mayor Philippe Saurel's decision to cancel three electronic music festivals provoked opposition on digital platforms and a few protests. Today, the silence of cultural audiences is an issue for a political agenda based on the value of participation.

A lack of cooperation

The new team at the helm of the city and Metropolis has an ambitious cultural project incorporating values emerging at national and European levels – cultural rights and diversity, participation, and territorial equality. This appropriation of emerging values in discourse is concomitant with the profound demographic transformations that the Metropolis has undergone over the last twenty years. However, the concrete implementation of this project and set of values face several obstacles.

The modes of implementation and governance of Montpellier's cultural policy that we have described so far show that this model of public action is not very porous and conducive to adopting new values. This first obstacle is compounded by a more or less consensual silence on the question of values, reinforcing the system's inertia.

As far as inter-institutional cooperation is concerned, this less-than-integrated management style is also a hindrance. The DRAC actors interviewed emphasized either the absence of a strategic vision or the lack of visibility of cultural policy. Recently, Montpellier expressed its desire to join the "contrat de filière musiques actuelles," but the reasons behind this request remain unclear, apart from the fact that it represents a significant financial manna to be mobilized to help a sector facing difficulties.

Public disaffection with culture is another obstacle to the implementation of this program. There is a strong contradiction in the desire to promote public participation and access to culture, particularly among young people and the working classes, when audience renewal is at stake today (Lombardo and Wolf, 2020). The implementation of participatory cultural schemes, such as shared creations, is hampered by the disaffection of audiences in working-class areas:

The first failure is that you cannot get the residents [...] We organize a meal with people we had identified because they had already taken part in shared creations and lived in the neighborhood —small groups of twenty residents. We invite them to a meal, and seven texts selected by the residents punctuate the meal. [...] Each dish corresponded to a text: their first text was about a homeless person, so the first dish was an apple with a glass of water. [...] It was great; it was excellent. Everyone was pleased. I remember the actors were completely enthusiastic. By the second meal, we are half full. By the third meal, we gave up. (Extract from an interview with a theatre director)

This is perhaps one of the main limitations of the discourse on inclusion and participation of the people through and in culture. Indeed, these objectives would require genuine reflection on values and aesthetic programming and the implementation of a flexible framework to adapt cultural action to plural realities.

Conclusion

Montpellier's cultural policy must now face up to its heritage and transform the values associated with it. This desire for transformation is as much due to budgetary constraints, which require a restructuring of a system based on the costly financing of major facilities, as to the fact that culture is an instrument for transforming a metropolis faced with challenges linked to its growth. Today, this desire for change is hampered by the independence of the directors of the major facilities from politics, their economic weight and the absence of any real instruments capable of bringing about the expected changes.

The Montpellier-Sète bid could initiate new dynamics in terms of cooperation in an area comprising 152 communes. However, the ambitious goal of pursuing new values in an area marked by significant disparities could lead to similar difficulties if an effective change in modes of governance does not accompany it.

3. Introduction to the Norwegian cases

In the Norwegian context, public cultural policy governance is performed along the three lines or levels of public administration that have existed since the introduction of the Municipalities Act in 1837 (Kvavik 1984), i.e., the national, regional (the county) and the local (municipal) level. Within the Nordic region, slightly different from Denmark, where private funds have played a significant cultural policy role funding and consequently shaping the national cultural sector (Bille 2022), together with Finland and Sweden, Norway with its high level of public cultural policy interaction stands out as a textbook example of the so-called Nordic, welfare based, cultural policy model (Duelund 2003, Mangset et al. 2008, Berge 2022). One central aspect of this policy tradition, apart from public sector's central role, is the principle of leaving policy responsibility to the most local authority possible, a kind of Norwegian version of the subsidiarity principle. In other words, the state can only intervene in policy when necessary, or when the lower levels of governance are not able to handle it. Nevertheless, cultural policy – i.a. with all its national institutions and buildings – is a sector where more policy than other sectors has been left within state care. This is related to the fact that traditionally much professional competence has been centred within the state bureaucracy, most prominently the Ministry of Culture and Arts Council Norway. The latter has albeit been based on peer committees consisting of a geographically and otherwise diverse mix of artists and cultural mediators, but still with meetings placed in Oslo and generally considered part of the national, state level.

On the national level, The Ministry of Culture in Norway (current name: Ministry of Culture and Equality) is formally responsible for the policy areas of culture, equality and discrimination, copyright, the media, sport and the voluntary sector. While the sector of culture has been a core responsibility for the ministry since the establishment in 1982, other policy areas have also been part of the ministerial portfolio in different periods. This includes research (1982-1990), church affairs (1990-91 and 2002-2010), and, recently, equality and discrimination (2022-).

The county level, furthermore, represents the meso level of Norwegian government and is interesting in terms of cultural political intervention and impact both as a subject of its own and as an intermediary between the state and the local political and administrative levels. Vestland is a county (administrative entity) and a region (geographical entity) situated on the western coast of Norway. In 2022, it had a population of 641 292, and a cultural budget around 31 million €. Based on this budget and the county's overarching framework of cultural policy, Vestland funds activity within the following categories: Library, Art, Cultural heritage, Cultural dissemination, Outdoor life, Voluntariness and Sports.

Finally, the municipal level represents the local level of the Norwegian government. The city of Bergen is the second-largest city in Norway, and it has the status of a municipality and the administrative centre of Vestland county. With a population of 286 930 inhabitants, the cultural budget was around 48 million euros in 2022. Cultural policy is covered by the City Government's Department for Culture, Voluntary Sector and Inclusion. This department has four units: Bergen City Archives, Agency for Social Inclusion, Agency for Culture, and Bergen Public Library. The city has high ambitions for its cultural policy, particularly regarding the plans for the quality and vitality of its professional art field, included the music field, and the many plans for enhanced diversity in cultural participation.

3.1. Ministry of Culture, Norway

Objectives and values

As in other cases, the primary angle to analyse values is also in this case to approach them through stated objectives. In the case of the Ministry of Culture, the explicit cultural policy objectives are readily available, e.g., in the latest white paper on cultural policy from the Ministry (Ministry of Culture 2019). This document, entitled *The Power of Culture* (*Kulturens kraft*), states the following general, societal objectives for Norwegian cultural policy:

A living democracy where everybody is free to express themselves, and where diversity and creativity is held in high esteem. An inclusive society where arts and culture of the highest quality inspire us, connect us and teaches us about ourselves and the world we live in. (Ministry of Culture 2019, p. 9. Our translation .).

This overarching goal is followed by the statement of nine general cultural policy goals:

A free and independent cultural life, that

- Create art and culture of the highest quality
- Promotes Bildung (“danning”) and critical reflection
- Preserves and communicates cultural heritage
- Creates and distributes cultural provisions that is experienced as relevant, representative for the population
- Is accessible for everyone, encouraging individuals to experience and take part in cultural activities
- Creates meeting places and builds communities
- Renews itself and shows an ability to adapt
- Has international relevance and promotes intercultural understanding
- Strengthens the Norwegian language, the Sami languages, the national minority languages and Norwegian sign language as fundamental carriers of culture (Ministry of Culture 2019, p. 9).

Similar or comparable statements are found in the annual budget documents from the Ministry of Culture. These documents are comprehensive presentations of the proposed budget allocated from the ministry, presented to the parliament. In addition to numbers and tables, these documents also contain reports on the development within different parts of the cultural sector, in addition to statements on general cultural policy goals for the current administration. The last budget document from the Ministry of Culture (currently the Ministry of Culture and Equality), presented in October 2022, describes the objectives for the governmental cultural policy in the following way: “The goal for the cultural and equality policy is that people across the country shall have freedom and the opportunity to live the life they want” (Ministry of Culture and Equality 2022, p. 11). This rather general goal is followed by this statement: “The opportunity to participate shall not be defined by factors like social background, economy, gender and gender identity, sexual orientation, age, level of functioning, ethnicity or where in the country you live. Everyone shall be able to enjoy cultural and sports experiences (...) People shall have access to culture, independent of who they are or where they live” (ibid.).

The quote from the ministerial budget document testifies to the basic fact that the practical organization of relevant ministries has an evident impact on the way objectives are formulated, and, hence, also what values that get explicitly promoted. In the case of the Norwegian Ministry of Culture, the ministerial portfolio has changed repeatedly in the last decades, to include e.g., church and religious affairs, research and education policy, and, most recently, gender and equality policy. This

responsibility was added to the ministry around 2015, with the formal name of the ministry changing in 2022. The values inherent in the overall objective stated in the budget document, “the freedom and opportunity to live the life they want” seems to be a direct consequence of this added responsibility. In contrast, the 2012 budget document stated the overall objective for cultural policy like this: “The overall goal for the cultural policy is to make sure that everyone can access a variety of different arts and culture offerings of high artistic quality, and to secure material and immaterial cultural heritage from past and present as an irreplaceable source of insight, identity and experience” (Ministry of Culture 2012, p. 14). In different white papers from the Ministry, e.g. in the relatively recent paper on arts and culture for children and young people, comparable statements on the general objective on cultural policy is found (cf. Ministry of Culture 2021). The general aim, in this context for the benefit of children and young people, is to make sure that a diverse and high quality arts and culture offering is available to everyone. This includes the possibilities of active cultural participation.

The values expressed through goals and objectives like the quoted ones, are different ones. At the same time, they are, seemingly, not opposed to one another, neither implicitly nor explicitly. In short, the following values seem to be inherent in the goals of Norwegian cultural policy at state level: aesthetic values, values of well-being, identity values and values of democracy and/or equality. In addition, we also find economic values related to creative labour – expressed in the idea that it should be possible to make a living and preferably a profit by working as an artist or creative worker. Seen together, we see that there is a strong combination of aesthetic, welfare and democracy values expressed through the statements of cultural policy objectives. Firstly, art needs to be of high quality, be diverse and have artistic autonomy. Secondly, art is thereby given a quality that has the power to enrich lives and create better societies. Thirdly, given the importance of this power, arts and culture need to be accessible to everyone. Time and again, we find different statements underlining the importance of this triad of basic values. The combined emphasis of these values is also repeated by a majority of our informants in interviews.

Even if there are certain changes in the way cultural policy values and objectives are expressed during the last decade (or two), they are, generally, speaking, more or less the same. The importance of quality, the importance of accessibility and the importance of diversity was stated ten and fifteen years ago, and it is stated in the most recent cultural policy documents. At the same time, we find certain differences in the way certain values are emphasized during different political administrations. One evident example of this, is that in periods with a right-wing government there has been a bit more emphasis on the business side of cultural production as well as on the importance of private funding.

A challenging question to answer is whether there is a hierarchy and/or tension between the values expressed in these cultural policy goals. The short and preliminary answer is no, to a very little degree. (We will expand upon and complicate the answer in the next sections.) Both in the written documentation, as quoted above, and in our interviews with different cultural policy stakeholders, it is challenging to find evidence of one value being superior to another. The same goes for the question of explicit tensions between different values; the experience of these being at odds with one another. There are, however, certain cracks in the seemingly impregnable coherency of Norwegian cultural policy, and we will look closer at some of these cracks in the following.

Implementation coherence

General implementation, strategies and resources

Norwegian cultural policy is generally described as an example of the Nordic model of cultural policy (Mangset et al. 2008). A central aspect of this model is the essential role of the state and the importance of public funding. The largest chunks of public funding are channeled through the state and the municipal level, while there is also some funding administered by the regional level. In 2022, the distribution of public funding between national, regional, and municipal level, was around 47% national, 6% regional and 47% municipal funding.

Broadly, we can speak of three kinds of funding coming from the state/governmental level for the cultural sector: 1. The annual funding of institutions (in a rather broad sense), which includes national and regional theatres, the national opera house, museums, libraries, archives etc. 2. The funding of a broad variety of artistic projects, productions, and programmes. The most important part of this kind of funding is channelled through the Norwegian Cultural Fund, which is administered by (the arms' length body) Arts Council Norway (ACN). ACN is a directorate under the Ministry of Culture, distributing funding from the ministry. ACN consists of an administrative unit and an arms' length council, distributing funding according to a set of quality criteria. 3. The funding of certain programmes and projects through lottery funding. Within the cultural sector, the most prominent programme funded by public gambling proceeds is The Cultural Rucksack, receiving more than 300 million NOK per year. (The Cultural Rucksack is a national, permanent programme, aiming to provide every Norwegian pupil between 6 and 18 with one or two cultural experiences (music, theatre, literature, cultural heritage etc.) per year, as part of their school education.) In addition to these broad categories, there are also substantial subsidies through VAT exemptions (books and magazines) and through funding for cultural purposes stemming from other ministries.

Again, broadly speaking, we think is fair to say that the combination of the abovementioned three categories of funding reflect the basic values expressed in Norwegian (state) cultural policy. The institutional funding emphasizes a combination of aesthetic, democratic and identity values, e.g., through securing the institutional continuity in the cultural sector. In return, the funded institutions are expected to combine artistic excellence and proper heritage management with accessibility and democratization. The funding of projects, productions and programmes is the kind of funding that is most directly related to aesthetic value, with Arts Council Norway as the most important gatekeeper of artistic innovation and excellence. At the same time, clearly visible in the council's funding agreement with the ministry, this is not the only value they are expected to represent. They are also expected to contribute to "an inclusive and diverse cultural sector". (This expectation, pointing towards the values of democracy, equality and identity, was not present to the same degree ten years earlier, as we will comment upon below). The third category of funding, lottery funding, is to a large degree representative of democratic and identity values. The lottery funding (from the public gambling organization Norsk Tipping) is distributed to broad cultural programmes, to sports funding and to voluntary organizations.

A specifically implemented, meta-value central to the organization of Norwegian cultural policy is the arms' length principle, which is invoked in a number of discussions concerning cultural policy in Norway. The principle is considered a kind of value that is considered to be fundamental and crucial to the field of cultural policy, being dubbed by some as the constitutional law for this policy. This value is on the one hand a practical operationalization of the value of artistic autonomy – making sure that creativity and artistic innovation is held separate from political and/or economical interference. On the other hand, the principle has a direct consequence on the public organization of cultural policy responsibility. Even if the principle in effect is an administrative or organizational principle, the

prominence of the principle has, in effect, made it an unquestionable value in its own right. At the time of writing, it is discussed in relation to a revised Act on Culture, in which the Ministry of Culture suggests including the arms' length principle as a guiding principle for cultural policy at all levels of government.

On the budget of the Ministry of Culture

The proposed budget for 2023 was in total 23,3 billion NOK (at the time of writing equalling around 2,2 billion euros.) This amount was distributed to the following budget chapters:

- Administration (the ministry): 209 million
- Voluntary purposes: 3560 million
- Cultural purposes: 10 106 million
- Media purposes: 8900 million
- Equality purposes: 544 million

In general, the combination of budget posts naturally reflects the ministerial responsibilities, which includes media policy, not uncommon to cultural ministries, as well as supports for voluntary organisations and equality organisations. The largest part of the budget is still dedicated to what is named "cultural purposes" in the budget text. Within this post, the most important funding is the allocation for the Arts Council (2,2 billion NOK), for music and theatre institutions (2,9 billion NOK), libraries (1 billion NOK) and museums (2,3 billion NOK).

It is challenging to see in what way the budget is related to specific values of cultural policy, apart from the fact that they do reflect the combination of values inherent in this policy. The support for voluntary organizations is evidently related to the values of democracy, equality and identity, and the support for a diversity of cultural purposes reflects the combination of aesthetic values, democracy values, well-being values etc., as mentioned above.

An aspect that is commented upon related to budget allocation, is that cultural producers/institutions are very much aware of and concerned with which specific budget chapter they are financed through. While the ministry itself underlines that it does not matter whether the funding is related to this or the other budget chapter, representatives from the cultural sector often think otherwise.

Coherence of implementation with regard to main values

In general, it is fair to say that the general level of coherence between principal policy values and actual policy is rather high in this case. We can start with looking at the experience of coherency from stakeholders and policymakers. The different agents we have interviewed for this case, how do they respond to the question of coherence and/or incoherence? A top-level bureaucrat expresses for example that his actual work is "very closely related" to the overall political objectives. He says that it is very easy for him to recognize these overall goals and values in his day-to-day work. In short, he describes these goals as "making high quality art available to as many people as possible." This is clearly resonating with the explicit goals quoted above. He also states that he feels that he represents the budget allocation from the parliament. Our informants from the ministry, working more closely with the political side of cultural policy, also express a general feeling of coherence between values and practice. They refer to a very general aim of cultural policy, anchored in the Norwegian constitution. The revised constitution (revised in 2000) refers (in paragraph 100) explicitly to the public responsibility of securing an infrastructure for public discourse and expressions. This paragraph has been increasingly invoked as a fundamental legitimating statement for cultural policy. The very fact

that the ministry informants, similar to a number of cultural sector representatives, refer to this principle, testaments to the fact that there is a high degree of consensus on a set of basic cultural policy values, including freedom of expression and the state responsibility for this freedom.

At the same time, not every stakeholder in the Norwegian cultural sector would agree with an analysis that just points at a general consensus and claims to identify a 100% coherence between what policy says and what policy does. A couple of examples can illustrate this.

An expert informant in this case exemplifies a fundamental point in an analysis of value coherence: The fact that one and the same value can be interpreted differently from different perspectives. In other words, there can at times exist an incoherence within one and the same value. An obvious example of this, relevant to cultural policy, is how the seemingly self-evident value of freedom is seen from different sides of the political spectrum. In actual discourse, the values of autonomy and freedom are very closely related and challenging to separate from one another. A right-wing perspective might argue that it is important to be free and independent from public funding in the production of art – that the freedom of the arts is best secured by reducing the role of government. A left-wing perspective might argue in an opposite manner – that stable public financing of the arts is the best way to ensure that art can be developed with freedom and innovation, free from commercial constraints etc. In our case, we can observe that what we referred to as a meta-value, the value of the arms' length, is interpreted differently. Our expert informant was explicitly concerned that the gradual professionalization of cultural policy, whereby influence is moved from the ministry to a directorate and bureaucrat level, is indeed a slow undermining of the arms' length principle, and not a strengthening of it.

Another angle on the question of coherency and/or incoherency is represented by our informants working as politicians. On the one hand, although they represent the same (coalition) government, there seems to be a slight tension between the values represented by the two political parties they represent. While there are no explicit values that the political parties and our politician informants would disagree with, the prioritization between them shows some differences. When confronted with the question of whether some values or objectives are more important than other ones, one of them would put the value of democracy, access and participation on top, while the other was struggling to say that something was more important than something else. At the same time, they both seemed to agree that their political programs saw cultural policy priorities somewhat differently, e.g. on the importance of large national cultural institutions.

The politician informants reminded us also of a basic fact, highly relevant to the analysis of value implementation and coherence: politics tend to be a game of pragmatism, negotiations and practicalities. One of our interviewees expressed this fact through pointing to that it could at times be difficult to recognize all the fundamental principles and objectives in the day-to-day practical politics. He described this as something he needed to remind himself about regularly – what values that their policy actually were based upon. Our other politician interviewee illustrated the pragmatic side of politics from another perspective: She recalled a specific case where a fundamental change in a cultural policy programme was implemented by the Ministry of Finance, in their systematic work on the state budget. In other words, cultural policy might be effectuated by other stakeholders than the ones explicitly in charge of this policy. This might also make it challenging to identify coherence between values and operationalized policy, simply because actual politics is at times guided more by practicalities, coincidence and pragmatic compromise more than actual values.

Governance, adaptability and social accuracy

Democratic openness, dialogue with stakeholders, power relations

A central part of the general value clusters guiding Norwegian cultural policy at a state level, is the arms' length principle, as discussed above. This is a principle that quite clearly is relating to the question of separation of powers: politics and aesthetics need to be adequately separated. As our case study have documented, the interpretation of this principle and this separation of powers is not universal. The interpretation of the principle seems to be dependent on the position and perspective of different stakeholders: What is seen to be a necessary professionalization of the sector and effectuation of the arms' length principle by one, can be seen as an unnecessary distancing from practical, hands-on politics by another.

A parallel potential tension is visible in the changing roles and power distribution between the political and bureaucratic level in state cultural policy in Norway. During the last one or two decades, there has been a substantial increase in the tasks assigned to directorates under the Ministry of Culture, especially to Arts Council Norway and Arts for Young Audiences Norway. From a ministry perspective, this shift in influence and power constitutes a necessary professionalization, whereby decisions on art funding and organization are properly moved away from political influence. From a sector perspective, this is not necessarily the case. As one of our expert interviewees state, this might as well be a shortening of the arms' length, as the decisions and priorities of bureaucrats are more rigid and less transparent.

Social accuracy, adaptability, evolution of values in relation to social developments

One fundamental question in this study is to what degree culture and cultural policy is relevant to society, in other words how it adapts to society, or its social accuracy. An empirical finding that is interesting is that the public, explicit cultural policy in many ways and areas might be seen to have come to a stage where it is perceived as too narrow. The traditional scope of the policy, focusing on institutions, certain formats, and genres of art (including music) and predominantly funding, does not necessarily reflect the cultural production, distribution, and consumption of a modern society. To some extent, this resembles what Mangset (2020) refers to as the "end of cultural policy" (as we know it), however perhaps with a slightly new and different content. Where Mangset pointed at cultural policy's incapacity to absorb and make use of knowledge-based input, for example from policy researchers, this current policy challenge encompasses the cultural policy discourse on a broader scale. Our analysis of the empirical material in Uncharted WP4, brings us to wonder if not the current cultural policy scope has drifted somewhat off what contemporary cultural activities mean to society. Some examples of topics that seem to lack on the current cultural policy agenda are a) an awareness of the danger of cultural sector becoming an elite project, placing the cultural sector amidst political and economic elites, b) the changed relationship between national policies and international (digital) distribution, and a concurring lack of regulation authority; c) online presumption of culture (for example in SoMe), and finally of course d) AI-produced or -enhanced cultural content.

These and other examples indicate an insufficiently reflexive cultural policy, that is in danger of being increasingly irrelevant to the citizens, or to an increasingly narrow segment of the population in a country. One way to frame this, is to claim that its social accuracy is reduced. The fact that these topics are not sufficiently reflected on in the data material, represents both a strong indication of the point – the interviewees are part of the narrow cultural policy discourse – and an evident value incoherency. Furthermore, it seems at its strongest at the national level, where the production of cultural policy

discourse is essential.

At the state level, there thus is a need for reflexivity in terms of rearranging cultural policy; from seeing cultural democracy merely in terms of what the institutions and actors that are currently part of cultural policy discourse define as cultural democracy, and instead towards a significantly broadened scope of participation and co-governance. The need for stating this so clearly, builds on a fear that the cultural sector and discourse within the current cultural policy framework is in danger of becoming axiomatic, in the sense that practice aims at confirming the discourse. In its chapter on the cultural sector, the governmental white paper report NOU 2022: 9 The Norwegian Commission for Freedom of Expression, warns that the space for expressing radical and counteractive meanings, particularly those criticising or doubting cultural policy doxa, is in danger of shrinking. The reasons for this potential development are surely multiple and complex. Interestingly, this seems to be less detectable within the empirical material of this study.

This might also be said to represent a contrast to a developing emphasis on democratic and inclusive values. One source to back this claim is the funding agreement for the Arts Council and the stated objectives from the Ministry of Culture. In the funding agreement for 2013, the main objectives were two: “1. Contribute to the start of innovative and experimental projects, and 2. Be custodians of cultural heritage, hereunder strengthen archives and museums, promote the communication of culture and knowledge, promote the development of digital content and the safeguarding of collections.” There is an obvious contrast to the stated objectives in the funding agreement from last year, quoted above, which emphasizes both artistic innovation and democratic inclusion. Furthermore, the omnipresent concept (and value) of sustainability also entered the explicitly stated objectives this year. The sustainability concept was not mentioned in the agreement for 2022. We can identify a slowly developing discussion on possible new ways of legitimating cultural production and cultural policy in this perspective: is it part of the problem or part of the solution.

Conclusion

On the national level of Norwegian cultural policy, we have identified a considerable coherence in how values and objectives are stated and implemented. Among the most important values, we find quality and accessibility for all, relating to democracy, equality equity and fairness and aesthetics value clusters, and all of these are easily found as the policies are implemented into budgetary dispositions, various measures, institutional support, and artist policies. The few incoherencies we found, arguably confirm this rule rather than contest it. At the same time, there are potential incoherencies on the horizon. One of these is the pressing issue of the value sustainability and the lack of efforts to operationalize this value in actual cultural policy.

A final comment to the considerable coherence observed in state cultural policy in Norway has to do with the financial situation of the country. The apparent lack of tensions and incoherencies might partly be explained by a very robust economy, which also has affected national spending for culture. The cultural budget from the Ministry of Culture has, as mentioned, increased gradually year by year for several decades. The national economy of the country clearly lessens the need for strict prioritisation, and hereby also the potential conflict between different values and value clusters. The financial situation creates an ability to add new objectives, goals and, potentially, values, to existing ones, without removing or replacing them.

3.2. Vestland county Cultural Policy

Objectives and values

Main values and their evolutions

The object of this analysis is Vestland, one of 11 counties in Norway, representing the regional administrative and policy level. The most prominent responsibilities of the counties are providing/running upper secondary schools, public dental services, county infrastructure (roads and public transportation), industrial and commercial development, and finally culture. Within public cultural policies, the regional level represents a relatively small actor in the sense of both economy and activity. Still, some of the most ambitious counties (and here, Vestland should be counted in), keep successful programs for production and distribution (cf. Berge et al. 2018), artist (musician) residencies (cf. Berge 2017), and display of culture (including music). Moreover, the county level of course holds the responsibility for two of the most important and successful cultural policy institutions there are, namely the public libraries and the abovementioned Cultural Rucksack program.

As mentioned, today the number of counties is 11. However, due to a persistent political disagreement, in 2024 this number will increase to 15, as three counties that were merged by the conservative government in 2020, as a result of a decision made by the sitting social democratic government, are to be split back up. Also, the cultural policy has been sought regionalized (and consequently repoliticized), however without the same luck. A political campaign in 2019, run by the conservative government, aiming to decentralize cultural policy power from the state to the county level thoroughly failed (see Berge 2022). If the regional level really is to rise in interest and relevance, is yet to see. Historically, the county level within administration and politics has been regarded with a solid dose of ambivalence and skepticism. Right wing parties have wanted to abolish it, replacing it with larger, merged municipalities, while center-left wing parties often have treated them with relative disinterest, keeping them more than anything as a strategy to dam up for what they have seen as neoliberal ideas of cutting back on the number of municipalities. In this relative state of limbo, squeezed between the local (municipal) and state levels of administration and policy, the county level in many ways rests in the shadow of the other two, in terms of both formal power and status, and popular interest (Berge 2022). This is also the case in terms of cultural policy. One point that illustrates this, is the fact that in 2022, the culture budget of Vestland county was 13 million € smaller than that of the city of Bergen, which is the county capital (31 compared to 48 million €)⁶⁰. In terms of budgets, the regional level thus was outshone by its own county capital. In many ways, the same could be said about the two's cultural plan prose, where Bergen's high pitch ambitions often leave county plans in the behinds. This finding is interesting as it highlights how the regional level despite being small both in budget and responsibility still operates as if it was an equally important level as the local and state levels.

On an overarching level, both objectives and values of Vestland county cultural policies relate to a regional framework of culture that is organized in three sectors: Culture, sports, and integration (both in general (inclusion) and of immigrants). More specifically, the three are divided into the following sub-sectors: a) archive, b) library, c) cultural distribution, d) cultural heritage, e) sports and outdoor life, f) integration, strategy, and analysis, g) arts and cultural development, and h) administration of culture and sports. This structure is reflected in all sectors of the regional governance; in how the administration is organized, in policy plans and in the budgets⁶¹. Firstly, how the county administration is organized does not say very much about values, perhaps apart from one thing: the county administration is placed geographically in two different cities Bergen and (the much smaller city) Førde.

⁶⁰ See Vestland county budget 2023 / Financial plan 2023–2026 and Budget 2022, Action and Economy Plan 2022–2025, Bergen municipality.

⁶¹ Culture builds society. Regional plan for culture 2023 – 2035.

This signalizes a will to pertain to the decentralization tradition also within a county context.

Hierarchies and tensions between values

Plans, however, indeed reflect objectives and values. The explicit cultural policy objectives in Vestland are found in particularly two regionally adopted white papers, firstly the Culture Builds Society – Regional plan for culture 2023 – 2035, and secondly, the Culture builds society – Action plan 2023 – 2026. The first broadly (over 70 pages) outlines the visions and objectives of the county, the second follows up the plan with a relatively short and to the point (12 pages) description of how the county wants these objectives to be realized.

In terms of values, by outlining visions and objectives in depth, both the plans to a large degree, however perhaps mostly indirectly, state the most principal values on which the cultural policy rests. For example, in the introduction of the paper, the vision and principal objective are stated; the vision is “Culture Builds Society”, and the principal objective is “Everyone should be able to participate, experience and create”. The vision is somewhat tricky to translate to English, as it also could read Culture Builds Societies or even Communities, which of course represent small but still analytically important nuances. However, focusing on the build-metaphor, sustaining this vision, are several "value principle" clusters that relate to and emphasize culture's capacity to secure well-being (on both a broad and narrow scale), build democracy (locally and regionally), contribute to equality, equity and fairness, and to mobilize a social link between citizens, and citizens and the authorities. In short, this represents the belief that culture has the capacity to substantially contribute to society in profound ways, that is, more than being icing on the cake.

Another goal that is clearly stated in the plan, related to the aesthetic value cluster, regards Vestland's cultural policy ambitions. Above, we claimed that Vestland in many ways keeps more modest goals than its capital Bergen, a fact that reflects the regional level's generally lower importance and (subsequently) self-esteem. It may thus come as a surprise that Vestland in its regional plans, it is stated that a cross cutting aim of the county cultural policy is to become or stay “a leading region”. However, this seemingly ambitious goal must be interpreted in terms of what and whom they compare themselves with. As other Norwegian regions are very heterogeneous in terms of cultural policy ambitions, many also quite vague about them, this goal does not really say much. Where Bergen states that they are to be leading in Europe or internationally, in Vestland's case, an unanswered question is leading compared to who? Perhaps as an effort to bring some clarity to this question, in the plan the concept of leading is outlined through five operationalizations. It is stated that Vestland aims to be a leading region where:

1. Cultural clusters can develop regional qualities and resources.
2. Vestland has a professional cultural life at a high level.
3. Cooperation between professional and voluntary, and private and public actors, is the basis for investing in both elite and broader initiatives.
4. Vestland has a sustainable cultural infrastructure with a diverse offer for everyone.

The fifth point is not really an aim, perhaps more a pious wish on behalf of the regional level, or a mere description of the state of the art in Norwegian cultural policy. It reads, “An offensive cultural policy at all three levels of administration shall support initiatives and investments in cultural life”. Pertaining once again to the image of not overselling anything, the ambition of leadership is immediately moderated, as the plan reminds its readers that to be a leading cultural county is an ambition, not a part-taking in a competition. Thus, Vestland reassures us, it does not “intend to beat anybody, but to make the best of its own resources and to develop solutions and measures that are adapted to Vestland's cultural life, with quality at all stages”. In terms of cultural excellence, thus, Vestland county is a reluctant “leader”, something that we believe is relatively typical for regional level

plan prose.

Finally, in the introductory sections of Culture Builds Society, the UN sustainable development goals (SDGs) are explicitly stated, not as one goal in the plan, but as a precondition for all other goals in the plan and subsequently in all regional cultural policies. It states: “Sustainability is existentially fundamental and a prerequisite for everything we work with. The culture in Vestland must be a driver for social, environmental, and economic sustainability.” For one, in a discourse where value clusters, according to both policy plans and bureaucrats, have remained very little changed over the past ten or so years, this orientation towards the UN SDGs represents something genuinely new.

Implementation coherence

General implementation, strategies and resources

All the mentioned objectives – and subsequently, value clusters – are also present in the data material stemming from our interviews with bureaucrats, politicians, and experts – on all levels (street, higher up in the government hierarchy, etc.). This indicates that the value clusters that permeate regional plans are well internalized among the actors within the regional cultural field. On a meta level, it is interesting to find that so many of the goals stated in the regional plans are also repeated by the actors that are closely related to the cultural systems that these plans are thought to inform and govern. This is the case for both the values and the value hierarchies. It is also the case for budgetary consequences of policy plans and their implementation strategies. It is interesting to observe that there is little sign of discrepancies within the material regarding budgets, apart from the, at least in a Norwegian context, ritual whining about too little money for culture. We will return to that later. The county budget is transparent⁶², accurately reflecting the regional plans. For example, it is easy to retrieve the eight sub-sectors from the plan, each concretized with measures (including the number of applications and their funding needs) and prioritizations. Finally for each budget post, it is listed how the allocation relates to the defined objectives of the sector. This transparency is emphasized throughout the interviews in this study. In the cases where the informants stated dissatisfaction, this almost entirely had to do with prioritizations, either by politicians rearranging the bureaucracy’s recommendation, or by higher level bureaucrats prioritizing in other ways than the informant saw optimal.

County cultural policies’ similarity to the national level

Another meta level finding is that many of the objectives, and thus value clusters, that we find in both regional plans and bureaucrats’ discourse, are very similar to those stated in national plans, often representing deep-rooted Norwegian and Nordic cultural policy traditions. This tells us that there perhaps is not a big difference in how the national and the regional level think, plan and act cultural governance, and that the regional level in this aspect places itself much closer to national than local cultural policy practice. This finding is supported by the fact that many of the interviewees from the regional level told us that they keep themselves oriented about national level policy plans and implementation, some even very systematically, for example through having regular meetings where national policy is identified and discussed. All this points in a direction where it is fair to describe the discourse as consensus oriented. We find a relative agreement among regional level cultural actors about what is at stake within cultural policy, what the most important goals are, how to get there, and why. As of the latter point, most prominently, an overwhelming consensus reigns about culture’s

⁶² Budget found here (in Norwegian):

<https://www.vestlandfylke.no/globalassets/foto/dokument/budsjett2023vestlandfylkeskommune.pdf>

capacities to build society (cf. Vestland's vision). Thus, to the extent that there are disagreements over cultural policy issues, these never touch on this underlying premise; culture is necessary and good for both the society at large, and any other types of communities. In the Bergen case, this relative consensus is to some degree contested or challenged by some of the informants who refreshingly remind us about the potential an autonomous culture and arts field hold in society. This potential, often epitomized by metaphors like (culture and arts being a) watchdog or rebel, pointing out and criticizing problematic social issues, holds a double value. Immediately, it is not necessarily recognized as community-building, but on a more philosophical level, it is recognized as just that. In policy paper analyses, the presence of both these perspectives – culture as building / culture as critique – in the same context (like how it is in Bergen city plans), is easily interpreted as an inconsistency. However, we suggest it rather is interpreted as different modes of instrumentality, where culture's constructive powers are seen on long- or short-term bases.

As we have established that there is a coherence between values found in regional government plans and values found in the bureaucrat and cultural practitioner discourse, it is interesting to look at how these values come to show in the material. Several of the objectives that appear in the empirical material, closely relate to value clusters like democracy, equality, equity and fairness, identity, and social link. One objective that quite literally relates to the vision culture builds societies that is frequently found in the interview data, is that of *Bildung*. This concept, that dates to German romanticism (see e.g., Bruford 1975), resembles how culture is seen to hold a profoundly civilizing capacity, both on an individual and societal level.

Fair access

Another main objective that relates to many of the overarching value clusters, that appears frequently in the material, is the goal of disseminating culture and providing a rich, high-quality cultural offer to all citizens of the county, what is in a cultural policy research context often referred to as the democratization of culture. In this context, that is a quite ambitious goal, as much of the region is extremely sparsely populated. Some parts of the county are geographically large, however still populated with only a few hundred people, or even less. The idea that they should have even the slightest proportion of the offer that people in for example a city like Bergen have, is borderline absurd. Still, this is a goal that is promoted extensively, resulting in for example music policies bedding for the existence of no less than two opera houses in the region, where one is in a quite remote area. Arguments used to justify such priorities are often related to equity; it is not fair that people in the countryside should not be favored with relatively easy access to high quality art, for example classical music. The goal of publicly supporting a rich cultural life in every tiny little village or hamlet of the region, largely reflects a specific Norwegian political and cultural tradition, representing a proactive non-centralization policy, facilitating for people to stay in all parts of Norway. It should be stated that this tradition has both replaced and supplemented a tradition of democratizing the culture, i.a. by sending city-based productions on tour to remote areas (Bjurström & Hylland 2018). As culture is seen as crucial to build societies, this is clearly an example of the operationalization of several of the values mentioned above, roughly compiled in the notion of social sustainability (to which we return in just a moment). On that note, also economic sustainability arguments are seen in the material, pointing towards another political tradition, namely a Nordic welfare-based artist policy focus. Here artistic work is emphasized as work in line with that of other occupations. In line with this, the need artists living in the countryside have for institutions to work for, is recognized in the same way as with those in the cities.

