



UNCHARTED

## UNCHARTED

Understanding, Capturing and Fostering the Societal Value of Culture



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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report considers the relationship between the centrality of neoliberal, or market-based, logics and the prioritisation of instrumental cultural values in the cultural fields of thirty European countries. Through an analytical coding of the Council of Europe's *Compendium of Cultural Policies and Cultural Trends* (2020), the report identifies the relative deployment of civic and politico-economic cultural values across Alexander and Peterson Gilbert's *Resistant, Emergent, Established, and Dominant* (REED) typology of European neoliberal cultural policy regimes. A broad correlation between the centrality of market-based logics in cultural policy and the relative importance of civic and politico-economic cultural values is recognised, although this varies in regard to the specific cultural value. Notably, certain civic values (social cohesion, civic action, and social capital) and politico-economic values (soft power, cultural diplomacy, and inbound tourism) are widely present across the REED typology. Positioning the instrumental cultural values in relation to Eurostat cultural expenditure and participation datasets illustrates that the deployment of civic and politico-economic cultural values increases with greater cultural participation but declines with increased expenditure on culture as a percentage of total government spending. This report therefore offers researchers and policymakers a new means of conceptualising Europe's subsidised cultural fields through the relationship between the relative centrality of neoliberal practices and the prioritisation of instrumental cultural values.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

This report compares national-level cultural policies across 30 countries (the EU 27, plus Switzerland, Norway and the United Kingdom) to assess the degree to which market-based, or ‘neoliberal’, approaches influence the prioritisation of instrumental cultural values. Existing comparative methodologies have sought to cluster countries into various ‘cultural policy archetypes’ often based on the direct or indirect nature of policy intervention or through geo-spatial proximity and shared cultural heritages. Such geo-political models remain prominent within both academic and policymaking contexts and have served as the basis for important analyses of the European cultural sector (see Rius-Ulldemolins, Pizzi & Arostegui, 2019; Arostegui & Rius-Ulldemolins, 2018; Dubois, 2015; Hillman-Chartrand & McCaughey, 1989). The challenges of undertaking international comparative analysis of cultural policy regimes are widely acknowledged (Alexander & Hägg 2018; Schuster 1987; 1997; 2007; O’Hagan, 2017). Such challenges centre on the ability of a single analytical framework to capture variation in cultural policies, which differ along many axes. Further, this report suggests that existing cultural policy typologies do not reflect either the hybridised nature of government intervention or the universal dissemination of market-based logics in the contemporary European cultural field (see Alexander & Rueschemeyer 2005; Dalle Nogare & Bertacchini 2015).

Many texts recount how Europe’s subsidised cultural sectors and its cultural institutions have undertaken a ‘neoliberal’ or marketised transformation over the last forty years (Alexander 2019; 2018a; 2018b; Ekström, 2019; Sevänen 2018). For Western European countries, the justification for state support of culture has moved from elitist conceptions of art’s intrinsic value to a marketised regime of justification which legitimatises state expenditure in the cultural field on the grounds of maximising extrinsic social and economic impacts (Belfiore, 2012; 2015; 2020). Post-Communist Eastern European countries have also arrived at similar marketised justifications, while the European Union, itself a central protagonist in Europe’s cultural fields, is explicit in promoting instrumental rationales for cultural expenditure across its member states (Schlesinger; 2015; Ahearne, 2003; McGuigan, 2016:177; Inkei, 2019).

The wide dissemination of marketised practices seems to suggest that there is a degree of ‘neoliberal’ isomorphism across Europe, and to indicate the existence of a homogenous pan-European cultural field predicated largely on the dictates of market rationality. The reality, however, is more nuanced. Although versions of marketised rationality have proliferated across Europe, a market-based approach in cultural policy varies in prominence across nations, and relatedly, has different degrees of influence across cultural sectors. Therefore, a more focused typology of post-marketised European cultural policy is required to ascertain how such market-based or ‘neoliberal’ practices have influenced the prioritisation of cultural

values. In response, this report draws on Alexander and Peterson Gilbert's (2020, forthcoming) thematic typology of the relative centrality of marketised 'neoliberal' practices in subsidised cultural fields across thirty European countries between 2014 and 2020.<sup>1</sup> Their typology is placed in relation to the relative prominence of civic and politico-economic values within the subsidised cultural sector. In this way the report seeks link market-based policies with cultural values. Cultural values are subsequently charted in relation to cultural expenditure, cultural employment, and cultural participation across different cultural policy regimes in order to discern the relationship between instrumental cultural values and marketisation across Europe.

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<sup>1</sup> The 2014-2020 timeframe intentionally aligns with the European Union's 2014-2020 Multiannual Financial Framework and the methodology of the Council of Europe's *Compendium of Cultural Trends* (2020).

## 2. BACKGROUND: NEOLIBERAL CULTURAL POLICY REGIMES

Neoliberalism is a notoriously complex, unstable, and emotive term. Rarely deployed neutrally, neoliberalism can be defined as ‘a politico-cultural belief that advocates monetary exchange and free markets as the best method to organise human activity’ (Alexander 2018:24). For its advocates, such market-based logics represent the most efficient and effective means to distribute public and private resources, the market having ‘perfect knowledge’ of every potentiality. The role of ‘neoliberal’ government is therefore to protect this market-based mechanism from extraneous influences while also defending individual freedom of choice and hard-won personal property (Harvey, 2005:87; Foucault 2008:132). For critics, however, these market logics represent a highly politicised imposition of capitalist values on society, manifested in a programme of policies which reinforce the class dominance of finance capital and undermine social solidarity in favour of state-endorsed competitive individualism. For many within the cultural sector, the neoliberal state neglects its historical role in protecting the cultural sector from the market and actively forces the cultural sector to rescind its autonomy from the market (McGuigan, 2016).

Both these perspectives represent something of a caricature but serve to illustrate the ideological connotations of the term. The term ‘neoliberalism’ is politicised; consequently, using it creates challenges for ‘value neutral’ analysis. In response to this, the terms ‘marketisation’ and ‘marketised practices’ are favoured in this report, and ‘neoliberalism’ is not analysed beyond its influence on marketisation and preference for marketised practices.

Taken at the level of multi-sectoral government policy, such marketised practices often involve privatisation of formerly public resources, weakening of labour market regulation to allow for more choice and competition, cuts to taxation to inspire growth, rationalisation of government spending, deregulation of international finance markets, restricting of labour organisations, and a broad instrumental governmental rationality predicated on discourses of efficiency and managerialism. Many marketised practices have been taken up by countries across Europe over the last forty years, fundamentally shaping the nature of governmental intervention across all sectors of the economy, including the cultural sector and its institutions. Taking the UK as an example, Alexander has mapped how marketised practices shaped the activities of subsidised cultural institutions in response to the requirements that state expenditure be justified on the grounds of value for money, public impact, and effective business logics (Alexander, 2008; 2018a; 2018b; 2019). Similarly, many states have incentivised corporate sponsorship through indirect tax relief to donors and demands for match funding placed on funded cultural institutions. In keeping with neoliberalism’s emphasis on demand creation, the increased significance of corporate sponsors often results in a turn towards more populist, and sometimes popular, public programmes to guarantee sponsor

exposure, prioritising market knowledge over cultural expertise (Alexander, 2014; Wu, 2003, McGuigan 2016).

However, there are ‘extraordinary variations’ in the relative centrality of marketised practices within the wider government policies across Europe, reflective of the ‘contextually specific institutional landscapes and policy approaches’ (Brenner & Theodore, 2002:353; Hall, 2011:707-8; Harvey, 2005:87). In response to this variation, Alexander and Peterson Gilbert (2020, forthcoming) coded eight vectors of marketisation across European cultural policy regimes on a scale of -2 to +2, ranging from little evidence of the criteria in policies (-2) to strong evidence of its presence (+2).<sup>2</sup> (See Figure 1.)


1. An emphasis on sources of private financial income within the cultural field, notably increased reliance on corporate sponsorship, commercial earnings and trading activities outside the traditional scope of the subsidised cultural sector.
2. Tax regimes which recentre the allocation of resources from the state to the market.
3. A policy focus on public value, consumer accountability and a demonstrable return on state investment.
4. Policy outcomes which can be characterised as traditionally social policy objectives.
5. Policy outcomes which are economic in focus and centre on stimulating economic growth and wealth generation.
6. Desétatisation, deregulation and a turn to governance structures which mirror the operation of the private sector.
7. Active integration of the subsidised cultural field into the creative industries and creative economy, and the location of the subsidised cultural sector in discourses of innovation, creativity and global competitiveness.
8. Limited state intervention in the fields of cultural employment and a focus on the entrepreneurial creative subject and a flexible labour market.