Coherence of implementation with regard to main values

As consensus still is the dominating state of cultural policy thinking and practice, more explicit tensions and deviations from the norm are of course of particular interest. In the data material from Vestland, there are a few examples of such “cracks” in the otherwise conform or homogeneous discourse. In the following, three such cracks are analysed: The “lost” value environmental sustainability, the recurring failure of regionalization of cultural policy power and the relationship between the state and the regional level, and finally the claim that despite receiving adequate – one could argue, generous – funding, the cultural sector claims to lack the necessary moral support in the public opinion, from politicians and bureaucrats, etc., and consequently experiences reduced psychological safety. The first example relates to the “mismatch” between how the value cluster sustainability is addressed and framed in regional plans, and how it is (not) operationalized in bureaucratic practice and discourse. One would think that the UN SDGs prominent position would have a trickle-down effect within the county organization, including the practice field the bureaucracy is set to serve. However, while sustainability in its social and economic form is extensively discussed in the data material, environmental sustainability – what is often termed as the green transition within the cultural sector, remains little mentioned, or mentioned only when specifically asked. It appears that the county bureaucracy is somewhat stuck in old value and objective hierarchies and priorities, not able to grasp how the global aim of green transition is relevant or possible to operationalize for them. Here, interestingly, the cultural practitioners seem more agile and capable to take on the responsibility of greening the sector. Some of these sector actors have in fact pointed this out, criticizing the public government for being too slow or disinterested in what they see as one of the most important and urgent political and moral issues of our time. In that sense, this also constitutes a relevant example of tension between values that have different moral standing within the different spheres of the cultural sector: the plan (rhetoric), the bureaucrat (mediation) and the practice (cultural organizers and workers) levels.

The county’s position among artists and institutions

The second “crack” in the varnish, relates to the relationship between the state and the regional level of cultural governance. Most prominently, this regards a general distrust to the regional level among cultural practitioners, in terms of allocation of funds, organizing institutions etc. Thus, several recent efforts to decentralize power to the regions, e.g., to allocate funds and organize institutions, have been met with opposition and, ultimately, failure. The distrust has several reasons, but one important is related to what is seen as a lack of professional competence within the county (and municipality), particularly concerning their capacity of being sufficiently sensitive to the cultural field’s autonomy claim (Hølleland & Skrede 2019). The fear seems to be that the county could fall into being more instrumental in their policy making and implementation than the state bodies. Since the county level has never really been tested at this, it remains to be seen if the fear is real. Furthermore, the distrust relates to a lack of trust in the county being able to build sufficiently strong professional clusters. Such strong cultural clusters are seen as important for both being a relevant sparring partner to the practice field, and for holding the symbolic power needed to assign symbolic capital. The latter is important since public funding is such an important profit in the cultural economy. Today such profit is hierarchized, with a post in the global state cultural budget on the top, followed by funding from Arts Council Norway, and with local or regional funding at the bottom. That is, regional funding is seen as beneficiary, but lacks the consecrating powers of state funding. The effect this tension has, is that it destabilizes how overarching goals and values are being regarded regionally. The regional administration is aware of this complex but are left without means to mitigate it. This state of organizational indisposition could thus be seen as a characteristic inconsistency marking the regional level of governance.

Culture's post-Covid position in society

The third and final “crack” relates to culture’s status in society, more specifically how the practice field perceives this status or lack of status. Especially during the pandemic, many artists tell, they felt an intense inconsistency between how culture is valued in cultural policy plans and how it is valued in society, both in everyday life and in politics. Many refer to how cultural arenas and institutions were the first to be closed and last to be reopened, showing the real face of society’s valuation of arts and culture (Røyseng et al. 2022). The rescue packages that were launched, aiming to mitigate the consequences of the shut-down, could never make up, they asserted, for the sorrow of being conceived as less necessary to society than bars, restaurants, amusement parks, etc. This lack of whole-hearted support was not sufficiently compensated by the cultural administration, including the regional level. Consequently, also on this level, an implementation incoherence seems apparent.

Governance, adaptability and social accuracy

Democratic openness, dialogue with stakeholders, power relations

An overarching (meta) finding in the material, that seems to be the same on all three governance and policy levels analyzed, is that plans, the democratic processes behind decisions and implementation of policies are transparent and accessible for everyone. In particular, new technology has contributed to this, opening for policy and administrative documents being available to all, political debates being streamed, etc. One infrastructural component that also adds to this, not least with regards to dialogue with stakeholders, is the agreeable size of the actual bureaucracy on at least the regional and municipal levels. In Vestland, the county hall is located in Bergen, easily accessible and open to the public. The fact that it is easy to approach the cultural administration underpins a sense of openness, even though few actually take use of the opportunity. Rather, several of the interviewees tell that they rather approach the practitioners, in order to keep informed and in touch with the field of practice. We thus tend to conclude that the power relations between the bureaucracy and the cultural workers and practitioners are relatively flat.

Street bureaucrats straight to the top

The lack of antagonistic relations between bureaucrats and cultural practitioners – antagonisms one would expect to find, as the two parties represent quite different professional traditions and interests – could relate to their shared social capital. Many bureaucrats are former cultural workers, and many artists and cultural workers have a past as bureaucrats. They often share networks and meet regularly at the (few) events that take place in the region. This close relationship between bureaucracy and the field of practice, is well analyzed by Lipsky (2010), who uses the analytical concept of street level bureaucrats. In the Norwegian cultural bureaucracy, street level bureaucrats are frequently found, throughout the organization (all the way to the top), in all three governing levels. Most prominently, this results in a great sensitivity to cultural sector needs and desires. When interviewed, the actors tell about little difference between sector representatives and bureaucrats, with regards to values and strategic desires and needs. In one interview, a senior bureaucrat for example told about her frustration in a case where the politicians sat aside her allocation suggestion for three cultural institutions in favor of a sports facility. It took some work to make them change back, but it felt necessary to her to do this – she knew it was life or death for these institutions. Interestingly, she shared her thoughts and frustrations over how some of the cultural institutions made themselves inaccessible to the same politicians. For example, she told us while giggling, that several of the

institutions delivered their annual reports in English, as an attempt to be relevant internationally. Not all politicians in Vestland even speak English, she said. When asked if this could alienate local and regional politicians, she confirmed that in some cases this could be so. Another possible reason for lack of tensions and antagonism in the material, is the Nordic cultural policy tradition with a strong corporative component (Mangset, 2015). This means that artists' and cultural workers' organizations have kept and keep strong ties to political and administrative bodies. This model of a three partite cooperation between politicians, organizations and bureaucracy traditionally has worked effectively to reduce conflicts. In the empirical material, there are several traces of this tradition, telling the story of a field that sees itself better off with consensus than conflict. Finally, the consensus can be explained simply by the lack of need for harsh prioritization. In the Norwegian oil-income-based economy, funding has for long come relatively easy for all with the required need and qualification. This lack of need to prioritize, amid budgets that have increased every year for the past twenty years, has assumedly paved the way for a (perhaps unhealthy) consensus.

Social accuracy adaptability, evolution of values in relation to social developments

As stated in the first case, one fundamental question in this study, which relates to all the Norwegian cases, is to what degree culture and cultural policy is relevant to society. This is how we interpret social accuracy. At the state level, a prominent finding was that one specific lack of accuracy was related to a too narrow cultural policy discourse. The danger with this is that the discourse potentially grows axiomatic: the most important objective of the cultural policy is to confirm its own existence. If that is the case, the legitimacy of the cultural policy is at stake. Fortunately, this narrowness in the cultural policy scope seems to reduce as one turn from the state level via the county level to the local level. At the county and local levels, the proximity to the cultural practice field is so tangible that the cultural policy must be adopted to be sensible to the citizens.

This proximity is interpreted both in positive and negative terms. One example is how the arm's length-principle is interpreted and operationalized. This example is interesting because it appears in different shapes and forms on all three levels, something that indicates that it is important to a wide range of actors and roles. In the county case, one bureaucrat for example told us that he felt his potential for being hands-on on projects had shrunk over the past years. In particular, he felt his professional expertise challenged, as he no longer was to choose musicians to various productions that the county organized and financed. This job was taken over by a committee of peer-musicians, providing a selection of musicians and a content that not always was the one he felt was needed. The actual phrasing that he used, being hands-on, is of course an intriguing parallel to the arm's length-principle, as the latter represents a hands-off approach to governance. The balancing of being hands-on and/or keeping hands-off in our view represents one of the most prominent features of the cultural policy model as it acts out in Norway. As displayed in the state and municipality cases, the entirely opposite operationalization of the arm's length principle – outsourcing power from a ministry to a directorate in the first, and back-sourcing such power from local street bureaucrats to the local policy level in the second – can both be interpreted and advocated as a reduction of an arm's length. This fact indicates that how the arm's length principle is operationalized, is potentially ideologically and politically charged.

Conclusion

On the regional level of Norwegian cultural policy, we find a strong coherency in the understanding and implementation of policy objectives and central value clusters. Based on our empirical material, we find a transparent, trust-based, and well-organized bureaucracy. Especially, there is a high degree of transparency within policy making and implementation, and room for dialogue between politicians, bureaucrats and the stakeholders within the remaining cultural sector. We see this state in light of a long-standing Nordic welfare model and an even more long-standing Norwegian policy model, where trust, regionalism/decentralization and social cohesion are core values.

Despite this state of relative tranquility, also on the regional level, some value incoherencies are found. We will highlight two, one concerning the value cluster sustainability, and one concerning cultural democracy. Firstly, there is a lack of coherence between the place sustainability, mainly framed through the UN's SDG, holds in plans and general rhetoric, and how this is implemented and operationalized on an operational level. While the goals are big, the consciousness among bureaucrats is seen as (too) low among the practitioners and institutions in the cultural field. Secondly, an incoherency regarding cultural democracy is identified. This incoherence relates to an increasingly mismatch between a too narrow public cultural policy scope and how cultural production, distribution and consumption are actually acting out. This latter point leads us to worry that the public cultural policy holds a growing lack of social accuracy. Cultural policy, what it encompasses and who it is for, is shrinking to a level where its legitimacy could be at stake. Especially at the regional level this is a danger, as this policy and bureaucracy level already holds relatively little public engagement. This "problem" is most clearly detectable on the state level. At the county level, the relative proximity to the spaces where cultural activity takes place is so tangible, that the cultural policy must adopt to be sensible and relevant to the citizens. One pertinent challenge is however that an increase in professionalism among cultural stakeholders potentially means a decrease in their proximity to the public. Consequently, this could promote unfortunate allegations of elitism.

3.3. City of Bergen Cultural Policy

Objectives and values

Main values and their evolutions

The municipalities play a significant role in Norwegian cultural policy. Some cultural policy tasks are enshrined in legislation. The Education Act and the Library Act instruct all municipalities to provide extracurricular culture schools (kulturskole) for children and youth, and public libraries. Cinema has also traditionally been an important task for the municipalities. Moreover, the municipalities have a broad range of socio-cultural tasks connected to the civil society, amateur activities, and organizations within sport, children and youth activities, heritage, music and more. Finally, the municipalities have taken care of local culture venues and culture houses (Mangset & Hylland 2017, p. 238). Some municipalities, especially the large ones, also have developed a cultural policy for the professional art field, for example by running large art institutions or policy measures for the support of artists or businesses within cultural and creative industries. The city of Bergen, which is our case of analysis, is the second largest municipality in Norway, and the city's cultural policy covers a wide range of areas reflecting an ambition of having not only local impact, but also regional, national – and international – significance.

Cultural policy objectives and associated value clusters at the municipal level are not very different from objectives and value clusters at the regional and the national level. The overarching objectives for cultural policy in the city of Bergen are formulated in a ten-year-plan called the Cultural Strategy.⁶³ The strategy document is based on the overall political platform at the time the strategy was developed. The current Cultural Strategy is titled «The cultural city of Bergen – at the forefront internationally», stating the overarching policy goals and strategies for the period 2015–2025. It highlights five ways the city aims to position itself: in having 1) a world-class and well-renowned arts and culture scene, 2) a knowledge-based, innovative and enterprising cultural landscape, 3) a diversity of cultural experience of the highest quality – for everyone, 4) a high level of knowledge of arts and culture among the local population, and 5) a development strategy for the city in which arts and culture is central.

High artist policy ambitions

Artist policy has traditionally been a state level concern in Norwegian cultural policy (Heian 2018). Few municipalities have invested much in this. However, over the last two decades, in the era of the cultural and creative industries, some municipalities have developed an artist policy aimed at the professional art field (Haugsevje 2022; Haugsevje et al. 2021). The city of Bergen is an exception in this regard. Artist policy and policy aimed at the professional cultural field has been an important part of cultural policy in Bergen for a long time. Among the objectives is to ensure quality and uniqueness in the production and presentation of art and culture, and to raise the level of competence in the artistic and cultural communities. The Cultural Strategy states that the city of Bergen should be an innovative space for spontaneous cultural activities, temporary events, and experimental artistic expressions, and that the city has an international position and appeal which should be even more strengthened. According to the Cultural Strategy, the city of Bergen aims to build robust creative enterprises and value chains through good financial and practical measures. The city also has a comprehensive art plan (almost hundred pages) dedicated to the professional field, in which the overarching objective is that “[t]he city of Bergen is to become an international hub for the arts, focusing on both niche and

⁶³ Cultural Strategy for the City of Bergen, 2015–2025.

mainstream endeavors, being visible, socially relevant, forward-looking, and willing to explore new paths”⁶⁴. Further, the art plan states that it is important to make space for the autonomous and independent art, “at an arm’s length from the political city system”⁶⁵. The policy objectives for the professional field which are articulated in the Cultural Strategy and the art plan reflect an aesthetic value cluster emphasizing quality, artistic excellence, and autonomy, as well as an economic value cluster emphasizing innovation, growth, and employment. The art plan also states that the city’s art policy should contribute to facilitating a strong public discourse about art and its societal relevance through an investment in art critics, professionally qualified criticism at various levels, and critical discussion in various formats. The highlighting of art criticism and public discourse reflect that art and culture also might have the role of a watchdog and be a sphere of dispute, and through this contribute to individual and societal *bildung*, dialogue, civilization, and emancipation. This can be connected to a democratic value cluster.

Music policy

The policy on the music field seems to relate to the same basic main value clusters that are present in policy for other parts of the cultural field. The art plan states that Bergen should have a competent, innovative and international music scene, in which creativity, professionalism and uniqueness are central⁶⁶. The policy reflects an aesthetic value cluster (aesthetic excellence, creativity and innovation), a value cluster of democracy (diversity, cultural democracy, autonomy) and a value cluster of economy (growth, employment, competition). The professional music industry in Bergen has fostered many artists who have made international success. Thus, the music policy is a field where artistic excellence, creativity, innovation and enterprise, and subsequently international reputation is highlighted. Particularly evident in the music policy is the emerging international ambitions, evolving from the ambition of being an important Nordic music city, to being “in the forefront internationally”.

Participation and inclusion

Cultural policy in Bergen is of course not exclusively aimed at the professional field. Residents and tourists as audiences and cultural participants are also important cultural policy target groups. The Cultural Strategy highlights that the city of Bergen should be an attractive place to live, and that art and culture are important parts of that. Art and culture are emphasized as vital elements in urban planning and development, e.g., as part of cultural corridors in the city center and as part of the infrastructure in all neighborhoods. These objectives may be related to a mixture of value clusters, such as identity, well-being, and economy.

Another very important objective is to develop children and young people’s cultural knowledge and secure their cultural participation. In the years since the Cultural Strategy was developed, the city of Bergen has also developed several other cultural policy documents which highlight the importance of diversity and participation for everyone. More specifically, it has been developed a plan for participation and diversity in the field of art and culture (2021–2023)⁶⁷ as well as several plans dedicated to specific groups: children, young people, elderly people, and people with disabilities. These objectives are related to value clusters of well-being and equality, and a social value cluster. Participation and access for everyone have been important and stable values of Norwegian cultural policy for decades. The last years, however, the political efforts in order to include minorities, such as

⁶⁴ Bergen municipality’s art plan for the professional field 2018–2027, p. 19, our translation.

⁶⁵ Bergen municipality’s art plan for the professional field 2018–2027, p. 12, our translation.

⁶⁶ Bergen municipality’s art plan for the professional field 2018–2027, p. 31.

⁶⁷ Plan for participation and diversity in the field of art and culture, 2021–2023, Bergen municipality.

immigrants, seniors, and lgbtq+ individuals, have been strengthened. However, these policy values are not replacing traditional policy values. Rather, they are added as new layers to the old ones, in a sedimentary fashion (cf. Dubois 2015; Henningsen 2015).

Hierarchies and tensions between values

In general, there is a strong consistency between the values highlighted in the policy documents and the values referred to by the officials interviewed. The interviewees emphasize the importance of a cultural policy ensuring good financial and practical measures for the professional field including the creative industries and the large and traditional institutions on the one hand, and, on the other hand, for the cultural access and participation for everyone, such as children and youth, amateurs, minorities, elderly etc. However, when they in the interviews were pushed to prioritize, the interviewees on all authority levels highlighted access and participation as the most important cultural policy goal. An elected public official expressed what he thinks is the most important: “Most culture for as many Bergen residents as possible”⁶⁸. The reasoning behind his statement is that if everyone has the opportunity to experience as much culture as possible, he believes that it will contribute to the enriching of individuals and to the forming of a society – which he sums up in one word: *bildung*. This politician represents a party on the Norwegian center-left-wing. However, there is with a very few exceptions an all-party consensus that the most important goal is cultural participation for everyone regardless of where people live and what background they have, and that art and culture thus should be able to develop and unfold independently of the market. It is also seen as a necessity that this wide distributed art and culture has high quality. Bureaucrats on all levels also seem to share this idea. An external expert expressed in an interview that there is very little of the ideological left-right divide in Norwegian cultural policy. And because most people agree upon these things, the cultural policy discussions can become quite dull. The expert argued that culture policy might have gotten more attention and more influence in society if there were some strongly disagreeing on the use of public money on culture.

To be sure, the political right wing tends to emphasize an economic value cluster slightly more than the left-wing does. It is also possible to identify a tension between policy prioritizing the large institutions, such as art museums, theaters, etc. versus policy prioritizing emerging artists and unestablished talents. The politician mentioned above, agree that it is important to take care of the cultural institutions, but his heart lies with the emerging artists:

I'd rather give from the big ones to the small ones. [...] Don't get me wrong, I obviously want Kode [Bergen's art museums] to be taken care of, and the great painters [...] but we need to create some new great painters, and they are living on next to nothing. The same goes for Edvard Grieg. Now, Troidhaugen [Grieg's former home] is being renovated for 500 million Norwegian kroner. Imagine if I could use the same money to give to musicians to create a new Edvard Grieg.⁶⁹

The interviewee highlights a tension between an identity value cluster, emphasizing heritage, memory, tradition, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, an aesthetic value cluster, emphasizing creativity, invention, innovation, artistic excellence, and an economic value cluster, emphasizing competition, innovation, growth, and employment. To sum up, it is possible to identify some rather weak tensions between values in local cultural policy. However, the main picture is that everyone agrees about what the most important values are.

⁶⁸ Interview with elected public official.

⁶⁹ Interview with elected public official.

Implementation coherence

General implementation

Since 2000, the city of Bergen has been governed by the City Government (byrådet) appointed by the City Council (bystyret) based on the principles of parliamentarism. Only a few Norwegian municipalities have introduced parliamentary governance. In contrast, most municipalities are governed based on a model where a small selection of elected officials constitute an Executive Committee responsible for making administrative decisions and preparing matters for the Municipal Council. The motivations for introducing parliamentary local governance in Bergen were to strengthen the role of the elected officials and obtain a more evident political local governance, make more holistic assessments, and contribute to a clearer structure of political responsibility (Ølberg 2018).

A well-developed structure for implementation

The municipality has established an organizational distinction between two levels of authority. The bureaucrats at level 1 constitute the secretariat for the political leadership. Their work is carried out in a political context, but they should not enter the realm of party politics. The practical policy implementation is done by the bureaucrats at level 2, at an arm's length from politics. We will discuss this division later in this case.

The main governance tool is the City Government's policy platform⁷⁰. The current platform has the title "Bergen – a good city for everyone", launched by a four-party-constellation at the center-left-wing. When interviewed, the Commissioner for Culture emphasized that the local platform is the most important, but that he also needs to have the national political platform in mind in his political work. The City Government which was in charge at the time we did our investigations, was a minority government, which means that they needed support from the other parties in policy making. The Cultural Strategy and the many thematic plans are also central government tools. One of the bureaucrats interviewed expressed that her actions must be in accordance with 14 different cultural policy plans.

When it comes to implementation, the interviewees point out that there is never enough money to implement all purposes. Regarding the prioritization between different purposes, the political platform document is the most important. The Commissioner for Culture experiences a great amount of autonomy in his decisions, however there are some restrictions: the budget limits, a desire to avoid political unrest, and the fear of critical coverage in the press. Norwegian legislation on the transparency of political processes, gives anybody including journalists access to political documents such as meeting agendas and minutes, and correspondence. The press is mentioned by both the elected officials and the bureaucrats as significant actors in the local political power structure.

Governance is done both formally and informally. The administrations at level 1 and 2 receive each year a letter of governance from the political leadership. The administrations have autonomy to decide how to fulfill their missions within the budget limits. However, the politicians might also come to the administration with additional ideas and purposes, and preferably with resources to carry them out. There is a continual non-formal dialogue between the elected officials and the bureaucrats regarding the prioritizing and implementation of policy. The interviewees express that even though

⁷⁰ Policy Platform 2019 – 2023 for a City Government from the Labor Party (Ap), the Green Party (MDG), the Liberal Party (V) and the Christian Democratic Party (KrF).

most policy implementation is done through formal processes, there are a significant amount of non-formal processes going on, such as lobbying. This is happening in a local context, between stakeholders, politicians, and bureaucrats, but also between the local, regional and national level. Typically, such lobbying is happening when big political issues is at stake, for instance when there is a chance to promote Bergen as a potential location for a political measure that is to receive national funding. That was the case with a recent political process in the music field. The question was whether a national agency within the music field should locate a part of their administration in Bergen or not, or at least strengthen their interaction with the city of Bergen and the regional music industry. The formal process which included formal meetings and an appeal from the local music industry did not succeed. One day, however, the involved actors met accidentally for lunch at a music festival in the city. They had a non-formal conversation which contributed to a more constructive dialogue about possible future collaboration. Even though the case is still not settled, the case demonstrates that there is often a frontstage and a backstage in policy making and implementation.

Budget details

The budget details are transparently and pedagogically communicated in the municipalities' website. The municipality also offers a "Budget school" on their website⁷¹, which is kind of a "budget for dummies" – page where people can find information about how the budget process works, and how they as citizens can influence the budget. In 2022, the total municipal culture budget was approximately 48 million Euros⁷². Almost 287 000 people are living in the city (January 2022), which means that the budget on culture per capita amounts to 168 Euros (2022). This is about average among Norwegian municipalities.

About 16 % of the total culture budget is explicitly dedicated to music purposes (2022). A great share of this is spent on music activities for children and youth, including the kulturskole (which offers not only music activities, even though music makes up the largest part). In addition to the explicit music budget, there might be music purposes "concealed" also in other parts of the culture budget, such as in the parts dedicated to cross-aesthetic art, creative industries, multicultural measures, culture for senior citizens, and culture for citizens with mental disabilities. It seems to be a reasonable coherence between budget priorities and the local policy objectives and the value clusters they can be associated with.

Coherence of implementation with regard to main values

Because of the overall consensus in culture policy issues, at the local level as well as at higher levels, the question of implementation is seldom a question of values or objectives. Rather, it is a question of allocation of resources and prioritization within budget limits. If policy is not implemented as planned, the reason usually is lack of funding, not political opposition. One bureaucrat in Bergen expressed that "most things are financed by downsizing existing things, but that is rarely discussed". Because there is never enough funding for implementing all parts of a policy program, there might be incoherences between values and what is implemented.

Incoherence is also present because of practical, legal, and bureaucratic obstacles in the processes of

⁷¹ <https://www.bergen.kommune.no/politikk/budsjett/budsjettskolen>

⁷² Budget 2022, Action and Economy Plan 2022–2025, Bergen municipality.

implementation. When politicians come up with an idea, for instance that the youth club in a particular district should extend its opening hours, the politicians often want to demonstrate their political drive by making it happen immediately. Even though the funding might be sorted out, it is not always possible to act fast. Local bureaucrats at the two different levels experience that there are a few additional obstacles when policy is to be implemented. There are for example many considerations to make regarding such as staff and organization, logistics, working time regulations, purchasing terms, and other sorts of bureaucratic procedures. A big issue that has emerged in recent years is the question of protection of personal privacy, where new legislation is far stricter than earlier. The bureaucrat interviewees experience that issues such as these have expanded in the last years, making it more demanding to implement even small measures. These obstacles in implementation processes arise as a result of a “competing” value cluster present in public governance, concerning the values of bureaucratic and legal integrity, ethics, transparency and trust.

Arm’s length and bureaucratization

As mentioned, the city administration is divided in two different levels of authority, where level 1 is the superior and level 2 is the subordinated level. The administration of policy measures is done at the authority level 1. Earlier, this administrative responsibility was delegated to the bureaucrats at authority level 2. This centralizing move of authority was done in order to achieve greater consistency between goals and means, to reduce differences between districts with regard to policy implementation and to extend the arm’s length. Interviewees from both levels express that the change might have led to greater consistency. A positive result is that the street level bureaucrats (cf. Lipsky 2010) at level 1, who are working closely with applicants, are relieved of the responsibility for the approval and rejection of applications. At the same time, the bureaucrats at this level experience the change as a bureaucratization that inhibit them to engage in active efforts regarding the needs they can identify as part of their “love to the district”⁷³, as a level 2 bureaucrat expressed himself. Thus, this change also means that the street level bureaucrats (at level 2) have lost important tools in their daily work close to the citizens. At the same time, the change has given the bureaucrats at level 1 a chance to be more hands on. It is interesting to note that locally, in Bergen, they have chosen to move power upward in the system, while at the national level (as discussed in the Norwegian ministry case) there is a tendency to move power downward. Both moves might, paradoxically, be described as a way to shorten or extend the arm’s length, depending on how we understand this principle. In our data there are interviewees who tend to describe both these types of moves as an arm length reduction, even though they are opposite. This tendency indicates that the arm’s length principle has turned out to be an instrument which is possible to use (and abuse) politically.

Incoherence related to the democratization of culture

A more fundamental incoherence can be identified between the highly emphasized value of access and participation for everyone and the actual amount of the local population that are users of or have access to public funded culture or take part in public funded arenas or activities. After decades of political efforts for the democratization of culture, research shows that the democratization goals are “difficult, if not impossible, to reach” (Mangset 2020, p. 400). This incoherence is present in cultural policy at all policy levels. However, in Bergen as well as in many other municipalities, a significant part of cultural policy measures and budgets are dedicated to the funding of low-threshold services such as e.g., spaces for music rehearsal, music studios, youth clubs, and community festivals of different

⁷³ Interview with public official.

kinds – activities and measures that might reach broader target groups. Thus, it is possible to argue that this incoherence seems to be slightly weaker at the local level than at the regional and national levels.

Governance, adaptability, and social accuracy

Democratic openness, dialogue with stakeholders, power relations

As mentioned, the democratic processes behind decisions are to be transparent and accessible for everyone, due to the open government legislation. Everyone has the right to access and inspect documents and conversations related to political and administrative matters. City Council meetings and also meetings in the different political committees, including the Standing Committee on Finance, Cultural Affairs and Business Development, are streamed online at the municipality's website. The city of Bergen established the online streaming of meetings in 2012, to make the local policy making more accessible to the citizens and to create engagement and a more transparent dialogue with them. In general, there is a high level of trust in Norwegian society, also with regard to the political system, the politicians and the bureaucrats. However, over the past few months, Norwegian media have had several news stories about politicians violating rules of impartiality, insider regulations, and other laws. In the long run, such incidents can obviously reduce the level of trust in society. Another disturbing tendency is that the voter turnout is lower than earlier, particularly among young people. In Bergen, the voter turnout in the recent local election was 64,1 %, which was a little higher than the national average (62,5 %).

The city of Bergen has established several strategies for increased citizen involvement. As regulated in the Municipal Act⁷⁴, every citizen, including people under the age of 18, have the right to put forward a citizen proposal, with a minimum of 300 signatures. The City Council is obliged to consider the proposal within six months. The municipality also have established three councils of involvement; one council for the involvement of senior citizens, one for the involvement of people with disabilities, and one for the involvement of youth. Additionally, the Planning and Building Act states that all municipalities should have procedures to protect the interests of children and youth in planning and building issues. This includes the appointment of a representative for children and youth in planning and building matters, which can be highly relevant in some cultural policy making and implementation. Lastly, the City Government's Department for Culture, Voluntary Sector and Inclusion makes use of citizen panels, including youth panels, in order to strengthen the involvement from target groups and the precision of policy measures.

Social accuracy, adaptability, evolution of values in relation to social developments

As described, the city of Bergen has developed several thematic cultural policy plans which reflect the emerging attention in society on the value cluster of equality. This value cluster has been present in local cultural policy for a long time, but our data show that it has been enhanced and expanded. The policy has developed from a focus on the inclusion of people with immigrant background and children

⁷⁴ Lov om kommuner og fylkeskommuner (kommuneloven) [the Municipal Act]: <https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/2018-06-22-83>

from low-income families, to a more sensitive focus on the inclusion of a broader range of groups, such as people with disabilities, sexual minorities, and old people. According to our analyses of cultural policy plans, budgets and interviews with politicians and bureaucrats, the value cluster of equality has permeated local cultural policy.

The value cluster of sustainability is another emerging cluster in our society. Local cultural policy is to a certain extent influenced by this development. This is also the case in Bergen. A political goal for the city is for example to make the city a “walker’s city” in the sense that it is easy to move around in sustainable ways, e.g., as a pedestrian. This goal has influenced cultural policy in the sense that there have been developed plans and strategies for the transformation of city districts into vibrant cultural centers within walking distance. Interviewees in the administration also describe how they today are obliged to consider the carbon footprint in the implementation of cultural policy measures. Moreover, the city has established a scheme for the eco-certification of festivals, among other things. Apart from such initiatives, it is hard to identify other significant reflections of the value of sustainability in local cultural policy in Bergen. Besides, the strengthened emphasis of Bergen as a significant actor on the international art scene, which necessarily have consequences with regard to the transportation of artists and audiences, is not very easy to combine with the value of sustainability. As a matter of fact, interviewees argue that cultural policy is a policy area that should be protected against too many requirements with regard to sustainability and climate goals. An elected official said: “It may sound like I’m not concerned about the environment, but I actually believe that culture, by its very nature, is environmentally friendly”. This interviewee was not alone in pointing out an inherent eco-friendliness of culture. In contrast, research indicates that there is an ongoing greening of the cultural sector. However, this seems to be a bottom up-driven development, while the political requirements and incentives have been few (Løkka 2023; Oakley & Banks 2020).

Conclusion

Local cultural policy in the Bergen case reflects a broad range of values. There is a considerable coherence between the objectives and values articulated in policy documents and what is articulated by politicians and bureaucrats in the interviews. It is hard to identify a clear hierarchy in the structure of value clusters. However, when politicians and bureaucrats are asked to point out the primary values, as they were in the interviews, they highlight the values of cultural participation and accessibility for everyone, which can be labeled a democratic value cluster. However, it is seen as a necessity that this culture has good quality, which we can associate with an aesthetic value cluster. Tensions between value clusters seem to be few and relatively weak in this case, as in all the Norwegian cases. To be sure, the political right wing tends to emphasize the economic value cluster slightly more than the left wing. And there is also a tension between a backward-looking identity value cluster (as in taking care of the large museums and heritage institutions) and the more forward-looking aesthetic, economic and competitive values (as in fostering new artists). According to budget appropriations and interview data, there seem to be a reasonable coherence between the policy objectives and the practical policy implemented. Cases of incoherences or non-fulfilment seem to be rooted in lack of resources, and delays or frictions that arise out of another, competing bureaucratic value cluster. On a more profound level, there is obviously an incoherence between the value of access for everyone and the statistics on who and how many that actually are users of public funded culture. This incoherence seems, however, to be slightly weaker at the local level than what is the case at the national level.

When we compare the values reflected in local cultural policy with emerging values in the society as such, we can identify different degrees of adaptations. The value cluster of equality (inclusion, non-discrimination, diversity) has been present for a long time in local cultural policy but has recently been even more emphasized. The large number of new thematic plans within the cultural area for increased diversity and inclusion of various groups is an evident sign of this development. Another emerging

value cluster in society today is the one related to sustainability, particularly environmental sustainability. However, so far, this value cluster seems to have had a limited impact on local cultural policy, at least in Bergen. As a matter of fact, politicians and bureaucrats tend to argue that cultural policy is, and has always been, inherently green and eco-friendly. Thus, it seems that they are not very much in line with the cultural sector as such, which has taken several initiatives for a green transition.

4. Ministry of Culture, Hungary

4.1. Introduction

With the Hungarian democratic transition after 1989, Hungary adopted Western models for managing culture under the direction of the National Cultural Fund (1993). This is a semi-autonomous organization designed following the arm's length principle aimed at financing cultural and artistic projects. From this perspective, different administrations aimed at establishing mechanisms to overcome authoritarian and direct intervention in cultural institutions (Apor, 2012). Still, interventionism has been regarded as a not wholly abandoned trend in this public policy domain during the last three decades (Bozóki, 2017).

Important changes in cultural policies were fostered during the first Victor Orbán government (1998-2002). The new orientation of cultural policies stressed national heritage and architectural nationalism. At the same time, nationalist values were enhanced within other areas, such as producing films and operas with akin content. Culture became an essential aspect in the celebrations of the Hungarian Conquest (902 AD) with an aim to “solidify the continuity of traditional Hungarian Right-wing politics” (Bozóki 2017: 100).

Since 2010, Hungary has been governed by the far-right party Fidesz, whose period in office started with a constitutional reform. The Ministry of Culture was initially transformed into a Secretariat within the new Ministry of Human Resources. The Secretariat is in charge of heritage, museums, arts and part of international cultural relations (Inkei, 2016). Besides this Secretary, the National Cultural Fund and the Hungarian Academy of Art (MMA) also integrate the cultural policy system. The MMA is a public entity that facilitates “the prevalence and protection of the values of Hungarian and universal culture, the respect of the traditions of Hungarian arts and the birth of new and significant artistic works”⁷⁵. These institutions have been reformed in the last decade, giving more powers to the central administration within their management boards or mechanisms.

In 2022, based on Article 17 (1) of the Fundamental Law, the Parliament established the Ministry of Culture and Innovation. The responsibilities and powers of the Minister are reflected in Articles 128-139 of Government Decree No. 182/2022 (24 May 2022). This institution, together with the MMA and the National Council for Culture⁷⁶, currently represent the cultural policy system, following a centralist, interventionist and discretionary illiberal model (Inkei, 2022). In this regard, it should be noted that even though this cultural policy system formally exists, relevant decisions are often taken by other government actors and Fidesz or Victor Orbán-related clientele (Personal interview, 11-05-2021, Inkei, 2022). Cultural policy strategies or initiatives are unknown by the opposition or do not follow a conventional Parliamentary debate. Parliament Commissions do not regularly take part in the cultural debate leading to projects or laws approval because the government is formed by Fidesz supermajority. Moreover, the party constantly blocks potential Parliament and Commission deliberations.

⁷⁵ See presentation at: <https://www.mma.hu/web/en/index>

⁷⁶ The National Council of Culture is an Hungarian organization established by law, which provides the professional foundations for unified government strategic management of cultural sectors. The Council reports annually to the government on its activities. The President of the Council is appointed and dismissed in a government decision. In addition to the President, the members of the Council are the leaders of cultural strategic institutions named in the law, and the president of the Hungarian Academy of Arts.