**Figure 1:** REED Vectors of Marketisation (Source: Alexander and Peterson Gilbert, 2020 Forthcoming)

Alexander and Peterson Gilbert generated a graphical representation of the total vector scores for each country which shows a clear hierarchy of neoliberal deployment within the cultural policy regimes of Europe (Figure 2).

<sup>2</sup> Alexander and Peterson Gilbert’s mapping incorporated a broader conception of a ‘cultural policy system’ which encompasses not only the cultural policy-making bodies (government departments, arts councils, regional arts bodies) but also the actions of cultural institutions, cultural intermediaries, and creative producers disciplined by the dictates of cultural funding policies.

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**Figure 2:** Neoliberal Vector Total Scores Across European Nation States 2014-20. *Source:* Alexander and Peterson Gilbert, 2020 Forthcoming.

This ranking enabled the development of a Resistant, Emergent, Established, and Dominant (REED) cultural policy typology which classifies nations on the basis of shared marketised characteristics as evidenced within Figure 2. In Europe, four categories of ‘neoliberal’ policy orientation emerge (Figure 3).

REED Marketised Cultural Policy Regime	European Nation States
Resistant	Bulgaria, Slovenia, Croatia, Slovakia, Cyprus, Estonia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Sweden, Norway
Emergent	Romania, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, France, Italy, Finland
Established	Poland, Belgium, Portugal, Spain, Malta, Germany, Luxembourg, Denmark
Dominant	Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria, Ireland and UK

**Figure 3:** REED Typology of European Nations. *Source:* Alexander and Peterson Gilbert, 2020 Forthcoming.

Alexander and Peterson Gilbert (2020, forthcoming) offer an applied analysis of the REED typology in relation to various Eurostat datasets. Looking to central government expenditure on culture in 2018, a broad correlation between reduced cultural expenditure as a percentage of total government outlay and the degree of marketised practices was recognised.<sup>3</sup> This relationship is echoed in local government expenditure. However, Eurostat statistics only include direct expenditure and not indirect expenditure, primarily the philanthropic tax incentives favoured by more marketised regimes. Placing the 2019 GDP of each country in relation to the REED typology ranking reveals that more productive countries tend to employ marketised practices more consistently within their cultural policy systems. Nations with higher cultural employment as defined under NACE Rev.2 91 (Libraries, Archives, Museums and Other Cultural Activities), tend to exhibit more centralised marketised practices while cultural participation broadly increases with centralised marketised practices.

Such trends are instructive and provide the basis for the following analysis of the deployment of marketised cultural values across the REED typology. The REED models offered a prism by which the responses of European nation states to the COVID-19 pandemic can be analysed. Alexander and Peterson Gilbert illustrate that the scale of financial intervention grew across the REED models with an increased propensity for repayable financial measures in those countries where marketised practices were more prominent. While some commentators have prophesied the collapse of neoliberal marketised rationales due to the injection of major state funding into the cultural field following COVID-19, it is evident that the rationales for intervention remain framed on the marketised instrumental cultural values explored within this report. Indeed, the prominence of the instrumental cultural values within the European COVID-19 cultural policy response only serves to augment the significance of the present account.

### 3. METHODOLOGY: INSTRUMENTAL CULTURAL VALUES

Echoing the methodology found in Alexander and Peterson Gilbert's REED cultural policy typology, the current study comprises a comparative analysis of six clusters of heuristic instrumental cultural values as they are prioritised across the REED cultural policy ranking. The advent of marketisation within the cultural policy rationales of European nation states marked a shift from a justificatory regime which drew on an intrinsic conception of the value of culture, albeit in tandem with other geopolitical and economic factors,

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<sup>3</sup> This dataset draws on the UN's Classification of the Functions of Government (COFOG) Group 08.3, Cultural Services. COFOG 08.3 comprises 'the provision of cultural services Administration of cultural affairs, supervision and regulation of cultural facilities, operation or support of facilities for cultural pursuits (libraries, museums, art galleries, theatres, exhibition halls, monuments, historic houses and sites, zoological and botanical gardens, aquaria, arboreta, and so on), production, operation or support of cultural events (concerts, stage and film productions, art shows, and so on) and Grants, loans or subsidies to support individual artists, writers, designers, composers and others working in the arts or to organisations engaged in promoting cultural activities' (Eurostat, 2020).

to the present position where extrinsic social and economic outcomes are core rationales for state intervention. This shift is clearly evidenced within the stated objectives and funded activities of ‘instrumental cultural policy’ (Vestheim 1994:65). These instrumentalised benefits constitute this report’s conception of ‘instrumental cultural values’ as the positive externalities that are deployed to justify state expenditure within the cultural field (Marshall, 2019:143; O’Brien, 2010).

This deployment of cultural values stands somewhat at odds with much of the cultural value literature which seeks to escape the bounds of instrumentality, or at least, provide policymakers with justifications for investment in the cultural field beyond the normative social and economic impacts (See Hewison & Holden, 2004; Holden 2004, 2006, 2015; Brown & Carnworth, 2014:40; Hesmondhalgh, 2017:20; O’Brien, 2010:41).<sup>4</sup> Many of such accounts are ‘distorted by the wish to protect public funding and to influence policy’ (Crossick & Kaszynska, 2016:6-7). Unsurprisingly, these attempts are mired by disunity in the conceptualisation of such ‘cultural values’ (O’Brien & Lockley 2015). This report sidesteps such varied understandings of ‘cultural value’ and instead focuses on the prioritisation of specific ‘instrumental cultural values’ within the post-marketised subsidised cultural field. Six clusters of paradigmatic cultural values are derived from reviews of key literatures and policy documents, most notably Crossick & Kaszynska (2016), Klammer, Petrova & Mignosa (2006), Brown (2006), Brown and Novak-Leonard (2007), Brown & Carnworth (2014), Essnet-Culture (2012), KEA & PPMI (2006), and Dümcke & Gnedovsky (2013). In order to maximise analytical potential, the six clusters of instrumental cultural values are considered within two broad categories:

**Civic Cultural Values** refer to cultural outcomes which impact on civil society and comprise a variety of social benefits, ranging from citizen identity and wellbeing to the fostering of creative faculties and the acquisition of cultural capital. Notably, the following are often positioned as a means to counteract a decline in social welfare provision elsewhere in government policy.

- (1) *Social Cohesion, Civic Action, and Social Capital*
- (2) *Education, Cultural Literacy, and Creative Capabilities*
- (3) *Health, Wellbeing, and Social Care*

**Politico-Economic Cultural Values** operate more directly in the realm of economic and geo-political outcomes. These outcomes include positioning the cultural field within a competitive creative economy, a

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<sup>4</sup> A significant attempt to conceptualise cultural value more robustly was found in the UK Arts and Humanities Research Council’s *Cultural Value Project* which comprised over eighty funded research projects interrogating the nature of cultural value. In the *Cultural Value* report, Crossick and Kaszynska (2014:124) emphasise the ‘active’ nature of the arts and culture to ‘effect change’, defining cultural value as ‘the effects that culture has on those who experience it and the difference it makes to individuals and society.’

growth in geopolitical soft power influence through culture and a maximisation of inbound tourist economies. Such politico-economic cultural value clusters comprise:

- (1) *Soft Power, Cultural Diplomacy, and Inbound Tourism*
- (2) *Culture-led Regeneration, Placemaking, and Creative Clusters*
- (3) *Innovation, Talent, Wealth Creation, and Creative Economies*

The primary data source for coding is the Council of Europe's *Compendium of Cultural Trends 2020* which contains a regularly updated overview of the cultural policy positions across Europe. The *Compendium's* data was supplemented by Scottish Parliament's *Arts Funding Enquiry: Comparative Analysis (2019)*, the Budapest Observatory's *Public Funding on Culture in Europe (2019)* and Eurostat (2019/20) alongside a variety of translated policy publications.

The deployment of both civic and politico-economic instrumental cultural values are themselves measured through a numerical system which articulates the relative prioritisation of the cluster of cultural values within the subsidised cultural sector:

- 0 = No mention of the value
- 1 = Implicit references to the value
- 2 = Explicit references to the value but not as a primary policy objective
- 3 = The value placed as a primary driver within state cultural policy

A common theme within European cultural policy governance is the decentralisation and devolution of policy making and cultural expenditure to regional, municipal, and local level (Schuster, 1997; Kawashima, 2015). Where there is significant divergence between regional cultural policies or where cultural expenditure is devolved, this analysis assembles a *national* cultural policy regime. This enables a more direct comparison with less-devolved European counterparts. It should be noted, however, that while some funding priorities are divergent in devolved administrations, the core instrumental cultural values tended to remain in chorus with those expressed by national government cultural policy.

## 4. RESULTS

### 4.1. VISUALISING CIVIC CULTURAL VALUES

The following graphs illustrate the prioritisation of civic values across the REED model. (See Figures, 4-7.)