4.2. Objectives and values

Strategic approach to cultural policy goals definition

It should be noted that Hungarian cultural policy is characterized by the absence of programmatic or strategic documents or plans guiding policy action. Since 2010, the governments led by Fidesz have not produced specific cultural policy programs or plans as part of a strategic approach to this public action domain (Inkei, 2016; Bozoki, 2016). No explicit document has been elaborated except for some sectoral strategies delivered by the National Council of Culture, such as the Hungarian Pop-music strategy (2020). Instead, policy principles and objectives can only be found in some legal texts and speeches of the Prime Minister (Inkei, 2023:2).

Legal framework setting main goals of cultural policies

Functions and goals of the State Secretariat for Culture (Kultúraért Felelős Államtitkárság) were defined as:

[...] use available state resources to initiate and promote the creation of new cultural assets, and to preserve national and world cultural heritage assets in Hungary. It defines and organizes the guiding principles and programs for the development of international cultural links, and of activities aimed at further popularizing Hungarian culture in the international arena.⁷⁷

The approach to cultural policies fostered by Fidesz after 2010 is also reflected in the new Constitution (The Fundamental Law of Hungary), which entered into effect on 1 January 2012. The text echoes government radical and Christian ideology since it was approved with a parliamentary supermajority and lacked domestic and EU consensus. New cultural provisions in the Constitution involved reconfiguring the institutional system and the state's constitutive role in the culture domain. The text gives an essential role in cultural administration to the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (established in 1827) and the Hungarian Academy of Arts (Magyar Művészeti Akadémia – MMA). Both its Preamble and Article H place national culture as an instrument of social and political cohesion, linking it to natural and human-made resources of the nation:

We commit to promoting and safeguarding our heritage, our unique language, Hungarian culture, the languages and cultures of nationalities living in Hungary, along with all man-made and natural assets of the Carpathian Basin. We bear responsibility for our descendants; therefore we shall protect the living conditions of future generations by making prudent use of our material, intellectual and natural resources. (Preamble)

As we can see, the cultural basis of the Hungarian nation, such as the language and heritage, are stressed. The use of the Carpathian Basin as part of the historical events leading to the settlement of the Hungarians in Central Europe at the turn of the 9th and 10th centuries and the common territory established since then are particularly relevant. Moreover, Article H points out regarding this heritage: “the State and every person shall be obliged to protect, sustain and preserve them for future generations”.

⁷⁷ See presentation at: <https://2010-2014.kormany.hu/en/ministry-of-human-resources/offices-of-the-ministers-of-state>

Still, cultural diversity is also addressed in the Fundamental Law, stressing the Hungarian singularity with respect to Europe. Under the Right to Self-Determination, in Article XXIX. Besides framing cultural rights in this way, the Preamble stresses Hungarian culture's contribution to "the diversity of European unity". Along these lines, it indicates: "We respect the freedom and culture of other nations, and shall strive to cooperate with every nation of the world". Moreover, Article X, 3, including references to the rights to academic, science and the arts, frames the role of the above-mentioned institutions in cultural governance (MMA).

Cultural policy goals in governmental documents and pronunciations

During the electoral campaign, the 2009 Fidesz Culture Program ('Quality in Culture') employed the rhetoric of a need for modernization of cultural institutions, including libraries, museums, and traditional culture houses, strongly emphasising urban heritage, while contemporary arts were marginalized. The focus was instead on national heritage and monumentalism (Babarczy, 2017; Kristóf, 2017). Additional clues can be found on related documents or declarations (Bozoki, 2016). Viktor Orbán's speech delivered at the village of Kötcsé (2009) and the Declaration of National Cooperation (2010) are stressed in this context. In these statements, national and ethnically defined national community values are crucial for cultural action. According to Bozoki (2016: 34), missing "is the idea of cultural diversity deemed as a value in its own right".

The national framework programme for 2007-2013, called the New Hungary Development Plan, originally contained no separate culture chapter dedicated to cultural targets in conformity with the European Union's policy. Moreover, the Secretariat manages no open culture information databases, so cultural data is mainly retrieved from the Gazette's legal decisions on cultural powers or initiatives (Personal interview, 11-05-2021). Along these lines, when asked about programmatic goals of cultural policies, an Executive bureaucrat in the music sector (Interview, 08-2023) answers without detailing specific goals: "there is a kind of widespread political strategy on cultural sectors, there have been some issues about the appointment of some of the key directors of cultural institutions." Another Executive bureaucrat (Interview, 08-2023) from the opposition points out: "Government policy supports a kind of curated group, almost like a clientele, of artists that are more right wing, more in line with their own views on the world, and this leads to a lack of resources for independent cultural organisations". Such organizations are mostly associations and SMEs not linked to official claims and networks.

The new Ministry of Culture and Innovation (2023) involves reframing the area goals, which tends to dilute the above Secretary's autonomy in policies aimed at higher education and "management of initial vocational and adult education and training". Moreover, the new Minister recently has manifested the need for further transparency and formality in the use of resources and policy evaluation, which would go against existing lobbies in the sector (Óry, 2023).

Based on the above legal framework and Primer Minister speeches, Inkei (2022) summarizes the main explicit goals and ground values of cultural policy as the preservation and strengthening of national identity. From our interview with an Executive officer (2023), we also identified that being a linguistic minority is seen as a threat in this regard. Still, the interviewee identifies as a specific value of cultural policy the value shift in the last decade towards conservatism "I use to say a 'conservative revolution". Secondly, Inkei adds liberal laissez-faire culture, artistic excellence from those representing the nation, cultural market competitiveness, and tackling migration's (adverse) cultural effects. Lastly, based on the above, we should add the importance of consolidating a clientele network reinforcing certain value grounds concerning national culture should be pointed out. In brief, the main goals of cultural policies are fostering national identity through affiliated cultural expressions, fostering artistic excellence, and cultural production.

4.3. Implementation coherence

General implementation, strategies and resources

The above general orientation of cultural policies is translated into non-systematic implementation. Instead, the different lines of action are dispersed in different institutions across the administration, including the Prime Minister's Office, addressing the Protection of cultural heritage and the Subsidy of Műpa, Palace of the Arts (Inkei, 2022). This also entails the work of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Foreign Affairs (Cultural Institutions Abroad).

Resources and budget structure


During recent years, the country has had one of the highest European cultural budgets as a percentage of GDP. In 2021, Hungary had the second-highest share of expenditure on cultural services (2.1 %) after Estonia (EUROSTAT, 2021). Furthermore, the cultural budget has gone from 610 million euros in 2015 to 1520 million euros in 2021, representing 2.8% of the total budget share (Inkei, 2021: 12). This budget has historically been centralized at the state level administration. For instance, the central government managed almost 60% of the share and 20% at the local level for 2015–2017 (Budapest Observatory, 2019: 12). Moreover, while the central government institutions invest about 75% of the cultural budget, municipalities currently are in charge of the remaining 25% (Inkei, 2022: 12).

Moreover, in 2015, a minimum amount of cultural support for towns was introduced. This means that a village or town – regardless of its population – would receive a minimum of 1.2 million HUF (ca. 4000 EUR) contribution to culture. Nevertheless, most municipalities spend several times more on culture than the "per capita" central redistribution. The top-down intervention and corporatism have reduced cultural facilities and local governments' autonomy (Bonet & Zamorano, 2020, Personal Interview, 11-05-2021). According to the National Development Agency, between 5 and 15% of the local cultural budget is provided by EU assistance. In the last few years, this situation seems to have deepened:

And they (central government) do not really like to give funding to others that they see as counter to this kind of narrative. This year and last year, the independent theatres (*both lucrative and non lucrative*) in our district received no state funding whatsoever from the central government, and you can imagine with COVID and with the financial situation, inflation, that's a huge hit. (Executive bureaucrat, Budapest district, Interview, 08-2023).

When analyzing the distribution of the above cultural budget within cultural sectors, the structure reveals a significant concentration on historical monuments and theatre, followed by museums and archives and music and dance.

Figure 1. Sectoral distribution of the central administration cultural budget



Source: Inkei, 2016 and https://www.ksh.hu/stadat_files/ksp/hu/ksp0003.html

Therefore, State-owned facilities and projects in Budapest and at the national government level are a significant focus in the budget. For instance, resources for equipment and monument restoration, such as in the case of the Erkel Theatre, the Franz Liszt University of Music or the Liget Budapest, among many others. However, several decentralized initiatives have also been taken regarding concrete developments. Accordingly, when promoting the city of Pécs as the European Capital of Culture in 2010, about 100 million euros were used to put arts spaces in value, building conference and consent centres, libraries or urban transformation (FaraGó, 2012). Other cultural projects and spaces, such as the so-called Agoras, have been funded in several cities. It should also be noted that state-promoted local cultural activities, such as the Night of Museums, reflect a diverse program in aesthetic and even nationalist terms⁷⁸.

It has also been pointed out that the minister decides and assigns a quarter of the National Cultural Fund budget. These grants, about 7-8 million EUR a year, are subsequently disclosed on the website of the institution (Inkei, 2016). The European Regional Development Fund's funding contribution, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and the European Social Fund have been vital in this development, supporting museums, libraries or local organization projects (Inkei, 2016).

Legal reforms as part of policy implementation

Legal reforms have also been conducted in recent years. Five parliamentary acts and several government decrees were passed about the MMA between 2011 and 2016, giving this organization a prominent role in cultural administration at the national level and the central government additional powers over the MMA. This included setting up the Budapest Hall of Art, the Vigadó Concert Hall and the Hild Palace under the MMA in 2013. Legal reforms also granted the intervention of the MMA in the designation of a third part of the reviewers' board in charge of assigning grants for artistic projects presented to the Fund in 2015 (Kristóf 2017)⁷⁹.

⁷⁸ See at <https://muzej.hu/en/2023>

⁷⁹ Moreover, it should be noted that different directors of the MMA were close to the party in government. For instance, the interior designer György Fekete (2011-2017), posed the defence of national sentiment and Christian values as an exclusionary variable for valuing artworks (Jonášová, 2019).

Inkei (2022) identifies 18 Acts associated with culture in the last five years, which are mostly related to overhauling the structure and hierarchy of institutions. Two of them are particularly relevant. The Act CXXIV / 2019 on the National Council for Culture and the Institutions of Cultural Strategy points out 16 strategic institutions with their leaders as members of the National Culture. Subsequent regulations give a vital role in this system to the National Council for Culture. For instance, Act XVI / 2021 frames “the financing and support of activities of cultural strategic importance, the predictable operation of the institutions providing such activities, and the predictable future of the beneficiaries of cultural strategic subsidies”(Inkei, 2022:14).

In brief, main implementation strategies are associated with robust public investment in artistic excellence, distribution of such resources to favour those expressions more aligned with the constitutive character of the administration, and limiting the power of certain actors opposing such definition of national culture, such as local administration and independent organizations.

Coherence of implementation with regard to main values

Four dimensions should be highlighted when analyzing the above general principles guiding cultural policy principles. The first goal concerns the framing and consecration of a traditional definition of national culture by promoting language and historical heritage as key coordinates for organizing public cultural action. In this regard, the level and structure of the culture budget, importantly focused on historical heritage, reflect this guiding value. Moreover, from a strategic standpoint, the corporate use of the state by stakeholders and political actors aligned with this national conception and the blocking of other state actors and stakeholders can be seen as coherent with this objective.

Secondly, other traditional values in the country's cultural policies are preserved, such as excellence in the arts, which is reflected, for instance, in budget allocation or political discourse within the MMA. A particular interpretation of this value is reflected in the grant distribution for the music sector, which goes beyond classical music, covering different aesthetics from folk to popular music (Executive bureaucrat, music, Interview, 08-2023).

Thirdly, references to the value of cultural diversity are found in the Constitution from a fundamental rights standpoint but they do not seem coherent with the homogenizing dominant approach in political statements and actions. Several cases of censorship of art performances and pieces, including live shows, exhibitions or actors, have occurred based on their association with gender or political orientation (Artistic Freedom Initiative, 2022). Other examples include opponent writers being removed from the school curricula or increasing control over media. The consequences of these policies include the emigration of artists and intellectuals (Human Platform, 2020). Other values disputed and held in this context relate to freedom of speech and artistic independence, which have become increasingly relevant in the above scenario (Jonášová, 2019).

Another incoherence concerns the lack of strategic planning and transparency for the area, which entails specific values in itself. The Fundamental law stresses institutional autonomy. However, cultural policy administration has been characterized by discretionary interventionism over arts institutions or local governments. It has also shown the instrumentalization of culture by Fidesz-related clientele networks. This whole dynamic shows the dominance of values instead of transparency and public accountability, aligned with neo-authoritarian or illiberal policy systems. Therefore, this policy is far from the nineties' initial attempt to establish an arms-length model of cultural administration. As mentioned by Inkei (2016), the country's cultural budget lacks transparency in terms of resource distribution. It is dispersed across different budget items corresponding to different social policies and institutions. This actually represents an understanding of culture as a transversal issue and a specific consideration of accountability.

4.4. Governance, adaptability and social accuracy

Fidesz obtained the last parliamentary elections in April 2022. The party gained two-thirds constitutional majority for the fourth time in a row. Even in the context of the Ukraine war and post-COVID pandemic, the general situation shows the government's hegemony and the continuity in the strategic use of culture, with monumental representations of national identity and the relaunch of the culture government as discussed above.

In this power relations scenario, the above description of cultural policy orientation and evolution in the last ten years reveals the establishment of a central government system closed to public debate and contestation. Given the illiberal model of the regime, Inkei (2022:3) stresses that "participatory planning and negotiated decision-making are almost entirely absent. For instance, in the case of cultural grant making design or public consultation about heritage policies, a bureaucratic approach is implemented where legal channels for public audiences are poorly used: "At the central level, it's more of a symbolic gesture, so you know, more ticking the boxes, OK we sent the letter" (Street level, Interview, 08-2023). Interviewees confirm this:

So I am not participating in creating any culture policies. Usually, cultural policies in Hungary are not a result of participatory processes. There are consultations, but usually, these are consultations with political figures, so there are cultural policies that we have to comply with, for which I don't think there were any prior negotiations. (Executive bureaucrat, music, Interview, 08-2023).

The overall approach to democratic openness and resulting cultural policy design reveals that the usual top-down character of instruments used by central administrations is deepened due to the clientele dynamics in place. In this regard, the interviewee underlines how such an approach is aligned with a specific understanding of society that obstacles to any sort of multilevel collaboration in cultural policies:

Well, I would say that at the government level, there is a very hierarchical perception of culture policy, whereas we see culture, especially publicly funded and supported culture, as a tool for community building. [...] That's also often a point of friction with the central government, because they often have a clear perception of the kind of culture that they like, that is acceptable to them, the one they prefer, usually the more conservative. (Executive bureaucrat, Budapest district, Interview, 08-2023)

The governance scheme and approach not only limit the intervention of local government and social actors in policy-making but are often opposed to these dynamics. Instead, the idea of a government of experts, in most cases men, is revealed. The standard mechanism for cultural policy design and implementation consists of ministerial and expert decisions that are translated into the law or policy (Executive bureaucrat, Budapest district, Interview, 08-2023).

4.4. Conclusion

As we described in this case analysis, Hungarian cultural policies lack a critical component of policy evaluation, which is a systematic and assessable structure of goals and strategies for implementation. The lack of accountable policy frameworks and procedures challenges the emergence of tensions derived from public debate that may affect the legitimacy of policies or passed laws. In this regard, we have structured the main identified principles and notions guiding policy-making from legal texts, Prime Minister speeches and literature.

Based on the above scheme of objectives and ground values, we can see an essential degree of coherence in Hungarian cultural policies concerning boosting a particular understanding of national identity. This is done through intense support of historical heritage, as well as performing and

audiovisual arts narratives. As a counterface of such policy action, we find exclusionary mechanisms to stress the boundaries with those artists or art pieces outside such definitions and the values embodied behind them (gay groups, migrants, etc.). This is also coherent with those implicit and explicit mentions of the need to give a cultural battle against migration.

Certain coherence is also found regarding those goals related to boosting artistic excellence, primarily based on the high level of public resources targeted to public cultural institutions and grants to boost production.

Other goals described by policymakers as part of cultural policy debates, such as the need for transparency, facilitating laissez-faire culture or cultural market competitiveness, can be seen as instrumental to the need to frame policy programs under liberal economics. However, the above illiberal policies, consisting of direct and indirect censorship and corporatist public intervention in the cultural market, seem to oppose such claims.

5. Ministry of Culture, Portugal

5.1. Introduction

Since the First Constitutional Government came into power in 1976 the cultural administration has largely been organized as a Secretary of State, that it means as a minor administration. Cultural administration at the central level has started playing a more relevant role since the '80s, when a First Ministry of Culture was created (Garcia et al., 2014). Nevertheless, different views on the importance of culture in the state bureaucracy between the political parties that have mostly governed the Portuguese Republic since 1976, the Socialists and the Social Democrats, have led to changes in the status of the cultural administration that have frequently involved downsizing the Ministry of Culture to a Secretary of Culture under Social Democratic Administrations. This fluctuations of the central cultural administration can be associated to a historically low cultural budget in relation to the European and regional context (Garcia et al., 2016) that is reaching 0.66% of the national budget⁸⁰. The type of policy actions, the budget distribution, the institutional mix, as well as the private and state actors participating and supporting cultural action, suggest that Portuguese Ministry policies correspond to a combination of Architect and Patron State model of intervention (Chartrand et al., 1989; Garcia et al., 2016).

Since 2015 the cultural administration constitutes a Ministry, composed by the Minister and two Secretaries: The Secretary of State for Cultural Heritage and the Secretary of State for Cinema, Audiovisual and Media. The Organic Law of the Government (Decreto-Lei 169-B/2019⁸¹) that establishes the organization and functioning of the XXII Constitutional Government, describes: "The Mission of the Ministry of Culture is to formulate, conduct, implement and evaluate a global and coordinated policy in the area of culture and related areas, namely in the safeguarding and valorization of cultural heritage, as well as in the area of media, in the area of artistic creation and cultural dissemination, in the qualification of the cultural field and, in coordination with the Minister of State and Foreign Affairs, in the internationalization of Portuguese culture and language" (Article 23).

The legislative activity between 2015 and 2021 was notably in seven areas ranging from the support to the arts production to heritage, a well consolidated and supported field, in a great extent, due to its closely tied to the tourism industry which is a key sector in the country's economy (Carvalho et al., 2016). Major efforts are dedicated it to National heritage (material and immaterial one) which are regulated by a specific legislation to provide autonomy in managing and servicing museums, monuments or palaces. Ministry has also major competences in promoting the arts through autonomous bodies and strategic planning⁸².

In the music sector the central cultural policies promote a tied coordination with educational and socio-community policies, as well as with private actors (companies and associations) to stimulate music creation and consumption. Private stakeholders' action is integrated to state policy action, not only in the music field, but are significative examples of this coordination in this case. One of the most internationally recognized is Casa da Música, a high culture institution in the sector that allocate three orchestras and a diversity of classic and contemporary music activities. The relevance of non-state actors' involvement in the Portuguese case is reflected in the Chapter III, article 73.3⁸³ of the Constitution when it states: "Everyone has the right to education and culture [...] The State promotes the democratization of culture, encouraging and ensuring access for all citizens to cultural enjoyment and creation, in collaboration with the media, cultural associations and foundations, cultural and

⁸⁰Source: [General government expenditure by function \(COFOG\) Eurostat](#)

⁸¹ <https://diariodarepublica.pt/dr/detalhe/decreto-lei/169-b-2019-126869983>

⁸² Such as Plano Nacional das Artes 2019-2024 (Diário da República, 2021)

⁸³ <https://www.parlamento.pt/Legislacao/Paginas/ConstituicaoRepublicaPortuguesa.aspx#art73>

recreational groups, cultural heritage associations, residents' organizations and other cultural agents".

The elaboration of this report is based on the analysis of documentary sources from state institutions and agencies as well as from the main private organizations involved in the development of cultural policy and the music sector. We have also conducted semi-structured interviews with experts, politicians and technicians. These sources are anonymized and coded⁸⁴.

5.2. Objectives and values

Main objectives, values and their evolutions

The center-right party in power since 2006 (Social Democratic Party) has emphasized private participation in the financing of culture. The achievement of classic objectives of cultural democratization, such as promoting access to cultural consumption or supporting large cultural institutions, depends significantly on companies and foundations. Main objectives in this frame are funding the arts and promoting the creation by giving support to the private entities involved in cultural action deployment. The financial crisis of 2008 exacerbated this cultural funding model in the context of a restructuring of the cultural administration. The rationalization, simplification and efficiency of the Secretary of Culture was a priority objectives of the government between 2011 and 2015 (Governo do Portugal, 2011). As in other European countries the evolution of cultural policy objectives shows a prioritization of economic objectives over redistributive ones (García et al., 2016). On this background private initiatives in the music sector and Popular music events (Festivals) and venues have wide spread in the main cities fostered by entrepreneurs and small private organizations. These initiatives, which resulted from the situation of economic recession, succeeded in organizing themselves into networks of venues and events, giving rise to the "Circuit" Live⁸⁵ (B7; B8) a platform of 23 live music venues from all over Portugal that seeks to consolidate the sector in the creative, consumption and training dimensions of popular and contemporary music. Even popular music is a dynamic and vibrant field in Portugal this initiative is excluded from public support⁸⁶.

National identity values are of great significance and historically rooted⁸⁷ in the case of Portuguese Cultural Policy. This type of values structures the most relevant policy areas, such as the internationalization of language and culture as well as material and immaterial heritage policies (Governo do Portugal, 2011). The promotion of the Lusophony that involve the valorization of the sense of belonging and community among Portuguese speaking countries was related in the last decade to economic and aesthetic values since operates in articulation with creative innovation aims and economic growth as well as with national branding objectives (Governo de Portugal, 2019). Lusophony policies have an impact in the music field mainly through the action of Camões Institute⁸⁸ which promotes the exchange, the cooperation and the diffusion of traditional (such as Fado) and contemporary music creators and creations within the Community of Portuguese Language Countries

⁸⁴ the interviews are coded and correspond to the following groups and profiles (a) cultural policy field: B1 elected official, B2 executive bureaucrat, B3 expert; (b) music sector: B4 elected official, B5 executive bureaucrat, B6 and B7 street level bureaucrats, and B8 expert.

⁸⁵ <https://circuito.live/#quemsomos>

⁸⁶ The funding they receive comes from the European Commission program Liveurope, a pan-European initiative supporting concert venues in promoting emergent musicians and music diversity. <https://liveurope.eu/about-us>

⁸⁷ and connected with national policies aimed at valorizing the Portuguese Empire Ultramarine Discoveries that persisted along the last century and still survive nowadays, crossing the dictatorship (1926-1974), the revolutionary period (1974-1976) and the arrival of democracy in 1976 (Rodríguez Morató et al., 2021).

⁸⁸ <https://www.instituto-camoes.pt/en/component/finder/search?q=music&Itemid=2596>

(CPLC)⁸⁹. In the realm of identity values (community, memory, belonging, tradition), the conservation and the promotion of heritage is a core objective also linked to economic (innovation, competitiveness) and social values link (social and territorial cohesion). The XXI and the XXII Government Programs of the Portuguese Republic (Governo de Portugal, 2014, 2019) put in the center of cultural action immaterial and material heritage as political authorities understand it as a fundamental and transversal element of economic development: "the government will promote a cross-cutting cultural policy that identifies, stimulates and articulates cultural components in all areas of government, in particular education, training, employment, regional development, tourism and foreign trade, the most prominent example of which will be the launching of an investment program for the recovery of the historical heritage that will mobilize several of these areas" (Governo de Portugal, 2014:197).

The importance of heritage in cultural policy and in public policy in general is expressed in the music sector in flagship projects such as Casa da Música, a Concert Hall in Oporto opened in 2005, which combines heritage conservation with other classic and emergent objectives of the Ministry of Culture, such as promoting music consumption, creation and training, or fostering culture-led urban regeneration and cultural place branding (Roseria Rodrigues, 2013: 81-83, 348). The values of national identity, democratization (such as territorial decentralization and access) and the promotion of creation are embodied in another of the major objectives of the present government: the rehabilitation of the emblematic Palácio Nacional de Mafra⁹⁰ to host the National Museum of Music in 2025⁹¹.

The XXII Government Program (Governo de Portugal, 2019) emphasizes values of efficiency and innovation, experimentation and excellence in artistic creation together with participation and the social value of culture. This is manifested in objectives of support to training and the creation of the activities of the National Theater San Carlos (TNSC) where the Portuguese Symphony Orchestra develops its activities. The TNSC is a great facility of high culture integrated to the Organism of Artistic Production (OPART)⁹², a Public Business Entity that illustrates the entrepreneurial turn of the cultural administration and the deepening of a policy aimed at attracting private support. The promotion of national competitions, awards and scholarships for young composers and performers is another of the forms taken by the values of excellence in the musical arts. On the horizon of participation, inclusion and the social value of culture, we find the activities of dissemination of music and theater in prisons.

In relation to innovation, creative economy and memory, the government has set as an objective the digitization of sound, music and radio heritage. This activity is being undertaken by the National Sound Archive. Encouraging the consumption of Portuguese music is another of the challenges related to cultural industries that appears to be linked to identity and economic values.

The National Plan for the Arts (NPA) (2019-2024) pursues democratization and cultural democracy aims, emphasizing a narrative of cultural rights. The Plan is presented as a "manifesto" articulating values such as equal access, participation (consumption, creation, programs), social and territorial cohesion through culture, representation and inclusion of specific communities, and the socially transformative value of culture.

The festivalization of cities and rural contexts, where musical shows are central, is related to economic objectives, job creation and competitiveness between territories to generate attractiveness. (Carvalho

⁸⁹ Portugal belongs to the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLC) an international organization that promote economic and cultural cooperation between countries having Portuguese as their official language.

⁹⁰ Palace form the s. XVIII near Lisbon.

⁹¹ <https://www.portugal.gov.pt/pt/gc23/comunicacao/noticia?i=do-metro-de-lisboa-para-o-palacio-nacional-de-mafra-o-museu-da-musica-vai-mudar-de-casa>

⁹² <https://tnsc.pt/opart/>

et al., 2016). However, these objectives are articulated with the values of community, identity and social cohesion, especially in the rural world (André et al., 2013). The National Arts Plan reinforces values such as access to culture, community participation and socio-territorial equality (Comissão Executiva do Plano Nacional das Artes., 2019) concerning Festivals. Finally, social protection and the regulation of the cultural workers' contracting are declared central objectives (Governo de Portugal, 2014) that appear linked to values of equality and autonomy in creation (B3; B5).

Hierarchies and tensions between values / internal coherence

The changes in the status of cultural administration in the last 10 years are linked to transformations in values hierarchies, within the framework of broader political, economic and social changes. A general point of departure is the growing importance of economic justification in cultural policy action at different levels as a common shift of European cultural policy since the mid '90s (Bianchini, 1993; Zimmer & Toepler, 1996; Gattinger & Saint-pierre, 2010; Menger, 2010). The impact of austerity policies in the cultural sector, mainly since 2011, has involved a market-centered reconfiguration of cultural values that have manifested in a cultural policy discourse that stressed the self-financing capacity of culture as well as the contribution of culture to economic growth and job creation (Governo do Portugal, 2011). Efficiency, innovation, competitiveness and the economic value of culture become predominant and have an impact in cultural policy actions. Nevertheless, at the rhetorical level and linked with a political strategy to tackle the social fragmentation and conflicts that have brought the great recession, culture appears also connected with social cohesion, well-being and community building (Governo do Portugal, 2011).

In 2015 we observe the continuity of the economic values that were strongly installed in 2011 (Governo de Portugal, 2014, 2019; Presidência do Conselho de Ministros, 2015) together with a renewing emphasis on aesthetic, social and democratic values, as well as on the identity value of culture (community, memory) that occupies in a stable manner throughout the decade a hierarchical and configuring position of cultural action. Renewal is given by the association of these classical values with values linked to economic and technological, political and social changes. The expansion of new technologies, the concern for the ecological crisis, the increase of ethnic diversity together with the struggles for the social protection of cultural workers and feminisms have driven the valorization of cultural diversity, sustainability, gender equality, social justice and technological innovation to promote democratization (through digitalization). The relevance of these values can be identified in The National Culture Plan 2019-2024 in which, in addition, the value of participation, social and cultural inclusion, as well as experimentation in artistic and social creativity occupy hierarchical positions in a strategy that articulates cultural and educational policies (Plano Nacional das Artes, 2019: 18-21).

From the point of view of the scheme of values over the last decade, we can say that since 2015 there has been a shift towards the revalorization of the principles of democratization and cultural democracy, after a period that can be located between 2011-2014 of radicalization of the economic value of culture. These changes in the hierarchy of values that are clear in the discourses of cultural policy turn out to be limited in practice because of the budget deficit of the Ministry of Culture, the lack of budgetary allocation to cultural decentralization and the social unprotection of cultural workers (B2, B3, B4, B8).

In contrast to the positive synergies that government programs emphasize in the relationship between culture and the economy, experts see an instrumentalization of culture, for example, in the case of the tourism industry or in attracting investment. The economic impact for culture as a result of these relationships is not significant. The economic support of the tourism industry generates a devaluation of culture and conflicts in relation to the objectives of territorial decentralization and deconcentration of resources, since the tourism industry focuses its support on large cultural facilities in the field of

heritage, such as museums and palaces (B2). The focus on heritage support is correlative to the conservative turns in the central government, which prioritizes conservation policies (supporting projects and facilities that contribute to the development of the tourism industry) and tends to apply a policy of "laissez-faire" in creation, artistic training and the expansion of musical consumption, for example, which requires a solid articulation with educational policies. While it is true that Portugal in recent years has improved in musical training programs, this has been the predominant trend (B5). This generates tensions between the economic value and the social, democratic and aesthetic values of culture.

In the case of music, there is a tension between the transfer of cultural competencies to the municipalities and the budget allocation at the local level. This fosters a disparate valorization of artistic experimentation and support for emerging musicians, generating territorial inequalities in creation, consumption and support for musical careers. The lack of support for professional musicians and the precariousness of the sector's labor market encourages an unsuccessful transition between musical education and insertion in the labor market for those who want to work as professional musicians beyond teaching music (B2, B3, B4). This situation is exacerbated by the fact that music has only one funding channel (the subsidy from the General Directorate of the Arts) whose evaluation criteria are generalist or permeated by the sectors with more tradition (such as heritage), which limits the possibilities of a favorable evaluation (B2, B3, B7). The importance given by the Ministry to the National Sound Archive project⁹³ was due to the fact that it contemplated music conservation, i.e., it was within the scope of heritage (B6). The music museum constitutes a similar case that also points to the fact that heritage operates as a privileged legitimization argument in Portuguese cultural policy that stifles the possibility of developing other actions.

Another of the tensions that cross the field of music is the contradiction between economic value and innovation in creation and environmental sustainability. While on the one hand international mobility is positively valued (festivals, recruitment of foreign artists, exchanges) public and private sponsors penalize the carbon footprint. This contradiction has a negative impact on those institutions that do not have the capacity or resources to comply with these criteria, as they see their possibilities of internationalization, which is fundamental in the sector, reduced (B5).

Finally, there is an inconsistency between the lack of resources available for culture and the fulfillment of the objectives of regulating cultural work established by the artist's statute (Diário da República, 2021). This generates tensions between the values of efficiency, equality and justice in culture that are increased because of the lack of awareness of the artistic collective itself of its status as workers and subjects of social rights (B3).

5.3. Implementation coherence

Implementation, strategies and resources

Main actions in the Government Program between 2011-2014 (Governo do Portugal, 2011:124-133) are focused on restructuring the Secretariat of Culture and increasing control of the cultural entities integrated into the secretariat under criteria of efficiency, transparency and scope of results. These include completing the National Library Network, continuing the National Literature Plan or revalidating support for the Portuguese Language Fund aimed at the internationalization of the language, implementing the Portuguese literature translation program for European Union countries

⁹³ <https://arquivonacionaldosom.gov.pt/>

and creating libraries in the Community of Portuguese Language Countries. Under the effects of the crisis, the cultural administration is limited to finalizing previous policies that do not involve the music sector. The only relevant action is the declaration of Fado⁹⁴ as UNESCO heritage and it comes from the local level. (Sixth Session of the Intergovernmental Committee (6.COM), November 2011).

Actions in this context are aimed at increasing private collaboration and promoting heritage. First, the preparation of the "White Paper on Culture" in order to improve the financing model for foundations involved in the cultural sector. The fostering of the private cultural sector brings together a set of measures ranging from attracting companies in the creative economy to increasing the outsourcing of services and equipment. Second, a new strategy for the Museum Network aimed at optimizing resources, research and interaction with the public. The drafting of the Statute of Arts Professionals concerns the protection of copyrights and the creation of qualified work.

In 2015, the Ministry of Culture was restituted (Governo de Portugal, 2014:197-205). Within this institutional framework, actions are geared towards increasing the cultural budget and strengthening measures for access to culture. The flexibilization of administrative processes, deconcentration and decentralization of cultural management are also priority measures in the field of heritage and support for creation. A broader consideration of measures to dignify cultural work (fiscal, labor legislation and social security) can be observed in this period.

Promoting the transversalization of cultural policy and articulating the levels of cultural administration are actions related to the reestablishment of the Ministry. These measures expand the space of cultural industries (to the digital press, for example) and give greater autonomy (and competence over heritage) to local and regional cultural policy. The cross-cutting nature of cultural policy is reflected in a closer relationship with educational policy to promote participation by reinforcing artistic content at all educational levels. Measures for access to culture also include free admission to museums and monuments and incentives for cultural consumption by people with functional diversity.

The preservation and diffusion of tangible and intangible cultural and historical heritage occupy a central place in the government's measures. The intervention includes the revitalization of heritage networks (monasteries, cathedrals, historical and artistic museums) and the creation of the National Sound Archive. The new institution is dedicated to the digitization of sound collections (including music) and is framed in a form of clusterization of the sector by being located in the Mafra Palace, next to the Museum of Music (B6).

Some actions, such as promoting training and increasing intellectual property protection cover the music sector. However, it is the 2019-2023 Government Program (Governo de Portugal, 2019: 185-191) where specific actions for music are presented in the context of a budgetary consolidation (up to 2% of the state budget) and the implementation of actions to measure the economic impact of culture (culture satellite account).

Actions on musical creation and dissemination show more consonance with the articulation between art, community action, inclusion and education underlined by the NPA 2019-2024. In this direction, policies are implemented for the expansion of audiences through a diversified programming of visual arts and music. Music is framed within the action that comprises the arts as agents of social and territorial transformation. The promotion of decentralization and territorial deconcentration of culture and the encouragement of networking among cultural facilities from an interdisciplinary and experimental vision of creation accompany these measures. The consolidation of the choir of the São Carlos National Theater and the Portuguese Symphony Orchestra, as well as support for training in dance and music and the creation of national awards for young musicians are part of this strategy.

⁹⁴ Since 1998, the Portuguese government has been promoting measures for the conservation (Fado Museum), research and dissemination of Fado.

Other actions in this regard include "Education and Access" y "KM2 Art and Community"⁹⁵ a program devoted to the promotion of musical careers as well as to expanding audiences. Moreover, the program "Culture in Expansion" (Porto-2014)⁹⁶ combines the encouragement of participation in musical creation and consumption with policies to promote the social use of urban space and infrastructures through artistic activities. Music programming in hospitals and prisons and the development of creative programs in vulnerable neighborhoods complete this type of interventions where music plays a relevant role in the objectives of well-being, social cohesion and inclusion through art.

The General Direction of the Arts (DGArtes), an executing agency of cultural policies under the Ministry, plays a relevant role in subsidizing bands and music schools, philharmonic and other regional traditional music ensembles. (Direção-Geral das Artes, 2021: 17). Among the measures to disseminate and support culture in the face of the COVID 19 pandemic, the increase in 2021 from 25% to 30% of the Portuguese music rate on the radio (Lei n.º 54/2010)⁹⁷.

Finally, social protection and the regulation of the hiring of cultural workers are central objectives (Governo de Portugal, 2014). This goal, which is linked to values of equality and autonomy in creation, has given rise in 2021 to the Statute of Cultural Professionals (Diário da República, 2021) addressed to intervene in favor of cultural workers rights (B3; B5).

Resources

The 2008 crisis was a turning point that sharpened the entrepreneurial turn of the central cultural administration (Garcia et al., 2016). The growing participation of the private sector together with the progressive decline in the provision of state resources for culture (beyond heritage) have generated relations of public-private interdependence in which Public Business Entities, the sponsorship of large companies, the participation of the third sector and the outsourcing of programs and equipment have flourished.