Figure 4: Relative prioritisation of civic cultural values for **Resistant** neoliberal cultural policy regimes.




Figure 5: Relative prioritisation of civic cultural values for **Emergent** neoliberal cultural policy regimes.

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


Figure 6: Relative prioritisation of civic cultural values for **Established** neoliberal cultural policy regimes.




Figure 7: Relative prioritisation of civic cultural values for **Dominant** neoliberal cultural policy regimes.

Across each REED category, the same prioritisation of civic cultural values occurred: Health, Wellbeing, and Social Care are least emphasised, followed by Education, Cultural Literacy, and Creative Capabilities with Social Cohesion, Civic Action, and Social Capital consistently most emphasised. Looking to average linear trends, the prioritisation of civic values as an ‘explicit policy driver or desired outcome’ increases in the Established and Dominant forms of neoliberal cultural policy, perhaps illustrative of the need to justify cultural investment through extrinsic social outcomes. Indeed, both Dominant and Established marketised regimes are more explicit in their use of civic cultural values as ‘primary policy drivers’ when compared with Resistant and Emergent regimes. However, it is notable that Social Cohesion, Civic Action, and Social Capital

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values are deployed as a policy primary driver or explicit cultural value in all the European countries, with the exception of Bulgaria and Poland who allude to such values less explicitly. Education, Cultural Literacy, and Creative Capabilities values are deployed in most of the European cultural policy regimes, although their relative prioritisation is less consistent. Finally, the cluster of values surrounding Health, Wellbeing and Social Care are more infrequently deployed across the different REED policy types. However, such values occurred as primary policy drivers in Resistant cultural policy regimes (Lithuania, Finland) and a Dominant cultural policy regime (UK). Ultimately, while there is some inconsistency across the REED models, it is significant that the country with the highest marketised ranking, the United Kingdom, also has the greatest civic cultural value score. Meanwhile, the country with the lowest marketised ranking, Bulgaria, also demonstrated the least civic cultural values.

4.2. CIVIC CULTURAL VALUES AND EUROSTAT DATASETS

It is informative to situate civic cultural values in relation to the pan-European datasets generated by Eurostat 2019/20. The deployment of these values can be placed against a ranking of general government expenditure on culture as collected by Eurostat 2019. (See Figure 8.)





Figure 8: The relative deployment of civic cultural values ranked from greatest to smallest percentage of total government spending on COFOG 0.82. Source for government spending: Eurostat, General Government Expenditure by Function (COFOG) [gov\_10a\_exp], 2018 Dataset - Last update: 07-05-2020.

This analysis suggests a broad correlation between the increased prioritisation of Health, Wellbeing, and Social Care and Education, Cultural Literacy, and Creative Capabilities with a decline in direct central government funding for culture. However, the use of the civic values associated with Social Cohesion, Civic

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
Action, and Social Capital remain largely stable across the different spending contexts. It should be emphasised that this dataset only concerns direct central government expenditure - *indirect* sources of government expenditure, such as tax regimes to incentivise corporate sponsorship, are not captured by Eurostat.

Figures 9 and 10 draw on the 2019 Eurostat *Culture Statistics* (2015 dataset) on cultural participation across Europe. They present national-level rates in attendance of ‘cultural sites’ as a percentage share of the national population aged 16 years and over, by gender. Eurostat figures distinguish female and male participation, and show differing levels of gendered participation across the European countries. Accordingly, the figures presented here are divided by gender; however, gender itself is not a variable for analysis. Similarly, socio-cultural and economic influences on participation within populations are well-known but not analysed here.



**Figure 9:** The relative deployment of civic cultural values ranked by the percentage share of **female** population aged ≥16 years who attended one ‘cultural site’ during the previous twelve months (2015). *Source for participation data:* Eurostat 2019.

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


**Figure 10:** The relative deployment of civic cultural values ranked by the percentage share of male population aged ≥16 years who attended one 'cultural site' during the previous twelve months (2015). Source for participation data: Eurostat 2019.

Figures 9 and 10 demonstrate that the relative prioritisation of civic cultural values decreases with lower rates of cultural participation (across both genders), with the notable exceptions of Switzerland, Luxembourg, and the Czech Republic.

**4.3. POLITICO-ECONOMIC CULTURAL VALUES**

Figures 11-14 illustrate the relative prioritisation of Politico-Economic Cultural Values across the REED cultural policy regimes:



**Figure 11:** Relative prioritisation of politico-economic cultural values for Resistant neoliberal cultural policy regimes

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


Figure 12: Relative prioritisation of politico-economic cultural values for **Emergent** neoliberal cultural policy regimes.





Figure 13: Relative prioritisation of politico-economic cultural values for **Established** neoliberal cultural policy regimes.

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
**Figure 14:** Relative prioritisation of politico-economic cultural values for **Dominant** neoliberal cultural policy regime.

These four figures show a correlation between the strength of neoliberalism (based on REED categories) and politico-economic cultural values, with the notable exception of Luxemburg. This serves to confirm the common hypothesis that neoliberalism is associated with a policy emphasis on politico-economic cultural values. Similar to civic cultural values, the degree of emphasis on types of politico-economic cultural values are ordered similarly across the REED policy categories: Innovation, Talent, and Wealth Creation is least emphasised, followed by Culture-led Regeneration, Placemaking, and Creative Clusters.

Soft Power, Cultural Diplomacy, and Inbound Tourism are the politico-economic cultural values most prevalent in cultural policies, even in Resistant cultural policy regimes. This politico-economic instrumental value cluster focuses on geopolitics and tourism, suggestive of a wider turn from localised socio-economic impact to global concerns. Established and Dominant cultural policy regimes emphasise politico-economic values most visibly but, interestingly, a range of countries within Resistant and Emergent cultural policy regimes also explicitly emphasise politico-economic values (scoring +2 on the vector). That said, Resistant neoliberal cultural policy regimes did not set any politico-economic cultural values as primary drivers within state cultural policy and the Culture-led Regeneration, Placemaking and Creative Clusters are markedly absent.

#### 4.4. POLITICO-CULTURAL CULTURAL VALUES AND EUROSTAT DATASETS

There are associations evident between the emphasis on politico-cultural values and both government spending and cultural participation. (See Figures 15-17.)




**Figure 15:** The relative deployment of politico-economic cultural values ranked from greatest to smallest percentage of total government spending on COFOG 0.82. Source for government spending: Eurostat, *General Government Expenditure By Function (COFOG) [gov\_10a\_exp]*, 2018 Dataset - last update: 07-05-2020.


The connection between state funding for culture and the relative centralisation of politico-economic cultural values is less distinct than found in the analysis of civic cultural values, although there remains a general increase across the REED categories. However, there is a noticeable dip in politico-economic cultural values in, roughly, the second quartile of total government spending, which is less prominent in the deployment of civic cultural values.

Figures 16 and 17 outline the deployment of politico-economic cultural values in relation to cultural participation, again divided by gender due to the differing levels of gendered participation across the European countries.

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**Figure 16:** The relative deployment of politico-economic cultural values ranked by the percentage share of **female** population aged ≥16 years who attended one ‘cultural site’ during the previous twelve months (2015). Source for participation data: Eurostat 2019.



**Figure 17:** The relative deployment of politico-economic cultural values ranked by the percentage share of **male** population aged ≥16 years who attended one ‘cultural site’ during the previous twelve months (2015). Source for participation data: Eurostat 2019.

The emphasis on politico-economic values broadly decreases with lower participation, with the notable exceptions of Luxembourg and the Czech Republic. However, less correlation is revealed here than in civic cultural values. This suggests that politico-economic cultural values are not as clearly tied to participation rates than are civic cultural values.

## 5. CONCLUSIONS

This report presents the first assessment of the relative prioritisation of instrumental cultural values across Europe, drawing on Alexander and Peterson Gilbert's REED typology that divides European nations by the degree of marketisation evident in their policy regimes. The conceptualisation of 'instrumental cultural values' and the categorisation of clusters of civic and politico-economic cultural values presents a new means of both evaluating the cultural sector and undertaking international comparative cultural policy analysis.

The report demonstrates a broad correlation between marketisation in cultural policy and instrumental cultural values across the thirty countries, although no explicit causality can be determined from this cross-sectional data. It is evident that certain civic values (social cohesion, civic action, and social capital) and politico-economic values (soft power, cultural diplomacy, and inbound tourism) are widely present across all of the European nations studied. The mapping of instrumental cultural values against cultural expenditure and cultural participation offers further insight, illustrating that emphasis on a variety of cultural values increases with cultural participation and decreases with increased direct cultural expenditure. The thematic coding of instrumental cultural values presented within this analysis offers policymakers and researchers a new vision of the justificatory regimes operative within the cultural policy and subsidised cultural fields of Europe.

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