Heritage contrasts with the music sector in terms of state support. Within the sector, classical and traditional music finds the protection of the state, while the support of creation in the case of contemporary music is the result of private initiative that takes place through large sponsors (in the case of Festivals oriented towards internationalization) or the coordinated action of associations or small companies in the case of concert halls. (B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, B7, B8). Festivals⁹⁸, for example, are relevant spaces for understanding the activity and financing of the music sector. However (1) festivals are predominantly locally driven (2) the complex chain of private intermediation, as well as the lack of detailed budgetary data on state funding to private entities makes it difficult to know the economic participation of the cultural administration in these activities.

Available data regarding the Ministry of Culture indicate that in the last decade there has been a sustained increase in the budget. It should be clarified that the 2012 budget is 22% less than that of 2011, due to the implementation of the European austerity plan (Estado, 2012:5).

⁹⁵ <https://www.pna.gov.pt/eixo-c/>

⁹⁶ <https://www.culturaemexpansao.pt/>

⁹⁷ <https://www.portugal.gov.pt/pt/gc23/comunicacao/noticia?i=em-setembro-30-da-musica-nas-radios-volta-a-ser-obrigatoriamente-portuguesa>

⁹⁸ Between 2011-2021 concerts have remained, despite the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, as the live shows with the largest number of spectators, generating 57% of the sector's total turnover (Instituto Nacional de Estatística, 2022).

Table 1: Evolution of national cultural public funding in Portugal 2012-2022 (million euros)

2012	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
167,1	174,09	189	216,7	273,5	361

Source: Own elaboration based on the General Budget for the State 2012-2022

Looking at the funding distribution by activity, the only sector in which we note a budget increase is that of heritage, which grew by 3 points between 2011 and 2012 and represents the largest percentage of the cultural budget (36%) at a very critical time for the country's economy (Governo do Estado, 2012:11). Heritage is predominantly a national sector, while festivals and events associated with tourism are local.

In the Portuguese case, the impact of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) on cultural budget increase⁹⁹ should be considered since it represents a contribution of 243 million euros from the European Commission in 2022 (Governo do Portugal, 2022:5). The benefits of the RRF are mainly materialized in heritage and music institutions under the orbit of conservation, such as the National Museum of Music or the National Sound Archive. The funding climb between 2018 (€22.2 million) and 2022 (€58.42 million) is due to the bigger contribution from the EU in 2021 (see Table 2).

Table 2: Evolution of the budget of the DGArtes and European Funding (EC/PRR) between 2012-2022 (million euros)

	Activities	Projects	Total	EC	PRR
2012	1,8	14,3	16,1	-	
2014	3,3	13,0	16,9	-	
2016	4,1	12,2	16,3	13,6	
2018	4,6	17,6	22,2	-	
2020	3,2	30,9	34,1	0,9	
2022	4,9	51,7	56,62	1,2	0,6

Source: Own elaboration based on the initial budget of DGArtes (Direção-Geral das Artes. República Portuguesa-Cultura, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018, 2020, 2022).

⁹⁹ Of the 16 projects financed with RRF in Portugal, 7 are for heritage support (this includes the rehabilitation of 49 facilities). Source: https://commission.europa.eu/business-economy-euro/economic-recovery/recovery-and-resilience-facility_en#map

Table 3: Distribution of the cultural budget by program (million euros)

PROGRAMS	2012	2014	2016	2018
Total Heritage	61,72	29,43	29,54	32,61
<i>a. Heritage (General Direction of Cultural Heritage)</i>	60,96	29,08	29,07	31,94
<i>b. Museus and heritage (Cultural Pomotion Fund)</i>	0,76	0,35	0,47	0,67
Visual Arts	13,75	13,26	14,21	13,92
Total Cultural Promotion (including grants)	7,92	7,93	12,60	12,38
<i>a. Music and Dance</i>	4,72	2,57	7,73	8,89
<i>b. Multidisciplinares</i>	2,28	3,68	3,27	2,38
<i>c. Teatro</i>	0,91	1,69	1,60	1,11
Cinema	2,06	1,31	1,16	1,52
Libraries and bibliographic heritage	0,10	0,00	0,01	0,01
Social action and integration	0,74	0,65	0,53	0,67
Management	0,33	0,00	0,02	0,02
Promotion and authorship and book difussion	0,09	0,05	0,05	0,23
Portuguese culture promotion abroad	0,04	0,15	0,06	0,32

Source: Own elaboration based on the management memories of the Cultural Promotion Fund (2012-2018) and the General Direction of Cultural Heritage (2012-2018).

Table 3 shows the transfer of resources from the Ministry of Culture to the funding and management agencies for cultural activities (Cultural Promotion Fund) as well as in the field of heritage (General Direction of Cultural Heritage). Available data by programs (2012-2018) does not discriminate between the budget assigned to the promotion of Dance and music and also does not provide details on spending on grants. Based on the data on the distribution of state funds to private non-profit entities (in the music sector (included in the item "Music and Dance") we have been able to identify that the Casa da Música Foundation is the one that has increased its funds the most and that receives the most funds (from 3.21 to 10 million euros between 2012 and 2022) compared, for example, to the budget for regional orchestras (managed by small associations), which in the last decade have received an average of 0.55 million euros. (Fundo de Fomento Cultural, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018, 2020, 2021). As a whole, budget distribution data shows that music is in a marginal position compared to heritage or the visual arts.

Table 4: Ministry of Culture budget by artistic activities (million euros)

ARTISTIC ACTIVITY (million euros)	Executed Budget	Planned Budget
	2018-2021	2023-2026
Theater	31,41	57,4
Street performing arts, circus and interdisciplinarity	13,55	15,6
Music and Opera	8,26	19
Dance	6,26	10,8
Programming	5,8	32,7
Visual Arts	3,9	12,5

Source: Own elaboration based on the General Budget for the State from 2022 to 2023 (Governo do Portugal, 2023).

The distribution of the state budget executed between 2018-2021 and the budget projection for the period 2023-2026 by artistic area shows a commitment of the state to increase the economic support to the music sector. Since 2019 the NPArts manages and finances the NPA with a budget allocation that has increased from 433,000 euros in 2019 to 1 million euros in 2021 (Governo do Portugal, 2022; Direção-Geral das Artes, 2019).

The relevance of Heritage in public spending and the predominance of values related to this sector (identity, community, memory) are frequent findings in the collected data. In order to expand on this information, we present a comparison of spending on performing arts and music versus heritage over the last decade.

Table 5: Economic support to heritage and performing arts and music in 2012 and 2022 (million euros) and sectors percentage in the global cultural budget.

Cultural sectors	2012	%	2022	%
Patrimonio	60,96	36,48	150	41,55
Arts (including performance arts and music)	44,32	26,52	63,38	17,56

Source: Own elaboration based on el presupuesto para el patrimonio y las artes en el presupuesto estatal 2012, 2022 y 2023 (Governo do Portugal, 2012, 2022, 2023)

For the year 2022 the resources for the heritage sector published in the state budget come from the RRF (Governo do Portugal, 2022:5). The comparison between the years 2012 and 2022 shows that the budgetary situation for performance arts and music, despite the increase in the approved budget for 2023, is worse than 10 years ago in relative terms. The gap between one sector and the other has grown from 10 to 14 points in terms of the percentage that each represents in the overall culture budget. It should be considered, as we pointed out before, that heritage is almost exclusively a matter for the central state, while the resources of artistic activities such as theater, music and festivals are more deconcentrated (local level) and more participated by the private sector (companies and associations). Although we do not have data on the results of the implementation of this measure, it is worth noting that since 2015 cultural institutions have the status of public utility. This opens up another source of resources for culture based on the donation of 0.5% of the income tax (Governo de Portugal, 2014).

Coherence of implementation with regard to main values

The examination of values, objectives and actions in the Portuguese case shows a high degree of coherence between identity and communitarian values with actions in the field of heritage (tangible and intangible) and, to a minor extent, of the linguistic-cultural community on the islands and in the former colonies. The patrimonial actions are the ones that have the greatest amount of state economic support and presence in the government's actions. Heritage permeates and organizes most of the cultural spheres, including music (i.e., Museum of Music, Sound Archive, Fado Museum, Casa da Música as emblematic architectural heritage, Festivals, etc.). The financing capacity of other actions, such as those in the field of music, often depends on the relationship they have with heritage (B5, B6, B7).

Identity values are linked to economic values and internationalization objectives. While there is coherence between these values and actions in the area of heritage, in the case of policies for the international promotion of Portuguese language and culture the degree of coherence decreases significantly. In this sense, there is a mismatch between the rhetorical dimension and the allocation of resources for this item, which occupies the last place in the state budget distribution (see Table 3). On the other hand, heritage policies (in Museums, for example) show inconsistencies in relation to the values of inclusion and participation expressed in government plans and the scarce development of programs articulated to education and the expansion of audiences, due to the imbalance between state spending on activities and human resources (minority) and infrastructure (B1). Similarly, in the area of books and libraries, the discourses based on the value of equality and access to culture are contradicted by the marginality of this sector in the budget (see Table 3).

As we have seen, the values of aesthetic excellence, innovation and artistic creativity, as well as the social, participatory and well-being values are those most frequently related to music in official documentation. However, the budgetary support that these actions have in the context of budget distribution is poor (see Table 3, 4 and 5) and dependent on other sectors (for example, heritage) and on large private actors that concentrate resources (limiting territorial decentralization and cultural participation) or on a multitude of non-profit actors that compete for scarce resources (making their human resources precarious). Interviews with experts (B3, B7, B8), executive bureaucrats (B2, B5) and street level bureaucrats (B6) underline what the official documentation reviewed points out. Overall, this constrains the objectives of decentralization and actions aimed at promoting aesthetic excellence and artistic innovation and creativity (lack of support for music careers and emerging contemporary music) as well as those aimed at participation, social link or well-being. The few resources available for music are concentrated in institutions of high culture, such as the Opera Theaters (see Table 4) or the Casa da Música, a facility crossed by tensions between objectives aimed at the local context and international projection; between values of high culture and popular music. This is reflected in an elitist and not very risky programming and in the disconnection with the needs of the territory, in a facility with strong state support (B8). While it is true that the budget for the performing arts (which include music) has grown from 2012 to 2022 by almost 20 million euros (see Table 5) and that this has allowed an increase in human resources in the sector (B1, B2), its weight in the overall cultural budget has decreased by 7.96% in the same period. The inconsistencies between values and actions in the field of music (especially contemporary and popular) are mainly related to the entrepreneurial approach that the state has promoted of it, by releasing it to the private sector and limiting its support to traditional, classical and internationalization-driven music (B2, B3, B4, B6, B7, B8). This has an impact on the musicians' own perception of their articulation in the social, cultural and productive context (B2, B3, B8) and stimulates the search for solutions outside the state sphere, which is counterproductive for encouraging the public promotion of the sector.

In parallel, the weak actions for the promotion of musical creation, associated with aesthetic values, artistic innovation, inclusion and equality, come into conflict with the valuation logic of grants and subsidies, which are generalist and do not always have expert evaluators for each sector or are more oriented towards results and impact in other policy areas. This generates disagreements in the music sector because of the perception of different forms of instrumentalization of art and culture (B2, B4).

Finally, there are inconsistencies between values and actions that are transversal to cultural policies and involve cultural rights, equal distribution of cultural resources in the territories and the rights of cultural workers (issues highlighted both in government programs and in the National Culture Plan that has a symbolic budget of 1 million euros in 2022). In relation to this, although actions have been promoted to improve the coordination of territorial levels as well as coordination with other policy areas (educational, social, labor) with the aim of advancing in terms of cultural rights of the population and rights of cultural workers, the lack of budgets and the entrepreneurial matrix of cultural policy that has been consolidating since 2006 (with the entry into power of the PSD) enters into contradiction with these changes supported by social, participatory and equality values. This forces public and third sector human resources committed to these changes to make great efforts that have an almost cultural "activist" character in order to promote or give continuity to the actions (B1, B7, B8).

Table 6. Intervention fields and values per Government Programs periods¹⁰⁰

	Main interventions	Main values
2011-2015	Reestructuration of Cultural Administration (Secretary) and budget cuts Promotion of market actors participation Externalization of services/programs Promotion of creative economy Promotion of Heritage Promotion of cultural tourism Promotion of Lusophony (support to musicians mobility) Promotion of Libraries	Economic Efficiency Competitiveness Identity Community Belonging Aesthetic Social Cohesion Well-being
2015-2019	Ministry's restitution Promotion of Heritage Archives digitalization Creation of the National Archive of Sound Reinforcement of the articulation between culture-education Administrative deconcentration Territorial decentralization Elaboration of the Estatuto del Artista (shift from authorship rights to social protection rights)	Economic Efficiency Competitiveness Innovation Identity Community Belonging Aesthetic Social link Participation Equity
2019-2023	National Plan for the Arts Enhancing the link between cultural, educational and social policies Promoting Cultural Communit Action Fostering coordination between territorial levels, cultural programs and facilities (interdisciplinarity) Publication of Artist's statute Rehabilitation of heritage (Recovery and Resiliency Facility) Extraordinary package of measures against the pandemic (increase in the share of Portuguese music on the radio) Promotion of consumption (free museums, increased diversity in music programming)	Innovation (creative, administrative) Inclusion Community Cultural rights Social-link (social and territorial cohesion) Economic Social rights Identity Memory Aesthetic Equity Participation Equity Diversity

Source: Own elaboration based on documentary analysis and interviews

5.4. Governance, adaptability and social accuracy

Democratic openness, dialogue with stakeholders and power relation

The role of the state in cultural policy has varied from a patron state (autonomous bodies, agencies, excellence) to an architect state (since 2015 Ministry, welfare-oriented) with increasing features of a facilitator state (private sector support, fiscal incentives, undefined artistic standards and diversity). This has configured a particular model of governance. From a perspective that emphasizes the historical-cultural dimension and the logics of action that shape governance structures and dynamics (Le Galès, 2002) in this section we examine the governance structure and the participatoy instruments, as well as the predominant governance dynamics that give rise to greater participation of state bureaucracy actors, social or market actors, and regulate more open or close democratic schemes to citizens, as well as more concentrated or distributed forms of exercising power.

In Portugal, private actors are key in the deployment of cultural policy. This is transversal to the different periods of government since 2006, after the fall of the Socialist Party. The victory of the center-right Social Democratic Party formula promoted a neoliberal reconversion of cultural governance in a framework of strong welfare cuts. These changes diminished the institutional status of cultural administration and encouraged the participation of private actors with different explicit and implicit strategies. On the one hand, companies were involved in co-financing and co-governance of cultural affairs. This required an administrative restructuring that took place between 2011-2015. On the other hand, state support was removed from cultural sectors that already had a weak institutional link or were left to the private for-profit and non-profit sector (such as popular music) to

¹⁰⁰ Programa do Governo XIX (2011-2015), Programa do Governo XXI (2015-2019), Programa do Governo XXII (2019-2024).

the private sector. Within this framework, the participation of the third cultural sector was involved as a low-cost instrument for the implementation of cultural policies. The governance relations and forms of participation in the Portuguese case should be seen in the light of this phenomenon of neoliberalizing turn of the cultural policy in force until now, despite the change of discourse more oriented to democratization and cultural democracy introduced by the government programs since 2015 and especially by the Strategic Plan for Culture.

The participation of foundations and associations is widespread and shows hierarchical cooperation relations with the state, which are correlative to an elitist approach to culture, for example in the case of music. Foundations (in articulation with public business entities) are in charge of classical music and contemporary music of high culture (i.e., Casa da Música, Teatro Nacional de São Carlos) and have solid state support. Against this there are a multitude of small non-profit organizations with little funding that support traditional music. Finally, contemporary popular music is sustained, as we have seen, by more or less formalized private initiatives that are exceptionally financed through competitive funds from the General Directorate of the Arts or European funds (i.e., Leave Circuit). Under these conditions, the forms of participation and the capacity to influence the action of cultural policy is a challenge for those organizations that are less consolidated and more detached from the state. It is important to consider that cultural associations are mainly supported by the municipalities and not by the central administration. (Santos et al., 2022: 36).

In the case of the Ministry of Culture, participation mechanisms are limited to administrative and legal instruments that involve citizens in a very mediated and weak manner. Participation is restricted to consultations (surveys, studies, reports) designed and administrated by experts. The Ministry's new arts support model (2017), for example, is the result of a consultive and deliberative process restricted to the participation of stakeholders and experts. Participation is limited to obtaining information and producing a few recommendations, which usually have a limited impact on the definition of cultural policies (B2).

The process of designing the NPA involved a participatory process with stakeholders. Moreover, with the aim of strengthening the relationship between culture and education, mechanisms have been promoted for the participation of the educational community in cultural institutions and vice versa. Within the NPA, the program "Indisciplining the school" is another example of participation that consists of creating a space for deliberation, breaking with hierarchies in the educational context and promoting articulations between the school and the surrounding community (B1).

From a multilevel governance point of view, a key issue is cultural decentralization. On the one hand, there is a conflicting relationship between levels of governance due to the imbalance between budget allocation and devolved competencies. On the other hand, there are competitive relationships between local levels because of public and private resources. This strengthens inequalities in terms of participation in those cities that have more cultural resources (heritage, for example) and stakeholder support, as opposed to those that do not have these assets. This is produced on the basis of deficient state territorial coordination mechanisms and generates a polarized distribution of cultural resources among the capitals that affects equal access to culture in the state territory.

Decisions about cultural programs and facilities are influenced by those actors and sectors with the greatest power. One example is the way in which cultural heritage policies influence other cultural policies (B6, B8). These hierarchies and the significant role of the private sector restrict the possibilities of transforming the central cultural administration into a space more open to citizen initiatives or to the participation of small cultural organizations in major cultural decisions. The Ministry's governance dynamics is top-down and occasionally includes participatory processes (such as those explained above) which are restricted to non-binding consultations.

Social accuracy, adaptability, evolution of values in relation to social developments

In the last decade, cultural policies in Portugal have shown changes ranging from a strong focus on the economic value of culture to a progressive reinforcement of values linked to cultural democratization (equality, access) and values inherent to cultural democracy (equality, recognition of diversity, participation). In addition to these, some new ones have been incorporated, such as those related to environmental sustainability and sexual diversity.

One of the ways in which cultural policies have responded to the social demands of the second half of the 20th century and so far in the 21st century in terms of gender equality, sexual diversity or environmental issues has been by incorporating these values into the evaluation criteria for awards and subsidies (granted by the General Directorate of the Arts) (B2, B4). The mobility of artists and the rehabilitation of infrastructures is influenced by the values of sustainability incorporated in the protocols and standards of cultural institutions (B4; B5). The values of diversity (ethnic, sexual) are a relevant topic in the National Culture Plan that contemplates different actions to implement programs in educational and cultural institutions (B1).

Concerning the demands of the cultural sector itself, state action has responded, although with limits, to the structuring of the sector. The change from the Secretary to the Ministry of Culture, the increase in the overall budget and the elaboration of the NPA move in this direction. The introduction on the political agenda of the serious precariousness of cultural workers and the informality of the sector are the result of the sustained demands and collective organization of cultural workers led by the Union of Entertainment, Audiovisual and Music Workers. The publication in 2021 of the Artist's Statute is the result of a complex process of diagnosis, reflection, deliberation and consensus within the sector. The challenge now is the budgetary availability to guarantee labor rights and overcome the dynamics of the informal economy that prevails in cultural work. There is a great pedagogical task to be done in this regard (B2, B3, B4).

The contemporary popular music sector (rock, pop, etc.), faced with the abandonment of the cultural administration, has generated self-organized initiatives that have gained strength and attracted the attention of European funds (B7, B8). Central cultural policies have proved resistant to these demands and continue to favor classical institutions, those linked to identity values (regional and traditional bands) or commercial ones (large festivals) and, more recently, those musical projects with social value. For the alternative music sector, this orientation asxifies experimentation and instrumentalizes musical creation to economic, communitarian or social values (B7). Cultural policy demonstrated its ability to adapt during the pandemic by providing extraordinary funds for culture and prioritizing it in the Recovery and Resiliency Facilities.

Finally, the call for decentralization and, mainly, for the creation of multilevel coordination mechanisms to avoid territorial inequalities in access to culture and other forms of participation has been addressed by the cultural administration, although it is a challenging process, given its administrative complexity and costs. It is worth highlighting that the vision of networking (between facilities and programs), transversality (between policies) and interdisciplinarity that underline cultural policies since 2015 are changes in progress and are proposed in articulation with improving inter-territorial coordination of cultural policies.

5.5. Conclusion

Through the case of Portugal, we have been able to see how changes and continuities in the values and actions of cultural policy at the central level occur at different rhythms, producing contradictions and inconsistencies in the configuration of values and objectives in relation to the implementation of cultural policy. In this direction, we have seen how identity and communitarian values, associated with

the colonial history of the country, predominate in the present and permeate the rest of the values and actions of cultural policy. These values constitute part of the matrix of cultural policy. We have also noticed that, especially since the mid-2000s, these values are linked to an economic valorization of culture that prioritizes efficiency and results, alliances with the private sector, as well as an instrumental role of culture in economic growth policies linked to tourism and internationalization. There is therefore coherence between the hierarchy of identity values, the main heritage measures and the budgets. Where we find discordance is between the values of equality, inclusion and participation, emphasized in government programs since 2015 and in the 2019 National Plan for Culture, with a symbolic allocation of resources (human and economic) and the scarcity of pedagogical activities or in articulation with education in Museums and other heritage facilities such as Palaces. In this sense one of the star policies of the 2015-2019 period is the Museum of Music in the Mafra Palace. At the same time, this shows the relevance of heritage to drive actions in other areas. The case illustrates the low priority that music and, in particular, popular and contemporary music has for the Portuguese cultural administration. The values of aesthetic excellence (opera, institutions of high culture with the participation of foundations) or economic values (large festivals and concerts with the participation of companies) are those that are at the basis of the legitimization of state intervention in culture. The value of experimentation and creative innovation are displaced and mobilized in alternative circuits of private initiative. This generates inconsistencies with the emphasis on artistic creativity and diversity incorporated in recent discourses. Music has been acquiring social value (inclusion, cohesion) within the framework of the National Culture Plan (this has repercussions on the evaluation criteria for subsidies and programs). However, part of the sector rejects this valorization (and the economic one) because it understands it as another form of instrumentalization of art and culture that reduces freedom of creation and autonomy.

We have also detected inconsistencies in the spectrum of cultural and social rights in cultural policy. In this sense, we find an upscaling of the values of democratization and cultural democracy and the continuity of an unequal distribution of cultural resources within and between local territories that disables these values in practice due to deficiencies in the coordination of policies from a multilevel point of view. In relation to social rights, the inconsistencies have to do with the lack of budgets and the economistic and entrepreneurially oriented elements of the cultural policy matrix that contradict the social and equality values of the Statute of the Artist. The fragile awareness of labor rights and the strong naturalization of informality in cultural work play against the deprecarization and social protection of cultural work. These weaknesses, constraints and discordances are consistent with the little importance that the state has given to culture. The lack of consensus on the institutional status of culture, the insufficient state funding and the power inequalities in the capacity to influence decisions on culture (between large private actors and the constellation of organizations that support cultural action with scarce resources) result in a cultural policy that seems to be in a permanent process of remaking.

6. Arts Council England, UK

6.1. Introduction

Arts Council England (ACE) is a public body under the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport. ACE is the result of a 1994 division of the previous Arts Council of Great Britain into three separate bodies for England, Scotland and Wales. ACGB was established in 1946, and the British model of arts council have generally been seen as a model for similar arms' length bodies in different countries (including Norway). The main goal of an arts council of this kind is that it shall fill the need for a qualified distribution of public support to the arts, while being independent of political authorities and interest organizations.

The ACE describe themselves as an "independent charity as well as an arm's-length non-departmental public body"¹⁰¹. Since their establishment, their responsibilities have been expanded. From 1993, they were established as a distributor of National Lottery funds, following a National Lottery Act. And in 2011, their responsibilities were expanded to include museums and libraries.

The ACE currently support arts, museums and libraries, and per now, they describe their aim and responsibility in the following manner: "We are the national development agency for creativity and culture. By 2030 we want England to be a country in which the creativity of each of us is valued and given the chance to flourish and where everyone of us has access to a remarkable range of high quality cultural experiences. We invest public money from government and from the National Lottery to help deliver this vision." (<https://www.artscouncil.org.uk/>) As we will return to, the explicit aim and objectives of the agency have been changing slightly during the last two decades (cf. Lee 2022).

The ACE is a core actor for the governmental cultural policy of England, being responsible for the major part of state funding of arts and culture. This includes administering the national lottery funding to cultural purposes. Furthermore, ACE is also, as mentioned, a template or a reference point for numerous other arms-length cultural policy bodies, making the case even more justified in a comparative perspective.

6.2. Objectives and values

Main values and their evolutions

There are several sources in which to look for the explicit objectives and values of Arts Council England. One of them is the so-called managing agreement from their governing body, the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS). (Now with Digital removed from the title of the entity.) Besides describing the Arts Council's formal obligations in terms of reporting, administration, budgeting, performance indicators etc. the agreement also describes the priorities and expectations for the council as seen from the department (more specifically, from the Secretary of State in charge of these issues). Among these priorities (in the Management agreement for 2016-2020), are the following:

- to give a high priority to supporting the delivery of the outcomes of the Culture White Paper which sets out the direction for arts and culture policy for this Parliament

¹⁰¹ <https://www.artscouncil.org.uk/lets-create/delivery-plan-2021-2024/delivery-plan-2021-24>.

- to use its national and local overview and its expertise to support the local and regional devolution agenda by engaging with the development of local cultural strategies in partnership with other cultural agencies and lottery distributors
- to continue to pursue commercial and philanthropic approaches to generating revenue for arts and culture organisations which will complement grant-in-aid funding, and to seek innovative cost-sharing solutions with other Arm's Length Bodies to maximise these additional sources of income
- to prioritise access to arts and culture for disadvantaged young people and communities."¹⁰²

Furthermore, the Arts Council is also expecting to be “encouraging participation”, specified in the following manner: “You will be expected to support the department in increasing wellbeing through access to and participation in arts and culture by supporting arts and culture; articulating the benefits of access and participation; and delivering solutions working in conjunction with other Government Departments and partners.” Finally, they are also expected to be “Sustaining excellence and promoting Britain”: “You will be expected to support the department in sustaining excellence in UK sport, tourism and culture, promoting Britain around the world by supporting the best of our arts and culture.” The agreement also quotes the five strategic goals of the Arts Council (more on these below), as described in the ten-year framework *Achieving Great Art and Culture for Everyone*.

As we can see, the agreement with the DCMS is explicitly concerned with coherence of objectives (and thereby of values/value clusters) between established cultural policy principles and the work done by the Arts Council. More specifically, the council is expected to prioritize work that supports the outcomes of the so-called Culture White Paper. These outcomes include equal access, community development, national branding/soft power and cultural investment. The Culture White Paper also identifies three forms of value related to culture: the intrinsic value, the social value and the economic value¹⁰³. Furthermore, the council is on the one hand expected to support the increasing of wellbeing following from participation, and the other hand also work on “articulating the benefits of access and participation”.

In addition to the priorities of the ACE, as defined in the agreement between the ministry and the council, the ACE are also defining their overall outcomes and investment principles of ACE, as they are defined in their strategic documents. The most central of these documents is the strategy *Let's Create*¹⁰⁴. This is the council's strategy for 2020-2030, guided by a delivery plan and so-called investment principles (more on these below). The strategy was developed on the basis of a number of commissioned reports, evidence reviews and a project on gathering views from a large number of people, entitled *The Conversation*¹⁰⁵.

The outcomes defined within this strategy, as well as within the Delivery Plan, are the following: “1. Creative People. Everyone can develop and express creativity through their life. 2. Cultural communities. Villages, towns and cities thrive through a collaborative approach to culture. 3. A creative and cultural country. England's cultural sector is innovative, collaborative and international.”

As we can see, these expected outcomes are very much people- and community-centred, focusing upon the value-clusters of identity (with a special emphasis on community), the aesthetic (with a special emphasis on creativity) and democracy. The latter value cluster is especially visible in the

¹⁰² <https://www.artscouncil.org.uk/sites/default/files/download-file/Final%20DCMS%20ACE%20Management%20Agreement.pdf>

¹⁰³ See

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/510799/DCMS_Arts_and_Culture_White_Paper_Accessible_version.pdf.

¹⁰⁴ <https://www.artscouncil.org.uk/lets-create>

¹⁰⁵ <https://www.artscouncil.org.uk/lets-create/strategy-2020-2030/lets-create-how-we-got-here>

continuing insistence (as we will return to) that everyone is creative; that creativity is universal, and, inherently, that everyone's creativity is of equal value. These overall outcomes are to be achieved through four so-called investment principles: Ambition and quality, Inclusivity and relevance, Dynamism, and Environmental responsibility. (As these principles are key to the implementation of values in practice, we will discuss these in the next section.)

The slogan-like tagline of Let's Create, is Let's Create: "A country transformed by culture. Bringing Us Together, Happier, Healthier. To Excite, Inspire, Delight. To Enrich Our Lives." In other words: culture has, explicitly stated in the Let's Create strategy, transformative power, both for the country, for its individual citizens and for the social communities they are a part of. Culture makes you happy, healthy, excited, inspired, delighted, enriched. This creates, indeed, a foundation for a very ambitious form of cultural policy.

Hierarchies and tensions between values/internal coherence

The vision included in the Let's Create strategy, expresses in condensed form the combination of democratization and excellence that seems to be a core combination of basic values: "by 2030, England will be a country in which the creativity of each of us is valued and given the chance to flourish and where everyone has access to a remarkable range of high-quality cultural experiences." In other words: on the one hand there is an emphasis on the extreme democratization of creativity as a personal competence, ability or gift: we all have it, apparently. On the other hand, there is an emphasis on securing access to a wide ("remarkable") range of high-quality culture, presumably produced by someone not belonging to the general public, but who is a professional cultural producer. On a discursive/rhetorical level, we might say that there indeed is at least a potential tension or incoherence here. How shall the very inclusive perspective on creativity (everyone has it, and the creativity of all us should be valued) be combined with supporting high-quality experiences? Are these two values and/or objectives in some way related, or do they constitute two separated trenches of cultural policy?

At the same time, on a rhetorical level, there seems to be a solid coherency between different statements of value. There is no apparent or explicitly acknowledged tension between the different value clusters that are expressed through the wide range of objectives and expected outcomes. Interestingly, the ACE has, possibly as a tension-reducing exercise, defined what they mean by "culture". In the delivery plan, we can read the following:

'Culture' means many things to many people and is often used to refer to food, religion and other forms of heritage. Here, though, we use it to mean all those areas of activity associated with the artforms and organisations in which Arts Council England invest: collections, combined arts, dance, libraries, literature, museums, music, theatre and the visual arts.¹⁰⁶

Although there is a large degree of consistency and coherency on the level of strategic documents, there is also a recent change within the ACE discourse not visible on the face of these documents. As analysed by e.g. Lee (2022), there has been a clear shift in the concepts emphasized by ACE, moving from arts to creativity. In other words: while the concept of "arts" was core in the documents guiding ACE's work ten or fifteen years ago, there is comparatively speaking not many references to art/arts in current strategic documents. And, conversely, the concept of creativity has moved to the centre of the explicit strategies of the council. We will see, in the following, whether this shift might be a clue to potential tensions between stated objectives and goals on the one hand and practical policy implementation on the other?

¹⁰⁶ <https://www.artscouncil.org.uk/lets-create/delivery-plan-2021-2024/introduction>

6.3. Implementation coherence

General implementation, strategies and resources

How are the established values emphasized by Arts Council England transferred to actual practice? ACE have aimed to answer this question themselves through the abovementioned Delivery plans, which the council describes like this: “These will set out in more detail the steps we will take to deliver Let’s Create and how we will resource them”¹⁰⁷. These plans represent an attempt to be concrete about the relation between principles and practice, and in order to do so, the delivery plan introduce five different themes, with accompanying actions under each theme. The themes listed are these: Building a fit for the future cultural sector, Strengthening our place-based approach and supporting levelling up, Increasing our support for individuals, Helping the cultural sector to work internationally, and How the Arts Council will change. In addition to themes and actions, some of the actions listed under each theme are also related to a specific budget amount.

The practical implementation of the cultural policy goals and values that Arts Council England represents can also be described through looking at the different categories of funding available to English cultural producers and institutions. In general, the three most important categories of this funding are National Portfolio Organizations (NPO), National Lottery project grants and Develop your creative practice funds (cf. Kleppe, Mangset and Miland 2020). Let us take a closer look at these funding categories, with a special emphasis on the music sector.

NPOs

National Portfolio Organisations is the single most important programme of ACE. The total number of organisations receiving this kind of funding is currently around 1000. The recent annual report states that “We are investing £446 million each year in 985 organisations which we believe and expect will make the biggest contribution to realising our Let’s Create vision over the next three years.”¹⁰⁸

Among the 985 supported organizations, there are 101 NPOs within the sector of music, varying greatly in size and scope. Ranging from the Royal Opera House, receiving 24 million GBP in 21/22, to NMC Recordings, receiving 40 000 GBP in the same year. The Royal Opera House, is one of the two major opera institutions in London, while NMC recordings is a record company specializing in recording works by contemporary British and Irish composers. Among the other recipients on the list, we find e.g. symphony orchestras, music festival, concert venues, youth orchestras, arts and culture charities etc. The majority of these NPOs are giving funding through grants-in-aid, with only 8 of them receiving lottery funding (see below on these two sources of funding). The applications for NPO support are, in the first stage, handled by a network of regionally employed experts with knowledge of the applicants. The next stage of assessment is handled by either the national council of ACE (large applications) or by regional area councils, of which there are five.

National lottery project grants

These grants are supporting projects from cultural producers or organizations, open for applications between 1000 and 100 000 GBP. After an initial technical check of the application, they are assessed on feasibility and risk. Afterwards, the applications are assessed by the regional council or regionally

¹⁰⁷ <https://www.artscouncil.org.uk/lets-create/delivery-plan-2021-2024>

¹⁰⁸ <https://www.artscouncil.org.uk/media/21592/download?attachment>

employed experts, on how they score on four different criteria: Quality, Public Engagement, Management, Finance. For each of these criteria, a final assessment is given as to whether the criteria are met, with the grades of Met – outstanding, Met – strong, Met, Potential, Not met.

As this kind of grants have a different kind of funding source than the grant-in-aid funding, they are also subject to specific policy directions for the distribution of the proceeds from the National Lottery¹⁰⁹. Among these policy directions, we find statements clearly echoing other value-based statements of the priorities of ACE, e.g. “the need to involve the public and local communities in making policies, setting priorities and distributing money”, and “the need to foster local community initiatives which bring people together, enrich the public realm and strengthen community spirit”. The value of sustainability is also emphasised among these directions: “the need to further the objectives of sustainable development”.

This kind of finding are subject to changing priorities. Current priorities for this funding, are museum collection projects and grassroots live music. Let us look closer at the latter priority, as an example of the music policy of Arts Council England. The funding is open to “all types of music and genres”, and the applicants can apply for between 1000 and 40 000 GBP, to support programming, audience development, “asset purchase” etc. The support is directed towards local venues and promoters, described as the main “research and development sector of the musical industry”.

Develop your creativity funding

This kind of funding is directed towards individual creative or cultural practitioners. ACE describes this category of funding like this: “Funding to support individuals who are cultural and creative practitioners and want to take time to focus on their creative development.”¹¹⁰ More specifically, the funding supports “development activities [within] our supported disciplines, for example undertaking a period of research, networking, or time to create new work”. The funding amounts range from 2000 and 12 000 GBP. The last official list of successful applicants includes 400 individual artists, getting funding for e.g. the projects “Setting foundations to become a Hip Hop female trailblazer” and “Immersive Audio Album Project”.

Music Education Hubs

A specific, central programme that might serve as an illustration of the music policy of ACE, is the programme of Music Education Hubs (MEH). This is developed in a collaboration between ACE and the Department for Education. The MEHs are explained by ACE in this manner:

A Music Education Hub is a partnership, led by a Hub Lead Organisation, that is responsible for supporting, delivering and enabling access to music education activity for children and young people within a local area. [...] The network of Music Education Hubs covers every area of England to ensure all children and young people have equitable access to high-quality music education activity.¹¹¹

At the time of writing, there are 116 different MEH spread throughout the country. The Hub lead

¹⁰⁹ https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1166427/ACE_ARA_22-23.pdf

¹¹⁰ <https://www.artscouncil.org.uk/dycp>

¹¹¹ <https://www.artscouncil.org.uk/MusicEducationHubs>

organizations (and organizations taking part in the partnerships), are local authorities, schools, arts organisations, community or voluntary organisations. In other words, this is a system that is rather coherent with the overall aim of democratizing the possibility to be creative and the value cluster of democratization.

MEHs are also expected to deliver results according to three aims described in the National Plan for Music Education:

1. To support schools and other education settings to deliver high-quality music education;
2. To support young people to further develop their musical interests and talent, including into employment;
3. To support all children and young people to engage with a range of musical opportunities in and out of school.

This national plan has a telling title, clearly signaling a certain value perspective on music: *The power of music to change lives*. In other words: music might have profound impacts on people and on the lives they live.

Budget


We can divide the budget of the ACE in two different ways. One way of looking at the ACE budget is to divide it between different categories of available funding. In general, the three most important categories, are the abovementioned NPOs, lottery grants, and development funds. Another way of dividing the budget is to look at the source of the funding, which have some consequences for how the distribution of funds might be evaluated. ACE distributes a combination of so-called grant-in-aid and funding from the National Lottery Fund. In 2021/22, the distribution between these two funding sources were 254 million GBP from lottery funding, and 689 million GBP from grant-in-aid.

Grant-in-aid is usually defined as money paid by central or state government to a lower level of government. In the UK, grant-in-aid is usually used for payments coming from central level to a non-departmental public organization, as in this case, Arts Council England. As explained by governmental definition, grant-in-aid is “A sum of money provided to an organisation to be applied in general support for the objectives of that organisation”. And, importantly, “Grant in aid is paid where the government has decided, subject to Parliamentary controls, that the recipient body should operate at arm’s length.”¹¹² The lottery funds stem from the proceeds of the National Lottery, and, as mentioned above, these are subject to a specific set of policy directions.

In the fiscal year 2021/22, the total amount of funding from ACE was around 920 million pounds. This funding was distributed in these broad categories:

¹¹² https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/654680/2017-09-27_Grant_Definitions.pdf

Figure 1. Distribution of ACE funding in 2021/22



Source: Figure from Annual Report 2021/22 (Arts Council 2022).

As we see, the largest portion of the budget is the funding for the National Portfolio organizations. The second largest portion consists of funding from the preliminary Cultural Recovery Fund, aimed to mitigate some of effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. The National Lottery Project Grants also constitute a substantial portion of the annual budgets, as do also the abovementioned Music Education Hubs.

In the series of guiding principles, values, objectives and aims, the ACE also operate with a set of so-called investment principles, which deserve closer attention, as they seem essential to the legitimacy of ACE funding. As mentioned, these principles are Ambition and quality, Inclusivity and relevance, Dynamism, and Environmental responsibility. A lot of work have been put in to explaining, outlining, interpreting and understanding these investment principles. The Arts Council has e.g. a webpage titled “Investment Principles Resource Hub”. This page is presenting “resources from across the creative and cultural sectors”, to “help you make sure your work, and the way you work, is environmentally responsible, ambitious and high quality, inclusive and relevant, and dynamic”¹¹³. Using the concepts of this work package within the UNCHARTED projects, these principles might be labelled the explicit value clusters of Arts Council England.

Among these investment principles, the principle of Dynamism stands out, as it seems to represent a value on a separate level. Dynamism, in the language of ACE, represents the ability to change, which in other words might be interpreted to affect the importance and prioritizing of other essential value clusters.

¹¹³ <https://www.artscouncil.org.uk/lets-create/strategy-2020-2030/investment-principles/investment-principles-resource-hub>

Coherence of implementation with regard to main values

If we hold the actual implementation of policies and the budget priorities of ACE up against the many levels and varieties of value-based, we think it is fair to say that the policies show a high degree of coherency. As shown, the value clusters that explicitly guide the cultural and music policy of ACE are identity (including community), aesthetics (including creativity) and democracy. The different funding categories, programmes, budget priorities and technical administration and assessment of applications seem to reflect these value clusters quite consistently. They combine the priority of democratizing the opportunities for creativity, democratizing access to culture and the support of high-quality cultural production.

At the same time, this specific combination of aesthetic qualities and excellence and democratizing creativity has an obvious potential for tension, in the sense that prioritizing one might be at the expense of the other. However, this kind of tension is not detectable in the documents that we have based this case study on. It might be that interviews with practitioners and ACE employees had shown a slightly different picture.

In her analysis of how arts councils of England and South Korea have developed, Lee points to a possible challenge relevant in this context – that the combination of democracy and excellence might potentially delegitimize the institution of ACE:

If the relativist idea of culture is fully taken on board, the Council's funding structure and criteria would require radical transformation, further delegitimizing the institution of the Arts Council. One may wonder what this would mean for professional artists and organizations: how they can articulate their unique roles and contributions and justify their eligibility for arts funding when every creative and cultural expression is valued equally and becomes a potential object for public support. (Lee 2022, p. 63).

Whether this analysis is right, remains to be seen.

6.4. Governance, adaptability and social accuracy

Democratic openness, dialogue with stakeholders, power relations

The ACE is both an arms-length body under the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, while it is also registered as a charity. ACE receives a funding/management agreement from the Department, as commented in the introduction to this case (see above). This document also covers the governance and accountability of ACE. What becomes clear from reading this document, is that the ACE is evidently a tool to operationalize the policy of the DCMS. The ACE are, as quoted from the agreement, expected to give a high priority to supporting the established outcomes for the ministerial cultural policy, while they also are “expected to support the department” on other issues. So, while ACE is an arms' length body, there is at the same time no doubt where the policy priorities originate.

In the question of dialogue with stakeholders, it seems that the level of dialogue is quite high, at least as is visible in the documentation used in this case. The current strategy, Let's Create is based on, according to ACE, conversations with more than 6000 people, and the conversations has been used to formulate the priorities and objectives within the strategy. Furthermore, the level of available information and communication to potential applicants and benefactors is high, as evidenced in the very thorough information given on the webpages of the council and in a variety of pamphlets and brochures. It seems that there also has been a certain shift in the role of central vs. regional competence. At present, considerable power is in the hands of the regionally based area councils

when it comes to administering funding. Furthermore, the ACE has also abolished the use of peer review panels (cf. Lee 2022, p. 57), which has principal consequences for the role of the ACE.

Social accuracy, adaptability, evolution of values in relation to social developments

Within the value-based work of Arts Council England, there has been a certain development during the last one or two decades. One example of this is the rise and (potential) fall of the focus on public value. In the last years of the 00s, ACE, along with a number of other cultural policy stakeholders in the UK, focused heavily on defining and measuring public value (see e.g. Bunting 2006, Carnworth and Brown 2014). Hailed by some as a more efficient way of defining the success of public services and public goods, others saw public value as “the latest buzz-phrase that can be pedalled as the most modern version of public sector management snake-oil” (Gray 2008, p. 211). In current documentation and strategies, the focus seems to be placed elsewhere, as documented above.

There are two specific values or value clusters that seem to get specific attention in the way ACE reports on their work and results: sustainability and equality. In the annual reports of the council later years, there is a designated Sustainability report, placed under the main heading of Accountability report. In other words, the results on sustainability indicators constitute one of the main areas where the council is to be held accountable. This report presents specific numbers on e.g. waste, use of water, CO2 emissions, travels and use of energy, resulting from the activities of ACE.

In a parallel manner, equality is also explicitly measured and reported, on several indicators. The annual report asks, “how have we responded to our Equality Objectives?”. The answer is using four categories to measure diversity and equality - Black, Asian and Ethnically Diverse, Disabled, Female and LGBT+ - and the report presents the share of grants and funding these groups have received from the council.

A final point saying something about the evolution of values in the work of ACE, is the change in the use of a fundamental concept, “art”. By and large, “art”, or “arts” have been replaced with “creativity”. In the 10-year strategy for 2010-2020, ACE defined itself as “the national development agency for the arts, museums and libraries”, while in the current strategy, they define themselves as “the national development agency for creativity and culture” (cf. Lee 2022).

6.5. Conclusion

The overall picture of the cultural policy and the music policy of Arts Council England is a rather coherent and consistent picture. To put it shortly, they pretty much do what they say, or, to use a colloquialism, put their money where their mouth is. As shown above, the arms’ length body of ACE has developed a rather advanced system and hierarchy of objectives, aims, goals, principles, expected outcomes etc., partly as an answer to specific directions from the funding ministry DCMS. Furthermore, principles and aims and objectives are actively and explicitly related to one another in the many strategic documents, plans and information sheets produced by ACE.

At the same time, there is a potential incoherence and/or tension implicit in the value configurations of Arts Council England, visible in the rhetorical shift from arts to creativity, and in the combination of aesthetic excellence and democratized creativity.

7. Creative Europe Culture sub-program, European Union

7.1. Introduction

Until the 1990s, there was no real European cultural policy, apart from a few small budgets granted to organizations, and a few labels created to protect cultural diversity and heritage. With the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, "culture" appeared for the first time in the legal basis and became a coordinating competence of the EU. This led to the introduction of four programs to support the cultural sector: Media (audio-visual industry), Raphaël (heritage), Ariane (books and reading) and Kaleidoscope (artistic creation and performing arts). These last three programs were integrated into a single Culture program in 2000. In 2014, "Culture" and "Media" were merged into a single program : "Creative Europe". Between 1992 and 2014, this process of 'decompartmentalization' of artistic disciplines - with the exception of audio-visual - has been accompanied by a generalization of project-based funding and an alignment of cultural policy with the European strategy for innovation (Arfaoui, 2019).

Creative Europe is divided in three strands: the Media sub-program (at least 56% of its budget), the Culture sub-program (at least 31% of the budget), supporting cross-border cooperation, platforms, networking and mobility in all cultural sectors - and a Cross-sectoral strand, comprising a guarantee mechanism, and transnational policy cooperation and support for policy development. The Culture sub-program's main instrument is a funding mechanism, including calls for projects for cultural actors - mainly SMEs, non-profit organizations and public bodies. In addition to Creative Europe programs, the EU also intervenes in the cultural sector through legislative regulations (cf. copyright directive) and other funds (structural funds, regional funds, etc.).

Culture is considered as a "weak" European competence, due to the principles of subsidiarity¹¹⁴ and conferral¹¹⁵; which explains why "cooperation" is Creative Europe's primary objective (implying the notion of "European added value"), and why it only provides funding for projects (refusing operating funding, avoiding to replace Member States action). The program's budget was 1.4 billion € (2014-2020), and is currently 1.85 billion € (2021-2027) – which is extremely limited compared to the European budget (1,43%), demography (5,45 € per inhabitants) and economic weight of the cultural sector (0,03%).

7.2. Objectives and values

Foundation and multiplication of values

Europe Creative values are based is very short and broad legal basis, contained in Article 167 of the TFEU¹¹⁶. It mentions a contribution to the "flowering of cultures", respecting "national and regional diversity", and protecting the "common cultural heritage"; more specifically, it cites the following objectives: "encouraging cooperation"; "improvement of the knowledge and dissemination of culture"; "conservation and safeguarding of cultural heritage" and, finally, the development of "non-commercial cultural exchanges, artistic and literary creation".

More and more values have gradually been added to this minimum base, by successive transcriptions

¹¹⁴ Principle of subsidiarity states that decisions are retained by Member States if the intervention of the EU is not necessary ; EU should act only when Member States' power is insufficient.

¹¹⁵ Principle of conferral states that EU has no competences by right, thus any areas of policy not explicitly agreed in treaties remain the domain of the member states.

¹¹⁶ TFEU (2007)

of the EU's political priorities in the Council, Parliament and Commission's official documents, testifying a strong internal coherence of values¹¹⁷.

This inflation of values can be schematically summed up as follows: an initial phase centred on cooperation, heritage and diversity (1992-2014); the emergence of a 'creative turn' and the notion of 'cultural and creative industries', under the Juncker Commission, including economic values, competitiveness, innovation, digital shift as well as social inclusion values (2014-2020); then, from 2020, the appearance of "environmental sustainability" (particularly following the IPCC reports and the European "green deal"), "gender equality", "care" (well-being, health) and "recovery" of the cultural sector, particularly following the historic COVID-19 incident.

Figure 1. The progressive accumulation of values assigned to the "culture" sub-programme

Maastricht Treaty (TUE) 1992 + Lisbon Treaty (TFUE) 2007	Diversity (national/regional cultures ; + languages, identities, expressions, audiences) Heritage / common / history / safeguarding / conservation / dissemination Cooperation / non-commercial exchanges (+ circulation, intercultural dialogue, cohesion, communities, mobility)
Creative Europe 2014-2020 (Parliament + Commission 2014)	Creation (+ quality, + freedom of expression) Innovation (technological, artistic, social) + digital shift Economy (competitiveness , industrial strategy, growth, employment, entrepreneurship, interest of the UE, sustainability) + recovery, resilience (post COVID-19)
Creative Europe 2021-2027 (Council 2018, Parliament + Commission 2021)	Inclusion (of marginalized people, people with disabilities, minorities, refugees...) / social / gender equality / non discrimination / equality / fair remuneration Participation , audience engagement/ developpement Education / + Well-being / Health Environemental sustainability (greening, fighting climate change)

Source: Own elaboration

An undefined mix that "satisfies everyone"?

Many values coexist within Europe Creative; most of them are not defined precisely, and have little or no hierarchy - apart from several "priorities" set out in the Annual Work Plan and calls. This "melting pot" of loosely defined values would makes it possible to "satisfy everyone": "there is no tension over values because they are so generic that everyone agrees on them". This statement is false, given the many debates on values, but it is true that most actors seems to be able to recognize some of their own priorities in this large and blurry mix of values. The absence of a corpus of definitions or a precise doctrine of values produces an open framework, leaving freedom of interpretation to actors – "diversity", sustainability" or "inclusion" are presented as challenges to be addressed, rather than

¹¹⁷ The Mid-Term evaluation welcomes an alignment of the program with "Europe 2020's objectives of smart, sustainable, and inclusive growth"; the Annual Work Plan 2022 presents itself as « fully aligned with the political priorities of the Commission."

values containing a strong political or ideological orientation.

A cohabitation between innovative and democratic conceptions?

These numerous values can be understood in the context of a contemporaneous opposition between an "innovative" liberal conception (economy, competitiveness, etc.) and a "democratic" interventionist conception (diversity, inclusion, participation, etc.) of cultural policies (Arfaoui, 2019). These two conceptions cohabit in the Creative Europe programme, which constitutes a space for dialogue and conflict between "hybrid" values. The innovative conception is clearly predominant, but the democratic conception is still inserted, making it possible to "enroll" cultural actors who are reluctant to conform to liberal values. The two conceptions sometimes clash sharply, and senior civil servants are divided as to which values to prioritize, even though the innovative and liberal conception seems to prevail in their comments and in the program's rationale for action (see part 2).

Heteronomous values: innovating to face social challenges

The aesthetic or intrinsic value of culture is not mentioned in the program, only including heteronomous values to culture. It funds projects on the basis of their "innovative" responses to social and economic issues, without judging the quality of the artistic creations, remaining the responsibility of professionals. This refusal to be an "arbiter of taste" is welcomed by many actors. However, the lack of adaptation of strategic priorities to the specific characteristics of cultural sectors and the piling up of numerous social objectives that cultural organizations are required to reach is criticized: "national cultural policies have traditionally made artistic creation so sacred, that they forgot about society... The EU has to be careful not to do the opposite".

The polysemy of "inclusion" and "diversity"

"Diversity" is not clearly defined : it can refer as much to national and regional languages and cultures as to creative contents, to the sociology of artists and audiences as to creation, production or distribution. It is sometimes valued as the "pluralism" of singularities, other times as support for independence in the face of the domination of strong commercial actors, or often, as a synonym for "inclusion" concerning social discriminations.

"Inclusion" is also variable, often referring to the social inclusion through culture, of specific target groups within artists audiences (such as people "with disabilities", "belonging to minorities", "from different geographical and socio-economic backgrounds" and "socially marginalized groups"¹¹⁸). Some authors claim that "inclusion" is a liberal value, designed to replace the objective of reducing inequalities, reformulating the problem of 'social justice' into the issue of providing individuals an environment enabling them to be self-entrepreneurs, rather than acting on material and structural inequalities (Arfaoui, 2019; Oakley, 2006; Schlesinger, 2016).

"Cooperation": a retrospective value, in tension with sustainability?

"Cooperation" is a central objective of the program, primarily justified by the principle of subsidiarity and "European added value", retrospectively associated to certain values. Cooperation would thus

¹¹⁸ Cooperation Projects Call, 2023

serve economic development ("viability", sustainable strengthening of the sector and its competitiveness), diversity (exchanges and dissemination of cultural forms), creativity and social innovation (sharing and building new models to face social, ecologic and economic challenges). Cooperation is currently in tension with environmental sustainability values: the program is mainly based on mobility, circulation of creations, audiences and artists, which involves polluting transports, in contradiction with the objective of decarbonisation and the fight against climate change.

Cultural and creative industries VS general interest?

Economic values are taken in external or internal tensions. Their inclusion in the redefinition of European cultural policy is associated with the "creative turn" of the 1980s, itself associated with a "neo-liberal turn" (Arfaoui, 2019) – including in the 2000s the notion of "cultural and creative industries". Since then, we observe a generalization of project-based funding, the introduction of an entrepreneurial lexicon, new public management tools, and the imperative of results. This made it possible, in a neoliberal conception, to justify increases in the budget, perceived as an investment with the goal to empower actors toward their autonomy, rather than a subsidy that would permanently compensate for unprofitability.

To avoid any distortion of competition, the program's financial regulations stipulate that projects funded must be non-profitable and of general interest - but the definition of this limit is under permanent debate and is open to sectoral exceptions (such as the funding of profitable actors but reduced to non-profitable sectors of their activity, considered to be of general interest).

Economic tensions : competitiveness VS independence and diversity?

Economic values are generally associated with competitiveness - with the objective of strengthening the EU's position in international trade. This logic may be in contradiction with the value of diversity, because focusing funding on export objectives may exclude small independent actors – yet essential to creative diversity. However, economic value is also mobilized as support for the viability and sustainability of a fragile sector (particularly post-COVID) and its small organizations. Music sector actors are divided on these economic concepts: those with a commercial rationale are pushing for a market and competitiveness approach (by interest, by conviction, or to justify a sectoral policy within the EU liberal framework) - while those with unprofitable social objectives are fearing their exclusion and seek to reduce the importance of economic values, or to focus them on the reinforcement of their non-profit or independent models. Generally speaking, cultural operators seem "reluctant to embrace the new 'competitiveness' general objective"¹¹⁹. Is the appearance of notions such as economic "sustainability" and "ecosystem" only a discursive attempt to "soften" economic values in order to "enroll" reluctant actors, or a redefinition of economic values aiming to include unprofitable segments?

7.3. Implementation coherence

Implementation, strategies and resources

General orientations of the Europe Creative Program are defined, led and developed by the Directorate-general Education, Youth, Sport and Culture (DG EAC), based on the objectives set by the

¹¹⁹ Mid-Term evaluation (2018), *ibid.*

Council and Parliament; its operational and financial implementation is carried out by the European Education and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA). Human resources are unanimously described as understaffed, which has an impact in terms of proximity, dialogue and administrative management capacity.

"We achieve our objectives through the funded projects"

The culture sub-program is essentially made of grants, attributed through calls for projects. These calls put actors in competition, aiming to stimulate cooperation and innovations supposed to respond to the challenges facing the sector and society, identified through the priorities set by the Commission. Our analysis will focus on these calls, but the program also includes other instruments: a guarantee mechanism covering the risks of default by funded operators; European Capitals of Culture; prizes in the fields of music, heritage, literature, architecture; a scheme to promote the Translation and promotion of European literary works; "Culture Moves Europe", which provides mobility grants to artists and cultural professionals, and other schemes.

There are three main types of calls for projects : cooperation, networks and platforms. Networks and platforms projects account for €38 million¹²⁰ (22% of the budget); networks aim to offer "a stable and long-term base for professionals to develop their international skills and strengthen their competitiveness" while platforms promote "emerging artists and fostering a European programme of cultural and artistic works"¹²¹. Cooperation projects account for €115 million¹²² (64% of the budget). Cooperation projects applicants must choose between two main objectives (transnational creation and circulation or innovation), then indicate how their project will respond to a selection of "transversal priorities". Eligibility and funding rules vary according to the size of the partnership:

Table 1. Eligibility and funding rules

Scale	Minimum number of partners	Minimum number of countries	Maximum Grant	Maximum co-financing rate of the eligible budget
Small	3	3	200 000	80%
Medium	5	5	1 ME	70%
Large	10	10	2ME	60%

Source: Own elaboration

In 2021 and 2022, under the Culture Sub-Program, Creative Europe supported a total of 441 projects and provided grants to around 2146 organizations; the success rates were 35% in 2021 and 26% in 2022¹²³. Beneficiaries are composed mostly of public organizations (24%) and Non-profit association (61%)¹²⁴.

¹²⁰ 2014-2020 budget

¹²¹ EACEA (2021)

¹²² 2014-2020 budget

¹²³ Implementation report (2023)


¹²⁴ Mid-Term evaluation (2018)

A growing but tiny budget: less than 0.1% of the sector's value

In its first phase (2014-2020), Creative Europe had a budget of € 1.47 billion, expanded to € 2.44 billion in its second phase (2021-2027) - the Culture sub-programme representing at least 31% of this budget. This 68% increase is impressive. However, it will be partially absorbed by high inflation¹²⁵, and it remains a 'tiny' budget (1,43% of the European budget), furthermore in relation to the economic weight of the cultural sector in Europe. For example, the 2014-2016 programme represented the equivalent of an annual support of 0.03% of the value of the sector (estimated at € 560 billion – 4.5% of EU GDP, employing 8.5 million workers, equivalent to 3.8% of Europe's workforce)¹²⁶. Even projecting the 68% increase, the current budget would not reach 0.1% of the sector value. This budget also seems extremely small in relation to European demography: 5,45 € per inhabitants (to be compared with the €40 to €400 per inhabitants, for the national policies studied in this report).

Budget distribution

Over 2014-2016, the average amount awarded per organization was €138,000 (for 1280 organizations)¹²⁷; this figure rises to just € 81,848 (for 2146 organizations) for the combined years 2021 and 2022¹²⁸. The raw funding data is partly public, but statistical processing is very complex without pre-processing and missing some key information; this lack of transparency is justified, according to respondents, as a way of "avoiding jealousy between countries or sectors". Given the cross-sectoral nature of many projects, it is impossible to establish an exact breakdown by sector; the most recent data estimations (2007-2015)¹²⁹ show that the performing arts receive the most funding (43%, including 15% for music), followed by the visual arts (17%), heritage (16%), design and architecture (8%) and literature (5%). Several sources indicate that this balance shifted sharply in favor of music in the years that followed.



Sources: data from the Mid-Term evaluation (2018), including "Culture survey" (% of respondents by Culture sub-sector), and programme data (yearly funding).

¹²⁵ Implementation report (2023)

¹²⁶ Mid-Term evaluation (2018)

¹²⁷ Mid-Term evaluation (2018)

¹²⁸ Statistics from non-public database

¹²⁹ Mid-Term evaluation (2018)

The music policy budget

The Commission states that the budget dedicated to music projects increased significantly during the 2014-2020 period: "more than 130 music projects received EU funding for a budget of over € 98 million (...) further € 7 million were dedicated to "Music Moves Europe" (MME), supporting more than 60 small-scale music projects (training, music education, small venues, co-creation, sustainable recovery) and several studies"¹³⁰. Subsequently, two sectoral calls for projects were launched, the first for € 2.5 million (MusicAIRE, 2021), and a second in preparation for € 4.5 million (LiveMX). Taking into account the de-sectorised calls for projects, EACEA claims that 'almost 30% of the 2021 budget under Creative Europe went to the music sector'¹³¹ – which would mean an increase of more than 100% between 2015 and 2021¹³². However, music sector actors are still waiting for a genuine sectoral programme, which was mentioned but appears to be blocked.

Coherence of implementation regarding values

Do projects meet values?

Creative Europe aims to achieve its objectives through the projects it funds: to what extent are these projects – and their effects – coherent with the program's values? Applying to Cooperation Projects, the main objectives to be chosen by beneficiaries are not values but types of action ("transnational creation and circulation" or "innovation"); they should then select "priorities" ("audience", "digital", "international"), some partly referring to values ("sustainability", "social inclusion") – it is not compulsory to respond to all of these priorities. Finally, the Call states that all projects must consider "cross-cutting" issues in the design and the implementation of their project: "inclusion, diversity, gender equality, and greening Creative Europe"¹³³. Are these responses purely declarative? Some claim that project leaders could be "bluffing" by "ticking the boxes", in the absence of any effective coercive conditionality, such as quotas or impact indicators (estimated carbon footprint; proportion of women; etc.): "It's the best-written projects that win, not the most relevant or ambitious". Objectives can be only theoretical, and even when indicators exist, in most cases they are self-assessments (unreliable), and data focus on activities rather than impacts, which would require more in-depth studies. Therefore, a dissociation can occur between the stated objectives, the activities carried out and the real impacts. Practices of financial opportunism (common in all types of subsidy) are observed, favored by the sector's fragile economies, poorly subsidized in some countries or sub-sectors. In this way, project funding can be "diverted" to finance ordinary functioning rather than innovation - which may, paradoxically, correspond to the values advocated, if already included in their previous activities.

However, there are certain signs of coherence: "cooperation" is one certainly achieved objective – as it is compulsory; and several projects have been reported to produce strong, innovative, inspiring and coherent impacts with the program's values. It is impossible to prove it for most of them, but at least, the need to specify their strategy regarding priority issues lead them to start reflecting about it - or to take a first step in this direction.

¹³⁰ 2014-2020 Music Projects (EACEA, 2021)

¹³¹ Unofficial document (EACEA, 2022)

¹³² Sources : Mid-Term evaluation (2018) ; Music Projects (2021)

¹³³ Cooperation projects Call (2023)

Instrumentalization and stacking of priorities

Calls for projects are criticized for the proliferation of social and economic issues to which the applicants must respond. This "piling up of priorities", transcribed from the EU's general objectives, is seen as unsuited to the specific nature of the cultural sectors and their own challenges, eventually unfavorable to its economic strengthening, or to the artistic creation itself. In this perspective, criticisms are expressed regarding the "instrumentalization" of culture in the service of heteronomous values, lacking a more "sector-oriented" approach¹³⁴.

The large number of priorities is described as unproductive: "the programme would function better if the beneficiaries were allowed to focus on one measure as a priority, rather than spending resources on incorporating all priorities, which may be less efficient"¹³⁵. Responding to all the issues could be at the expense of dealing with them in an innovative, effective and far-reaching way, and would lead the projects to a logic of "tokenism", with symbolic displays but no structuring transformation of practices. "Culture is being asked to respond to all social challenges... This shift towards political directions is taking a disproportionate proportion. We're turning away from production and creation, projects are asked to deal with lots of other things... and when you touch everything, you don't touch the essentials."

The unequal pre-selection of calls for projects

Selection processes induced by calls for projects have counterproductive effects regarding the values advocated. Actors can be excluded by the need of resources for co-funding, access to information, knowledge, time and skills to handle administrative complexity and vocabulary. Depending on the calls, success rates vary between 5% and 30% - not considering the self-exclusion of other actors. Favored organizations are notably those who master the current European "fashion vocabulary", and are already included in European networks, or identified in the Commission's inter-knowledge relationships and by the members of the juries (whose composition sometimes reveals in terms conflicts of interest - and therefore unfairness) - leading some to denounce a "continuous co-optation process".

The Commission claims to be reducing these inequalities by simplifying its procedures and increasing co-financing rates (from 50 to 80% for the smallest projects) - which should open the door to poorest actors. To deal with complexity, local Creative Europe Desks can support organizations in setting up and drafting their projects - but their staffing levels makes them unequally capable of doing it, which creates inequalities between countries. Some support can be provided by private organizations, but it remains financially inequitable. All these inequalities (according to budget, geography, skills, relations...) can therefore contradict the values of diversity, inclusion and non-discrimination.

Controllability VS innovation?

Funding from calls for projects involves complex and time-consuming demands of administrative and

¹³⁴ Implementation report (2023), regarding the music sector

¹³⁵ Implementation report (2023)

budgetary justification. Some consider that it is above all the "measurability" of projects that is judged and selected - partly linked to the distance between senior officials and beneficiaries, justifying a highly quantified "hyper-rationalization" in order to exercise "remote control" (Arfaoui, 2019) – even though this control is unable to measure the effects of the projects. However, this administrative duty can be detrimental to the implementation of projects and to their innovative potential. The prior hyper-rationalization can conflict with the need to adapt to new situations and the "local knowledge" implied in real time management: "a project doesn't work like that, we move forward at sight, with hazards, we have to adapt, discover...". Furthermore, the need for "constant justification" can conflict with the time needed to invent proper "innovations" and fulfill the project's objectives, and may cause suffering at work and thus have negative effects on the projects and staff involved.

Exclusionary effects on aesthetic diversity?

Exclusionary effects induced by calls for projects can contradict the value of diversity. For example, music projects funded between 2014 and 2020 breakdown roughly as follows in aesthetic genres: "classical", "contemporary" and "opera" (around 60%); "traditional", "world" and "heritage" (around 20%); "pop", "rock" and "electronic" (around 15%)¹³⁶. Some types of music are even almost completely absent, such as urban music and hip-hop. Funding thus seems to operate the same inequalities between aesthetics as most of "elitist" national cultural policies. These inequalities are linked exclusion (and self-censorship) mechanisms favoring the most structured, skilled and staffed actors mentioned above, but also to potential unconscious aesthetic judgements within the selection process. When questioned about this lack of diversity, senior civil servants reply that no particular strategy to diversify aesthetics exists, claiming that other criteria are discriminating (relevance, innovation, etc.). "Aesthetic blindness" shows its paradoxical limits: only a proactive policy that takes aesthetic diversity into account could counter these inequalities.

The Commission argues that the programme promotes diversity through its objectives of audience development and the circulation of works and artists, but we have no data on the diversity of these artists - or of their audiences and criteria (aesthetic, sociological, linguistic, etc.) would be needed to qualify it.

The new calls for the music sector claim an opening to new types of actors, and could diversify beneficiaries. In particular, "Cascading Grants", which management is delegated to professional networks, closer to the sector and with better knowledge of its specific needs and issues, could potentially be more open to small and excluded actors. But this delegation is problematic as it implies conflicts of interest, forcing networks to evaluate their own members. Above their diversification value, this opening to new types of beneficiaries in the music field could have interesting local legitimizing effects for actors such as concert venues, whose cultural role is not recognized in many countries.

¹³⁶ These percentages are not precise, and should be read as orders of magnitude; the count only includes projects with clearly identified aesthetics, in the document "2014-2020 Music Projects" (EACEA, 2021)

Short-term financing VS long-term impact?

Creative Europe aims to produce long term structuring impact, with an ephemeral project funding supposed to stimulate innovations aiming for sustainability. This focus on innovation and new actions precludes the funding of operators' structural and ongoing activities, even though they would perfectly reach the programme's objectives. However, this avoidance is sometimes compensated by an involuntary operating funding, through misappropriation and financial opportunism (paradoxical coherence).

What are the long-term impacts of the “innovative” projects funded, given that most of the activities and jobs funded cease when the funding ends? Senior officials emphasize the creation of knowledge, skills, content, ideas, relationships, links and the sharing of good practices, that will have potential effects in the future: "sustained impact is found in permanent partnerships and in the peer learning"; 87% of Cooperation Project beneficiaries would have "reported that they had some follow up or continued relationship with the project partners after their project completion"¹³⁷. Creative Europe also stresses the long-term effects in terms of "professionalization and internationalization of careers, skills development, and building capacity"¹³⁸, or the effects of incubation projects, prizes and mobility grants for emerging artists, but these effects are not sector-wide.

In order to reach structuring effects beyond the direct beneficiaries, “good practices” and new models and strategies experimented must be genuinely evaluated and their results widely disseminated. However, our survey revealed major lacks of evaluation, legacy and public transmission/dissemination of project results.

Impact limitations also arise regarding the size of the projects supported: smaller projects are often excluded, even though they could have more tangible impacts on local areas or specific target groups, due to their long term’s implantations, proximity, links and adaptability. Finally, the requirement for international circulation and exchange is sometimes at the expense of in-depth local action¹³⁹.

Music as an arena of tension between economic values

Following lobbying by the music sector, the Parliament opened the door to the possibility of sectoral action in favor of music, and a number of dedicated schemes have recently emerged, in the framework of “Music Moves Europe” (MME). The orientation of these sectoral actions is debated: should priority be given to competitiveness, market and exports; or favor independence, diversity, social impact and “general interest” actions?

The debate opposes actors in favour of a EU's international influence policy, which would benefit the most commercial actors in the music industry, distribution and streaming, to actors defending an “music ecosystem” policy, benefiting in priority to independent sectors and actors oriented towards socio-territorial action, education and amateur practices. The first calls tended to focus on export actors and support for creators through career development. Challengers criticize this restrictive

¹³⁷ Mid-term Evaluation (2018)

¹³⁸ Mid-term Evaluation (2018)

¹³⁹ Observation shown that some cooperation projects with a citizen participation core objective had to scale down their local participatory ambitions, in an attempt to encourage participation on an international scale (limiting the number of participants, limiting their power through the change of scale, reducing the time artists spend in residence in the same area, etc.).

approach to economic value, which does not consider the “value chain” of the whole sector: “our structures are essential for the artists of tomorrow, for new audiences, and our models are the most fragile”. The absence of dedicated objectives to specifically support independent productions was also denounced as dangerous for diversity.

The competitiveness objective itself has effectiveness limits: how can such a small budget have a major market impact? As for the job creation objective highlighted by the Commission (the Culture programme as a whole would have “generated 3000 jobs over 2014-2016”¹⁴⁰): what guarantee that these jobs will be maintained over time?

7.4. Governance, adaptability and social accuracy

Democratic governance

“Commission wants to double, Parliament wants to triple; finally, the Council reduce”

The development of values and instruments depends on consensus within European institutions and in their negotiations. The Commission has a strong power over policy proposals, transcription-reinterpretation of annual priorities, technical and operational control over calls and other funds. It is seeking to increase Creative Europe's budget and tend to multiply its instruments. If no consensus is reached, the Council makes the budgetary final decision, with a tendency to negotiate downwards: “culture comes at the end of the negotiations. It's a small budget, the big negotiations are around the CAP, Cohesion...”. Within the Council, some countries seem to be restricting the cultural budget and competences, fearing that the EU would have too much influence on artistic contents – or willing to maintain a strong state power on this symbolic, linguistic and national soft power issue. Other states, where the cultural sector is economically weak, have less interest in competitiveness or support policies - which explains why the MME is mainly supported by countries with strong music production.

Parliament has relatively little power. However, its role was decisive in increasing the program's budget by 68%, and it is again calling for doubling the budget of the 2028-2034 program. The Parliament's Culture Committee proposed the MME preparatory action, which was then integrated into Europe Creative, and have inserted in the last program's objectives document an open door for a sectoral action for the music sector. It no longer has power during the implementation of the program, but can make suggestions and criticisms within the implementation report (most of which are fairly mild and vague).

A lack of democratic and sectoral dialogue

Most negotiations are not public nor open to stakeholders (like the open method of consultation (OMC), only including senior civil servants and experts appointed by member states), and apart from a few online consultations and scattered events, there is no major debate on what a European cultural policy could be.

Regarding the music sector, a Music Working Group organized by DG EAC in 2015 was welcomed by the sector as an opportunity to express its needs, and resulted in a relatively exhaustive reference

¹⁴⁰ Mid-term Evaluation (2018)

document¹⁴¹. Subsequently, however, the different forms of sectorial dialogue and consultation have been criticized for their infrequency, lack of transparency, unfairness and low impact on policy orientations. Several events gathering music sector professionals would “have left no room for well-argued claims”, nor their minutes been made public. Representativeness of their guests is questionable (some individuals representing networks of several hundred members, while others only representing their single organization); and in some events, a paid participation added another unequal barrier. The organization of some of these dialogues has been delegated to professional networks, which is also reported to be unfair and potentially unbalanced, regarding their specific position and interests in the field. Music sector professional actors are calling for a permanent, structural dialogue arena with the Commission to be set up, with a defined, transparent method and fair representativity of the sector’s diversity.

Formatting and restricting criticism through competition

Dialogue with cultural actors is affected by their status of applicants or (current or potential) beneficiaries, in competition for access to funds. The project-based funding logic, placing actors in a “demand” position, could “shape legitimate interlocutors” and create “ventriloquist organizations”, incorporating the vocabulary of the programme. To access funding, several organizations recruit European project specialists, and redirect their projects and philosophies of action, which can profoundly change their ethos and definitional autonomy (Arfaoui, 2019). Fearing of jeopardizing their funding, and through a conscious or unconscious adoption of the Commission's watchwords, cultural organizations would therefore soften their critical views, producing “a credible, compatible and appropriable critique” (Arfaoui, 2019) – and leaving little room for the expression of political radicalism.

Lobbying: an unequal access to the political agenda

The most structured and wealthiest actors have the ability to influence certain senior civil servants or MPs, leading to democratic inequality. For example, the cultural sector’s lobbying is less active and developed than the audio-visual sector’s lobbying, which partly explains their imbalance in funding. Senior civil servants justify this unequal access by the need to negotiate with representative organizations - but certain sectors with little or no structuration at the European level are therefore unable to be represented. Imbalances in access to dialogue with the European institutions are reflected in the MME initiative, which has been further driven by actors defending economic values, at the expense of actors defending non-profit values.

Lack of data, transparency and evaluation

Democratic dialogue on the program's values and strategies is made more difficult by a lack of access to data as a basis for discussion, whether concerning program statistics, internal negotiations, or sectorial observation. In the music sector, the production of a study on market trends and gaps in funding needs¹⁴² was welcomed, but the promise of an observatory centralizing the sector's data has

¹⁴¹ The AB MUSIC Working Group Report (European Commission, 2016)

¹⁴² Analysis of market trends and gaps in funding needs for the music sector (DG EAC, 2020)

not been implemented.

The program's evaluation could be a basis for democratic discussion, but is very patchy and uncritical: only a few impact indicators are featured, and all the evaluation criteria are considered satisfactory, with a few minor negative points¹⁴³. This tendency to praise the coherence and successes of the programme rather than pointing out its limitations and inconsistencies is partly explained by the "client relationship" in the consulting market, leading to self-censorship and censorship.

Social accuracy and adaptability

A layering logic dominated by liberal values

The evolution of values follows a cumulative logic of "layering" rather than "conversion" or "displacement" (Dupin-Meynard *et al.*, 2023; Streeck & Thelen, 2005). New values are added without replacing the previous ones - but their hierarchy can change significantly (as for the enhancing of competitiveness value). The overall architecture of values allows for hybridity and malleability, even if there is a relative consensus around "neoliberal" values and instruments, and clear movements towards a "financialization of public finances" (Chiapello *et al.*, 2021): a public action "seen as an investment to be exploited, shaped by the imagination of the private sector" ("leverage effect", "return on investment"); public problems framed as "funding problems" (public action justified on the basis of resources rather than values).

Path dependency and adaptability

The evolution of values and instruments is limited by the political and legal basis of the EU - as the principle of subsidiarity, limiting the scope of European competences. It is also affected by an institutional "path dependency" reinforced by economic stakeholder lobbies, as illustrated by the continuity of the Media program's financial predominance and the blocking of other sectoral programs. However, we observe a strong adaptability of the programme, sometimes very reactive. This was illustrated by the introduction of dedicated calls for projects following the war in Ukraine; or by the increase in co-financing rates for projects, and the development of actions favoring the 'resilience' of the sector following COVID-19 period.

A consensus on contemporary social issues?

Creative Europe integrated new values such as gender equality or ecology, in a context of massive social shifts and struggles, like the rise of feminist and ecologist movements in recent decades, making these subjects "inevitable". Other values might also constitute responses to the crisis of legitimacy of cultural policies, like the focus on "audience development" and "participation" during the 2014-2020 period (Dupin-Meynard & Négrier, 2020).

These evolutions partly correspond to the political balances in the European institutions, where a

¹⁴³ See: Mid-term Evaluation (2018)

center-right consensus is built, but capable of integrating more markedly left-wing social issues. The Parliament Culture Committee is described as a forum with no conflicts between political groups, with the exception of one exclusion of extreme right (aiming to maintain total subsidiarity). The ability to hybridize political values can also be explained by other factors: the extremely low budget and strategic importance for culture within European policies; the sociology of senior civil servants; a strategy of 'enlisting' actors in a sector reluctant to embrace the values of competitiveness.

Non-profit cultural actors would be expected to denounce the strong heteronomy of the values advocated as a threat to the independence of culture (Arfaoui, 2019). However, it seems that many of them have already incorporated such values (inclusion, diversity, participation), or are currently incorporating them (gender equality, ecology). Cultural actors would prefer to guarantee the justification of their funding by negotiating the types of heteronomous values that suit them best – social rather than economic – instead of defending a "purely cultural" or "intrinsic" value whose justification would be difficult to impose in front of the rise of economic values.

A lack of proximity and sectoral accuracy?

The relevance of the values regarding the cultural sector challenges is criticized: political priorities seem poorly adapted to the specificities of the sector, and the Commission lack of proximity to understand local and sectoral dynamics. Desks, in contact with applicants, provide feedback three times a year, but they are unevenly resourced, as 50% of their funding comes from the Member States. Proximity is also limited by the Commission's chronic understaffing, and senior officials complain about their capacity to meet and listen to local actors ("we have very limited resources to travel (...) we go to events, but more to talk than to listen"). Understanding of the sector is also limited by the lack of data production and analysis; in some cases, in-depth studies are carried out, but real observatories are missing.

7.5. Conclusion

The EU's cultural policy values are highly coherent with the EU's global political objectives. However, these objectives are being allocated to cultural policy in increasing numbers, in a gradual accumulation more than a replacement or displacement, leading to a cohabitation of heterogeneous and hybrid values ("there's something for everyone"). This value inflation, along with a lack of prioritization and precise definition of values (often being broad "issues" to address more than values) may lead to contradictions and stacks in which the values are diluted. The transcription of political, social and economic objectives results in a total "heteronomisation" of cultural policy values, politically justifiable, but risking a lack of coherence with the cultural sector's specificities.

Globally, innovative and democratic conceptions are in tension. Neoliberal values seem to be dominant, through the strong vocabulary of innovation, competitiveness, "cultural and creative industries", along with a process of "financialization of public funding" (competitive project-based funding, leverage effect, return on investment...). However, many social values are still claimed and implemented, making it possible to support (or "enroll") non-profit actors. Competitiveness values are in strong contradiction with independence and diversity values - impacting the diversity of financed actors and projects (small or large, profitable or unprofitable), their types of intervention (social or commercial) and their aesthetics genres (elitist, minority, popular...).

Several types of inconsistencies exist between implementation and values. A first type of inconsistency

concerns the lack of resources: budgets are too small regarding the economic and social weight of the sector, driving to limited impacts on competitiveness, inclusion, diversity, participation and other objectives. A second and strong decoherence is linked to the effects of competitive project-funding: several excluding selection processes are in contradiction with social and aesthetic diversity, and administrative complexity and controllability may be in contradiction with innovation and freedom. The competitive context may also put independent actors in a “demand position” and lead them to “ventriloquism” or “shaped criticism”, in contradiction with democratic values. The multiplication of selection criteria linked to non-prioritized issues to address, to which the answer is merely declarative, without coercive conditions, can also lead to discrepancies, financial opportunism and windfall effects, favoring projects with tokenism logics more than effective respect for values. However, financial opportunism and disguised operating funding may be seen as paradoxical coherences regarding values – enabling long term impacts, and value-related objectives to be achieved despite the negative effects of selection processes. Another type of inconsistency concerns the limited long-term effects of ephemeral project financing. While positive long-term effects have been identified regarding creation of new links between diverse actors, mutual learning, internationalization of careers and "upskilling", most cooperation links do not continue beyond the funding period, and there is a lack of evaluation of the experiments and dissemination of the "good practices" invented, reducing the impact of projects beyond their partners. Similarly, ephemeral funding does not ensure a long-term sustainability of job creation.

Several contradictions also appear between implementation and values. International cooperation, which is effectively implemented with positive effects, is completed at the expense of ecology (multiplying travels), and at the expense of more in-depth actions with more long-term structuring impacts on territories (acting everywhere rather than concentrating efforts). “Diversity” seems to be a “watchword” without content or strategy – the program aims to stimulate the circulation of creation and artists, but the diversity of their aesthetics and audiences is not clearly targeted nor achieved. Within selection processes, “aesthetic blindness” can produce aesthetic discrimination, in favor of the most legitimate styles of cultural production – linked to the levels of institutional structuring of actors, corresponding to the classic cultural policies of democratization - admittedly less and less elitist, but still hierarchical. Diversity is also in tension with competitiveness objectives, favoring the most profitable actors on export markets, at the expense of independent and unprofitable actors, and therefore of aesthetic diversity. In order to achieve the diversity objective, it must be accompanied by a dedicated strategy to ensure a fair distribution of funding.

The democratic debate on values and strategies is fairly limited to inter-institutional negotiations, although the parliament has been able to influence policy evolutions to some extent. Dialogues with the cultural sectors exist, but they are short-lived, rare, and their consequences are difficult to identify. These discussion arenas also lack transparency and representativeness, favoring the largest and most organized actors and creating democratic distortions linked to lobbying. In addition, the competition for access to funding limits the scope for radical criticism. Broader debates with society and citizens do not exist in a truly massive and participative form. A consistent effort must be made to democratize political decision-making, in structured, permanent and representative dialogue with the sectors, and in broadening the dialogue with society.

PART 2. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Introduction

Why do public authorities develop cultural policies? Because they see culture as a value. But the value of culture appears to be a universal answer to questions that are not or are less so. Why is this? Our survey panel provides a well-documented answer. Thirteen in-depth case studies have been carried out in different national contexts, three of them involving the same issues at different levels of public action (national/regional/urban). These national contexts are deemed to reflect different models of cultural policy. In the UK, we have an Anglo-Saxon model based on the principle of action at arm's length, where public authorities, as such, delegate powers to specialist councils. In France and, in some respects, Portugal and Spain, we have the architect's model, which, on the contrary, postulates substantial and direct intervention on the part of the State, through a dedicated administration. With Norway, we have the Nordic model of cultural policy, which relies both on the typical state intervention of the Architect, and on certain Arm's Length principles. With Hungary, we have a model that, inherited from that of the engineer in the Soviet era, is now assumed to be illiberal. Finally, with our focus on the European Union itself, through the analysis of the Europe Creative program, we take an interest in a newcomer to cultural policies. Since history shows that novelty isn't always innovation, we ask whether Europe Creative is innovative in the way it conceives of and promotes culture through public action.

Two hypotheses

Our hypothesis was twofold. On the one hand, we believed that the value of culture, as the foundation of cultural policies, could differ widely from one country to another, from one level of action to another, and even from one sector to another. In other words, the universal value accorded to culture could be matched by specific questions, typical of the contexts in which they were posed. On the other hand, we believed that certain elements of convergence could emerge between these different ways of valuing culture, regardless of context. The hypothesis was then to discuss the coherence of the models or levels to explain how the value of culture underpins policies about it.

Comparison's structure

The comparative synthesis that follows is organized around three subsections, before concluding with a more global comparison and the general lessons we can draw from our analysis, with a view to improving cultural policies.

In the first, we return to the way in which the value of culture is expressed as a basis for cultural policies. We examine both the rhetorical elements that emerge in this regard, and the tensions in the discourse that threaten the coherence attached to the "great principles". The aim is to assess the discursive coherence of the valorization of culture in public policy.

In the second part, we examine the conditions under which these values are concretely implemented. The aim here is to verify that there is coherence between the discourse on values, objectives and actions. These are expressed in the budgetary, organizational and instrumental decisions that lie at the heart of the cultural policy machine. We shall see that the inconsistencies observed have different origins, which it is interesting to analyze and distinguish.

In the third section, we examine the democratic governance of cultural policies and their social accuracy. Thus, we aim to compare how, and to what extent cultural policies are discussed and

negotiated within public institutions, with sectoral cultural actors and with citizens, before questioning how cultural policies are responding to the new values emerging in European societies, as the new environmental, gender and cultural rights issues that have emerged over the last decade, after long being excluded from the principles of cultural valorization in the name of cultural exception.

In the conclusive parts, we change perspectives. Firstly, we move on from the analysis of the valorization of culture to the factors that explain its diversity. What weight does the "model" of cultural policy have in containing the genesis and implementation of these values? Similarly, what weight do territorial and sectoral factors have in demonstrating the differences and convergences between cases? Secondly, we draw global lessons from our observations to question the place of value in cultural policies. Usually, value should be the dimension from which norms are defined, then algorithms, and finally instruments, images and discourses of justification. Is this seemingly Cartesian logical chain really traceable in practice? Should we revisit it, and in some respects reverse it, to give a more realistic and critical picture of the relationship between cultural value and cultural policy? How can we imagine cultural policies with truly democratic values and implementations, and what changes would this mean in practical terms?

1. Cultural value and cultural policy

There is a paradox in the values underlying cultural policies. On the one hand, there is a clear convergence of values, while on the other, their mode of expression is often implicit.

On the one hand, then, these values are fairly clearly identified around three main pillars: aesthetic freedom, access for the greatest number, and the logic of social exchange through culture. Naturally, these major values are expressed in terms that vary from country to country, but they can be compared in terms of meaning and complementarity.

Creative Freedom

The first value of culture is the importance of freedom or autonomy in artistic creation. This is the value closest to what we might call the intrinsic aims of cultural policies. In France, the value of aesthetic freedom can be defined within the republican triptych (Liberté - Égalité - Fraternité) under the heading of liberty. From this stems a series of organizational principles and a philosophy of action. Free creation is thus perceived through the proactive action of public authorities, who are deemed to guarantee this freedom through laws and funding. It distances itself from the economic value of culture, which appears in this scheme as an instrumental consequence of a policy based on the value of creative freedom, and not as an objective in itself. Even in England, a country with a reputation for being less complex about market value, the economy acts as a lever for the development of culture, rather than as a value in itself. It is more in the southern countries (Spain, Portugal) that this valuing of culture by the economy is strongest in discourse. At all levels, it is linked to a dynamic tourism industry, or to external influence, as we shall see later. But the economic spin-offs expected from culture appear more as a rhetorical argument, in defense of the cultural sector, for example, than as the expression of an intrinsic value of culture. The creative freedom can be expressed in another way: as autonomy. This is particularly the case in Norway, where the evidence of freedom acquired through public intervention alone is more debatable. As in the UK, the means of this autonomy, synonymous with freedom, is the establishment of Arts Councils, at a distance from political power, and less severe with regard to the risk of economic than political instrumentalization. In Portugal, as in Spain, this freedom/autonomy is built both on a register of excellence and heritage, and on highly topical debates on the status of the artist. The aim of these normative projects is not only to ensure the artist's social and economic status. It is also to guarantee the means of aesthetic autonomy.

Contrasting cases

From this point of view, a real difference can be heard in two cases that are in many ways opposed: Hungary and the European Union.

In Hungary, where the cultural effort is greater than in most other countries, the value of culture is much more closely defined around the notion of national identity and heritage, with freedom not considered a value in itself in a regime that is precisely assumed to be "illiberal". The instruments derived from this vision of national identity and heritage are much more inspired by control than autonomy. Hungary is thus our first exception to the rule of significant consensus on artistic freedom.

The second exception is the European Union. The Europe Creative program operates on the basis of an avoidance of any fundamental debate about the intrinsic value of culture or cultural policies. This is undoubtedly due to its subsidiary position in the field of cultural policies, which can only be justified in limited and specific niches. This search for the "right niche" explains why the European Union is looking for distinctive elements of value, to justify its (increasing) resources allocated to culture. The European Union is the realm of extrinsic cultural values, opening up more than others to issues of gender, the environment, sustainable development and so on.

Equality

The second major value of cultural policies is established around the notions of access or democratization. In the French triptych, this corresponds to the notion of equality. The process of legitimizing cultural policies goes hand in hand with the idea that excellence, creativity and freedom cannot be the preserve of a single artistic sector or milieu. It must be as close to the people as possible. Here too, the coherence of the value of access runs through all the cases studied, whether it's the value attached to national, regional or local policies, on the one hand, or to the Creative Europe programs, on the other. Secondly, this value of access refers to organizational logics that may differ from one country or level of administration to another. The Norwegian model underscores this by taking a particularly far-reaching view of territorial equity, as illustrated by the example, in Vestland, of support for facilities of excellence even in sparsely populated areas. In the case of France, and in some respects Portugal too, this involves two linked processes. On the one hand, the cultural administration deploys a network of regional or local offices whose mission is to convey the values attached to national policy close to the people. On the other, the State and local and regional authorities are partners in a model of cooperation that is also familiar in Spain. As we shall see in the next section, this cooperative philosophy is not without its tensions. But it is characteristic of a convergence that has gradually been built up, and which has resisted all attempts to call it into question. Take France, for example. Several territorial reforms have attempted to limit the shared competence ("concurrent" competence, to use the Spanish expression) of the different levels of administration in the field of culture, in the name of rationalizing public policies. These attempts have all failed, in favor of maintaining the freedom of intervention of each level, and continuing their cooperation with the State in this field. In Spain, tensions regularly arise over the framework for cooperation between the State and the autonomous communities. But this cooperation remains a sign (in this case, as an alternative to the deployment of a genuine State cultural administration) of the value of social and territorial access to culture.

Here too, the contrast between these countries, on the one hand, and Hungary and the Creative Europe program, on the other, is great. For the former, it's not so much territorial social access as the cooperative system that contrasts with the above. The strong concentration of responsibilities in a small group of national actors, and the control exercised over what is offered under the heading of culture, reduces cooperation between state and local authorities to almost nothing. The latter are

very weakened in terms of public action in general, and cultural action in particular. The value of access comes at the expense of freedom, including the freedom to cooperate.

Contrasting cases

In Europe, this cooperative philosophy of access is understandably limited. Firstly, this is due to the program's limited resources at European Union level. It is also the consequence of the subsidiary nature of culture in European competences. Any cooperative approach would entangle the European administration in an unsustainable system of interdependence. Europe has often been defined as a "power without territory". Culture is a perfect illustration of this. Admittedly, there are relays for this policy, agencies whose mission is to bring European programs closer to the territorial actors who are furthest removed from its codes. But our study shows just how wide the gap remains between a relatively small number of actors who have mastered the codes and methods of recognition, and the great mass of others who fail, if they don't give up even before making the attempt. But if the value of culture is combined with the value of access, the fundamental challenge remains for Europe Creative. This partly explains the ease with which the program embraces the new values emerging in contemporary society around the notions of diversity, participation and inclusion. They can be read as an alternative way of consecrating the value of access, by privileging social or societal entry points over territorial ones. In some respects, this is also the case for cultural policies in the UK.

In the case of Arts Council England, as in most other countries, the value of equality is today in tension between the ability to access (culture) and the ability to express lived cultures. This internal tension between democratization and cultural democracy is assumed to a greater or lesser extent within institutions: rather less so in large institutions and ministries than in territorial projects and local and regional authorities. It is a tension between aesthetic and democratic values, as we shall see later.

On the other hand, this value of equal access, which presupposes an even more global belief in the value of culture, is today reconfigured by the new values emerging within societies in the name of gender issues, ecological transition, cultural rights and participation or inclusion, precisely those on which the Europe Creative program is based. Having long focused on two dimensions (social and territorial), the value of access is seeing its spectrum extended, and with it the risks of inconsistency in implementation. As the sources and criteria of equal access do not necessarily overlap, they can give rise to competition between exclusionary principles, unresolved by the still rather rhetorical notion of intersectionality. These new values are also at the heart of the third major value of culture for cultural policies.

Bildung

This third value of culture lies in its ability to build society. What does this mean? In Norway, this value is expressed through the idea - *bildung* - that culture has a civilizing capacity, through participation and cultural practices, at both individual and societal levels. This value, inherited from German Romanticism, implies that culture contributes to well-being, which in these very terms is akin to the classic definition of the welfare state. But the notion of well-being focuses less on the individual than on social relations. Hence, in Norway, the importance attached to volunteering is the value of culture in action. In France, the importance of associative life in cultural development is comparable. More generally, this social dimension of well-being through culture corresponds to the third element of the triptych: fraternity. At a level that remains general, fraternity through culture corresponds fairly well to the German-Norwegian *bildung*: making society or civilization.

Of the three great values of culture on which cultural policies are based, this is undoubtedly the one that rests on the highest belief in the virtues of culture. At the same time, it is the one in whose name

the cultural policy system is often criticized for its lack of popular recognition, inclusivity, respect for different social and territorial forms, and equality. Bildung functions as a vaccine against cultural conservatism. However, it expresses itself differently in different countries and at different levels. Here again, the case of Hungary stands out from the rest, insofar as the content of bildung differs from that observed in other countries and on a European scale. Here, the "constructivist" nature of culture is used to create a highly homogeneous content and civic identity, with a strong emphasis on reinventing tradition and community mythology. Elsewhere, creating a society through culture implies, on the contrary, encouraging the expression and exchange of diverse cultures, at least on the scale we're concerned with here: discursive coherence. In fact, we can support the hypothesis that the "national" value accorded to Hungarian culture is not totally opposed to certain trends observed in other countries, from the standpoint of sovereignty, international influence, or even the economic valorization of culture. The orientation of certain cultural policies, notably those linked to international cultural exchanges or heritage enhancement, is directly linked to this sovereignist vision of culture. In this respect, the promotion of the "Marca España" is similar to that of heritage in Portugal, and that of French culture in international exchanges, as well as the promotion, through culture, of the English brand image. But the content of this soft power through culture, which for a long time served to homogenize national cultures, has given way to the valorization of the diversity of what a country's culture refers to. Thus, in parallel with the promotion of the "Brand España", Galicia's cultural policies emphasize the capacity of culture to create or reinforce the brand image of the autonomous region, and to promote it on an international scale, while the city of Barcelona is one of the world's pioneering metropolises in its cultural branding strategy. Everywhere, "the" national culture has been more or less transformed into "cultures within a country", as illustrated by the shift, in France, from the notion of "French culture" to "cultures of France". That's why Hungary is the exception in our panel of cases.

Implicit values

To conclude this comparative panorama, and before turning to the subject at hand, we should mention two observations that we will take up in greater depth in Part 4 of this report.

Firstly, as we have already indicated, values are most often expressed implicitly. All the people we spoke to expressed a certain difficulty in considering the notion of value independently of cultural policy objectives. It was only by going through these objectives that it was possible to express the values to which they refer. This raises the question of whether the logical sequence from values to norms, then to objectives, and finally to instruments and discourse, should not be called into question. In some respects, values are presented more as a posteriori rhetorical justifications for public policy objectives, rather than as a priori references. In the normal course of cultural policies, reference to values is rare, or incantatory. There is no real debate in the milieu, in corporate negotiations or parliamentary controversies about the value of culture. There are two exceptions to this observation. The first concerns the fundamental questioning of the value of culture on the occasion of the Covid-19 pandemic. Whatever the government's approach to culture, the sudden closure of most cultural venues and events prompted people to question the meaning and social value of culture in an unprecedented way. The second exception, also event-driven, is more focused: Montpellier's bid to become European Capital of Culture in 2028. As we have seen, this bid has led stakeholders to question the value of the culture at stake in this mobilization, from the point of view of artistic content, territory and civilizing capacities. In order for the valorization of culture to be explicit, the normal course of cultural policies must be interrupted, which is, by definition, very rare.

Hierarchies and Tensions

Secondly, while values are generally presented as "autotelic", with no hierarchical dependence on any

other instance, what happens when we highlight three major values of culture? A simple solution, often expressed in our interviews, would be to consider them as complementary and mutually reinforcing: aesthetic freedom takes on its full meaning in access to the greatest number, which would be the guarantee of societal well-being. We shall see that this model of complementary values does not stand up to scrutiny in practice. First of all, these three values are not only complicit, they are rivals. Aesthetic freedom can conflict with territorial or social access, or with the civilizing capacity of culture. Interviews by level, or illustrations given in the music sector, show such tensions. If national levels often privilege freedom, it's because it best justifies the existence of national sectoral institutions and policy objectives. If territorial levels put more emphasis on the logics of access and well-being, it's because they are more directly constrained by their space of legitimization, which is less sectoral than territorial. Because values are not purely theoretical constructs but resources linked to interests, and therefore power relations, they cannot simply be described as complicit or complementary.

This is so true that there are also tensions in the way a value is appropriated by different actors within the same level of cultural policy, or different actors within the same sector. This is clearly seen in the case of Spain, with changes affecting the reference value depending on whether the government is right-wing or center-left. In the former case, excellence and the market value of culture become ends in themselves, while in the latter, they are values only on condition that they are at the service of territorial cohesion, in which public authorities play a leading role. This same political tension can be seen in the promotion of culture in Portugal. Within the same sector, the case of French music policy is emblematic of the tensions that exist between the Ministry and the Centre National de la Musique, which is nevertheless its specialized operator for the music industry. Aesthetic freedom certainly remains the shared reference point, but it refers to two differing visions of the economy: on the one hand, legitimate support goes to projects that could not be sustained in a market logic, in the name of aesthetic value; on the other hand, legitimate support goes to projects that present a potential for valorization within an economic sector, regardless of their aesthetic value.

There is thus a hermeneutic of the value of culture, which is never given in advance, but is constructed and evolves according to the balance of power between actors and the assertion of new values within societies.

Public policies are always based on two pillars: legitimacy and efficiency (Capano, Howlett, Pal & Ramesh 2023). Values seem to be on the side of legitimacy. They embody what the public actor is democratically mandated to do, and in the name of which he intervenes in culture, as in other domains. The kind of orientation may vary greatly according to national cultures, their type of inter-level governance, and the levels of government themselves. However, beyond the legitimacy to act, the value of public action lies in its efficiency, i.e. the quality of the "means/objectives" couple it implements. In this respect, the major values we have identified around creative freedom, social and territorial access and "bildung" are most often accompanied by an attempt to economically valorize the culture of cultural policies. Interestingly, this valorisation - which is everywhere a means of justifying public action on grounds other than the social, political or aesthetic dimension - is especially present in countries where the legitimacy of cultural action is most debated. In Spain, it is debated in terms of the State's vocation in a plurinational society. In Portugal, the historical presence of private foundations plays an influential role in the production of public cultural assets. On a European scale, the creative economy serves to justify a policy that is otherwise considered subsidiary. Are there, then, two "Europes": that of legitimate cultural policies, where key values are affirmed, with tensions and nuances, at every level of government; and that of cultural policies in search of legitimacy, which resort to the rhetoric of efficiency, particularly economic efficiency, to justify their place?

This opposition between two Europes is unsatisfactory. On the one hand, it excessively homogenizes national contexts, and the major differences that can exist between national, regional and local levels. On the other hand, and above all, it fails to take account of a general tendency in cultural policies to avoid the question of the aims of action (and therefore of the values on which it is based), in order to concentrate on the question of means, instruments, tactical and strategic objectives. This crisis of political ends extends far beyond the perimeter of cultural policies, to be one of the indicators of a more general erosion of democracy in Western countries (Snyder 2018).

2. Implementation coherence

In this section, we are mainly using the distinction between three levels of government as the vantage point for comparing implementation coherence across different cases and countries.

Main implementation strategies

Local level

The political and administrative organization differs in size and structure in the three analyzed cities. Bergen and Barcelona have well-developed political and bureaucratic structures for policy implementation, while Montpellier has a less comprehensive administration, which makes implementation more challenging.

As one of few Norwegian municipalities, Bergen has introduced parliamentary governance. The motivations for introducing parliamentary local governance in Bergen were to strengthen the role of the elected officials and obtain a more evident political local governance, make more holistic assessments, and contribute to a clearer structure of political responsibility (Ølberg 2018). Still, the implementation of cultural policy is done very much “in-house” and “hands-on” due to a well-organized bureaucratic system divided into two authority levels. In contrast, Montpellier seems to have a less developed bureaucratic structure at the local level, and the politicians are thus the principal actors together with the major institutions. In Montpellier, governance seems to be done primarily through the elected representatives’ appointments of managers for the large institutions. These appointments are not necessarily followed by mandates describing the political expectations. It seems thus to be more challenging to ensure policy implementation within the Montpellier system than within the Bergen system. In the Barcelona system, there is, as in Bergen, a well-developed bureaucratic structure. The local cultural administration has taken on the role of facilitating and coordinating the cooperation between institutions and non-state actors. But it seems that the local cultural administration has a limited role in implementation compared to what is the case in Bergen.

In Barcelona, political color has a certain impact on cultural policy and the implementation of it. This seems to be the case also in Montpellier because the administration plays a minor role in this context. In Bergen, it seems that political ideology is not that important when it comes to cultural policy making and implementation. In Bergen, and Norway more generally, despite some small differences in prioritization between parties, cultural policy seems to be more consensus-driven and not that dependent on whether governance is done by the left or right wing of politics.

Regional level

The level of systematic planning differs in the three regions studied. In Occitania (France) and Vestland (Norway), the regional systems for implementation of cultural policies and schemes are working in accordance with what is desired, while Galicia seems to lack systematic strategies or planning.

In Occitanie, the regional bureaucracy's policy implementation is supplemented by three agencies, responsible for performing arts, literature, and cultural and creative industries. In Vestland, this work is carried out in house in the regional administration by regional bureaucrats. In Galicia, policies are centered around orange industry, tourism, and heritage, and carried out in house in regional administration.

The level of cooperation between the regional level and other government/governance levels (state, municipality) varies between the three regions. In France, we find an interesting ambiguity in governance as the state level holds a very central role in implementing cultural policies also regionally, as part of a long-standing decentralization/deconcentration tradition. At the same time, new (newly merged), bigger and (assumedly) stronger regions have a growing ambition to implement policies in accordance with their regional needs. Also in Norway you find some ambiguity in the relation between the Vestland region and the state, one that assumedly includes other counties than Vestland alone. This ambiguity resides in that at one side we find a very streamlined national cultural policy and implementation strategy across the different governance levels, and on the other, a very asymmetric status profile between especially state and region (but also between region and large city municipalities like Bergen). In Galicia, it seems, the most direct factor regulating the relationship between different levels of governance relates to which party is in charge politically at each level. Evidently, the difference in cultural policy objectives and values between for example centre-left and centre-right in Spain is larger than in for example Norway, with France being perhaps more similar to Spain than to Norway. Hence, in Norway the cultural policy implementation would be less affected by two different political parties with different ideologies being in charge on different levels than in the other two countries.

In terms of objectives, Galicia in Spain stands out with a broad focus on so-called "orange tourism" and economy and identity policies (including language policies), whereas Occitania and Vestland in France and Norway respectively focus more on cultural institutions and artist policies per se. In the latter two cases, funding is allocated for both long-term support (institutions) and project support (institutions and artists/cultural workers). One thus may assume that Galicia relates more than the other two regions to a policy profile or model that emphasizes cultural heritage and identity, as part of a strategy that sustains an overarching, national policy designed for growth in the tourism industry. It seems, this agenda – i.e., for example artist policy being part of a strategy to strengthen orange tourism/industries – could appear in Norway and France too, but then more indirect and implicit (even disguised) and surely presented as a spill-over-effect more than a primary goal.

National level

The countries included in this study (Spain, Hungary, Portugal, England, France and Norway) represent different cultural policy models, whether one choose to use the model framework of Cummings and Katz (1987), Hilman-Chartrand and McCaughey (1989), Zimmer and Toepler (1996), or any other attempts to systematize differences in national cultural policies). Therefore, it is of no surprise that the national level of these countries implements their cultural policies and their cultural policy values rather differently. This has to do with the distribution of responsibility between the state and the market on the one hand, and between different levels of government, on the other hand, as illustrated

above.

All countries rely on different public bodies to implement their cultural policies, while their relative importance, power and responsibility vary greatly. In France, a rather wide range of national directorates, delegations, centres, and institutions play a central role, as well as ministerial offices for cultural affairs in the regions. In England and Norway, the arms' length bodies Arts Council England and Arts Council Norway (recently renamed Arts and Culture Norway) are implementing essential parts of cultural policy on a national level. In Hungary, the Ministry of Culture and Innovation, together with the Hungarian Academy of Art (MMA) and the National Council for Culture are the central national entities. The Hungarian example represents, however, a considerable shortening of the arms' length of these public bodies, following a centralist, interventionist, and discretionary illiberal model.

Regarding the priorities within funding, there is an evident difference between some of the countries. Heritage seems to be a (state) priority for countries like Spain, Portugal, and France, partly because this sector is also closely linked to tourism, which is of immense importance in these countries. It seems also to be a priority for Hungary, but for more ideological reasons, to invoke and foster a national identity. The heritage sector is less of an obvious priority for England and Norway.

On a superficial level, the national implementation in the different countries seems to reflect the cultural policy model these countries have been referred to. While England and Norway seem to exemplify the patron state in the typology of Hilman-Chartrand and McCaughey (1989), France is closer to the role of architect. The outlier among our cases, Hungary, might be said to have moved in the direction of engineer, in the mentioned model. However, other comparative differences seem to be more relevant, e.g. regarding cultural policy stability. There are considerable differences between the six countries regarding the stability of their cultural policies, as some of them seem to be very much affected by political/ideological or economic changes. In the case of Hungary, the right-wing government of Viktor Orbán has changed the nature of cultural policy after 2010. The main cultural policy objectives in Hungary seem to be to strengthen and preserve the cultural basis of the Hungarian nation, such as the language, heritage and monuments. The primary value, consequently, is national identity. In Spain, the changing administrations between conservative/right-wing and left-wing governments have clearly affected objectives and the implementation of cultural policy. It seems that in the other countries, Portugal, England, Norway and France – both the general cultural policy system and the implementation of actual policies, is less inclined to be affected by party politics.

Another difference between the implementation of cultural policy in these countries, is the way financial aspects have been affecting the realization of cultural policy. In some countries, like in Spain, both the financial crisis, cuts, and downsizing (whether legitimated by austerity or ideology), have had a considerable impact on the policies implemented. On another end of the spectrum, we have Norway, where the overall cultural budget has been steadily increasing over the last two or three decades, with no financial setbacks during this period.

Coherencies and incoherences

Local level

In Bergen, we can identify a high degree of coherence between the local policy objectives and the value clusters they can be associated with, on the one hand, and the budget priorities and actions, on the other hand. This is the case in music policy as well as in cultural policy in general. In contrast, Montpellier seems to lack a bureaucratic structure and instruments for implementation, which creates incoherences between values on the one hand and the actions carried out on the other hand. The weakness of the horizontal, individualized policy is that it introduces a logic of cultural action

management by sector or major aesthetic field, which does not necessarily correspond to the reality experienced by actors in the cultural sector, particularly from the voluntary sector, who operate according to a more cross-functional, multi-disciplinary logic. Because of this, it is challenging to implement projects and events which are more cross-aesthetic. In Barcelona, there is a general coherence between value clusters and implemented actions. An exception was the period 2011–2015, where economic (market oriented) values and aesthetic (artistic excellence) values were the communicated values on a discursive level, while the actions carried out were mostly connected to economic values, such as tourism development.

The analysis of Montpellier demonstrates an inertia in the system that makes it challenging to implement measures corresponding to emerging values. At this point, Barcelona seems to be more capable of governing in line with emerging values. An example is the changes in budget allocations in 2016, in which budgets for measures reflecting economic value clusters were downsized and budgets for measures reflecting sustainability and democratic value clusters were increased. In Bergen, emerging values of diversity and democratization are transformed into political action, while environmental sustainability still is given very little impact. In France the inertia seems to be connected to the organization of actors and instruments, while in Norway it seems to be linked to an attitude among politicians and bureaucrats saying that the cultural sector is inherently eco-friendly. Certain incoherences can also be identified as a result of a lack of resources, at least this is the case in Montpellier and Bergen.

Regional level

The first identifiable inconsistency in implementing regional cultural policy is budgetary. All three regions do not have funding to follow up objectives. This even includes Norway and Vestland, even if the economy here is much better than the European average. However, both Galicia and (in particular) Occitania face problems as funding is cut back. The result is that several institutions, projects and programmes are not able to fulfill the aims uttered in policy objectives and plans. In the case of Occitania, it also means that established bodies of implementation and governance, more specifically, the three agencies for, respectively, performing arts (Occitanie en scene), literature (Occitanie livre et lecture) and cultural and creative industries (Occitanie film), are forced to merge, reduce or, worse, to terminate their activities.

In Spain, the prioritization of heritage and identity, as mentioned above, is not free of tensions. For example, one can conclude that the policies do not meet contextual demands, e.g., cultural policies designed for rural areas. As the government, mixing regionalism and entrepreneurship, exploits Galicia's large-scale cultural facilities as pathways for economic growth and place branding, this happens at the expense of cultural democratization and grassroots activities. As such exploitation takes place to a much lesser degree in Occitania and Vestland, the same incoherence is not detectable here.

While the Vestland case offers a study in how rhetoric about the green transition and UD's SDGs fades out when meeting cultural street level practice, this aspect is not even apparent in the other two cases. Sustainability and the green transition are not matters of incoherence, simply because they seem missing as objectives in regional European cultural policy. So, then one finds a wicked dilemma: what is worse, to not be capable of following up noble intentions or to not have such intentions at all?

National level

Comparing implementation coherence at a national level, there is an evident feature: every single of

the seven national cases exhibits different combinations of coherency and incoherency between acknowledged cultural policy values on the one hand and actual policy implementation on the other. There is, however, considerable differences in the level of coherency.

At a principal, programmatic level, there are rather high degrees of value coherency in most countries. In France, e.g., all major programmes might be related to the three key values of freedom (aesthetic, economic); equality (access, sovereignty); fraternity (diversity, cooperation). Similarly, in the Norwegian Ministry of Culture and Arts Council England, we find a high level of programmatic coherency. In other words: the cultural policies agree with themselves. Looking more closely at policy implementation in the different national cases, there are different kinds of incoherencies appearing. At one level, as in France, there is a certain incoherency between the priority of the basic values – as they are not of equal importance in practical politics. Furthermore, there are also, as in Norway and France, competing interpretations of one and the same value, e.g. the values of freedom and /or autonomy.

The differing interpretation of values can be explained by ideological and political divisions. Ideology and party politics also seem to affect the level of coherency/incoherency, but to a very different degree in our cases. In Spain, there is a detectable difference between a right-wing and left-wing national administration during the last decade, with the latter showing a higher degree of coherence. However, this might partly be explained by the financial leeway provided by COVID-19 funds. In Hungary, the ideology of the conservative/nationalist administration explains the high level of coherence between the explicit value of national identity and cultural policy priorities. At the same time, there are considerable incoherencies between other explicit values, like diversity and autonomy, and the actual implementation of policy.

Another pattern discernible in several countries, is that different sectors of policy might be exhibiting different levels of coherence. In Portugal, e.g., the cultural budget is most coherent for performing arts, while the policy heritage sector much less so. An evident explanation for some of the incoherencies, like this one, is that resources are limited, and sometimes increasingly so. The most evident incoherency is thus between what the different cultural policies state in principle and the funds that are prioritized or available to translate the principles to practical politics.

In general, we can identify at least three evident external drivers of coherence/incoherence: economy, formal organization, political ideology. These three can, to different degrees, explain the observed coherencies and incoherencies in the different cases. We also think it relevant to point to another principal incoherency – between policy principles and political practice. Politics is extremely pragmatic by nature, which includes compromises, negotiations and logrolling on a day-to-day basis. This will, necessarily, affect the level of coherency between programmatic values and actual cultural policy implementation.

3. Governance and accuracy

Governance relations and democratic openness

Sociology approaches governance by stressing the social, cultural, political and historical factors that shape the structures and forms of social relations that give rise to certain governance patterns, considering their multilevel character. Understanding the logic of action as well as the agency capacity of the actors (social, public and market) involved in a given governance structure in order to maintain or change social and power relations is a key issue from the point of view of the neo-weberian tradition of governance (Le Galès, 2002). This perspective, which emphasizes the historical and cultural

dimension of governance, guides us in examining the way in which a diversity of actors establishes different forms of coordination (crossed by values, contradictions and uneven social and power relations) aimed at governing cultural policy at different administrative levels. Taking these governance characteristics into account, we organized the analysis in three axes: (1) governance structure and instruments of participation; (2) forms of participatory inclusion and exclusion that operate in governance structures; (3) predominant governance dynamics that give rise to greater participation of state bureaucracy actors, social or market actors, and regulate more open or close democratic schemes to citizens.

From participation to exclusion in local cultural governance: Bergen, Montpellier and Barcelona

The local level has been considered a privileged space for participatory governance, even with more or less degrees and levels of institutionalization. In relation to this, citizen participation in culture has been promoted in the cases of Barcelona and Bergen. In Barcelona, the broadening of participation mechanisms, which have been extended to the design and evaluation of cultural policies, results from a demand by citizens and cultural associations. In Bergen, there is a consolidated institutional participatory architecture that integrates committees and councils to promote active participation among citizens and cultural organizations. In contrast, in the case of Montpellier, participatory instruments are restrictive for decision-making. This configures a cultural governance that is not very permeable to the citizenry.

The dynamics of exclusion in Montpellier operate through the lack of availability of resources that mainly affects the working class, which tends to be disaffected in relation to culture. Barcelona has shown a shift towards inclusion since 2015 concerning participation. The primary efforts in this regard have taken the form of promoting cultural decentralization (facilities, events) and forums to include the voice of citizens in deliberations and decisions about culture at the city and neighborhood levels. In the case of Bergen, inclusion is oriented towards the values of diversity and equality, which entails the existence of various participatory instruments such as sectoral debate channels.

With regard to governance dynamics, except in the city of Montpellier, where a top-down dynamic predominates (when it is bottom-up, it comes from private actors), the other two cases (Barcelona and Bergen) show an inverse trend. Barcelona has, in recent years, promoted a bottom-up dynamic in the governance of cultural services and programs, while Bergen has integrated actions related to the environment and sustainability that come from bottom-up demands.

Managing limited participation in regional cultural governance

The three cases at the regional level show less participatory intensity. In the case of Galicia, the existing forms of participation do not have the capacity to incorporate modifications in the established configuration of values. Galicia also shows a low representation of stakeholders and the forms of exclusion in relation to social actors operate through a policy based on corporate and economic values.

The Occitan cultural administration is also limited in terms of participation since it focuses on consultative mechanisms that end up fostering a “club effect”¹⁴⁴ (mechanisms that de facto tend to

¹⁴⁴ Here, we follow the definition by Bourdieu (1999), who defined it as a process that sets barriers according to economic, cultural, and social capital. In public policies, this may “favors the construction of homogeneous groups on a spatial basis” (Bourdieu, 1999: 129).

exclude). The divergent approach is provided by the case of Vestland County, which places participation in the paradigm of proximity. However, this approach is in tension with the arm's length principles. Together with this, the value of transparency and the availability of information to citizens operate as a mechanism of inclusion and democratic openness in the case of Vestland County.

In relation to bottom up and top down governance dynamics, we see differences between the cases. The Galician administration is dominated by a top-down dynamic articulated to European level policies but shows greater autonomy from a multilevel point of view than Vestland County and Occitania. Unlike Galicia, the Vestland County administration shows a greater capacity to integrate the demands coming from below through institutional channels. However, a certain tendency towards corporatism may limit democratic permeability. The Occitan case is characterized by complexity in governance that involves the president and his cabinet, the vice-president, members of the culture committee, technicians, etc. The dynamics tend towards bureaucratization while the governance model seeks autonomy from the central level of cultural administration.

The challenge of inclusion in central governments' cultural governance

As we move up the government levels, participation mechanisms tend to decrease in intensity. In the six cases studied, we observed weak institutional mechanisms for participation. In Portugal, for example, the presence of private actors as the main partners in the deployment of cultural policy limits citizen participation and the democratic openness of institutions at all levels. In Norway, the mechanisms are also limited and there is a tendency to elitize participation, which is reflected in cultural consumption. The Hungarian case is the least permeable to participation and tends to exclude non-state actors. It is a corporatist model of participation that fosters a club effect.

The above levels of social intervention related to different cultural policy models and instruments. The participatory model of the Spanish central cultural administration includes public hearings and public debate of laws. These are also mechanisms that do not contemplate the voice of the citizenry as a binding element. In the case of France, the restrictions are linked to the cultural sector: the mechanisms for dialogue and consultation are limited to representatives of the sector. The Arts Council of the United Kingdom, fundamentally, implements measures that derive from decisions on a larger scale, that of the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport. However, this model is comparatively more open to deliberation than the previous ones.

In the Portuguese case, the dynamics of exclusion of citizens and cultural associations from participation are related to inequalities in the distribution of economic resources between actors and between levels of government, as well as to the power exercised by large private actors in cultural policy (who do have the capacity to influence government action). Both Portugal and France share the capacity of the major actors involved in cultural policy to impose their interests and exercise their power. Inclusion in this case is given by support for policies of access to culture.

In the Norwegian case, it is the arms' length model that potentially affects direct inclusion in the forms of participation. The Hungarian case shows forms of exclusion from cultural participation associated with the lack of representation of groups that oppose conservative values that curtail the right to diversity (e.g. LGBTBI+ sexual diversity). In the Spanish case, inclusion in cultural participation is implemented through actions aimed at specific groups (i.e. the elderly). Finally, the UK-Arts Council includes the voice of stakeholders in cultural policy making in a more forceful way through mechanisms designed for this purpose.

Overall, governance dynamics in all cases tend to be top-down. In the Portuguese case, bottom-up dynamics are framed in a neoliberalized administrative model based on economic values and efficiency, but not on democratic openness. On the other hand, there is a conflicting relationship

between levels of governance due to the unequal distribution of resources and competencies. Norway also promotes top-down dynamics, although in a framework of openness to stakeholders (agencies, communities).

In the Spanish case, there are limits to the participation of cultural organizations and the regional level in a framework that tends to top-down dynamics. Agencies (such as the National Institute of Performing Arts and Music) have a certain autonomy to implement top-down policies. In France, the lack of democratic openness can be associated with the fragmentation of bottom-up initiatives and hierarchical relations between central level actors and sub-state actors who seek to differentiate their roles vis-à-vis the central level (i.e. work in rural areas).

Finally, the two cases that show a greater counterpoint underline divergences in the dynamics and articulation of levels of government and non-state actors. On the one hand, in Hungary, where top-down dynamics dominate, we see ritual forms of participation and a bureaucratic integration of demands from below. On the other hand, in the case of the UK-Arts Council, regional levels have been gaining political capacity to act vis-à-vis the central government, which has introduced changes in the power relations of governance.

Creative Europe: a top down cultural governance under the principle of subsidiarity

Creative Europe shows, as other scales (central) little room for deliberation and negotiation that is not open to stakeholders. We also observe that there is an unequal capacity to influence policy action and policy actors (officials, MEPs) between those stakeholders with access to information and financial support from the European Union versus those who are excluded from these resources. These inequalities stimulate dynamics of exclusion and hierarchical relationships. In relation to governance dynamics, there is a predominance of top-down actions (as at the state and regional level) and the dynamics of competitiveness for resources structure governance relations (in a similar direction as in Portugal).

Table 1. Governance and social accuracy summary table

Case	Galicia	Vestland county	Occitanie	Portugal-Ministry	Norway-Ministry	Hungary-Ministry	UK- Arts council	Spain-Ministry	France-Ministry	Barcelona	Bergen	Montpellier	Creative Europe
Level	Regional			Central						Local			Supranational - EU
Emerging values	Access to culture, economic development (tourism)	Transparency, accountability	Heritage and cultural and creative industries	Increasing focus on diversity, social representation	Equity, arms' length principle, professionalization	National culture, artistic excellence	Sustainability , equality, and creativity- public value of culture	Socio-economic development, participation	Cultural democracy, artistic excellence	Democratization and decommodification	Equality, transparency, accountability, sustainability	Cultural heritage, economic value, cultural rights, diversity, participation, territorial equality	Subsidiarity- Democratic consensus
Participation	Ritualistic and with limited capacity to modify value framing	Based on proximity- in tension with the arm's length principle	Limited participation through consultations (club effect)	Local and corporate demands for more participation	Participation mechanisms are in place but limited- Potential elitization of cultural policies/consumption	Very limited- Club and corporate effect	Active involvement of stakeholders in policy design	Based on public audiences, public debate of laws	Dialogue and consultation with sectoral representatives	Integration of demands in various policy phases (design, implementation and evaluation)	Active participation of citizens and cultural organizations through institutional mechanisms (Committees, Councils)	Limited participation in policy design- disaffection of audiences in working-class areas	Very limited participation- negotiations are not public nor open to stakeholders / but specific dialogue devices
Inclusion/exclusion dynamics	Limited representation, focus on branding- Exclusion based on corporate and economic arrangements	Limited tensions between stakeholders together with common social capital	Institutional mechanisms for participation (such as Culture Committee)	Openness to listening to the sectors	Arms' length approach potentially affecting direct interventions (tension)	Lack of representation of groups confronting conservative values (LGTB, etc.)	–	Inclusion policies based on cultural access focusing on protected groups, i.e. the elderly-	More capacity to impose interest and power relations by "big players"- It coexists with new public policies aimed at supporting access	Inclusion through direct and indirect mechanisms (i.e. associations)	Focus on protected groups from a diversity and equality framing	Partisan consensus around the local cultural policy project- main demands from cultural organizations concern budget distribution	Excluded actors sharing lack of knowledge and capacity to deal with a lack of access to EU public funding (i.e. wealthiest players can influence certain senior civil servants or MPs)

Cultural policy model-ideological grounds	Conservative/religious/entrepreneurial representation of the region. Nation building/branding approach	Social-democratic model	Central-architect model-weak tension with emerging power of far right far-right Rassemblement National	Centre-left model with increasing capacity of intervention (budget, projects, etc.)	Communitarian- nordic model of cultural policies	Central architect and conservative model (illiberal)	Arm's length approach dominated	Centrist-social democratic approach	Architect model-centralized	Tension in governing coalition between "commons" and social democratic approaches	Social-democratic-with both right and left parties parliamentary intervention	Cultural democracy oriented (not really ! more democratization, big institutions with "high profiles", not a "demand policy", more top down)	Focused on resources allocation and MS coordination / "liberal" domination but coexisting with democratic values
Top down and bottom up governance	Mostly top down and with direct impact of EU level in regional policies + autonomy in the multilevel system than Vestland and Occitanie	Integration of bottom up demands through institutional channels- still corporatism may limit open participation-dealing with state and local level tensions	Complex governance. Seeking further autonomy from the state model of cultural policy-bureaucratic relationship with central gov	Trend from top-down and corporate structure to new spaces for participation-historical bottom up demands	Mostly top-down but open to other stakeholders (agencies, communities , etc.) intervention	Top down dominated, but with ritualistic methods of participation - bureaucratic reception of demands	ACE implementing DCMS policies but opening participation channels	Limited intervention of cultural organizations and other governments (i.e. autonomous communities) - agencies (INAEM) implementing top down policies with relative autonomy	Fragmentation and hierarchization tends to favour limited bottom up intervention-Local and other substate actors further differentiating their role from the state level (i.e. work in rural areas)	Active promotion of bottom up dynamics	Integration of bottom up demands, for instance concerning environmentalism	Bottom up demands mostly concern private actors	Top down dominated

Social accuracy

Social accuracy is defined in this comparative analysis as the relative capacity of local, regional or national cultural policies to represent dominant value hierarchies within their specific fields of action. Such a value configuration mirrors and is embodied in social demands, cultural sectors' interests or above-outlined bottom-up cultural dynamics and needs. As Dubois has pointed out, a complex interrelationship exists between cultural policy design and frameworks and dominant ideas and values circulating in society (Dubois, 2008). Bourdieu's theory on social inequality, for instance, generally permeated French cultural policy philosophy, which was further oriented towards tackling inequalities and citizens' pre-existing cultural dispositions crossed by economic and social positions in society (Dubois, 2011: 11). Still, as we saw above, the long term effects of this philosophy in terms of cultural policy implementation have been limited. Along the same lines, since the 90s, cultural policies in many central and northern European countries have moved towards increasing recognition of the cultural rights of minorities (Saukkonen, 2014).

The above approaches to social accuracy have been questioned in the last decade from different perspectives, which include policies aimed at recognizing multiculturalism or the rights of minorities. One example of political and theoretical projects against it include critical claims regarding the unexpected effects of policies of "recognition" carried under multiculturalist strategies, administrations seeking further economic liberalization of this policy field or the increasing intervention of neo-authoritarian governments in Europe (Bonet and Zamorano, 2021; Malik, 2015; Kymlicka, 2012). However, we may say that representing the plurality of values and socio-economic conditions existing in society remains a core goal of contemporary cultural policies. Therefore, from a democratic and welfare state policy perspective, the social accuracy of cultural policies can be seen as both a legitimate purpose and a challenge to be compatibilized with expected social transformations to be favored by such policies. For instance, possible transitions from a more conservative to a more liberal understanding of society's pluralism representing LGBT+ or other communities' rights are placed under this umbrella. Such prescriptive concepts are often embedded into policy programs, design, implementation and evaluation.

Local cultural policies social accuracy: democratization and new constitutive perspectives

At the local level, equality, democratization of cultural practices and cultural rights are transversal values to the three addressed cities: Bergen, Barcelona and Montpellier. As mentioned above, specific goals and values associated with these value principles are more or less present or underlined, such as Barcelona's decommodification or Montpellier's cultural heritage. In terms of social accuracy enablers, Bergen and Barcelona have active different mechanisms and programs to stimulate bottom-up intervention and participation in cultural policies. Among other things, these strategies are specifically aimed at supporting better capturing value plurality in their fields of action, ranging from gender to environmental issues. Montpellier is instead characterized by more sound claims against a limited representation of cultural actors in policy design, including aspects such as resource distribution. Coalitions in government negotiated the above values, mainly with an inclusive constitutive framework as the general horizon.

Regional cultural policies and the national articulation of value building: Galicia, Occitanie and Vestland

At the regional level, the policy's constitutive basis seems to remain aligned with national models. In Galicia, the constitutive basis of cultural policies matches the traditional centre-right Party orientation

in the field in Spain, based on a conservative, religious and entrepreneurial representation of the region. Instead, the Vestland social-democratic model and the Occitanie central-architect model - although tension by the emerging power of far-right far-right Rassemblement National- are better aligned with the pluralist national cultural policy orientation.

The above differential role of value driver of cultural policy is reflected in differential and common policy making. For example, heritage and cultural branding policies backing socioeconomic development strategies seem to be particularly relevant for value hierarchies guiding cultural policies in all cases. Still, some particularities must be noted. Firstly, the alignment of core values such as transparency and accountability in Vestland with the central government. Secondly, forms of governance and participation seem to contribute poorly to facilitating dynamics around cultural policy's social representation. On the one hand, Vestland is dominated by the national principle of arm's length, limiting actors' direct intervention in policy design but still allowing bottom-up dynamics. On the other hand, Galicia and Occitanie entail a more ritualistic form of participation or captured by corporate dynamics, respectively. In the French case, the ongoing demand for further regional autonomy with respect to the central government may facilitate a better capturing of components such as regional identity and socio-cultural development.

Central governments addressing value plurality: five models

The five central government cases we have examined show an understanding of cultural policy' constitutive values and goals aligned with their cultural policy models (architect, Nordic and liberal), except for the Hungarian illiberal orientation. Therefore, artistic excellence, access to culture, the defense of national culture and equity appear as key explicit components of cultural programs and officials' claims in all cases. However, the current direction of such policies following such models reveals various implementation forms. Differences in this regard range from strategic approaches to managing public resources under arm's length in Norway and the UK to more cultural democracy-oriented operationalization in Spain and the implementation of policies under the cultural democratization paradigm in France. Moreover, normativity is transversally crossed by values clearly distinguishing these policies, where nationalism is seen from a more homogeneous perspective in Hungary, and direct state intervention in enabling value plurality is less expected or possible in Hungary and the UK.

In terms of policy implementation, the ways socio-cultural diversity and values are negotiated through participatory dynamics also present several commonalities that are typical from the central level of government. The intervention of cultural organizations and social actors is often reduced to public consultation and debate procedures in the five studied cases, with limited capacity to impact on policy design. As cited above, this has actually been reflected in specific processes towards elite building and "club effect" dynamics, such as in Norway and Hungary, respectively. Still, it should be noted that sectoral policies in the UK allow the smoother intervention of cultural actors and artists. Also, in Norway, although to a lesser extent and attached to the arm's length approach.

Overall, social accuracy is aligned with a top-down approach to governance in all countries, which is only challenged by various claims transferred through emerging institutional channels for participation in Portugal and Norway and more bureaucratic channels in Spain and the UK. The above-limited participation is not directly translated into a lack of awareness of the need for inclusive policies, which are often designed top-down and encounter corporate boundaries, such as in France. Only in the case of illiberal Hungarian cultural policies, a clearly bureaucratic approach to participation is well aligned with a deficient consideration of social diversity or even with explicit exclusionary policies towards minorities.

Creative Europe cultural policies: limited room for social diversity interpretation and integration

Creative Europe cultural policies are characterized by a subsidiarity framework, reflecting the European Union's commitment to respecting the autonomy of the above Member States while fostering cultural cooperation. Furthermore, these policies often exhibit minimal participation, with negotiations occurring behind closed doors and without the open involvement of stakeholders, creating a barrier for less privileged actors who often lack the knowledge and capacity to access EU public funding. This exclusionary dynamic tends to benefit the more structured and wealthier actors, who can leverage influence over senior civil servants and parliamentarians. The policies primarily revolve around resource allocation and Member States' coordination, typically manifesting in a top-down, centralized approach that may only partially represent the diverse social values within the European cultural landscape.

Cultural policies' social accuracy landscape in Europe

Overall, our empirical analysis of cultural policies' social accuracy shows that EU institutions' incidence in value transference remains relatively autonomous concerning other administrations and actors. Instead, state policy models have an essential impact on all levels of government "downwards", for instance, by setting nationalist or multiculturalist framings. However, significant regional and local changes have been identified in the last decade, especially concerning a convergence towards broader and more diversified action capacity. Such transformation affects public cultural management's constitutive, political and identitarian dimensions, giving more margin of action in these fields to substate actors.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Comparative learnings

The case studies show a wide variety of contexts, strategies, and difficulties in defining and implementing a policy in relation to the plurality of values associated with culture. In this concluding section, we try to highlight some of the factors that explain the differences and the convergences we have observed.

The issue of comparative analysis, which underpins its complexity, its richness, but also its fragility, is that it is generally based on a limited number of cases whose variations around the variables of interest are due to a large number of factors ("too few cases, too many variables": see Lipjhart, 1971, 1975). This analysis, therefore, does not claim to provide an exhaustive account of the factors that explain the degree of coherence of cultural policy programmes and their implementation in Europe.

Instead, we limit our analysis to assessing the relevance of the four factors that, as we hypothesized in the introduction to this deliverable, could explain differences in terms of the content of action programmes, their implementation, and, eventually, governance and social accuracy: (1) the majority ideological orientation within the government, (2) the cultural policy model, (3) the degree of administrative decentralisation in the country and (4) the degree of marketisation of the cultural policy regime.

Values within programs

The comparative analysis shows that the values identified in the previous Work Packages are all found in the policy programmes under study. The Hungarian state is, to some extent, an exception to this general observation since the values associated with democracy, equality, and sustainability do not feature in the stated objectives of cultural policy. At the same time, aesthetic and identity values are, as in the other cases studied, essential within the cultural policy programmes of the Hungarian state. It is just as if Hungarian cultural policies had stuck to the old triptych of excellence, democratisation, and the promotion of national identity. In contrast, the other administrations studied have added to this triptych a complex set of heterogeneous values inherited from recent societal dynamics.

The self-proclaimed illiberal nature of the regime undoubtedly makes Hungarian cultural policy less permeable to these changes. Another way of analysing this resistance to the adoption of new values would be to say that the Hungarian state's cultural policy is justified by the overriding objective of building national identity, which means that those involved in its implementation do not have to resort to other forms of justification. In addition, we can notice the persistence of a substantial budgetary effort at a time when most of the other cases studied are facing significant budgetary restrictions or restructuring.

The Hungarian counterexample sheds light on the dynamics at work in the other countries of our sample. While the adoption of a plurality of values in the policy discourses and programmes can be understood as a reaction to the multiplication of societal demands that characterise liberal democracies, it can also be read as an attempt to justify cultural policies which can neither base their legitimacy in themselves nor on an indisputable higher principle and which, moreover, face with the imperative of economic efficiency brought about by the neo-liberal turn in the management of public policies.

Beyond this homogeneity, the analysis reveals significant differences between the cases studied, firstly in terms of the way administrations prioritise values and, secondly, in the tensions that emerge

between these values. Our comparative variables appear to be relevant in explaining these differences. First, the cultural policy models proposed by Chartrand and McCaughey (1989) appear to be correlated with the arrangement of values in the programmes. On the one hand, the adoption of extra-cultural values seems to be more recent in the countries of the Architect model - France, Portugal, and Spain - than in those of the Patron model - Norway and the United Kingdom. As we shall see, the independence of the cultural authorities from political power may facilitate the integration of social demands into cultural policy programmes. In contrast, the content of these programmes seems to be more the result of vertical approaches in the Architect model. In the latter countries, the adoption of new values seems more dependent on political will and changes in political majorities, as shown by the Spanish examples and, in France, the example of Montpellier. On the other hand, tensions between values also seem to be more acute in the countries of the Architect model, particularly between the dissemination of artistic excellence and cultural democracy.

Second, the degree of decentralisation, measured here by the Regional Authority Index (Shair-Rosenfield et al., 2021; Hooghe et al., 2016), seems to explain the tensions between the values held at the different levels of government. For the three countries covered by this multi-level analysis (France, Norway, and Spain), the tensions between state, region, and city are more pronounced in France and Spain, the two countries with the highest Regional Authority index. In Spain, the values in the cultural programmes of the State, Galicia, and Barcelona do not necessarily overlap. However, they do not clash - artistic excellence as the primary value for the State, regional identity for Galicia, and diversity and cultural rights for Barcelona. Conversely, there is a stricter division of values in the French case - artistic excellence and creativity for the State, accessibility and territorial identity for the Occitanie region and audience inclusion for Montpellier Métropole. This distinction might reflect a desire on the part of the local levels to distinguish themselves from a historically centralising state that is now involved in the process of cultural decentralisation.

The third criterion is the marketisation of the cultural sector. We can see from the various examples that this degree of marketisation (Alexander & Peterson, 2023) has an impact on the importance attached to the economic value. This is most explicitly cited in Spain and Portugal, two countries whose cultural policy regime is highly marketised, but also and above all within Creative Europe's cultural programmes. Several studies have previously highlighted the influence of the European Union in the marketisation of several areas of public policy, such as the economy (Van Apeldoorn & Horn, 2007) or health (André & Hermann, 2009). The results of our study of Creative Europe suggest a similar influence where culture is concerned. The European case thus reveals the most explicit tensions between the pursuit of economic objectives and the promotion of artistic or democratic values.

Implementation

Analysis of the implementation of cultural policies in Europe and their coherence with the values expressed in the documents and programmatic discourses also reveals a constant, that is in this case budgetary constraint. In all the cases studied, the implementation of cultural policies is subject to budget cuts in the context of rationalisation of public action and crisis of the COVID-19 pandemic. If this constraint is particularly acute, it is because culture remains, in all the cases studied, a secondary sector of public policy. Here, we see the first signs of a contradiction between this reality and the programmatic ambitions expressed by the public authorities in terms of culture. However, the weight of the budgetary constraint varies across cases, particularly with regard to the economic situation specific to each country. We can, however, note the role played by the variable of marketisation, insofar as the impact of budgetary restrictions on the implementation of cultural policies seems to be greater in countries where the marketisation of the cultural policy regime is more advanced, as shown by the Portuguese and Spanish cases. In other countries, a lesser dependence on fluctuations in the

economic context is achieved in return for a greater dependence of professionals in the cultural sector on public funding.

The other three comparative variables seem to impact the implementation of cultural policies to varying degrees. In Hungary, the main inconsistencies in implementation relate to a lack of clarity due to a lack of transparency, the discretionary nature of public decision-making, and the transversality of cultural policies. In the liberal countries, a similar criticism of the lack of legibility of cultural action is expressed through the intermediary of actors in the sector, but this essentially points to the inconsistency of budgetary means, the distribution of resources, or even the instruments used - large-scale facilities, sector-based vision of public action, weakness of consultative bodies - in relation to the stated objectives. In these countries, while the values are rarely discussed and are the subject of an implicit consensus, the debates focus on implementation, testifying to a certain extent of the technicalisation of the public debate.

These debates focus on different aspects depending on the dominant model of cultural policy. In countries where the Architect model is dominant, the challenges and the main inconsistencies revolve around the use of vertical instruments and the fact that policies are hardly cross-sectoral. In the countries of the Patron model, the debates focus first and foremost on the distribution of responsibilities within the framework of the definition of the arm's length principle. As the Norwegian case shows, this definition can be the subject of conflict between levels of government.

Finally, we were able to identify some significant differences according to the degree of decentralisation in the countries analysed. In Norway, the least decentralised of the three countries for which we studied the three levels of government, the main conflicts in terms of implementation between national, local, and municipal administrations concern, as we have mentioned, the definition of the arm's length principle. We can also note in this context a lesser capacity for action at the regional level, which suffers from a distrust expressed by the State as well as by cultural professionals. A similar mistrust could also be expressed towards the regional level in the French context prior to decentralisation. Today, decentralisation and the merging of the regions have enabled French regions to develop an actual cultural policy that is gradually gaining independence from the State. One of the specific limitations of the French case, however, lies in the weakness of the bureaucratic apparatus at the regional and municipal levels, which limits the achievement of programmatic objectives. Finally, in the Spanish case, we can observe greater instability in public policy instruments, primarily due to the influence of successive changes in political majorities. This can be interpreted as a consequence of the administrative structure of the "state of autonomies."

Governance

It is undoubtedly with regard to governance and social accuracy that our comparative variables seem to be least effective. All the cases studied favour a top-down mode of governance, and their main limitation in this area is a certain inability to involve professional actors in decision-making, particularly the most peripheral ones. This observation is moderated by differences in the political culture of the countries studied. For example, analysis of the Norwegian cases shows that the ability of professionals in the cultural sector to organise themselves, inherited from Scandinavian social democracy, allows for a higher level of consultation than in France in particular, where the fragmentation of the cultural sector encourages an individualisation of the relationship with public authorities and, as a result, reinforces the vertical nature of decision-making.

The first significant difference with regard to our comparative variables concerns the opposition between liberalism and illiberalism. In liberal regimes, although the forms of participation of professional actors in decision-making are more or less limited, this imperfection does not obey, as in Hungary, an explicitly exclusive logic in which groups opposed to the values of cultural policy are

deliberately sidelined.

The second observable difference, this time according to the model of cultural policy, helps to explain the differences in the degree of dialogue and consultation between the countries of the liberal bloc. In the countries of the Architect model, the inertia observed in the modes of governance can be explained by the persistence of vertical logic and by the intrinsic weakness of consultation bodies. In the countries of the Patron model, although consultation is better integrated into modes of governance, it would seem to lead to similar exclusive logic unfavourable to peripheral actors. This is seemingly one of the limits of the "arm's length" principle. While political intervention may be perceived negatively as the paragon of a clientelist and discretionary logic, it may also prove positive precisely in terms of encouraging better integration of actors who do not meet the criteria of artistic and economic excellence that condition access to subsidies and consultation bodies.

The other two variables, the degree of decentralisation and the degree of marketisation of the cultural policy regime, do not seem to have any impact on modes of governance and social accuracy. On the one hand, although consultation seems to be higher at the municipal level than at the regional and national levels, this is not the case in France, unlike in Spain and Norway. On the other hand, the United Kingdom, the country where the marketisation of the cultural policy regime is most advanced, has the highest level of participation at the national level; at the same time, this level of participation is low in Portugal and Spain, two countries where marketisation is established.

Table 1. Comparative learnings on cultural policy programs, implementation, and governance in Europe

Variable	Categories	Programs	Implementation	Governance
Political regime	Liberal	Plurality of values	Tensions around budget allocation and instruments	Weak to strong dialogue with private actors
	Illiberal	Democratisation and Identity	Lack of transparency – discretionary – transversality	Exclusion of confronting groups
Cultural policy regime	Architect	Plurality of values is more recent – Higher dependency on political majorities – Tensions between democratization and democracy.	Lack of cross-sectorial policies – vertical instruments	Inertia by lack of concertation
	Patron	Plurality of values more explicit – Tensions between excellence and democracy	Conflicts in the definition of the arm’s length principle – tensions in terms of task allocation	Inertia by lack of political intervention
Decentralisation degree	Low	Weak tensions between government levels	Mistrust regarding the regional level	No effect
	Middle	Differentiation strategies by lower government levels	Lack of bureaucratic development at the sub-national levels	
	High	Heterogeneity in cultural policy programs across government levels	Instability of instruments	
Marketisation of cultural policy regime	Resistant	Economic value is secondary	Cultural actors dependent on public expenditures	No effect
	Emergent			
	Established	Economy and tourist development	More sensitive to budget cuts	
	Dominant	Innovation and economic impacts		

2. Towards new democratic policies of cultural value?

What values? evolution, contents and weight of values

A historical evolution of cultural policy valuation

Cultural policies are, more than others, in constant need of justification regarding their legitimacy - not being as solidly consensual as “sovereign state policies”, such as justice or police. Historically, their value justification has evolved according to political shifts, major social changes, and evolutions of the cultural professional fields dynamics. Since the “liberal turn” taken by several European public policies in the 80s (Jobert, 1994), cultural policies have been furthermore asked to justify their purpose and results, as the pressure over accountability of public funds effectiveness and impact has been raised. Finally, the democratic legitimacy crisis of public institutions, and critics about the 'failure of cultural democratization' (Glevarec, 2016), also pushed cultural policies to mobilize new values and new strategies to re-legitimise themselves, in the years 2000-2020.

The evolution of cultural policies in Europe is mainly described in the literature as a heterogeneous process, following broad movements : an initial phase (1950s-1970s), “of 'elitist' public intervention in which a central State played the educational role of distributor of a legitimate culture”, a second phase (1970s-1980s) “which involved greater decentralization and democratization of the State's cultural functions, going together with a revision of public action instruments integrating the industrial production of culture and entertainment” and a final phase (1990s-2000s), “of adjustment of cultural policies to the objectives of economic growth and innovation, favoring the adoption of the principles of the 'creative' industries and economy” (Arfaoui, 2019).

From our case study analysis, we could add to these major turning points a new phase of diversification of values and social and economic objectives assigned to cultural policies, during the 2000-2020 period. This “value inflation” seems to proceed by “accumulation” rather than by “displacement” of “conversion” - the new values being added to the old ones without replacing them (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). Values related to “inclusion”, “participation”, “well-being”, “gender equality”, “interculturality” and “diversity” seem to have risen in recent years - in parallel with the continuing establishment of economic values, and the relative permanence of aesthetic values.

Instruments over values?

However, the debate on values is less lively and recurrent than the debate on instruments. As instruments are tools for allocating resources, their discussion seems to be the primary arena for power relations and conflicts of interests in the cultural policy field. This discussion is not systematically linked to the discussion of values. Thus, instruments can be highly contradictory to values, without this incoherence being the subject of obvious controversy. In some cases, values are defined “a posteriori” in order to justify instrumental choices - which gives an appearance of coherence, but in the opposite direction to the expected logic of “values > objectives > instruments”.

Furthermore, values are most often claimed without any precise definition, hierarchisation or prioritization, without being translated objectively in terms of effectiveness and instrumental incarnation - neither being accompanied by an according allocation of new resources. In the meantime, instruments are defined as the result of constrained political choices (legal frameworks, path dependency, political clientelism, reduced resources...). Values and instruments are therefore looking as if they are evolving in two parallel, unrelated worlds, with different dynamics.

Common values everywhere?

A hierarchy of the main common values in European cultural policies is difficult to establish, as in each administration, these values use different lexical fields and are not hierarchically presented nor precisely defined. Value clusters have therefore to be “reconstructed” theoretically – even if values are often intertwined. From our cases studies and previous works, we can distinguish the following value clusters : aesthetic (beauty, artistic excellence and quality, creativity, freedom of expression, autonomy of culture...); equality (access to cultural products for all, democratization, education, decentralization...); social cohesion (“bildung”, social link, community, inclusion, history, common heritage); diversity (democracy, multiculturalism, identity, dignity, cultural rights, recognition); well-being (individual emancipation, dignity, hedonism, health, entertainment); economy (soft-power, employment, growth, competitiveness, innovation, attractiveness, export...)145. Each of these values has a more or less “consensual” mention within the cultural policies observed, but their hierarchy is different, and their lack of definition, or real scope in terms of implementation, leads us to differentiate policies according to their implementation and their effects more than according to their values.

New social and democratic values?

Concepts such as “participation”, “gender equality”, “inclusion” and “sustainable development” seem to be emerging more recently in most cultural policies, albeit at different rates. However, most of these concepts do not revolutionize cultural policies: “participation” is mostly describing new modalities of social access to culture remaining, for the most part, within the classic paradigm of democratization (Dupin-Meynard, Négrier, 2020), gender equality and inclusion are specific social variations of equality values – and like sustainability, they could be considered as external issues imposed within cultural policies, more than new values specific to culture. Values linked to “cultural rights” and “cultural democracy” seem to propose a new philosophy of culture (Saez, 2017) and the literature describes an increasing recognition of cultural rights of minorities (Saukkonen, 2014). However, in our case studies, apart from occasional references to these concepts, there is little evidence of a real reversal of the logic of values on this basis. Although the notions of “diversity” or “plurality” are widely used, it is hard to distinguish whether they have any concrete content or efficiency - even though degrees of diversity recognition and multiculturalism promotion may vary strongly.

A liberal turn in cultural policies?

Do cultural policies in Europe have all moved towards a domination of economic values, following the so-called “liberal turn” and “creative turn” (Menger, 2013) ? An extension of the economic values scope can be noticed in the vocabulary (“cultural and creative industries”, “innovation”, “attractiveness”, “competitiveness”, “employment”, “growth”...). However, these economic values are often in tension with the “general interest” objectives that prohibit the funding of profitable actors (even if this distinction is managed with numerous exceptions), and they coexist with numerous social values, without replacing them. Economic values imply many debates within institutions and with sectoral actors in the profitable and unprofitable sectors – in particular about their priorities and beneficiaries (safeguarding the independence of an ecosystem of small, diversified actors; or aiming at competitiveness, favouring the large, most profitable actors on the market).

¹⁴⁵ List of values completed according to UNCHARTED Work Packages 1, 2 and 3 reports.

Beyond purely economic values, in cultural policies as elsewhere, a 'financialization' of public policies seems to occur : public action is more and more "seen as an investment to be exploited, shaped by the imagination of the private sector" ("leverage effect", "return on investment") and public problems are framed as "funding problems" before considering any common values or objectives (Chiapello, 2021). This mandatory "rentability" and "accountability" of public action implies an increase of "expected impacts" descriptions, control and evaluation devices, and a rationale of competition between actors financed for their projects rather than their ongoing activity. This logic of results, often measurable and quantitative, even when it concerns social objectives, stems from an economic vision of society and culture (Bourdieu, 2017).

Cultural heteronomy VS cultural autonomy?

Do any cultural policies claim values that are "purely" autonomous to culture? It seems that most cultural policies claim external, heteronomous to culture. In most cases, culture is not seen as good 'in itself', but because it contributes to other social and economic values. The discourse of an intrinsic cultural value (beauty, artistic excellence, art for art's sake) exists, but when analyzed closely, it is often linked to other values that are intertwined with it. In this respect, we observe that cultural actors rarely seem to negotiate values in the sense of an autonomous value, but rather negotiate the content and hierarchisation of extrinsic values - seeking to favor values that could justify their own activity's funding (for example, the defense of social rather than economic values). It seems that a process of "decompartmentalisation" and "increasing heteronomisation" of cultural policies is underway, leading to a "dilution of culture in other areas of public action" (Arfaoui, 2019).

The excellence VS democracy dilemma

A structural dilemma between excellence and democracy seems to exist, in different forms, in most cultural policies. On the one hand, cultural policies are justified by the promotion of a hierarchically valued cultural production ("artistic quality", "innovation", "excellence", etc); on the other hand, by the promotion of a cultural production "with social impact", "accessible to all", "diversified", representative of different identities and aesthetics styles, rejecting cultural hierarchy - these two objectives being often in contradiction. This dilemma is resolved differently by cultural policies. Some give priority to social criteria, others to so-called "artistic quality" criteria. Most of the time, they are intermingling.

The difference between the architect's model (cultural administration management) and the arm's length model (delegation of the judgment to peer groups) does not necessarily have a differentiated impact on this dilemma. Its resolution depends on the relative weight of each criteria (aesthetic or non-aesthetic) in the decision process, and on the sociology of the aesthetic tastes within the decision-making groups. On the one hand, funding instruments without any artistic criteria, run by civil servants, can have aesthetic hierarchical effects through other criteria (exclusion effects according to aesthetic style divisions, levels of structuration and administrative capacity...); and funding instruments based on artistic judgment by peers can also include numerous social criteria, some of which seek to rebalance the diversity of cultural productions. On the other hand, it appears that decision-makers, when acting as "arbiters of taste", always have a partly subjective definition of "aesthetic quality", beyond their membership of the political, administrative or artistic sector – a definition certainly linked to their diverse positions in the cultural field, but in all cases, not "democratic" nor "representative" regarding the diversity of tastes. Entrusting decision-making to artists does not guarantee democracy : it does guarantee a (relative) independence of these decision-making groups, but which is always socially determined by specific trajectories, positions of power, and therefore

particularly dominant positions in the social arena - “democratic elitism through stakeholders” (Gray, 2012).

To avoid this risk of “elitism”, a democratic cultural policy should define and share transparent selection criteria; make efforts to objectivize, enlarge, or at least discuss plurally the “quality” and “excellence” criterias; and be careful of the social composition of decision-makers groups (regarding trajectories, tastes, cultural origins...). Enlarging and diversifying decision-making groups can also avoid the concentration of power regarding decisions most at risk of subjectivity.

An accumulation of declarative and non-performative values?

Many values seem to be only declarative and symbolic, without concrete or performative content, without definition, as if they had no commitment or material impact. There is no enforceable right to legally report or condemn the non-effectiveness of values. Values in themselves are not measurable “objectives”, but in order to be implemented, they must be precise in concrete terms, otherwise they are no more than speeches without consequences.

This partly explains why contradictory values can coexist: their definitions are blurry, and multiple registers of justifications can be mobilized depending on the need to defend political choices and instruments. Cultural policy assessment and evaluation reports, when they exist, often valorise “coherence” without any tangible proof, no real impact indicators. The accumulation of new values on the agenda, without any real in-depth debate on the compromises or hierarchies that this accumulation implies, and without new associated instruments or resources, greatly diminishes the effective power of officially declared values – their importance in cultural policy might therefore be only theoretical.

Our case studies presented a number of values asserted without their concrete implications being specified. “Diversity”, for example, functions like a slogan, with no definition: diversity of which cultures, which aesthetics, which social groups? Aside from few policies defining precise targets (% of men and women ; % of cultural sectors ; % of types of projects...), vagueness ultimately leads to policies with a very relative diversity of productions (in the music sector, for instance, a very strong over-representation of legitimate “classical” aesthetics to the detriment of popular, world, electronic and urban music) - and relative diversity of audiences (for which indicators about their cultural and economic capital, origins are really rare). The same applies to “equality”, “social access” and “social cohesion”: most of the time, the target populations are unclear. Indicators are mainly quantitative, and the over-representation of populations with high cultural and economic capital among the audiences of cultural institutions is either not measurable, or not considered as an alarming incoherence demanding deep changes in implementation strategies. Protection of the “common heritage” also suffers from a lack of precision: what is common, whose culture, for whom? “Participation” as well, functions as a signifier easy to mobilize, because it has no ambitious content – who participates, to what, with what power over decisions? As for “cultural rights”, sometimes claimed, but which often doesn’t have any concrete implications in policy strategies. Indeed, a cultural rights based policy would imply a reversal of cultural policies : thinking “from the people’s point of view” rather than from a top-down “supply policy”; developing instruments to implement the recognition of cultural dignity, identities, communities; develop the right for everyone to have the means to practice their culture and share it with others. Policies that try to define the main lines of implementation on this basis are extremely rare.

To achieve any value coherence of policy implementation, values should therefore be precisely defined, in terms of concrete objectives and impact consequences – making it possible to confront implementation and results to objective goals. It may be argued that conflicts of values are healthy in

a democratic society, and that conflicting values should coexist. But in the absence of transparency about the definition of values and their implications, these conflicts lead to the “law of the strongest”: only the instruments are negotiated, and this negotiation is not democratic. Values conflicts must be anticipated and democratically resolved by prioritizing principles of action.

The undemocratic governance of values

Political and administrative power

Who has the power over cultural policy values definition, hierarchy and instrumental strategy? As other policies, cultural policies suffer from a democratic deficit. Decision is mainly restricted to elected representatives and executive civil servants, within institutional and inter-institutional negotiations. In this context, cultural policies are “as democratic as the state”, dependent on different degrees of power concentration, lacking proportional and social representation in several electoral systems, and linked to dynamics of political professionalization, favoritism, and clientelism - in other words, not very democratic.

Values and instruments may sometimes be transformed by political changeovers - but often slowly and marginally, due to the principle of accumulation rather than displacement, and to strong effects of institutional and legal inertia. Over-representation of several sectors, sub-sectors, institutions or aesthetic genres in the cultural policy budgets, for instance, seem to be broadly maintained in all the policies observed - which is also due to the electoral dynamics of satisfying “political clienteles”. However, political and bureaucratic dynamics seem, in the long term, to be porous to major social movements: we are observing changes in value’s grammars, linked to major contemporary social issues (gender equality and fight against climate change, for example). Yet, these developments are unevenly spread and seem to be more symbolic than material.

Sectoral interests

Beyond political and bureaucratic staff, values are, in some cases, discussed with sectoral actors. However, this is most often in informal (lobbying, bilateral meetings), or ephemeral (assemblies, working groups) settings; arenas for permanent, representative discussion with the sectors are very rare. In discussions between politicians and cultural professionals, values are registers of power relations, which very often correspond to the positions and interests of actors. As examples: each sector seems to claim a larger “share of the cake”; claims over the definition of economic values are linked to field positions (unprofitable actors; small profitable actors; market-wide actors); several professional corporations oppose claims against “cultural democracy” (threatening their oligopolies in defining artistic quality) (Dupin-Meynard et al., 2023). There is also a democratic limit to these sectoral discussions: sectoral stakeholders have an unequal access to the decision-making process, and the ones negotiating policy evolutions do not represent the sectors as a whole. Furthermore, they don’t represent citizen’s interests. Should public cultural policy issues only be negotiated between institutions, professionals and experts?

Missing citizens

Apart from sectoral discussion, cultural policies rarely seem to be the subject of public debate or citizen participation. With the exception of certain local cases, only a few dedicated participatory

mechanisms exist. In some case, direct claims from certain social groups or public controversies emerge (censorship of an event, symbolic weight of a funding cut, gender balance in programming, etc.), but they remain, most of the time, detailed debates, limited to an event or an instrument, and the scope of the debate remains predominantly professional rather than civic or societal. Little effort is made by policy makers to broaden the discussion - as well as by professionals in the sectors, for whom democratizing cultural decision-making could mean a reduction in their power and relative legitimacy. We are thus observing a concentration of power in the hands of public decision-makers and the most powerful professional bodies, to the detriment of the rest of society. Some cities are tending towards a more bottom-up approach; but a closer look at these participatory attempts is needed to evaluate their "democratic" impact: number and social composition of decision-making groups, initiative capacity, real weight of power in the decision-making... Do they make a real difference, do they produce a real democratization of decision-making?

Democratizing cultural policies would imply efforts to open debates on values and instruments with the cultural sectors in permanent and representative arenas, as well as participative approaches with citizens that give them a real capacity for initiative and power, while taking care to ensure that they are socially representative. In a nutshell, make culture a public issue.

Implementation incoherencies

Assessing the coherence of cultural policy implementation regarding poorly defined values is difficult – but several different types of discrepancy have been identified.

The first main incoherence is due to a lack of allocated resources corresponding to values claimed. Most values, if pushed to their consequences, would lead to ambitious policies (for example, the possibility for everyone to practice an art; the possibility for everyone to have access to the means of production and diffusion; the protection of heritage without discrimination; the representation of every culture and subcultures in the public institutions, etc.). However, cultural budgets are often very limited - and this leads to the choice of a drastic competition between cultural actors, with strong exclusionary effects. Project promoters on the ground are often caught between overweening objectives and very limited resources - as one theater director expresses: "They tell us to go ahead and build, go ahead and produce! And at the same time: there's no money, we have to cut. The same elected official signs a very strong development programme and signs a very strong austerity". This lack of resources has negative impacts on creative freedom, diversity, equal access, heritage protection, economy... and is also implying a "reversal of thinking": resources and instrumental issues are more debated than values and objectives issues ; and some values seem to be used as justifications for the lack of resources (for example, "innovation" or "excellence" used as exclusionary selection criteria for actors or projects). Cultural policies aiming to be coherent with the values they advocate should therefore massively allocate new resources that will enable them to be effectively implemented. The discussion of values should not be based on a lack of resources seen as "inevitable": it is a matter of political choices.

Another inconsistency concerns the choice and effects of cultural policy instruments. For example, strategies favoring large-scale facilities, or selective instruments favoring the most structured actors, induce a concentration of funding on certain aesthetic genres or types of projects. Most artistic, social and economic selection criteria produce exclusionary effects affecting diversity and equality. Whatever the model, there is an unequal allocation of resources, strongly inconsistent with the values advocated. Instruments must be designed, evaluated and transformed according to values, taking care of artistic freedom, equality, diversity and other claimed values.

Finally, incoherence appears through contradiction and accumulation of values. Certain values are

"incommensurable" references between themselves - all the more when they are not translated into objectives. This can create contradictions between very different, non-comparable and irreconcilable scales of values. Therefore, values must not only be clearly prioritized (particularly when value conflicts appear), but above all, defined in terms of their strategic implications and expected impacts.

* * *

Values and instruments of cultural policies are still overwhelmingly conceived in a "top-down" way, with a lack of internal rationality and a lack of democracy. There is an urgent need to open up public debates on the values of culture in cultural policies. Cultural policies should move away from the implicit and a posteriori justification of cultural policies, maintaining settled sectoral interests considering the limitation of resources as an intangible constraint, in order to redesign ambitious cultural policies that serve all citizens, through a democratization of cultural policy deliberation.

Appendix

Methodology per case

Ministry of Culture, Spain

Documentary analysis

- Official legal and administrative documents
- Online documents and information
- Budget information
- Academic literature

Fieldwork

6 semi-structured interviews, all of them conducted by Zoom, and lasting between 60 and 80 minutes. Interviews were anonymized and codified to be quoted in the report:

CULTURAL POLICY		
Elected officials	1	Ministry of Culture
Executive bureaucrats	1	Ministry of Culture
External experts	1	Academy
MUSIC SECTOR		
Elected officials	1	INAEM
Executive bureaucrats	2	INAEM
TOTAL	6	

Reports and official data

MCD (2013). Anuario de Estadísticas Culturales 2013. Secretaría General Técnica. Ministerio de Cultura y Deporte

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Cultura y Deporte

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Galicia Cultural Policy

Documentary analysis

- Official legal and administrative documents
- Online documents and information
- Budget information
- Academic literature

Fieldwork

7 semi-structured interviews, all of them conducted by Zoom, and lasting approximately 90 minutes. Interviews were anonymized and codified to be quoted in the report:

CULTURAL POLICY		
Elected officials	1	Xunta
Executive bureaucrats	1	Galician Agency of Cultural Industries. Film Library.
External experts	1	ACAMFE. Iberic Museums Association
MUSIC SECTOR		
Elected officials	1	A Coruña Provincial and City Council - Social Economy, Employment and Tourism
Executive bureaucrats	1	Xunta
Street level bureaucrats	1	Pontevedra City Council
External experts	1	Music Booking company since 25 years
TOTAL	7	

Reports and official data

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Ministerio de Hacienda y Administraciones Públicas (2014). CUARTO INFORME SOBRE EL CUMPLIMIENTO EN ESPAÑA DE LA CARTA EUROPEA DE LAS LENGUAS REGIONALES O MINORITARIAS, DEL CONSEJO DE EUROPA 2010 - 2013. <https://rm.coe.int/16806d81a4>.

City of Barcelona Cultural Policy

Documentary analysis

- Official legal and administrative documents
- Online documents and information
- Budget information
- Academic literature

Fieldwork

7 semi-structured interviews, most of them conducted by Zoom (5) and live face-to-face (2), lasting approximately 90 minutes. Interviews were anonymized and codified to be quoted in the report:

CULTURAL POLICY		
Public officials	1	Councilor of Culture of the party in power until 2023 (Bcn en Comú)
Executive bureaucrats	1	Technician of the Direction of Culture and Education for the Neighborhoods (ICUB)
External experts	1	Expert in Cultural Management. Senior Consultant of TRANSIT Cultural Projects, Academic Coordinator of the Master in Management of Cultural Companies and Institutions (UB)
MUSIC SECTOR		
Public Officials	1	Delegate for Cultural Rights of the Barcelona City Council for Bcn en Comú. Adjunct Professor in the Master in Cultural Industry and Sound Studies (University Carlos III)
Executive bureaucrats	1	Director of the Museum of Music of Barcelona
Street level bureaucrats	1	Founder and Director of the youth orchestra project "Vozes" of Barcelona.
External experts & Music Sector's representatives	1	Researcher in Cultural policy studies
TOTAL	7	

Grey Literature

Ajuntament de Barcelona (2012). Informe anual de les empreses i institucions municipals.

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Ajuntament de Barcelona. (2015). Marc Estratègic de l'Ajuntament de Barcelona 2012-2015.

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Ajuntament de Barcelona (2020). PAM+ 2020-2023 Programa d'Actuació Municipal Extraordinari de Resposta a la Pandèmia.

Ajuntament de Barcelona (2021). Fem Cultura. Plan de Derechos Culturales de Barcelona. In Barcelona Cultura. <https://www.barcelona.cat/culturaviva/accio/barcelona-impulsa-el-pla-fem-cultura-garantir-els-drets-culturals-de-la-ciutadania>

Ajuntament de Barcelona-Sisena Tinència d'Alcaldia Àrea de Cultura, Educació, Ciència i Comunitat (2021) MEMÒRIA de PROGRAMES TRANSVERSALS 2020-2021.

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Asociación Plan Estratégico Metropolitano de Barcelona. (2010). Pla Estratègic Metropolità de Barcelona.

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Ramon, J., & Rodríguez, D. (2014). Report Barcelona business friendly.

Sub-Comissió de Cultura 15M. (2011). Moviment dels acampats de Barcelona: propostes per a un nou model cultural.

Ministry of Culture, France

Documentary analysis

- Official and legal administrative documents
- Public discourses about cultural policy
- Parliament reports
- Statistics and datas provided by the Departement des Études, de la Prospective et de la Statistique du ministère de la Culture
- Academic literature

Fieldwork

10 semi-structured interviews (two third of which through videoconference) : duration : between 90 and 150 minutes, with guarantee of anonymity:

CULTURAL POLICY		
Public officials	2	Head of ministry directions
Street level bureaucrats	1	Civil servant in Regional State Direction
External experts	2	Researcher in Cultural policy studies, head of Culture Department in a National newspaper
MUSIC SECTOR		
Public Officials	2	Head of Ministry Direction & Music National Center
Street level bureaucrats	2	Civil servant in Regional State Direction and Music National Center
External experts & Music Sector's representatives	1	Researcher in Cultural policy studies
TOTAL	10	

Reports and official data

Cour des Comptes, 2021, Recentrer les missions du ministère de la Culture, coll. Entités et Politiques publiques, Cour des Comptes 2021. <https://www.ccomptes.fr/fr/publications/recentrer-les-missions-du-ministere-de-la-culture>

Ministère de la Culture : Chiffres clef du financement de la Culture pour 2022

Ministère de la Culture : Budget 2023 du ministère de la Culture.
<https://www.culture.gouv.fr/Presse/Dossiers-de-presse/Budget-2023-du-ministere-de-la-Culture-Projet-de-loi-de-finances>

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Ministère de l'Économie (Inspection Générale des Finances) et Ministère de la Culture (Inspection Général des Affaires Culturelles), L'apport de la culture à l'économie de la France (S.Kancel, J.Itty, M.Weill, B.Durieux), 2013. <https://www.economie.gouv.fr/files/03-rapport-igf-igac-culture-economie.pdf>

Observatoire des Politiques Culturelles : Les élus à la Culture, au Coeur de la fabrique des politiques territoriales, OPC 2022. <https://www.observatoire-culture.net/elus-culture-fabrique-politiques-territoriales/>

Inspection Générale des Affaires Culturelles : Évaluation de la politique publique de démocratisation culturelle, 30/03/2017 <https://www.culture.gouv.fr/Espace-documentation/Rapports/Evaluation-de-la-politique-publique-de-democratisation-culturelle>

Official discourses of Cultural Policy (ministers)

Rima Abdul Malak, 21/09/2023. <https://www.culture.gouv.fr/Presse/Discours/Discours-de-la-ministre-de-la-Culture-Rima-Abdul-Malak-pour-la-cloture-de-la-8e-edition-de-Think-Culture-organisee-par-News-Tank-Culture>

Roselyne Bachelot Narquin, 22/09/2021. <https://www.culture.gouv.fr/Presse/Discours/Discours->

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Franck Riester, 27/06/2019. <https://www.culture.gouv.fr/Presse/Discours/Discours-de-Franck-Riester-ministre-de-la-Culture-prononce-a-l-occasion-de-la-3e-edition-des-Journees-de-la-Creation-le-27-juin-2019>

Françoise Nyssen, 24/09/2018. <https://www.culture.gouv.fr/Presse/Archives-Presse/Archives-Discours-2012-2018/Annee-2018/Discours-de-Francoise-Nyssen-ministre-de-la-Culture-prononce-a-l-occasion-de-la-presentation-du-projet-de-loi-de-finances-2019-du-ministere-de-la>

Audrey Azoulay, 28/09/2016. <https://www.culture.gouv.fr/Presse/Archives-Presse/Archives-Discours-2012-2018/Annee-2016/Discours-d-Audrey-Azoulay-ministre-de-la-Culture-et-de-la-Communication-prononce-a-l-occasion-de-la-presentation-du-projet-de-loi-de-finances-201>

Fleur Pellerin, 30/09/2015. <https://www.culture.gouv.fr/Presse/Archives-Presse/Archives-Discours-2012-2018/Annee-2015/Discours-de-Fleur-Pellerin-ministre-de-la-Culture-et-de-la-Communication-prononce-lors-de-la-conference-de-presse-de-presentation-du-budget-2016>

Aurélié Filipetti, 2/02/2014

Rapport sur la politique Culturelle – Assemblée Nationale

Jean-René Cazeneuve, 6/10/2022.
https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/16/rapports/cion_fin/l16b0292-tiii-a11_rapport-fond#

Joël Giraud, 10/10/2019
https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/15/rapports/cion_fin/l15b2301-tiii-a11_rapport-fond#

Patrick Bloche, 17/09/2015
<https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/rapports/r3068-tl.asp>

Occitanie Cultural Policy

Documentary analysis

- Official legal and administrative documents
- Online documents and information
- Budget information
- Academic literature

Fieldwork

11 semi-structured interviews (the two third through videoconference), between 90 and 150 minutes, with guarantee of anonymity:

CULTURAL POLICY		
Public officials	3	Vice-president in charge of culture – Head of directorate of culture – Counselor at the President cabinet
Street level bureaucrats	1	Civil servant in the regional administration
External expert	1	Civil servant in the regional state direction
MUSIC SECTOR		
Public officials	3	Vice-president in charge of culture – Head of directorate of culture – Counselor at the President cabinet
Street level bureaucrats	1	Civil servant in the regional administration
External expert & Music sector representatives	2	Head of a regional agency – Head of a music federation
TOTAL	11	

Reports and official data

Occitanie original budgets available at: <https://www.data.gouv.fr/fr/datasets/budgets-primitifs-de-la-region-occitanie/>

Montpellier Méditerranée Métropole Cultural Policy

Documentary analysis

- Official legal and administrative documents
- Online documents and information
- Budget information
- Academic literature

Fieldwork

10 semi-structured interviews (the two third through videoconference), between 90 and 150 minutes, with guarantee of anonymity:

CULTURAL POLICY		
Public officials	3	Vice-president in charge of culture – Head of directorate of culture – Former head of directorate of culture
Street level bureaucrats	1	Civil servant in the regional administration
External expert	1	Journalist – Two directors of local theatres
MUSIC SECTOR		
Public officials	3	Vice-president in charge of culture – Head of directorate of culture – Former head of directorate of culture
Street level bureaucrats	1	Civil servant in the regional administration
External expert & Music sector representatives	1	Representative of a music festival
TOTAL	10	

Reports and official data

Montpellier Méditerranée Métropole (2015a). Report on 2015 original budget. Available at: https://www.montpellier3m.fr/sites/default/files/downloads/files/Rapport%20de%20pr%C3%A9sentation%20du%20compte%20administratif%202015_V2.pdf

Montpellier Méditerranée Métropole (2015b). 2015 activity report. Available at: https://www.montpellier3m.fr/sites/default/files/2015_rapport_activite_3m.pdf

Montpellier Méditerranée Métropole (2016). Report on 2016 original budget. Available at: <https://www.montpellier3m.fr/sites/default/files/downloads/files/Rapport%20budget%20primitif%202016.pdf>

Montpellier Méditerranée Métropole (2017). Report on 2017 original budget. Available at: <https://www.montpellier3m.fr/sites/default/files/Rapport%20BP%20VF3.pdf>

Montpellier Méditerranée Métropole (2018). Report on 2018 original budget. Available at: https://www.montpellier3m.fr/sites/default/files/pres_budget2018.pdf

Montpellier Méditerranée Métropole (2019). Report on 2019 original budget. Available at: https://www.montpellier3m.fr/sites/default/files/rapport_de_presentation_bp2019_vf_corrigee.pdf

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Montpellier Méditerranée Métropole (2023). Report on 2023 original budget. Available at: https://www.montpellier3m.fr/sites/default/files/presentation_bp2023_3m_30_03_2023.pdf

Ministry of Culture, Norway

Documentary analysis

- Official legal and administrative documents
- Online documents and information
- Budget information
- Academic literature

Fieldwork

6 semi-structured interviews, most of them conducted live face-to-face, some by Teams, lasting approximately 1h, guaranteeing the anonymity of interviewees, but in cases where anonymity is impossible, the interviewees were guaranteed a quote approval:

CULTURAL POLICY		
Public officials	2	Politician representing the Centre Party (Sp), elected to the Norwegian Parliament, and part of the political committee dealing with cultural affairs – Politician representing the Labor Party (Ap), elected to the Norwegian Parliament, and part of the political committee dealing with cultural affairs
Executive bureaucrats	2	Bureaucrats from the Ministry of Culture's department for media and art
Street level bureaucrats	1	Bureaucrat from the Arts Council Norway, working with music affairs.
MUSIC SECTOR		
External expert & Music sector representatives	1	Managing director of a national labour organisation in the music field.
TOTAL	6	

Official documents

Meld. St. 8 (2018–2019) The Power of Culture. Cultural Policy for the Future. The Ministry of Culture. White paper.

Meld. St. 18 (2020–2021). Experience, Create, Share. Art and Culture for, with, and by children and youth. The Ministry of Culture. White paper.

Prop. 1 S (2022–2023). Proposition to the Storting. Ministry of Culture and Equality. [The national culture budget, recommendation from the Ministry to the Norwegian Parliament].

Prop. 1 S (2021–2022). Proposition to the Storting. Ministry of Culture.

Prop. 1 S (2020–2021). Proposition to the Storting. Ministry of Culture.

Prop. 1 S (2019–2020). Proposition to the Storting. Ministry of Culture.

Prop. 1 S (2018–2019). Proposition to the Storting. Ministry of Culture.

Prop. 1 S (2017–2018). Proposition to the Storting. Ministry of Culture.

Prop. 1 S (2016–2017). Proposition to the Storting. Ministry of Culture.

Prop. 1 S (2015–2016). Proposition to the Storting. Ministry of Culture.

Prop. 1 S (2014–2015). Proposition to the Storting. Ministry of Culture.

Prop. 1 S (2013–2014). Proposition to the Storting. Ministry of Culture.

Prop. 1 S (2012–2013). Proposition to the Storting. Ministry of Culture.

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Vestland county Cultural Policy

Documentary analysis

- Official legal and administrative documents
- Online documents and information
- Budget information
- Academic literature

Fieldwork

7 semi-structured interviews, most of them conducted live face-to-face, some by Teams, lasting approximately 1h, guaranteeing the anonymity of interviewees, but in cases where anonymity is impossible, the interviewees were guaranteed a quote approval:

CULTURAL POLICY		
Public officials	1	A politician, representing the Labor Party (Ap), in the county council, with culture, sports and inclusion as part of his/her political portfolio
Executive bureaucrats	3	A senior official, working with culture, including the professional music field – A senior official, working with art production – A senior official, working with art communication.
Street level bureaucrats	2	A senior official for cultural arenas – A bureaucrat responsible for art in public space.
MUSIC SECTOR		
External expert & Music sector representatives	1	An expert from a regional opera venue.
TOTAL	7	

Official documents

Budget 2023 / Economy plan 2023–2026, Vestland county.

Culture builds society. Regional plan for culture 2023 – 2035.

Culture builds society. Action plan 2023 – 2026.

Scenario Vestland 2040

Regional culture plan 2014-2024

Strategy for volunteerism for Vestland 2021–2022

Strategy for e-sport and gaming, Vestland 2021–2022. <https://www.vestlandfylke.no/kultur/>

City of Bergen Cultural Policy

Documentary analysis

- Official legal and administrative documents
- Online documents and information
- Budget information
- Academic literature

Fieldwork

7 semi-structured interviews, all of them conducted live face-to-face in the interviewees' workspaces, lasting approximately 1h, guaranteeing the anonymity of interviewees, but in cases where anonymity is impossible, the interviewees were guaranteed a quote approval:

CULTURAL POLICY		
Public officials	1	A politician, representing the Labor Party (Ap), in the City Government, responsible for culture, voluntary sector and inclusion
Executive bureaucrats	2	Two bureaucrats at authority level 1, one of them working with amateur activities, voluntary sector, and the professional music field, the other one as a leader responsible for planning, analysis, and more – A bureaucrat at authority level 2, responsible for municipal cultural offices in the city districts, culture houses, rehearsal rooms, the culture school (kulturskole), culture for children, youth, families, and people with disabilities, culture based on voluntary work, and more.
Street level bureaucrats	2	A bureaucrat working in a municipal cultural office covering two city districts – A bureaucrat working in a municipal cultural office covering two city districts and running a culture house.
MUSIC SECTOR		
External expert & Music sector representatives	1	A rock musician who is also running a cultural venue.
TOTAL	7	

Official documents

Our translations of titles, except the Cultural Strategy, which are available in Norwegian and English edition.

Policy Platform 2019 – 2023 for a City Government from the Labor Party (Ap), the Green Party (MDG), the Liberal Party (V) and the Christian Democratic Party (KrF) : “Bergen – a good city for everyone”.

Cultural Strategy for the City of Bergen 2015 – 2025: “The cultural city of Bergen – at the forefront internationally”. (English and Norwegian edition).

Bergen municipality’s art plan for the professional field 2018–2027.

Bergen municipality’s art plan 2008–2017: “Bergen, City of Art”.

Cultural Strategy for youth, 2022–2026, Bergen municipality.

Art Dissemination Plan for children and youth, 2020-2025, Bergen municipality.

Amateur Cultural Plan, 2018–2027, Bergen municipality.

Cultural Venue Plan, 2019–2030, Bergen municipality.

Cultural Plan for people with disabilities, 2023–2027, Bergen municipality.

“Bergen municipality – a senior friendly city of art and culture”, 2021–2026, Bergen municipality.

Plan for participation and diversity in the field of art and culture, 2021–2023, Bergen municipality.

Budget 2022, Action and Economy Plan 2022–2025, Bergen municipality.

Bergen municipality's web site: <https://www.bergen.kommune.no/>

Ministry of Culture, Hungary

Documentary analysis

- Official legal and administrative documents
- Online documents and information
- Budget information
- Academic literature

Fieldwork

6 semi-structured interviews, all of them conducted by Zoom, and lasting between 60 and 80 minutes. Interviews were anonymized and codified to be quoted in the report:

CULTURAL POLICY		
Elected officials	1	District II Budapest
External experts	1	Academy
MUSIC SECTOR		
Elected officials	1	Petőfi Music Agency
Executive bureaucrats	1	House of Hungarian Music
Street level bureaucrats	2	Bartók fesztivál and National Cultural Fund
TOTAL	6	

Ministry of Culture, Portugal

Documentary analysis

- Official legal and administrative documents
- Online documents and information
- Budget information
- Academic literature

Fieldwork

8 semi-structured interviews, all of them conducted by Zoom, and lasting approximately 90 minutes. Interviews were anonymized and codified to be quoted in the report:

CULTURAL POLICY		
Elected officials	1	Deputy Commissioner – Executive Committee and Technical Team of the National Plan for the Arts.
Executive Bureaucrats	1	Observatory of Cultural Policies officer
External experts	1	Leader of the Union Entertainment, Audiovisual and Music Workers
MUSIC SECTOR		
Elected officials	1	Official of the General Direction of the Arts
Executive bureaucrats	1	Artistic director of Casa da Música
Street level bureaucrats	2	Coordinator of the National Archive of Sound – Head of the Network and Program “Live Circuit”. Founder of the Concert Hall “Maus Hábitos”.
External experts	1	Expert in popular culture and music
TOTAL	8	

Grey Literature

Comissão Executiva do Plano Nacional das Artes. (2019). Plano Nacional das Artes. Uma estratégia, um manifesto (2019-2024). República Portuguesa. Ministerio de Cultura;Ministerio de Educação.

Diário da República. (2021). PRESIDÊNCIA DO CONSELHO DE MINISTROS. Resolução do Conselho de Ministros 27/2021. Diário Da República -I Série-B, 27, 5–13.

Direção-Geral das Artes. (2019). Relatório de Atividades e de Gestão 2019.

Direção-Geral das Artes. (2021). Plano de Atividades 2021.

Fundo de Fomento Cultural. (2021). Relatório de gestão 2012.

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Arts Council England, UK

Documentary analysis

- Official legal and administrative documents
- Strategic documents and annual reports
- Online documents and information
- Budget information
- Lists of applicants and benefactors

Documents

Let's Create. Strategy 2020–2030, Arts Council England.

Let's Create. Delivery plan 2021–2024. Arts Council England.

Relationship Framework. How Arts Council England works with Music Education Hubs. 2023–24 Music Education Hubs. Arts Council England.

ACE Annual Report 2021-2022

ACE Annual Report 2020–2021

ACE Annual Report 2019–2020

ACE Annual Report 2018–2019

Management agreement between DCMS and Arts Council England

The Culture White Paper from DCMS

Different webpages under www.artscouncil.org.uk

Creative Europe Culture sub-program, European Union

Documentary analysis

- Official legal and administrative documents,
- Public reports, studies and evaluations
- Unofficial statistic data and grey literature provided by respondents
- Academic literature

Fieldwork

Observations during research-action within 2 European Cooperation Projects: Be SpectActive! A European Network on Audience Engagement and Performing Arts; Stronger Peripheries: A Southern Coalition.

12 semi-structured interviews, conducted by videoconference, lasting between 1h and 2h30, guaranteeing the anonymity of senior officials:

CULTURAL POLICY		
Elected officials	1	MP, Culture Committee, music initiative
Executive bureaucrats	5	Creative Europe Desk (France): 1 interview – DG EAC: 2 interviews (including 1 music specialist) – EACEA: 2 interviews (including 1 music specialist)
External experts	2	Arthur Le Gall, consultant, KEA European Affairs – Mehdi Arfaoui, researcher, author of a PhD about Europe Creative
MUSIC SECTOR		
Elected officials	2	CNM, National Centre for Music, France – EMC, European Music Council
Street level bureaucrats	1	Live DMA, European network of live music associations
External experts	1	Fabien Miclet, lobbyist and music policy consultant
TOTAL	12	

Official documents

Treaty on European Union (1992)

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2007)

REGULATION (EU) No 1295/2013 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 11 December 2013 establishing the Creative Europe Programme (2014 to 2020)

REGULATION (EU) 2021/818 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 20 May 2021 establishing the Creative Europe Programme (2021 to 2027)

A New European Agenda for Culture (2018) Communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social

Committee and the Committee of the Regions

Work Plan for Culture 2019-2022 (Council, 2018)

2022 Annual Work Programme for the implementation of the Creative Europe Programme

Reports, studies and evaluations

DRAFT REPORT on the implementation of the Creative Europe Programme 2021-2027 (2023)
Committee on Culture and Education

Mid-Term evaluation of the Creative Europe program (2014-2020) – Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council (2018)

Creative Europe Culture 2014-2020 Music Projects (EACEA, 2021)

The AB MUSIC Working Group Report (European Commission, 2016)

Analysis of market trends and gaps in funding needs for the music sector (DG EAC, 2020)

Call: European Cooperation projects (CREA-CULT-2023-COOP), Creative Europe, 2023

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